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*La gravure qui figure sur la couverture
représente un milicien de Zurich en 1757, d'après Holzhalb*

FOREWORD

There was a time when military history was a celebration of valiant deeds or a geometric analysis of tactics and strategy in which fleets and armies manoeuvred with a certitude largely absent from the reality of war. It was a history of decisive battles, of commanders who observed, overlooked and, occasionally, defied the principles of war.

Wargames have become a bloodless indoor sport. War stories, real or imagined, command a large and growing army of readers. Military history has moved on. Like history as a whole, it has extended its agenda from old preoccupations. The twentieth century experience of total war has compelled us all to realize that a nation's military institutions are affected by every element of society and, in return, few aspects of a society are immune from the apprehension or experience of war.

Canada as a Military Power was designed for both a national and an international readership. The editors have identified problems which, they believe, have given a specific shape to the Canadian military experience. They have sought contributions from both well-established historians and from younger scholars working in newer and often more recent areas. Some of the problems arose from Canada's emergence as a sovereign nation in a series of almost indefinable stages, many of them associated with her status as a junior ally, first of Britain, then of the United States. A related concern has been the problem of mobilizing a nation of sharply divided world views to participate in distant wars. The problem has been aggravated by the possibly inevitable exclusion of Canadians from the key political and strategic decisions which govern the conflict.

In a world of alliance systems, we believe that Canada's experience over more than a century will be of interest to both historians and policy-makers of great powers and small. That is why many topics have been designed to fit a familiar framework of comparative studies in military history. However, we believe that Canada's experience is just as important and almost as unknown to Canadians themselves.

The editors had hoped to establish the significance of our experience for an international audience. We knew the importance for Canadians. However our contributors went on to surprise us and, we believe, Canadian scholarship as well. Even the best-informed military historians of Canada are going to find some of their cherished convictions shaken and their horizons broadened. Continuing interest by scholars in the First World War emphasizes the fact that this was a crucial formative experience, truly Canada's "great" war, as the Civil War was to the United States. Familiar lectures about conscription in 1917, may have to be reconsidered. Besides, one understanding of alliance systems, industrial-military relations, military doctrines and a dozen other topics will be undergoing some modification in the wake of the scholarship assembled here.

Inevitably in a book of this kind, there are topics and potential contributors we profoundly wished to include but which, for reasons familiar to all editors, could not be managed. The deadline of the Revue was proof against the tantalizing temptation to delay until exciting work on bilingualism, aid to the civil power or disarmament had reached completion. The saving grace of all scholarship is that it is never finished and, in the realm of Canadian military history, it is entering an exciting and expansive phase. There is more to come.

Mississauga, January 28th, 1982.

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THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF AN UNMILITARY POWER

[Desmond Morton]

Military institutions were of central significance to the other new nations born in the nineteenth century. Canada's first defence minister, Sir George-Etienne Cartier, proclaimed that Canada's militia would become a key institution of her nationhood. Instead, defence has been of marginal concern in peacetime and frequently a divisive issue in wartime.

As an overview to the military problems of Canada, Desmond Morton offers three fundamental observations about Canada's military experience, at least in the first century since Confederation. Canada, in that period, was simultaneously indefensible and invulnerable. In consequence, her military experience has been acquired as part of an alliance, originally in the British Empire, then in the alliance systems of the Second World War and after. Both circumstances have encouraged Canadians to believe that military service in war or peace is properly a matter of personal choice.

Such historic constants may, as the author concludes, become obsolete through changing circumstances but they continue to exercise an influence on both policy makers and the public long after their foundations have been eroded.

The Consequences of Good Fortune

... and never, surely, was greater activity shown in any country than our militia exhibited, never greater valour, cooler resolution, and more approved conduct; they have emulated the choicest veterans, and they have twice saved the country.¹

Like most people, Canadians have their own self-congratulatory historical myths. Archdeacon John Strachan's rhetorical outburst on the feats of the York militia in the War of 1812 may have been contradicted by later historians but it remains the central assertion of a cult of military

amateurism. Many Canadians still believe that the raw soldiers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force were an easy match for the Kaiser's disciplined divisions or that seasick prairie-bred youths in their corvettes out-fought tough U-Boat skippers in the Battle of the Atlantic.²

Such myths are the understandable heritage of a people who have rarely been compelled to take direct responsibility for their own defence.³ Since the arrival of the first French regular troops in 1665, the key decisions about Canada's military security have usually been made elsewhere -- in Paris, London or Washington. Even more significant, the major financial weight of these decisions has fallen on French, British or American taxpayers.

Archdeacon Strachan might be forgiven his exaggerations, as befits a wartime morale-booster. As for his fellow-Canadians, generations would pass before any of them would admit that the decisive role in the War of 1812 was played by a handful of highly-trained British and Canadian professionals.⁴ Later, Canadians could celebrate the myth of an undefended frontier with the United States because it was British taxpayers who met the inflated bills for such military works as Fort Henry at Kingston, or the Rideau Canal system. In two world wars, stronger allies bore the brunt of the fighting. Canadians were spared all but minor disasters in part because they have been free to choose how and where to become involved.⁵

Like most people, Canadians have accepted their good fortune as the due reward of righteousness. Except in certain periods of crisis, like the early Cold War years, it has only been a vocal, military-minded minority that protested against the majority's indifference to defence preparedness. Their protest was generally futile because it flew in the face of Canadian historical experience. Who could deny the brilliant results of negligence and complacency? Not an inch of national territory has been conquered and even the few incursions have been surreptitious or short-lived. Ill-trained and wretchedly-equipped as it certainly was, the post-Confederation militia coped successfully with its most serious challenge, the North-West campaign of 1885.⁶ A nation that reputedly buys more insurance than any other in the world has paid a remarkably small premium for its military coverage. Capital, which might otherwise have been devoted to warships and fortifications before 1939, was available instead to build a costly railway and communications system.⁷ Defence reductions after 1945 provided a financial basis for Canada's cautious creation of a welfare state.

The people of Canada have enjoyed the benefits of low-cost military security without playing an isolationist role. In the years since the British North American colonies came together in the Confederation of 1867, Canada has participated in two world wars, in the Boer War, the Allied intervention in Russia, 1918-19, and the United Nations operations in Korea. Wars in this century have cost Canada a hundred thousand lives; as many more have returned permanently disabled.⁸ Participation has also caused bitter divisions among Canadians themselves. Harsh conflict over conscription for overseas service in 1917, 1942 and 1944 remains the most lasting political heritage of Canada's war efforts. If other nations have forged a new sense of national purpose in war, Canadians have instead been reminded of the depth of their national divisions.⁹

Historically, there have been three important features of Canada's military experience since Confederation. Taken as a whole, they go far to explain some of the features of civil-military relations described by James Eayrs in his major study of defence policy-making in Canada.¹⁰ First, national frontiers have made the country defenceless against its nearest neighbour and, so far, virtually invulnerable against the rest of the world. Second, Canada's involvement in war has so far been in the role of a junior ally in wars beyond her borders, where her national interest was at least ambiguous and her influence on policy or strategy has been modest. Finally, both of these geopolitical factors have convinced Canadians that, for the most part, military service is properly a matter of personal choice. As a nation since 1867, Canada has not possessed the unequivocal right to command the service of its people in its wars.

Defenceless and Invulnerable

Canada's huge territory and limited population have combined, at least since the mid-nineteenth century, to make her both invulnerable to serious outside attack and defenceless against her traditional continental rival, the United States. By the 1860's, prominent Americans, among them the Secretary of State, William Seward, seriously contemplated averting a civil war between North and South by a patriotic crusade against British North America.¹¹ Throughout the decade of Confederation, the American threat remained a powerful argument for the union of the scattered colonies.¹² Fire-eating enthusiasts like Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Denison of Toronto might yearn for war with the Americans, confident that Canadians could emulate the military feats of the Confederacy: British professionals had no such illusions.¹³

Confederation in 1867 was, in part, a way of allowing the British garrison to withdraw discreetly from a hopeless military situation. If there were illusions, they were burst by the secret reports of Lieutenant-Colonel W.F.D. Jervis, the British military engineer despatched to report on North American defence. Not even the expensive new forts at Quebec could save Canada's major citadel from easy capture. There could be no successful re-play of the War of 1812.¹⁴

British politicians and soldiers made no effort to communicate this grim news to Canadians. Indeed, Jervis made a second visit to Canada to offer a misleadingly optimistic report to the Fathers of Confederation at Quebec in 1864. Thoughtful politicians like Sir John A. Macdonald, the Dominion's first prime minister, were not deceived. If Canada wished to remain independent and free to pursue her own "Manifest Destiny" as a nation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, her first line of defence was to ensure that the United States never had a serious reason to go to war with her. The price was paid in the painful compromises needed for the Treaty of Washington in 1871 or the Alaska Boundary settlement of 1903.¹⁵ Canadians, swallowing their disappointment at such negotiations, learned to vent their frustrations on their British allies, not on their American neighbours.¹⁶ It was part of the self-discipline of survival.

Canada's second line of security was Britain's willingness to come to her aid. In 1865, Canadian delegates to London had secured a seemingly significant commitment from the British colonial secretary, Edward Cardwell. In return for Canada's pledge "... to devote all her resources, both in men and money, to the maintenance of her connection with the Mother Country ... the Imperial Government fully acknowledged the reciprocal obligation of defending every portion of the Empire with all the resources at its command."¹⁷ Cardwell's pledge was reiterated when, as secretary of state for war, he began the withdrawal of British garrisons from Canada in 1869. From the Canadian standpoint, the Cardwell commitment was an insurance policy and the premium was set at a million dollars a year, the sum the United Provinces of Canada had spent on its militia in 1865.¹⁸

The security Canadians believed they had purchased was largely illusory. Lacking a general staff, the British army gave little further thought to potential responsibilities in North America until the Venezuela crisis of 1895 revived the risk of an Anglo-American war. At that time, the War Office promptly concluded that under no circumstances would a major military force be consigned to the interior of

the North American continent. As for the Royal Navy, it took one look at the developing United States Navy and confessed that maritime supremacy in North American waters could no longer be guaranteed.¹⁹

Canada's third line of defence was the military organization it financed with its million-dollar insurance premium. Probably no conceivable amount of money could have purchased Canadian security against the enormous military potential the Americans had displayed during their Civil War. Even a half-hearted attempt at serious preparedness would have aroused American retaliation. How, then, should defence dollars be spent? The most prudent policy advice came from the military secretary to Lord Dufferin, Canada's second governor general. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Fletcher suggested that the government should decide how many soldiers it wanted, how efficient they should be and how much it wished to pay. Any two answers determined the third.²⁰ Fletcher's preference, shared by the succession of British officers appointed to command the Canadian militia after 1874, was to seek a smaller, more efficient military force. Canadian politicians and a few perceptive soldiers argued otherwise.²¹

Canada's post-Confederation militia served a political more than a military function. It was, an American observer scornfully reported, "a kind of military Tammany", a source of appointments, patronage and favours for the political party in power.²² It was also, with its top-heavy organization of battalions, a way of involving a great many Canadians in military affairs. Because it was widely dispersed and attractive to farmers and to the urban middle class, it was well adapted for the one purpose for which it was most frequently needed, aid to the civil power against strikers, rioters and the civilly disobedient.²³ What the militia was not, save in the eyes of its most infatuated admirers, was a serious national defence force. In 1896, when Canadians became aware of their last serious risk of war with the United States, the federal cabinet was preoccupied with deposing a prime minister on an unrelated matter. The adjutant-general was superannuated and his post left vacant while contenders mustered political backers to gain the post. The only mobilization plan was hastily drafted by an instructor at the military college at Kingston.²⁴

Paradoxically, as war with the United States became politically more inconceivable, planning for it became more significant. The American threat was the rationale for the Leach report of 1898, the Dundonald and Lake reforms of the pre-1914 years and for Defence Plan No. 1, the framework on

which Canada's post-1918 militia was supposedly built.²⁵ Canadian soldiers were obliged to fantasize about war with the United States only because other military threats to Canada were even more fantastic. Until the possibilities of transcontinental flight were demonstrated in the 1930's, the Arctic represented an impenetrable barrier to invasion. Ottawa could be accused of neglecting the security of its Atlantic and Pacific coastline but even the grimmest pessimists agreed that the Royal Navy could protect Canadian waters from all but a few agile commerce raiders or perhaps an errant enemy cruiser.²⁶ Until 1906, British fortresses at Halifax and Esquimalt offered a comforting reminder of imperial protection. When Canada took responsibility for the two fortresses and created its own small navy in 1910, the reasons had less to do with coastal insecurity than the wish of the Liberal government to make sure that any Canadian contribution to imperial defence would be close to home and under Canadian control.²⁷

Coastal security never meant immunity. In both world wars, enemy submarines entered Canadian coastal waters and, in the Second World War, briefly turned the St. Lawrence river into a hunting ground.²⁸ In both world wars, more soldiers were diverted to coast defence than the country's generals felt necessary. In the Second World War, the King government kept three of Canada's eight divisions deployed on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Political reasons also helped to explain the Royal Canadian Air Force's inflated Home War Establishment, standing guard against an aerial assault that moved from improbable to inconceivable.²⁹

Canada's combination of invulnerability and defencelessness has imposed a dilemma for military planners trained to expect more straight-forward defence problems. They have had little help from their political masters. In 1874, a major argument for appointing a senior British officer to command the militia was the need to show that Canada was living up to her 1865 commitment to Cardwell.³⁰ She was doing no such thing. Yet what was a reasonable scale of preparedness for Canada? Military forces may happily exist without a convincing military rationale: the real problem is to determine their appropriate equipment, disposition or level of efficiency. Lacking better advice, British officers could only impose their ideas of discipline and training on their Canadian subordinates. Each in turn encountered what one of them termed "the Upas-tree" of political influence.³¹ Lacking a military role, the militia found other functions. The militia estimates became a political slush fund. Commenting on the death of Sir John A. Macdonald in 1891, Major-General Ivor Herbert observed:

He looked upon money voted for militia purposes only as a means of gaining political ends, but he was honest enough to keep the use of it within strict limits, and consequently cut down the militia estimates to the lowest possible figure.³²

It was not easy for military reformers to operate successfully in such an environment. General Herbert was one of the few with any claim to success; few of his successors, British or Canadian, could boast comparable achievements. Canadian politicians had a long history of elevating their grubby practices into high constitutional principle. The doctrine of civil supremacy over the military, readily backed by public opinion, ended the careers of would-be reformers like Major-General Edward Hutton or Lord Dundonald.³³ In time, politicians withdrew from decisions about promotions, discipline or the location of summer training camps but there was no retreat from their right to intervene when and how they pleased in any matter that interested them or their colleagues. Problems of civil-military authority in Canada were not ended in 1904 when British officers were no longer, as a matter of law, to command the militia.³⁴ Canadian-born officers of high military reputation and intellectual stature like Sir James MacBrien and Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton experienced after the First World War most of the frustrations of their British predecessors.³⁵ So have the more recent Chiefs of the Defence Staff, even if details of their conflicts with politicians are discreetly masked from the public.

A country that cannot be defended and can hardly be attacked may be a delight to its population but it offers its admirals and generals some peculiar problems.

Fighting on Foreign Soil

Because Canada's security has depended on alliances and because a population drawn from other countries cannot easily forget old loyalties, Canada's experience of war has occurred almost exclusively on foreign soil. Canadians have fired their guns or dropped their bombs on targets in South Africa, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and Korea, not in Nova Scotia, British Columbia or the Niagara Peninsula. Like the country's domestic security, that should be grounds for satisfaction. The next best thing to not having to fight at all is to do one's fighting somewhere else.

Yet many Canadians have not been willing to make even that allowance. Isolation should have secured immunity. The costs of war have been smaller for Canada than for most of

its erstwhile allies and adversaries but they have not been negligible. The toll of dead and permanently disabled, the increases in national debt have not wholly been offset by wartime industrial expansion, temporary improvements in the status of women or trade unions and the growth of social security.³⁶ In an already divided country, wars have been profoundly divisive. The calculation of what is owed to an alliance system does not lead to a single, unanimously-agreed conclusion. The ties of loyalty to a homeland vary in intensity and, in a country of diverse origins, will not be shared at all by many fellow-citizens.

Yet, for all the objections, Canadians have engaged in four major wars since Confederation. Why? A simple but erroneous explanation is that in 1899 and in 1914 they had no choice. As British subjects they were bound by a British declaration of war. Yet, on both occasions, the Canadian government might virtually have ignored the conflict and, at the outset of the Boer War, that had been the intention of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Liberal prime minister. What changed his mind, a year before a general election, was the unmistakable mood of English-Canadian electors. Public opinion may have been artificially stirred by newspaper proprietors like Hugh Graham of the Montreal Star; it was nonetheless decisive.³⁷ When war came in 1914, it was Laurier himself, as leader of the opposition, who proclaimed Canada to be "Ready, Aye, Ready".³⁸ It was his Liberal colleague from Nova Scotia, E.M. Macdonald, who insisted that the wartime emergency legislation "omit no power that the Government may need".³⁹ Canada's War Measures Act certainly met that test. Much later, when the war effort had turned sour, critics might argue that Canada had been forced into the fight by the British: such a claim was historically absurd.

In 1939, when the Second World War broke out, such a claim could not even be asserted. While its precautions were in place from the moment of Hitler's invasion of Poland the Mackenzie King government waited for Canada's parliament to decide on war. After the carnage of 1914-18, war was too grim a memory to allow the euphoria of 1899 or 1914, but Canada proved unexpectedly united. The credit, as J.L. Granatstein has noted, belonged to a prime minister who had worked tirelessly and ingeniously to convert a country which, a year earlier, seemed almost unanimously opposed to a new European crusade.⁴⁰

If Canadians would go to war of their own volition, what was the attraction? Territorial gains hardly featured although, at the time of the Fashoda crisis of 1898, Laurier did cast covetous eyes on the tiny French fishing colony of

St. Pierre and Miquelon.⁴¹ Sir Robert Borden was urged at Versailles to see if the Americans, in their newly virtuous mood, might give up a few of their 1903 gains in Alaska.⁴² More obviously, an active role in war earned Canada a louder voice in the world but that expectation had not motivated the cheering crowds of 1914 nor did it even excite most postwar Canadians.⁴³ Since Canada's own security depended so heavily on stronger countries, she might have been expected to be committed to mutual security. In the inter-war years, nothing could be farther from the truth. Article X of the League of Nations Covenant was its fatal defect in the eyes of W.L. Mackenzie King, prime minister for most of the Long Truce.⁴⁴ In the jargon of the time, Canada was too much a net contributor to security to feel comfortable in a world of so many potential debtors. Canadians, as Senator Raoul Dandurand smugly informed the League, really did live in a "fireproof house, far from the source of any conflagration".⁴⁵

Canada's attitude to mutual security altered sharply in the wake of the Second World War. Her prompt response to both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1950-51 owed something to the retirement of Mackenzie King in 1948 and even more to a sense of contrition for the lost opportunities of the 1930's.⁴⁶ However, in her four twentieth-century wars, Canada has been moved by the perceived pressure of her own public opinion. Ethnic ties to Britain, indignation at her enemies, alarm at the aggression of dictatorships have helped to shape a warlike mood. Her military contributions may have been shaped by external advice but they have been determined by Canadian decisions. In 1899, Canada sent rather more men in their First Contingent than the British had invited.⁴⁷ In 1917, David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, pressed hard for more men from the Dominions, but it was left to Borden and his colleagues to decide that conscription was necessary but that a fifth or sixth Canadian division in France was not.⁴⁸

Public opinion has limited as well as promoted participation. The most obvious dissent has come from French Canada. In 1899, Quebec members of Laurier's cabinet and caucus, newspaper editors and university students in the streets of Montreal reminded the Prime Minister that not all Canadians believed that Britain's honour was their concern.⁴⁹ If Canadians seemed more united in 1914, the impression was soon shattered. Like Albert Sévigny, some of Borden's colleagues owed their election to opposing British "imperialism". French Canadian nationalists found a more congenial national enemy when the "Boches" of Ontario set out to eliminate French-language public schools in their

province.⁵⁰ In the Second World War, Quebec nationalist leaders instinctively knew that their role was to oppose the war effort although the King government in Ottawa nimbly manoeuvred to give its Quebec critics as few targets as possible.⁵¹

French-English differences over war have been such a preoccupation for Canadian historians and politicians that they have not always been very attentive to other elements of opposition to war. Criticism of Canada's role in South Africa was not restricted to Henri Bourassa and his admirers. The same rural Ontario editors and political radicals who condemned Joseph Chamberlain's imperialism in 1899 were lukewarm about conscription in 1917 and hot supporters of the isolationism and anti-militarism of the inter-war years. They spoke for constituents of impeccable British ancestry like "the Scotch" of Elgin county, recalled by their most famous progeny, John Kenneth Galbraith.⁵² Critics of Quebec's enlistment record failed to notice that recruiting in the predominantly English-speaking Maritime provinces was not dramatically more successful. The deeper the roots in Canadian soil, whatever the ethnic ancestry, the more hesitant Canadians might be to risk life and family welfare in a distant struggle.⁵³

Even some of those who served might have their own reservations about the extent of Canada's commitment to a foreign cause. In 1917, Unionist politicians were dismayed to learn that soldiers overseas were writing home to warn brothers not to enlist. To win overseas votes, the government promptly added soldiers' brothers to the growing list of those exempted from conscription.⁵⁴ In the Second World War, military voters did not punish Mackenzie King for his "limited liability" commitment to the war. In the 1945 general election, many service men and women supported his Liberal candidates. Most of those who did not, including a majority of the service personnel overseas, voted instead for the socialist CCF, whose war policies had been even more restrained. Service votes trounced the bellicose Conservatives.⁵⁵

A country whose wars have been fought overseas as a junior ally faces a number of inherent problems in peace or war. A wartime problem, elaborated by a number of authors in this book, is the near-impossibility of influencing policy or strategy. Although there is little evidence that Canadian leaders possessed any uniquely war-winning insights, they had little opportunity to present them. Indeed, Canada probably had a greater voice in the First World War when she was technically a colony than she did in 1939-45 when she

was ostensibly a fully sovereign nation. While the consequences for the Allied cause may have been marginal, the impact on the domestic war effort was significant. Canada's major combat involvement in the early years of the Second World War was in the air. Her decision, through the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan of 1939, to integrate most of her aircrew in Royal Air Force squadrons left Canadians at home with an impression that they were doing nothing to win the war. The effect on domestic morale could not be counteracted by the despatch of a team of public relations officers or the publication of a book of RCAF exploits.⁵⁶

A more acute problem for Canadian military policy-makers has been the difficulty of preparing for overseas wars. Governments in peacetime find no profit in planning (and certainly in being seen to plan) for unpleasant and unpopular contingencies. The problem is accentuated if planning must lead to costly preparations.

In the 1890's, it seemed obvious to Major-General Ivor Herbert that if Canadians fought, it would be somewhere in the British Empire. Accordingly, he rebuilt Canada's tiny permanent force to make it inter-changeable in discipline, organization and training with the British regular army. The collateral benefits for the militia were substantial as the professionals gained in morale and efficiency. Herbert's policies were soon checkmated, not by political superiors who seem to have been too stupid or lazy to understand his purpose, but by militia officers, jealous of any effort spent on the "regulars".⁵⁷ Frozen in their conviction that the United States was the enemy, the volunteer officers were slow to grasp Canada's military future.

When contingents were despatched to South Africa in 1899 and 1900, Herbert's successors profited from his work. Cadres from the permanent corps provided the framework for raw recruits and ill-trained militiamen. The efficiency of the infantry, artillery and mounted rifle units established a precedent that in future wars Canadians would serve in units under their own officers although using British arms, equipment, tactics and staff procedures.⁵⁸ Even in Korea, long after Canada's military destiny had been linked to the United States, the Canadian contingent served with the 1st Commonwealth Division.

In 1900, Laurier earnestly assured his Quebec critics that the South African war contingents represented no precedent. Laurier was wrong but neither he nor most of his political successors could admit it. After 1899, Canada's armed forces had found a role as auxiliaries in future British

wars but it was one no peacetime government could acknowledge. Before 1914, Canadian soldiers studied British military doctrines and training manuals. Officers (and their wives) visited the British, French and Swiss manoeuvres. A Toronto millionaire, Henry Pellatt, even took his regiment to Aldershot to share in the annual mock battle. Canada's official enemy remained the United States. Only the tempestuous and uncontrollable Conservative minister of militia, Colonel Sam Hughes, indicated reality by his prewar anti-German speeches. If war had not come in August, 1914, those speeches might have been grounds for his dismissal; he had cost his party German-Canadian votes.⁵⁹

Hughes was a rare and noisy exception among Canadian defence ministers. Between the world wars, Mackenzie King capitalized on the anti-war feelings of French Canadians and western farmers to rebuild his Liberal party.⁶⁰ If Canada's few staff officers resumed planning for war with the United States, it was probably less risky for them than suggesting that Canada might ever again send her men overseas. Even after 1936, when the King government consented to a modest rearmament programme, the main beneficiaries were the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force on the argument that they were essentially designed for home defence. The small sums allocated to the army were applied to coast artillery.⁶¹

Lack of peacetime preparedness had disastrous consequences for France in 1870, the United States in 1941 and for most major powers in between. Even by American standards, Canada was a nation disarmed in 1914 and particularly in 1939. The problem, for those who would berate politicians and voters, is that the consequences were by no means bad.

Lack of preparedness would certainly have been disastrous if Canadians had been defending themselves. That was not the case. Would it have made a difference in either world war if Canada had been able to apply her limited strength earlier? If a Canadian infantry division had entered the line in October, 1914 and not in March, 1915, would the First World War have been shorter? Would the additional heavy casualties merely have precipitated the conscription crisis of 1917? If a Canadian division had been available for the British Expeditionary Force in 1939, would it merely have added to the losses on the way to Dunkirk in 1940? An RCAF with an inventory of first-line fighters in 1939 could have added a few to "The Few" of the Battle of Britain but with no change in the outcome. Only at sea, where Canadians still have an exaggerated view of their wartime prowess, might a larger cadre of trained officers,

better escort vessels and more modern equipment have turned the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic a few months earlier. The benefits might have been dramatic.⁶³

Instead, because Canadians were ill-prepared for war, they needed time to train, acquire adequate equipment and adjust to the unexpected circumstances which each new war brings. Time saved Canadian soldiers from the disasters which befell New Zealanders on Crete, South Africans at Tobruk and Australians at Singapore. Time and a little battle experience allowed Canadians in both world wars to acquire the hallmarks of professionalism and a slightly overgrown sense of confidence. These were among the privileges of fighting on someone else's soil.

There were costs as well. As junior allies, inadequately prepared for war, Canadians had to compete with more powerful allies for badly-needed equipment. Like the smallest boy in a school queue, their turn came last, even when some of the equipment was manufactured in Canada. There was a price to pay for imitating British military manners. British accents and attitudes, as the Mainguy report concluded in 1949, added needless strains to Canadian naval discipline.⁶⁴ Inessentials like uniforms and mess snobbery made it harder for the Canadian army to accommodate French-Canadian and other non-British elements of the population.⁶⁵ At a much higher level, British doctrines of air power drew the RCAF into the costly and perhaps questionable allied bomber offensive over Germany.⁶⁶ Canadians might amend the details; the frills and the fundamentals were acquired by imitation. They still are as contemporary Canadian forces adapt jargon and uniforms as well as tactics and equipment to conform with their new imperial power, the United States.⁶⁷

Service as a Matter of Choice

If there was one idea which helped define the nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was the right of the nation to the lives of its young men. Conscription could be justified in peacetime as an aspect of national education and in wartime as a legitimate duty of patriotism.⁶⁸ Canada, born in the midst of European and American nationalism, was different. Perhaps a country that had little need to defend its frontiers and that fought its wars thousands of miles from its shores was entitled to a more voluntaristic view of military service. That was not the whole explanation.

There should have been ample precedent for conscription in Canada. In 1760, the tradition of the French milice survived in a conquered New France to join with the English tradition of the militia as the "constitutional force". More to the point, the French and American militia organizations played vital roles in frontier warfare both as fighters and as freighters for the regular troops.⁶⁹ Under the British regime, a militia-based military organization found men for the Pontiac rising and, with difficulty, to resist the American invasion of 1775. If the militia may not have been decisive in the early months of the War of 1812, the organization was essential for transportation and military service as the fighting dragged on. Militia laws in most the British North American provinces commanded the services of male British subjects between 16 and 60 with exemptions for criminals, lunatics, a few professions and objectors with religious scruples.⁷⁰

Even in the colonial period, the militia system had serious drawbacks. It was not that the militia was necessarily ill-disciplined or unreliable. In the petit-guerre of the frontier, the Canadiens proved highly effective. The embodied militia battalions in the War of 1812 became disciplined, dependable troops.⁷¹ The real problem with the militia was that prolonged universal service could wreck the colonial economy. Mobilization of large numbers of miliciens helped reduce New France to starvation by 1759. Militiamen in the War of 1812 deserted not from cowardice or disloyalty but for fear that their families would starve if crops were not planted or harvested. As society grew more industrialized and complex, a general call-up of the militia would have been as paralyzing as a successful general strike.

For all its problems, the idea of universal militia service died hard in Canada. The tradition was strong. Militia commissions, almost meaningless in a military sense, gave their holders social status. The hundreds of thousands potentially available at musters allowed politicians to boast of Canada's strength without putting them to the trouble of buying arms or ammunition. As an institution, the secondary militia survived in the Canada's until the 1840's. It lasted a generation longer in Nova Scotia. The levée en masse survived as a legislative ghost into the middle of the twentieth century.⁷²

Voluntarism was almost as old a Canadian tradition as compulsion. It had rarely been impossible for those with the will and the means to escape military service by buying a substitute. Under both the French and the British regimes,

the bulk of military service was in fact performed by those who volunteered for it -- under whatever economic or social compulsions. However, as an institution, voluntarism may formally be dated from the Militia Act of 1855. Obligated to provide for the police functions of British troops withdrawn for the Crimean War, prodded by the British promise of the rich Ordnance lands in return for creating an efficient militia, the government of Canada turned for inspiration to the United States. The solution, based on American example, was a 5,000-men "volunteer militia", trained, uniformed, armed and even paid for its services.⁷³

To many contemporaries, the concept was a dangerous innovation. The words "volunteer militia" seemed contradictory. The venerable politician and former militia staff officer, Sir Etienne-Pascal Taché, denounced voluntarism as a dangerous anglicising notion.⁷⁴ Unlike some innovations, the volunteers proved a success. By 1856, the government felt obliged to double the approved strength to 10,000 though the additional volunteers were unpaid. The new force struggled through a period of neglect, flourished during the alarms of the Civil War period and proved almost ideally suited to the subsequent Fenian threat. Moreover, once Canadians got used to letting people decide for themselves to drill with the militia, there seemed to be no good reason to revert to compulsion. In 1862, when the American threat was most acute, a government was defeated when it tried to restore a form of conscription. Among the defectors from the government ranks were Taché's fellow French-Canadians.⁷⁵ Sir George-Etienne Cartier, one of the victims, learned his lesson. As Minister of Militia in the new Dominion government, Cartier incorporated universal obligation to serve in his 1868 Militia Bill but he made it clear that the Dominion's new militia force would depend on volunteers.⁷⁶

It was a characteristically pragmatic decision. Patriotic orators might claim that Canadians would rise as one man to defend their country from invasion but there had been conspicuous gaps in the ranks of battalions called out in the 1860's, particularly in Quebec.⁷⁷ In a free society, young men should make their own choice of the glories, sacrifices, benefits and penalties of military service. Politically, voluntarism was the salvation of any military organization in Canada in the dreary and penurious 1870's and 1880's. In a country preoccupied with railways, capital investment and the grim business of making a living, the militia was a frill. If private enthusiasts would not keep it alive, compulsion would not help. Even the "Colonels' Lobby", the militia officers who sat in Parliament, were as prone to urge economy as reform.⁷⁸

There was a price for voluntarism. Cartier had proclaimed in 1968 that his new militia organization would become a national institution. He underlined his conviction by repeating his speech in French.⁷⁹ Self-selection meant that militia enthusiasts had to find motives for belonging to the force. Since militia battalions depended on their officers for financial support, the officers set the tone. A few, like Lieutenant-Colonel William Otter of Toronto, had developed a passionate commitment to military discipline and efficiency as a result of sharing in the humiliation by the Fenians at Ridgeway in 1866. Otter's battalion, the Queen's Own Rifles, became a model for the force and a springboard for Otter's own distinguished military career.⁸⁰ Few of his contemporaries shared Otter's priorities. Victorian Canadians could be persuaded to put their money and leisure into a militia commission in return for social standing and a chance to imitate the manners and uniforms of the British regular army. Memories of the departed British garrison were selective. The balls, band concerts and martial reviews were recalled; the disciplined professionalism was overlooked.⁸¹

Canada's volunteer militia developed a style that suited much of English-speaking Canada. Even Nova Scotians, when their resentment at Confederation had cooled, were prepared to participate. In most of French Canada there was much less spare cash and prestige for those who wanted to ape Queen Victoria's little army.⁸² The militia did not vanish from Quebec. There were two strong French-speaking city battalions. As in other parts of rural Canada, colonels enhanced their standing by distributing drill pay to the young men of the county. Cartier and a succession of French-Canadian ministers of militia ensured that Quebec got her share of staff appointments. What they could not ensure was that their appointees were qualified or enthusiastic. When Canada's military organization entered a period of reform in the 1890's, disparity between the English and French in the force grew. Because the militia depended on those who happened to have military tastes, it could not really become a nationally representative institution.⁸³ Even if French-Canadians had flocked to enlist when war came in 1914, there would have been pathetically few French-speaking officers fit to command them.⁸⁴ Although the Canadian army learned at least part of the lesson during the First World War, the problem reappeared when a Canadian naval service was established in 1910 and when the Royal Canadian Air Force was formed in 1923. What was done in peacetime could not easily be altered when war came either in 1914 or in 1939. In a way that Canadian historians have been slow to acknowledge, peacetime policies contributed to wartime crises.⁸⁵

Although Quebec nationalists tried to make conscription an issue in the bitter 1911 election, it was not even contemplated when Canada found itself at war in 1914. Hughes, as minister of militia, insisted that only volunteers would ever be acceptable in the ranks of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and married men must even secure the written permission of their wives.⁸⁶ The only compulsion driving the floods of volunteers in 1914-15 was the chill wind of winter and of economic depression but, as Professor Brown has indicated, critics of wartime recruiting might admit that securing half a million volunteers from a population of just over seven million was no mean achievement.⁸⁷

By 1917, Canada had enlisted virtually all those who could be persuaded to volunteer without at least the shadow of compulsion hanging over them. By all the evidence available then, conscription could only have been avoided in 1917 by reducing Canada's four divisions on the Western Front at a time when allied defeat seemed possible. The issue posed a dilemma inherent in fighting far away. To the Conservative prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, Canada had no choice. She must keep faith with the men who had volunteered to represent her in a vital struggle. Canada's frontier, insisted his colleague, Sir George Foster, was as surely in France and Flanders as it was on the coast of Nova Scotia. Borden's opponent, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, could take refuge in a colder, more Cartesian, logic, that volunteers were responsible for their own fate. Canada's liability must be limited to what it could do without fatal strain to itself. There were also those, as Laurier knew well, who had persuaded Quebecers that Canada had no liability at all in a European struggle. Compelling men to fight in a war which was none of their business was, in the eyes of anti-conscriptionists, the grossest form of oppression.⁸⁸

The conscription issue of 1917 was fought out by pragmatists, not by idealists. To make conscription acceptable even to his own supporters, Borden was compelled to dilute his Military Service Act with exemptions, appeals and delays until it was rendered almost ineffective. By the time conscription was enforced with full force after the successful German offensive of March, 1918, there was time for only a few thousand conscripts to reach the Canadian Corps before the Armistice of November 11th. To the end, the Corps was composed overwhelmingly of English-speaking volunteers.⁸⁹

Laurier's heir was William Lyon Mackenzie King. He could rebuild the Liberal party on the ruins Borden had left by his single-minded commitment to the Allied cause. King's Liberalism became a coalition between the war-weary and the

alienated. When the rise of the European dictators made war once again inevitable, King believed that he could unite his country for the coming ordeal only by an unequivocal promise that conscription would never be imposed for overseas service. The pledge was promptly echoed by his Conservative opponent, R.J. Manion.⁹⁰ King's policy as wartime leader respected a simple rule: avoid every error committed by Sir Robert Borden. If Borden had sacrificed to win Canada a voice in imperial strategy, King would remain silent and uncommitted. If Borden's commitment to the war had been heightened by his visits to wounded soldiers, King would stay away. Borden had concentrated Canada's effort on her Corps, shock troops who suffered thousands of casualties during their dogged and successful assaults. King, instead, would emphasize Canada's role in the air, for surely conscription would never be necessary to find pilots and navigators. Borden had sent every possible Canadian to the front; King would emphasize home defence where surely fewer questions of allegiance would arise. Compelled by colleagues and the Conservatives to seek release from his no-conscription pledge, King followed his victory in a 1942 plebiscite by his classic phrase: "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription".⁹¹ The necessity would be deferred to November, 1944.

Throughout the Second World War, the spectre of conscription troubled King and his more thoughtful colleagues. Most of the government's conscious policies, from the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 to the massive industrial expansion engineered by C.D. Howe, were designed to deploy manpower so that overseas conscription would be unthinkable. Canadian army expansion was governed by General Staff pledges that the ranks could be filled and re-filled by volunteers. Not before the summer of 1943 were Canadian troops committed to battle in strength and a second division was committed to the Italian theatre later in 1943 on the questionable advice that casualties would be smaller there. Ironically, that commitment was made over the objections of General McNaughton, the army commander, and the manpower needed for two separate administrative systems, contributed to the eventual crisis. By November, 1944, when King and his colleagues finally admitted that trained infantry reinforcements in Canada must be forced to serve overseas, the issue had acquired domestic political overtones.⁹² The controversy was commemorated by the bitter term, Zombie, applied to home defence soldiers who refused, under all manner of pressure, to "volunteer" for general service.⁹³

In the postwar years, the conscription issue had faded more slowly than memories of Canada's wartime exploits.

The decision by the St. Laurent government to despatch a brigade group as well as a destroyer flotilla and transport aircraft to support the United Nations in Korea was predicated on the assumption that volunteers could be found. A mild recession and the desire of some unsettled veterans to return to uniform met the need though only at the expense of the original recruiting standards.⁹⁴ During the Cold War rearmament of the 1950's, Canada's peacetime armed forces more than doubled to a strength of 120,000, all of them volunteers. The conviction that only forces in being would have a role in a future war could be translated, in Canadian military experience, into an argument for fewer rather than more men and women in uniform. Canada's unmilitary heritage and voluntarist tradition helped to ensure that her postwar forces would be small and professional. Personnel would be attracted by reasonable pay and a taste for military life more than by national idealism. As in the past, Canadians can believe that it will be the responsibility of the major powers to win or lose any future war. Canada would play a part -- but in its own way.⁹⁵

Deliberately, this essay has focussed on past Canadian military experience -- on the era before 1950. If generals have been accused of fighting the last war over again, civilians and their political representatives may be even more out of date. The military environment in which Canadians now live has changed out of recognition. Defence policy-makers who have detected the change must now argue theories about the future against the entrenched and often reassuring experiences of the past. The difficulty Canadians experienced in accepting the North American Air Defence Command of 1957 illustrated a national reluctance to recognize Canada's sudden vulnerability in an age of transcontinental missiles and bombers and their deadly payload. Canada's retreat from military responsibility and influence in the 1960's may reflect the new influence of Quebec's traditional world-view on Canadian foreign policy.

People depend on historical experience, forgetting that experience becomes as obsolete as old guns or radar equipment. Old certainties persist until, one morning, they vanish forever. Only then do the experts press forward to explain that they knew it all along.

Notes

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59. Preston, Undefended Border, pp. 191, 209, underlines that the emphasis was widely seen as anachronistic and was not even accepted by Militia Headquarters' only trained senior staff officer, Colonel Willoughby Gwatkin. On Hughes, see, for example, W.L. Weichel M.P. to Borden, December 4, 1914, Borden Papers, OCA 162, p. 78502. See Brown, Borden, vol. I, pp. 253, 257.
60. Eayrs, Defence of Canada, vol. I, pp. 168-9, 302-6; on planning, pp. 75-85.
61. Stacey, Military Problems, pp. 105-110; and a more severe view in Six Years of War, pp. 9-18, 26-29.
62. See ibid., pp. 6-37; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 14-17, 25-28; W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War (Toronto, 1977), pp. 25-37.
63. Ibid., pp. 69-77. See, for example, Hal Lawrence, A Bloody War: One Man's Memories of the Canadian Navy, 1939-45 (Toronto, 1979).
64. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, vol. III, Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto, 1972), pp. 125-7; Rear Admiral E.R. Mainguy, Report on Certain Incidents ... (Ottawa, 1949).

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73. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Investigate and Report Upon the Best Means of Re-organizing the Militia of Canada and Upon an Improved System of Police (Quebec, 1955). See J.M. Hitsman, Canadian Militia Prior to Confederation (Report no. 6, Directorate of History, June 30, 1966), pp. 69-71; Stacey, Canada and the British Army, pp. 92-97.
74. "Un vétéran de 1812" (E-P. Tache), Quelques réflexions sur l'organisation des volontaires et de la milice de cette province (Quebec, 1863) p. 5. See also Benjamin Sulte, Histoire de la milice Canadienne-française, 1769-1897 (Montreal, n.d.), p. 65.

75. Stacey, Military Problems, pp. 59-60; Stacey, Canada and the British Army, pp. 130-6.
76. Morton, Ministers and Generals, pp. 6-8. See Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871 Appendix, pp. 1 ff.
77. Lt. Gen. James Lindsay to Sir John Young, August 4, 1870, P.R.O., WO 32/813/058/316.
78. Desmond Morton, "The Militia Lobby in Parliament: The Military Politicians and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1897" in Adrian Preston and Peter Dennis (eds.) Swords and Covenants: Essays in Honour of the Centennial of the Royal Military College of Canada (London, 1976).
79. Sir Joseph Tasse, Discours de Sir Georges Cartier, Baronnet, accompagnés de notices (Montreal, 1893), pp. 356 ff.; Parliamentary Debates in the Globe, March 31, 1868, pp. 149 ff.
80. Morton, Canadian General, pp. 39-73.
81. The Montreal Herald summarized the situation admirably: "In Canada, an officer is useful to his regiment because he has the means to spend and the will to spend it; the regiment is useful to him because the paths toward social distinction are smoothed for the militia officer." (September 4, 1902). See Morton, Ministers and Generals, pp. 59-62, 116.
82. On Quebec differences, see J-Y. Gravel, L'armée au Québec (1868-1900) un portrait social (Montreal, 1974) esp. pp. 54-67. Gravel bases his book heavily on a single unit, the 9^e Voltigeurs de Québec.
83. Desmond Morton, "Le Canada français et la milice canadienne (1868-1914)" in J-Y. Gravel, Le Québec et la guerre (Montreal, 1974), pp. 39-46. Operational friction was evident even in the 1885 campaign. See Desmond Morton, "Des Candiens errants: French-Canadian Troops in the North-West Campaign of 1885", Journal of Canadian Studies, V, 3, August, 1970.
84. See Morton, "French Canada and Militia", p. 48n, table. On the officer problems experienced in the First World War: Desmond Morton, "The Short Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion, C.E.F.", Queen's Quarterly, LXXXI, 1, Spring, 1974; "The Limits of Loyalty: French Canadian Officers and the First World War" in Edgar Denton III (ed.) The Limits of Loyalty (Waterloo, 1980).

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90. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 30, 1939, p. 2425; Toronto Telegram, March 27, 1939. The issue is described by Neatby William Lyon Mackenzie King, vol. III, pp. 300-2; J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1967), pp. 23-4. See also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 6, 397-9.

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92. On conscription and manpower questions: Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 403-484; E.L.M. Burns, Manpower and the Canadian Army (Toronto, 1956); Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, ch. VI. For a crisp summary of a complicated issue: Douglas and Greenhouse, Out of the Shadows, pp. 235-247.
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94. Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 27-30; Stairs, Diplomacy, pp. 193-5.
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CANADA'S ALLIANCES

[John English and Norman Hillmer]

If war is diplomacy conducted by other means, Canada's alliance experience has made it harder to distinguish even the means. In her first century, Canada was part of two alliance systems, the British and the American. These two experiences have profoundly influenced Canadian life and have shaped every aspect of the Canadian armed forces, from their uniforms and military customs to their strategic and tactical assumptions. They have also shaped the thinking of the political leaders and diplomatic officials ultimately responsible for the deployment of Canadian military force.

Norman Hillmer and John English have explored Canada's diplomatic history from 1867 to the present. They conclude that the British alliance came to an end at Suez in 1956 and -- controversially -- that the American alliance became unhinged when Canada refused to support the United States in Vietnam. For good or ill, they assert, Canadians are more on their own than they have ever been.

Though largely unwritten and informal, two great alliances dominate the landscape of Canadian history. In the years before the Second World War, Canadian external policy was shaped by the British connection; in the years after, the United States provided most of the problems and possibilities. The alliance with Great Britain grew out of Canada's colonial dependency and found concrete form and expression in the two world wars. An alliance with the United States took root prior to 1939, and was given moral, military and economic substance in the war and the difficult peace that followed.

The Anglo-Canadian alliance had sufficient resilience and importance to survive the decline of British power after 1945. When Canada did not go to Britain's side during the Suez crisis in 1956, however, the alliance became unhinged.

Nor has the American alliance lasted, even though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Air (now Aerospace) Defence Command remain intact. These formal agreements were the products of an age when Canadians and Americans combined to ward off the threat of international Communism. During the 1960s, the two nations began to differ on how this end might best be achieved. Canada did not join the United States in fighting the Vietnam War. Eventually Canada opposed its neighbour's war. The alliance, in the sense of the "special relationship" which North American politicians so often extolled in the 1940s and 1950s, came to an end. This state of mind (for that pre-eminently was what lay at the heart of Canada's alliances), this belief in the beneficence and responsibility of American power, passed with the Cold War generation. Further tensions in the relationship -- economic, diplomatic, political and bureaucratic -- ensured that the alliance would not be revived.

Canada's alliances have been much more than combinations for the purposes of military security -- and much less. They have been less because defence was not always the issue; more because the Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relationships were so intense for Canadians, so sweeping in their range and implications. They were also very difficult to define. "Alliance" is a convenient label, and it has taken on many meanings. For supporters of intimate ties with Great Britain and the United States, "alliance" conveyed the strength and potential of these relationships; for critics, sceptics or agnostics, it illustrated the dangers of getting too close to a giant. The term had the additional advantage that it could be used by both groups to stress freedom of manoeuvre and to imply equality of standing.

Equality there never was. The intensity of emotion felt by Canadians towards the mother country and towards the United States, the sheer power of these relationships in Canadian life, thought and politics, was not reciprocated in Washington, New York, London or elsewhere in the United States and Great Britain. Canadians could not boast about their population or power, so they were apt to emphasize future greatness or current goodness. One observer directed a characteristically Canadian remark to the Americans in 1932: "Our material inferiority we will balance by our moral superiority ... you are big, but we are better; you are great but we are good."¹ This equation might be good for Canadian self-esteem, but it did little to make life in an alliance with a big power any easier.

Such problems, of course, are far from unique. They are shared by other small powers in alliance politics, formal and informal. Robert Rothstein has written:

An alliance with a single Great Power is undesirable. An alliance of several Small Powers and one Great Power is only marginally, if at all, an improvement. An alliance with several Great Powers is desirable but difficult to achieve. The only alternative left, if an alliance policy is still to be pursued, is an equal, multilateral alliance, that is, an alliance composed entirely of Small Powers.²

For all the benefits, and there have been many, Canada's "alliances" have placed the country in the most difficult position of all: the adherence of one minor power to the goals and causes and leadership of a single great power. Canadians were never uncritical or unrestrained in that adherence. The United States was sometimes available to offset British influence -- and vice versa -- but the options in Canadian foreign policy have always been distinctly limited.

The British Alliance

If the test of an alliance comes in war, the Anglo-Canadian entente was an unqualified success. At the outbreak of war in 1914 and 1939, Canada responded to Great Britain's call to arms and formed a powerful and effective military combination. This was not an alliance in the usual sense. Canada was part nation, but part British colony as well. Legally, diplomatically, psychologically, Canada remained a junior member of the British Empire until the Second World War. From the imperial connection the majority happily derived prestige, economic benefit, an (admittedly diminishing) measure of protection and a sense of difference from the Americans. Canadians -- English Canadians most particularly -- felt both sentiment and obligation towards the mother country. This was at its keenest when the homeland was in danger. It was widely believed that Canada must go to war beside Great Britain when a great and clear call of duty came. Strong emotions were involved, although that time now seems long ago and far away.

In the calm of peacetime, things were very different. One Canadian government after another, although never immune from imperial pressures or impulses, put nation above empire. Canadians had a huge land to develop: an economy to build; capital and immigrants to attract; markets to establish; means of transport to forge. Precisely because it anticipated the day when colonial subordination would be

superseded by national pride and power, the word "alliance" was used by Canada's first premier, John A. Macdonald (1867-1873; 1878-1891). In the debates which preceded the Confederation of Canada in 1867, Macdonald said that "a different colonial system" was being developed, "and it will become, year by year, less a case of dependence on our part, and of over-ruling protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more a case of healthy and cordial alliance." Instead of a dependent colony, "England will have in us a friendly nation -- a subordinate but still a powerful people -- to stand by her in North America in peace or in war."³ For Macdonald's biographer, Donald Creighton, this was as much realpolitik as an expression of developing nationalism: "A rough balance of power within the English-speaking world seemed essential to him to ensure Canada's survival. The diplomatic and military support of Great Britain could alone offset the political preponderance of the United States; and Macdonald proposed therefore to bring in the old world to redress the balance in the new."⁴

The physical threat from the United States diminished and then disappeared in the years after 1867, but American economic and political influences did not. Nor did the ties to the mother country, which were reinforced by their importance in counteracting American pressures and which politicians ignored at their peril. In the general elections of 1891 and 1911, Conservative party leaders were able to use cries against closer economic relations with the United States to good effect. In 1891 the Liberals advocated "full and unrestricted reciprocity of trade" with the United States, and some of the party's supporters went so far as to suggest that with reciprocity would eventually come union between the two countries. Donning the mantle of outraged patriotism, Macdonald was able yet again to deny power to the Liberals.⁵ Twenty years later the Liberals under Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier reached an understanding with the Americans on a reciprocity agreement, but the proposal aroused great opposition, especially in Ontario whose protected manufacturing industries feared the effects of competition with American industry and where loyalty to empire and motherland was especially strong. An election was called before the agreement could get through the House of Commons, and the Liberals were swept from office. During the campaign a debate similar to that of 1891 took place. "I am for the Empire against the world," a victorious Robert Borden declared, "but within the Empire I am for Canada first."⁶

There was another important Anglo-Canadian issue in the election of 1911: Laurier's plan for a Royal Canadian Navy. His Naval Service Act of 1910 made provision for a Canadian naval force which could only be placed on active duty or at the disposal of the British government for general service in the Royal Navy at the discretion of the Canadian government and parliament.⁷ For Laurier, the real question was one of control. Canadians alone would exercise the right to decide on the extent of their participation in any war. Borden, on the other hand, wished closer defence relations with the empire. He claimed that the German naval challenge had created an emergency of sufficient proportions to justify a monetary contribution to the British government for the construction of two or three dreadnought battleships.

The real emergency, the Liberals charged, was in Borden's party. The English wing of the Conservatives might well see the German threat as a test of Canada's national character and pride and of the empire's solidarity in time of crisis. Laurier's 'tinpot navy' was a pusillanimous compromise. But Borden's French supporters and the influential independent, Henri Bourassa, feared an extension of European militarism to Canada and opposed an expensive Anglo-Canadian naval policy in which they would have no voice. Borden concocted an alliance with Bourassa on the basis of opposition to Laurier's navy, and together they made substantial inroads on Quebec support for the Liberals; in English Canada Borden won the votes of loyalists angered by Laurier's stand on reciprocity and the navy.

Like Macdonald and Laurier before him, Borden had made it clear that "some little frontier war in India or with some savage foe in Africa of which we know absolutely nothing in this country" was very unlikely to be a Canadian concern.⁸ When war came in 1914, it was neither small nor remote. Canada and her sister dominions of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa went to war as colonies under the British crown, their participation (if not its extent) automatically dictated by the fiat of their common king. The decision was made, even so, without compulsion, and the contribution -- the sacrifice -- was enormous and unprecedented. Canada contributed over half-a-million soldiers and played a large part in the Allied air effort. Sixty thousand Canadians never returned.

Sacrifice was not enough. Borden demanded recognition of Canada's efforts through a place in imperial decision-making. After 1916, Canadian interests were expressed in an Imperial War Cabinet, made up of representatives from Great Britain, the dominions and India and presided over by the

British prime minister, Lloyd George. At war's end, a similar body -- the British Empire Delegation -- was constructed at the Peace Conference in Paris. Borden and Hughes of Australia led, in addition, a successful movement for separate representation of the dominions at the conference. Canada signed the Treaty of Versailles in its own right. Lloyd George, it was true, signed for the British Empire as a whole, the dominions included, thus diminishing the importance of the Canadian signature. The "senior dominion" remained constitutionally subordinate to Great Britain, but its emerging international personality had been formally recognized.

All successful Canadian politicians had to combine the national and the imperial. Inevitably there would be those who dismissed Borden as an imperialist, but the desire to express the vitality of a young nation through participation in the affairs, responsibilities and dangers of a great empire is abundantly clear. Professor Creighton has suggested that Borden's actions were nothing less than a revival and vindication of Macdonald's alliance ideal: "Canada was able to play a part in world politics such as she had never done before and would never do again."⁹

Canada would never do so again, says Creighton, because of the negative and destructive influence of the politician who dominated the post-Borden years. W.L. Mackenzie King succeeded Laurier as leader of the Liberal Party in 1919. Two years later he became prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs. There he stayed for most of the years until 1948.¹⁰ King was strongly committed to Great Britain, but his nationalism was of quite a different stamp from that of Borden. He gave the greatest weight to the unity of Canadians. If that unity were to be maintained and enhanced, Canada must be free of controversial imperial constraints and commitments, free to join or not to join with Great Britain in its foreign policy and defence decisions. This, King believed, was solidly in the British "anti-imperial" tradition, and it accorded well with his liberal philosophy, not to mention the realities of his political situation. He had a great deal of parliamentary and public support in Quebec and western Canada, where both empire and military were viewed with suspicion. King's concept of alliance emphasized flexibility of action and manoeuvre. Alliances were preferable to empires because they were freely participated in; only on this basis could the British Empire continue to exist and prosper and win adherents in Canada. King said that he wished the British to think of the dominions "really in the nature of allied powers; it was proper we should be consulted in any situation affecting us;

where we were not affected there was no need for consultation ... Maintenance of the principle of responsible Government in all relations of the British Empire, is the cornerstone of the entire structure."¹¹

In the 1920s King fought successfully to establish the autonomy which underlay his theory of alliance. In 1931, as a direct consequence of his urgings and those of his even more nationally-minded Irish and South African compatriots, the Statute of Westminster was passed by the British parliament, establishing the dominions' right to full legal independence. This was perhaps the closest approximation of a declaration of Canadian independence,¹² but King and his Conservative opponents and most of their countrymen did not act independently or wish to be independent. They continued to look to Great Britain for leadership while dreading that British diplomacy would again drag, in King's words, "a country which has all it can do to run itself" into a war "to save ... a continent that cannot run itself."¹³

Canadians lived in this curious schizophrenic world throughout the 1930s. Their government saw nothing incompatible in declaring that the parliament would decide the great issues of peace and war and at the same time maintaining and even extending a broad range of Anglo-Canadian military contacts, co-operation and standardization.¹⁴ More alarmingly perhaps, there was also a long list of Canadian "commitments" to support British forces in the event of a conflict involving both countries.¹⁵ The Canadian government was careful to keep Anglo-Canadian higher defence consultation and planning to a minimum, but there were those (in the government service and outside) who worried that a position had been established "which on moral grounds might compromise the freedom of action of the Canadian Government and Parliament at the time of actual crisis."¹⁶

They were right to worry. As war drew near in 1939, the King government explained to the House of Commons that Canadians had to follow Britain into any war which threatened the homeland. All those Anglo-Canadian traditions and sentiments and interests were doing their work. Canadians had no freedom of choice, a choice freely made.¹⁷ In the British Commonwealth, King observed, there had "evolved a unique alliance of a peculiarly tough and enduring kind whose members act together, unlike so many allies bound by explicit treaties, not because they were compelled to act together, but because they have the will to act together."¹⁸

Mackenzie King made this observation in 1944, after five years of alliance warfare. He betrayed little dissatisfaction with the role of a very junior partner (one that played no part in the higher direction of the war), because he felt little.¹⁹ The prime minister fought the war as he had waged the peace: co-operation with Great Britain when necessary; detachment where possible. In December 1939, the government agreed to establish training facilities for allied pilots on Canadian soil. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was prized not least because it appeared to make for a large chunk of detachment. Where better, it seemed at the time, to concentrate Canadian efforts and resources and thus to minimize the overseas commitment of land forces? What better way to retain the support of French Canada, where there was scant enthusiasm for a British war? King always tried, for the sake of the nation and his own political position, to keep both feet planted firmly on the home front. More co-operation and commitment, however, became both necessary and politically feasible after the fall of France. Much larger Canadian contributions of men, money and materiel were made to the common cause overseas than would have been acceptable in the beginning. That, in the final analysis, seemed right to King. As he said, Great Britain was responsible for "such freedom as we have."²⁰

After the war it was downhill most of the way for the British alliance. As the British retreated from their world role, North American geography was bound to assert itself with more and more of a vengeance. Thus the external affairs secretary was soon insisting that Canada was not "a tail to the American State Department,"²¹ just as officials had once been concerned to show that they were not agents of the British Foreign Office. There had long been a rough balance between Great Britain and the United States. One could be played off against the other, psychologically and diplomatically. The new equation, with a diminished Great Britain, was contemplated with misgiving. For all its drawbacks, the British connection helped to maintain the differences and establish some distance between Canadians and Americans. If the distinctions were erased, Canada itself might be lost, first in the hearts and minds of its people and then in political terms.²² Complete dependence on the Americans could only mean a loss of Canadian independence.

The British tie continued therefore to have its uses, and continued to be valued. Britain's Suez disaster showed the power and importance of the British connection in Canadian life. More Canadians favoured the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt than opposed it.²³ What difference, asked one Conservative member of parliament, was there "between a Nasser

in 1956 at the Suez and a Hitler in the Rhineland or a Mus-solini in Ethiopia?"²⁴ It was about time, said another, for a government that would not knife its best friends in the back.²⁵ The Canadian government's apparent lack of support for the mother country's action may well have been a factor in the Liberal party defeat (after 22 years in power) in the election of 1957; certainly the cry that Canada had deserted Britain was a popular one on the hustings. Even British prime minister Eden's critics spoke more often in sorrow than in anger. For Canadian diplomats, it was the classic national nightmare: a gap of policy and perception that threatened to widen between Britain (and France) on the one hand and the United States on the other.²⁶ The government carefully expressed its regret and quickly moved to help prevent a general war which might involve the big powers, to extricate Britain from its embarrassing position and to heal the divisions in the (now enlarged and multiracial) British Commonwealth. The United Nations Emergency Force was a Canadian initiative, winning external affairs secretary L.B. Pearson a Nobel Peace Prize.

Suez, however, also symbolized and contributed to the final unravelling of the Anglo-Canadian alliance. The Canadian government only slipped once publicly from its chosen and cherished position as mediator and peacekeeper, the prime minister referring scathingly to the excesses of the "Supermen of Europe."²⁷ But the private dismay ran deep. The British had lost their credibility in official Canada, as in so many other places. Canadian faith in British morality, responsibility and leadership had been seriously undermined. Norman Robertson, Canada's high commissioner to the United Kingdom, wrote of his "loss of confidence in British judgement and good sense, which derives from the whole handling of the Suez problem."²⁸ More than that, Suez laid bare the decline of Britain and signalled the end of empire; it badly damaged a balance of western power in which Britain could -- and did -- help Canada contain the influence of the United States.²⁹ Most of the Anglo-Canadian tensions of the Suez moment would pass, and Britain would remain Canada's second major trading and defence partner for years to come.³⁰ But the change in the relationship was unmistakable. As Lord Garner, stationed in Canada during the crisis, pointed out, the two countries settled down after Suez to the easy and comfortable relationship "appropriate to an elderly couple; relaxed contact was becoming the pattern of the Anglo-Canadian friendship."³¹ The heart and dynamism had gone out of the alliance.

The American Alliance

It would be incorrect to suggest that there was a Canadian-American alliance before World War II. Mackenzie King preferred the Anglo-Canadian alliance for all its problems, and he knew that most Canadians still accepted the obligations and benefits which that relationship bestowed. There was, nevertheless, a recognition in the interwar years that Canada and the United States shared a common territory and common purposes and that they were more alike than either Canadians or Americans had previously known or admitted. The United States was a proven good neighbour, a striking contrast to the warlike Europeans and a useful counterweight to the British connection, a connection which threatened to pull them into another great war. American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was extremely popular in Canada, symbolized and stimulated such feelings.

Two weeks after his victory in the 1935 election, King visited Roosevelt to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement. King got what he wanted, the agreement between Canada and the United States that had eluded governments, negotiators and propagandists since the demise of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854-1866. And perhaps, King hoped, the leaders derived more from the meeting than the agreement itself. King found Roosevelt "exceedingly easy to talk with," and Roosevelt assured King that "it was great just to be able to pick up the telephone and talk to each other in just a few minutes."³² Before this encounter, American presidents and Canadian prime ministers rarely talked at all. In the next four years King and Roosevelt met regularly and became increasingly close. Each sought the other's help in preventing another European conflict and in protecting his position if war should occur. From 1937 on, military leaders tried to talk and cooperate as never before, although without notable results. In August 1938 President Roosevelt, speaking at Kingston, Ontario, announced that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire."³³ These were the seeds of an alliance which World War II germinated.

The United States remained neutral after Canada and Britain went to war in September 1939, but the Americans were clearly sympathetic to the Anglo-Canadian cause. Two agreements made between Canada and the United States before America declared war in December 1941 are of particular importance. The first was the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940 which, inter alia, established a Permanent Joint Board on Defence to coordinate Canadian-American defence planning and commitments. The Hyde Park Agreement of April 1941 was

the economic equivalent of Ogdensburg. Created to deal with a dollar exchange problem, the agreement linked the economies of the United States and Canada for the purpose of defeating Hitler. In Parliament, Mackenzie King did not hesitate to assign to the agreement a "permanent" significance in the relations between Canada and the United States.³⁴

Wartime rhetoric often makes the ephemeral permanent. This time, however, rhetoric did become reality. It soon became clear that the postwar world would be dominated by the United States and that for Canada this would present special opportunities and problems. Graham Towers, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, explained the consequences of American predominance in October 1942: "The economic power of the United States will be so great that we shall in any case be subject to great and probably irresistible pressure to fall in line with their wishes regarding commercial policy."³⁵ Towers' comments reflect the sense of inevitability and of pragmatism with which many Canadians greeted the new realities of international relations. These were not the bonds of sentiment and loyalty which lay at the core of the Anglo-Canadian alliance. Polls did show, however, that Canadians and Americans thought that they were each other's "best friend," and that both publics shared a commitment to democratic values. Accordingly, there was support in both countries when Canada sought assurance in 1945 that the special relationship of the wartime years would continue in peacetime.

When the opportunity came for a bilateral military alliance, however, the Canadians hesitated. In 1946 the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee proposed that the two nations sign a defence pact to counter the threat of a Russian attack on North America. Although he was genuinely fearful of the Soviets, Mackenzie King was suspicious of the Americans as well. The reluctance also appeared in the economic area. When some of King's advisers recommended a customs union with the United States in 1948, he strongly objected. While recognizing the new demands of the Cold War upon the Canadian economy, King refused to accept that either military or economic exigencies should compel Canada to enter an economic union with the United States. His opposition was steadfast:

I [King wrote in his diary] would never cease to be a Liberal or a British citizen and if I thought there was a danger of Canada being placed at the mercy of powerful financial interests in the United States, and if that was being done by my own party, I would get out and oppose them openly.³⁶

There was no need to campaign. King's successor, Louis St. Laurent, had little enthusiasm for the proposal. For that matter, neither did many Americans.³⁷

In earlier times Canada had turned to Europe for protection from its enemy, the United States. In the postwar period, Canada once again employed Europe to maintain its distinctiveness from its ally, the United States. When Canada did not proceed with the customs union, the government gave as its excuse the discussions for a North Atlantic security pact. In fact, as Professor Eayrs has pointed out, a multilateral treaty was seen in Ottawa "as a device for reducing the pressure of the Pentagon. A United States administration pledged to coordinate its defence policies with those of allies in Western Europe as well as those of its ally in North America would be less likely than a United States administration going it alone to lean as heavily upon its northern neighbour. Canada, allied to the United States within the North Atlantic coalition, would have more room in which to breathe and to manoeuvre than would be hers if locked into a stifling bilateral embrace."³⁸ No nation worked more energetically for the North Atlantic Pact than Canada. Furthermore, to the irritation of the United States, Canada tried to expand the pact beyond the purely military. It succeeded in persuading the North Atlantic Treaty signatories to include an article calling for a broader alliance which extended to economic and cultural co-operation. Even so, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, soon became for Canada little more than a North American military guarantee to Western Europe.

The Korean War spurred rearmament. In December 1950 it was announced that Canada's 1951-52 defence budget would be three times the size of the previous year's. Despite this Asian war, in which Canada participated with the United States under the auspices of the United Nations, the focus of Canadian and American attention and defence expenditure remained upon Western Europe. J.W. Pickersgill, the influential prime ministerial confidant, counselled St. Laurent in September 1950 that "to maintain reasonably good relations with the United States and to satisfy a pretty wide section of people at home, some kind of [European] undertaking will be unavoidable."³⁹

Pickersgill urged concentration on the air force, and his advice was followed. In February 1951, defence minister Brooke Claxton announced that the Canadian government would commit an air division to the defence of Western Europe. This contribution, as well as that of a ground brigade, was motivated not only by fears for European security but also

by a Canadian desire to have its voice heard in NATO councils and in Washington. For Canadian political and military officials had begun to worry about the other obligations which the United States had assumed under the guise of its NATO responsibilities. The NATO agreement had given the Americans the responsibility for strategic air operations, leading them to request the use of Canadian bases for the launching of retaliatory atomic attacks on the Soviets. The Canadians realized that this request meant the stationing of nuclear weapons and American personnel on Canadian soil. It also implied that, in times of crisis, Ottawa would not always control the operation of American men and weapons in Canada. This fact became especially troubling in 1954, when the Eisenhower administration adopted the policy of "massive retaliation": the United States would reply to its enemy by using, in secretary of state John Foster Dulles' words, "a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." Canada's secretary of state for external affairs publicly expressed his concern: "From our point of view, it is important that the 'our' in this statement should mean those who have agreed, particularly in NATO, to work together and by collective action, to prevent war or, if that should fail, to win it."⁴⁰ Lester Pearson's remarks reflected his private fears about American military impetuosity and the desire to view and control the American military alliance within a broader North Atlantic framework.

Such comments were seldom made publicly. Nor were there many other Canadians who criticized American foreign and defence policy during the mid-1950s. More often journalists and analysts depicted the United States as a chivalrous giant boldly and generously bearing the burdens of free world defence. The country "was perhaps as relaxed in an alliance as it has ever been before or since."⁴¹ In 1956, when the USSR tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and brutally crushed the Hungarian rebellion, Canadians clung ever more tightly to their neighbour and ally. Nineteen fifty-six, it is true, was also the year of a pipeline debate which aroused much concern about the American economic presence in Canada. There were some bitter words about American economic aggressiveness uttered in the House of Commons and elsewhere, but there was no repudiation of the Canadian-American alliance. James Eayrs solemnly warned Canadians that they might be forced to give up their independence in the face of compelling international danger. At such moments sovereignty would become "supremely irrelevant."⁴²

In this atmosphere, Canada's willingness to permit the United States to build and man radar stations across the Canadian North is understandable. Equally understandable is the alacrity with which the new Diefenbaker government, despite some anti-American rhetoric in the election campaign, entered into the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957. This compact made explicit the symbiotic relationship of Canadian and American air defence. It also meant much more, and Diefenbaker made commitments whose impact he did not appreciate. Perhaps he can be excused, for many aspects of the agreement and of the events which followed remain controversial today. For our purposes, NORAD's importance lies in the integration of the military command structure which it achieved and the decay of the Canadian-American alliance to which it soon contributed.

NORAD had come at a moment when Canada was at a crossroads in deciding not simply a military strategy but also a national direction. Canada's new supersonic fighter, the AVRO Arrow, represented a major technological innovation and national achievement, but it was simply too expensive for the Canadian forces alone. The government cancelled it. Aware of its large air defence responsibilities, the government decided to buy Bomarc missiles and F-101 aircraft from the United States as an alternative. The United States made such decisions easier in 1958 by entering a Defence Development and Production Sharing Agreement which in effect gave Canadian manufacturers access to the United States market. The price was considerable integration with, and dependence upon, that market.

The Bomarc presented the Canadian government with a serious problem which it seemed only dimly aware of when it first bought the missiles. To be effective Bomarcs needed nuclear warheads, and these were unacceptable to Diefenbaker's external affairs minister, Howard Green. Defence minister Douglas Harkness, on the other hand, wanted the weapons and believed that Canada was obligated to accept them because of its NATO and NORAD commitments. Compromise within the cabinet became impossible. As Diefenbaker procrastinated, the Liberal opposition contented itself with denouncing the government's division and indecision. Diefenbaker began to blame the United States for the quandry in which he found himself. President John F. Kennedy responded by showing his personal dislike for Diefenbaker all too obviously. When the Canadian prime minister refused to give automatic support to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the United States could not contain its anger within normal diplomatic boundaries.

In early January 1963 the retiring NATO commander, American general Lauris Norstad, told the press at Ottawa airport that Canada was not keeping its promises to the alliance. The leader of the opposition, Lester Pearson, seized the moment, announcing that the Liberal party, if elected, would accept nuclear weapons. For Pearson's critics, it was a betrayal of a distinguished career in the search for peace. In the uproar which followed, the divisions within the Conservative Party widened. The United States State Department then issued an extraordinary statement which took direct issue with the prime minister's explanation of the nature of the crisis. Diefenbaker's credibility crumbled; so did his government. The Liberals won the election which followed in April 1963. In the bitter campaign, Diefenbaker charged that the State Department and the American president were working to defeat him. The Liberals and most commentators ridiculed Diefenbaker's charges, arguing that the question was one of keeping commitments. The journalist Pierre Berton, for example, justified his support of Pearson's nuclear stand on this basis: "To earn a reputation we must stop the pretence, the indecision, the fence straddling, the welshing and the double-dealing which characterized our relations with our partners. If this election proves anything it proves that anti-Americanism is finished as a political issue. We have cast our lot with this continent for better or worse and the people know it."⁴³

Pierre Berton was soon most unwilling to accept that Canada had cast its lot with such finality. Vietnam intervened, and anti-Americanism abounded in the public utterances of Canadians. In 1965 a former American ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, and a former Canadian ambassador to the United States, Arnold Heeney, published a report entitled Principles for Partnership, which declared that differences between the two countries should be settled in private. This recommendation, which described what had normally taken place in the 1940s and 1950s, provoked a strong negative reaction. Was Canada to remain silent while the United States destroyed Vietnam? Canadians increasingly thought it should not.

Canada's reservations about the United States war in South-East Asia were first expressed privately, in the time-honoured style of quiet diplomacy that Merchant and Heeney had celebrated. Prime Minister Pearson and external affairs minister Paul Martin initially questioned only the method and the scale of the American intervention. Their views were not taken seriously in Washington. In April 1965, therefore,

Pearson went to Temple University in Philadelphia and publicly called upon the United States to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in order that the possibility of negotiations might be explored. This tentative move so angered president Lyndon Johnson that he summoned Pearson to his Camp David retreat and berated him in a fashion that shocked the Canadian leader. Although Pearson and Johnson both subsequently tried to mend their personal relations, they were unsuccessful. Canada's influence in Washington was much diminished, and the government's general support of American policies in South-East Asia was further weakened. In September 1967 Martin called for an unconditional halt to American bombing. The government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, elected in 1968, sustained the criticism. In 1971 and 1972 Canada condemned the escalation of the air war. On 5 January 1973, external affairs minister Mitchell Sharp led parliament in adopting a nearly unanimous motion deploring America's Vietnam policy.

Canadians and Americans were growing apart in other ways. Canadians became more troubled about United States influence upon their economy,⁴⁴ and their governments moved cautiously to limit their reliance. Economic nationalism expressed itself in the federal budget of 1963 and in the Watkins and Gray Reports, which recommended sterner controls upon American investment. In August 1971, President Nixon announced his "new economic policy" and imposed a ten percent import surcharge, refusing to exempt his country's major trading partner. For the leader of Canada's Conservative party, it was all too much. The old assumptions were comfortable but false: "Canada is out in the cold as far as the special privileged relationship ... is concerned."⁴⁵ Nixon's action, in the more measured words of the Canadian foreign secretary, "threw into sharp focus the problem of Canada's vulnerability which has been a source of growing preoccupation to Canadians in recent years."⁴⁶

It was to reduce that vulnerability that Mitchell Sharp spoke in 1972 of a "third option" in Canadian-American relations, "a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life."⁴⁷ A Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was set up in 1974 to determine if foreign investment served the national interest; a federal government oil company, Petro-Canada, was established the next year; from 1976 the government allowed tax deductions only for advertising on Canadian radio and television stations, thus curtailing the use for that purpose of American border stations by Canadian businesses. The third option, admittedly, was honoured more

in the breach than in the observance. This was hardly surprising, given the size, importance and proximity of the United States and the complexity of the relationship. The significance of the third option lay in its rhetoric and the policy direction it espoused. Both would have been unthinkable in even a demi-official foreign policy document in the heyday of the alliance -- only a few years before.

In the 1980s the rhetoric grew more heated, and the policy direction more pronounced. Trudeau had fallen from power in 1979, but his return in 1980 led to stronger "Canadianization" programmes, especially in the crucial area of energy. The popular National Energy Programme, calling for fifty percent Canadian ownership of the petroleum industry by 1990, was directed against the United States and its massive oil companies. The strengthening of FIRA was rumoured. Washington reacted angrily. Congressmen threatened retaliation. American investors hit back by limiting the flow of new investments to Canada. American newspapers carried regular tales of a Canada no longer reasonable and neighbourly. Even that traditional champion of Canadian interests, the New York Times, no longer professed support for "Dear Canada."⁴⁸ There were serious disagreements over the environment, fisheries, communications and wider questions of foreign policy. Hostile bureaucracies faced one another with a "philosophic self-righteousness that leaves neither side particularly inclined toward compromise."⁴⁹ The "differences that strain Canadian-American relations today," the historian H.V. Nelles argued, "are more profound than at any time in living memory."⁵⁰ Obviously Canadians agreed. In 1966 only eight percent thought Canada and the United States were "getting further apart." In 1970 that figure was 28 percent. By 1976 it was 38 percent. In 1982 it is a whopping 49 percent.⁵¹ Another national poll showed that the same number -- 49 percent -- had little or no confidence in the ability of the United States to handle current world problems.⁵²

The special relationship had clearly ended. Ties with the United States would remain of necessity (in Trudeau's words) broad and deep and close,⁵³ but the relationship of the future would not be characterized by the regard and understanding of the past. The decline of American power relative to its allies and competitors, the winding down of the Cold War, an increasing Canadian resentment of American influence on the Canadian economy, and a renewed scepticism about the values of American society and about the good will inherent in American foreign policy aims all contributed to the fading of the alliance. Perhaps fear -- of military

defeat, of economic depression, of cultural immaturity -- had played too large a part in creating the ties which bound the two nations.

For many Canadians a moral twilight had always surrounded the Canadian-American relationship. During the Cold War Canadians had seen mainly the light; in the 1960s the darkness came suddenly. Novelist Mordecai Richler reflected the change of atmosphere. At one time, Richler admitted in 1968, he welcomed "the day when [the frontiers] might disappear and we would join fully in the American adventure." No longer would he rejoice: "Vietnam and Ronald Reagan, among other things, have tempered my enthusiasm. Looked at another way, yes, we are nicer. And suddenly that's important."⁵⁴ In 1968 Ronald Reagan was governor of California; today he is, for Canadians, a controversial American president. Vietnam has taken its place (not simply for Canadians, of course) in a lengthy compendium -- from Dallas through Watergate to Abscam -- which has "stripped America of its essential illusion that invincible power and limitless wealth were its God-given instruments for the creation of a great society in a better world." "How strange and unfamiliar it is," the political commentator Dalton Camp concluded, "to look upon the Great Republic without awe, admiration, or envy, but with unease, dismay, and perhaps pity."⁵⁵

As the relationship with the United States became even more difficult, the Trudeau government was bringing the Canadian constitution home from Great Britain, where it had resided since the beginning of the new nation in 1867. The constitutional issue precipitated a lively debate, at home and in Britain, that had more to do with domestic than foreign policy. Still, it was a reminder, and not always a happy one, of the once dominant British aspects of Canadian history. The ending of one of the last formal ties with the mother country was also an apt symbol for the 1980s: for good or ill, Canada and Canadians were more on their own than they had ever been.

Notes

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3. Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies (2 vols.; Toronto, 1977-1981), I, 1-2.

4. D.G. Creighton, "Macdonald and the Anglo-Canadian Alliance" in his Towards the Discovery of Canada (Toronto, 1972), 22-3.
5. D.C. Masters, Reciprocity, 1846-1911 (Ottawa, 1969), 15.
6. Quoted in Heath MacQuarrie, "Robert Borden and the Election of 1911," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXV, 3 (August 1959), 285.
7. Acts of Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 9-10 Edward VII, 1910 (Ottawa, 1910), chapter 43, 5, paragraphs 22-4.
8. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 April 1910.
9. D.G. Creighton, "The Decline and Fall of the Empire of the St. Lawrence," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers, 1969, 20-1.
10. King was prime minister from 1921-1926, 1926-1930 and 1935-1948. He was secretary of state for external affairs for all of those years until 1946, when the two offices were separated.
11. Public Archives of Canada. King Diary, 1 October 1923.
12. Stacey, II, 135.
13. Quoted in ibid., 243.
14. Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," International Journal, XXXIII, 3 (September 1978), 596-597.
15. Ibid., 598; Public Archives of Canada, RG 25 D-1, vol. 755, file 239 (II-B-81), Department of External Affairs, "Canadian Defence Commitments," 19 February 1936.
16. RG 25 D-1, vol. 755, file 239 (II-B-81), Department of External Affairs, "Canadian Defence Commitments," 19 February 1936. See also Hillmer, 598-599.
17. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 31 March, 9 September 1939.
18. Public Record Office, Kew, England, Cabinet Records (CAB) 99/28, Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 5 May 1944.

19. See Stacey, II, chapters 8-9.
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21. "Straight Talk From Mike Pearson," Maclean's Magazine, 15 October 1949. Quoted in Anne Trowell Hillmer, "Canadian Policy on the Partition of Palestine, 1947", unpublished masters thesis, Carleton University, 1981, 171.
22. Robert Bothwell, "Canada and the Cold War," unpublished manuscript.
23. Robert Bothwell, Pearson: His Life and World (Toronto, 1978), 80.
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25. Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma (Toronto, 1980), 156.
26. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (3 vols.; Toronto, 1972-1975), II, 228.
27. Quoted in Eayrs, Suez, 178.
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29. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order (2 vols; Toronto, 1979-1982), II, 379; Bothwell, Pearson, 82-83.
30. Laurence W. Martin, "Defence in the Anglo-Canadian Relationship" and Arthur J.R. Smith, "Historical Perspective on Canada-United Kingdom Economic Relationships", in Peter Lyon, ed., Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship (London, 1976), chapters 8 and 9.
31. Lord Garner, "Britain and Canada in the 1940s and 1950," in ibid., 103.
32. King Diary, 8 November 1935.
33. See Robert Bothwell and Norman Hillmer, The In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy in the 1930s (Toronto, 1975), 145, 166-170.
34. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28 April 1941.

35. Bank of Canada Papers, Postwar Reconstruction and Relief, file 220-25. Graham Towers to Norman Robertson, 6 October 1942.
36. J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds., The Mackenzie King Record (4 vols; Toronto, 1960-1970), IV, 273.
37. Recent research has shown that the Canadians exaggerated the United States' zeal for closer military and economic ties and that Professor Creighton's claim that there was an "intimate military alliance" made between the United States and Canada in 1946 and 1947 is misleading. Creighton's account is based on a misinterpretation of American motives and Canadian responses. See Joseph Jockel, "The United States and Canadian Efforts at Continental Air Defence, 1945-1947", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1978. Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto, 1976), 138-40.
38. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto, 1980), 66.
39. Quoted in ibid., 219.
40. L.B. Pearson, "A Look at the 'New Look,'" Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches 54/16. See also Holmes, II, 200-1.
41. Holmes, II, 221.
42. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches: Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto, 1961), 15-16.
43. Maclean's Magazine, 6 April 1963.
44. See the opinion poll evidence cited in Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," International Perspectives (Autumn 1972), 11.
45. Quoted in John Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1971 (Toronto, 1972), 245-6.
46. Sharp, 8.
47. Ibid., 1.
48. H.V. Nelles, "The Unfriendly Giant," Saturday Night, February 1982, 28.

49. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), "Report on Business," 13 February 1982.
50. Nelles, 28.
51. The Citizen, (Ottawa), 24 February 1982. Only eighteen percent thought that the two countries were drawing closer together, half the 1966 figure.
52. The Citizen, (Ottawa), 10 April 1982.
53. Saywell, 248.
54. "The North American Pattern," in A.W. Purdy, ed., The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the U.S. (Edmonton, 1968), 15.
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UNREQUITED FAITH: RECRUITING THE CEF 1914-1918

[Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge]

Few episodes in Canadian history left more lasting scars on national unity than the Conscription Crisis of 1917. Before the war-time government of Sir Robert Borden invoked the Military Service Act to keep the Canadian Corps up to strength, three years of recruiting campaigns had exhausted every appeal to pride, patriotism, escape and shame. Most historians have treated the recruiting campaigns as a mismanaged failure. Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge have taken a second look at efforts which drew half a million volunteers from a predominantly native born and rural population of less than eight million.

In what is perhaps the first detailed, statistical analysis of Canadian recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the First World War, Brown and Loveridge look closely at regional variations, the role of the old militia and new voluntary agencies and the factors which eventually drove the government to conscript men for overseas service.

On the morning of October 2, 1914 some thirty thousand Canadian soldiers found themselves crowded into thirty ships lying at anchor in Gaspé Basin, impatiently waiting the assembly of warships which would escort them to war. Those on deck soon spotted the imposing figure of Colonel Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence, in full uniform, proceeding in a launch from ship to ship. Colonel Sam, never one to miss an occasion for attention-grabbing, was passing out thick bundles of his farewell message to his boys. "Soldiers" the valedictory proudly proclaimed, "The world regards you as a marvel."

By now the men of the First Contingent were all too familiar with Colonel Hughes penchant for exaggeration. Among them were hundreds of recent immigrants who had served in the British army. They, at least, knew that a few weeks of drill and rifle practice had not made the Canadians into the efficient fighting force they would one day be. The Minister's message, the official historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Force records, was received "with mixed feelings."¹

That did not matter to Hughes. His 900 word statement was intended for another, more important, audience. Carefully worked into the patriotic prose and inspirational verse was his account of the miracle of Valcartier; how he, not quite single handedly, had created a training camp on the sandy banks of Jacques Cartier River a few miles from Quebec City and assembled there the eager volunteers from the cities, towns and farms of Canada.

Within six weeks you were at your homes peaceful Canadian citizens. Since then your training camp has been secured; three and a half miles of rifle ranges -- twice as long as any other in the world -- were constructed; fences were removed; water of the purist quality was laid in miles of pipes; drainage was perfected; electric light was installed; crops were harvested; roads and bridges were built; Ordnance and Army Service Corps buildings were erected; railway sidings were laid down, woods were cleared; sanitation was perfected so that illness was practically unknown, and thirty-three thousand men were assembled from points some of them upwards of four thousand miles apart. You have been perfected in rifle shooting and today are as fine a body -- Officers and Men -- as ever faced a foe.²

Four years later, at 6:30 on the morning of November 11, Canadian Corps Headquarters was advised that all hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. At the appointed hour an unaccustomed, almost eerie quiet settled over the lines. The first moment of victory was a time for reflection. In England, a Canadian soldier, recuperating from his wounds, wrote that "the people are taking the good news very quietly ... Nearly every family has lost someone, and a great many two or three sons."³ And, despite the joyous celebrations that erupted from Halifax to Victoria a few hours later, so it must have been in the hundreds of thousands of Canadian families which had sent one or more of their boys to war.

So much had changed since Colonel Hughes had directed his launch to and fro in Gaspé Basin. His original contingent had grown into a Corps of four divisions and supporting arms, commanded, after June 1917, by a civilian soldier from Canada, Lt. General Sir Arthur W. Currie.⁴ Hughes himself was no longer Minister of Militia and Defence, having been fired by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, in November 1916. His Department was now run by Major General S.C. Mewburn, a Liberal member of Borden's Union Government, and its staff had grown from 919 employees in 1914 to more than 5700 administrators, clerks and typists. Since Hughes' departure,

many of them worked in a separate Ministry of Overseas Forces with headquarters in London.⁵ The voluntary recruiting that supported the CEF through the first years of the war had been replaced by conscription in 1917. On Armistice Day 105,016 conscripts were available for service of whom 96,379 were on strength and 47,509 had already proceeded overseas.⁶ One of Hughes' inspirations, a "Shell Committee" to act as an agency for British munitions contracts in Canada, had been undermined by scandal and replaced, late in 1915, by the Imperial Munitions Board, directed by businessman Sir Joseph Flavelle and employing thousands of men and women in munitions production.⁷

When Hughes issued his first chaotic call for troops the nation was in the midst of a sharpening depression. Manufacturers reported that their plants were operating at less than fifty percent of capacity. Local correspondents of the Labour Gazette detailed the news of young men on the move everywhere, going from town to town, looking for a job. By 1918 the munition workers in Flavelle's factories were only a tiny fraction of an industrial army, working overtime in plants and mines, in a booming war economy. And Canada's farmers were producing and selling more agricultural products, at higher prices, than they ever had before. By 1917 there were serious shortages of manpower in the factories and on the farms of Canada, shortages as threatening to the war effort as the reinforcement crisis in the CEF which forced the passage of the Military Service Act.⁸

The manpower crisis had its roots in the hasty, unlimited commitments made by the Borden Government in August, 1914. The first was a decision to send whatever number of men were needed overseas to fight. Characteristically, Hughes announced in New York City on October 7, 1914, that "we could send enough men to add the finishing touches to Germany without assistance either from England or France."⁹ In Halifax in December Borden was more moderate but equally sanguine about his military manpower policy. Would, he was asked, the expeditionary force eventually reach 100,000 men? "I prefer to name no figure," he replied. "If the preservation of our Empire demands twice or thrice that number, we shall ask for them."¹⁰

That was easy to do in the winter of 1914-15. Borden, like his counterparts in London and Paris still anticipated a quick, decisive victory. And, up to that time, the countless hours he had spent trying to boost production in Canada with orders from the Allies for war material had yielded only disappointing results. The second commitment made in August, 1914, to seize the opportunities of war to revive the Canadian economy, remained an empty dream.

There was one more pledge that was easy to give in December, 1914. As Borden talked about raising men for the CEF, he observed that "Canada will answer the call as readily and as fully as its men [have] volunteered since August. There has not been, there will not be, compulsion or conscription."¹¹

The commitments to raise as many men and produce as many goods as necessary never changed during the Great War. But, as the war dragged on, with such an appalling wastage of manpower, and as war production steadily increased, it became ever more difficult to recruit men for military service. An examination of the administration of military manpower policy during the war and its relationship to the demand for labour in factories and on farms provides an interesting insight into the history of the CEF. It is not possible, in this short essay, to survey recruiting for all units of the CEF. Instead, we will analyse the recruiting of infantry battalions, the largest single portion of the Expeditionary Force. Unlike earlier discussions of this subject, our study will be based on the effective military force, i.e., the men shipped overseas, rather than on the men who enlisted for service, of whom tens of thousands were discharged in Canada for a variety of reasons.¹²

* * *

The raising of the First Contingent under the personal direction of Colonel Hughes was marked by confusion and chaos. Discarding a prepared plan of mobilization in the Military Districts across Canada, the Minister initially ordered each Local Militia unit commander to enroll men for a divisional contingent and send nominal rolls to Ottawa. There followed a flurry of amendments, additions and contrary instructions which confused and exasperated the local and District Officers as they tried to process the eager applicants for overseas service. Eventually 30,621 men, including 19,299 in 17 CEF infantry battalions and another 1071 in a separately organized battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, found their way to the ships awaiting escort in Gaspé Basin.¹³

The men came from 130 Militia units from every region of Canada. Significantly, more than sixty percent were raised in urban areas and almost half of the men, 48.4%, came from western Canada where the effects of the depression were most severe. Another 31.3% came from heavily industrialized Ontario.¹⁴ Many of these soldiers were among the tens of thousands of unemployed men who had been looking for work

in the summer of 1914. For them the army at least would provide shelter, clothing, food and \$1.10 a day. Even measured against the hazards of military life, that was better than the prospect of spending another bitter winter on the streets of Canada's cities.

The other remarkable fact about the First Contingent was that sixty percent of its men had been born in the British Isles. Undoubtedly many of them had a more profound sense of the threat the war posed to the Empire than did young Canadians of military age. But unemployment also affected their decisions to enlist. Canada was a nation of immigrants and more than ten percent of the population came from the British Isles. A very large proportion of these British immigrants were single males of military age and this was especially true in the western provinces where the number and proportion of single British-born males far exceeded that in any of the eastern provinces.¹⁵ Unemployment, therefore, and a comparatively large number of single British-born males in the population, in large measure account for the extraordinary large contribution that the western provinces made to the manpower of the First Contingent and to the next phase of voluntary recruiting.

The second phase of voluntary recruiting, for First Contingent reinforcements and a second contingent, began before the first men had reached England. It was far more orderly than the first. Perhaps the chaos at Valcartier convinced Hughes that a more systematic approach was necessary; perhaps his absence in England, leaving the administration of his Department in the more capable hands of Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, and Major-General Eugene Fiset, the Deputy Minister, explained the change. In any case, preliminary mobilization and training of recruits was delegated to the local militia units in the Military Districts.

Over the next eleven months, through September, 1915, seventy-one infantry battalions were authorized. Thirty-four of them not only recruited a full battalion but also sent one or more drafts of some 250 men overseas. Only two, the 70th from Essex, Kent, Lambton and Middlesex Counties in Ontario and the 57th from Quebec City, failed to send a full strength battalion overseas. Again the largest number of men came from western Canada, 41.4% of the total, closely followed by Ontario's contribution of 38.3%. Twelve percent of the men raised in the second phase of recruiting came from Quebec in four French and six English-speaking battalions. Eight percent of the men were recruited in the Maritime Provinces in six full strength battalions, two of which also sent extra drafts overseas.¹⁶

In the Quebec and western military districts a clear distinction between recruiting in urban and non-urban areas developed at the beginning of this period and it was beginning to emerge in Districts One and Two in Ontario by the end of the period. Seventy percent of the men raised in Quebec and sixty percent in the western provinces were enrolled in battalions which recruited exclusively in urban areas. In Ontario this type of recruiting did not begin until June 1915 and twenty percent of the 34,352 infantrymen sent overseas from the Province in this phase were raised in Toronto, Hamilton and London battalions.

This phase of recruiting also had its problems. Initial training was hindered by lack of equipment for several battalions. "The training of a unit cannot be pushed far when it has no equipment," an Inspector-General reported of the 58th Battalion at Niagara-on-the-Lake. "1/3 of men have no clothing, 1/2 or more have no shirts. They are short of boots and have no ammunition." Severe weather, winter quartering and the departure of local militia officers for overseas service further set back training schedules as did a serious outbreak of spinal meningitis in units at Toronto's Canadian National Exhibition grounds and in Belleville in the winter of 1914-15. Beyond that, the militia officers training the raw recruits had to cope with major disciplinary problems. Three hundred men had to be discharged from the 25th and 130 from the 26th battalions in the Maritimes. In several Ontario units a ten percent wastage of manpower because of misconduct discharges was reported. The 41st, a singularly ill-fated Quebec battalion, had 88 NCO's and other ranks absent without leave on the day the Inspector-General appeared.¹⁷

The other responsibility of the militia units, mobilization of recruits, was equally troublesome. Raising a battalion for overseas service was an expensive business and, apart from the equipment supplied -- in due course! -- by the Government of Canada, the costs had to be borne by the local units. One estimate came to more than \$13,000:

Advertising	\$ 2,554
Dodgers, Letters, etc.	1,690
Street cars	464
Postage	220
Signs for depots, etc.	850
Office supplies, telephone, rent, etc.	930
Autos, repairs, etc.	656
Sundries	520
Brass & Bugle Bands	2,000
2 Field Kitchens	2,500
Misc.	1,000
	<u>\$13,384</u>

Regimental funds were quickly dissipated and fund raising appeals had to be launched in the community to cover the costs of recruiting.

Moreover, after the Spring of 1915, when casualty lists became a daily feature in the press, the realization dawned that there was not going to be a decisive battle: the war was going to be long and difficult, and characterized by a shocking wastage of manpower at the Front. Now some members of the Militia and self-appointed spokesmen for the "better elements" in society banded together in Speakers Patriotic Leagues and Recruiting Leagues to assist the Militia's recruiting efforts. But these organizations became increasingly outspoken in their criticism of Militia recruiting. The job of mobilization and training was too big and too expensive for the Militia to handle. Far more men were going to be needed to fight the Kaiser and a much greater and more efficient recruiting effort was necessary. The logic of the argument, some spokesmen added, was a more centralized recruiting effort, more direct support from the Department of Militia and Defence, and a scheme of national registration to rationalize recruiting and, perhaps, as a prelude to conscription.¹⁹

The response from Ottawa was in exactly the opposite direction. Why not, the Government's new recruiting policy seemed to ask, capitalize upon popular clamour for men by handing the responsibility for raising battalions over to these zealous patriots? In the fall of 1915 the Department announced that henceforth the local regiments of Militia would be bypassed in the recruiting effort and that individual citizens and communities would be authorized to raise battalions on their own if they would assume the costs of recruiting.

Given a direct role to play, the patriots, especially in the West and in Ontario, responded with unprecedented energy. 123,966 men, in 170 battalions, were sent overseas in the final phase of voluntary recruiting from October 1915 to October 1917. Sixty battalions, 33.9% of the total, were raised in the western provinces and another 75 battalions, 42.4% of the total, in Ontario. Far fewer men were recruited in the Maritimes and Quebec, but even in these regions the battalions organized, fifteen in the Maritimes and thirteen in Quebec, exceeded the number recruited by the Local Militia units in the preceding phase.²⁰ At first glance this patriotic phase of recruiting, with the initiative in the hands of neither local nor central military authorities, appears to have been a triumphant vindication of voluntarism and local enthusiasm.

A closer look changes the perspective. 72,296 men, almost sixty percent of the total, were raised in the first three months of this two year period. Another thirty-eight percent were recruited in the next six months, following Sir Robert Borden's announcement on New Year's Day, 1916, that the authorized force level for the CEF had been raised to a half-million men. Then, from July 1916 to October 1917, a mere 2810 men were raised and sent overseas in infantry battalions. The last infantry battalion for CEF service, the 258th, was organized in Quebec in April 1917 by Colonel Pierre-Édouard Blondin, Postmaster General in Borden's Government. It embarked in October with 231 men. Blondin's experience was not unique. The last Maritime battalion, organized in August, 1916, sent 247 men overseas and the last western battalion, the 251st, raised in Winnipeg, embarked with four officers and 168 other ranks.²¹ In short, in the final phase of voluntary recruiting, enthusiasm peaked in the last three months of 1915 and then quickly evaporated. Save for Blondin's effort, not a single infantry battalion was organized in the 13 months from November 1916 to the first call up of conscripts in January, 1918.

What had happened? A large part of the problem can be attributed directly to the mode of recruiting authorized in the final phase. Lacking central organization and control, the citizens raising battalions engaged in ruinous competition for men. Three battalions were organized in Toronto in December, 1915, another in January 1916 and six more in February, 1916. In that same month at least six battalions were recruiting in Winnipeg and three in Edmonton. In the Militia phase of recruiting only two battalions, 2.8% of the total, failed to recruit to full strength. In the patriotic phase, 120 battalions, 73.6% of the total, were sent overseas at less than full strength and ten battalions, 6.1% of the total, were disbanded. Even appeals to men to enlist in special identity battalions seldom worked. Thirty-eight such units, Highlanders, Sportsmen, Bantams, Chums, Pals, Frontiersmen and others, were organized in this phase. Ten of them, including five Highland battalions and one "Dry" battalion from Winnipeg, were raised to full strength. But six others had to be disbanded and the remainder were all under strength.

Unbridled competition had other devastating effects. As soon as men were raised by a battalion's organizers they were sent back to the streets to recruit their friends. Even the most elemental training suffered. The 240th was raised in Lanark and Renfrew Counties in June, 1916. In May, 1917 the Officer commanding Military District 3 wrote:

At the time this unit was formed, recruiting was not very brisk and consequently the efforts of all of the officers were devoted to securing men. As recruits were obtained they themselves were used as recruiting agents especially among their own acquaintances. Training, therefore, was not performed on any extensive scale ... The Commanding Officer appeared to consider training of very secondary importance and he devoted much of his time to recruiting both for his own and Forestry Battalions.²²

The battalion was sent overseas two weeks later with 389 men.

Discipline suffered even more. The Inspectors General's reports tell a dismal tale. The 145th and 146th, both in training at Valcartier in the late summer of 1916, each lost a hundred or more men in five weeks between inspections. The 180th, an Ontario battalion, had 336 men away without leave when it was inspected and 300 men missed parade when the 199th, a Quebec battalion, was inspected. A western battalion, the 210th, recruited 1020 men, 782 were left when it was inspected; 152 had been discharged and 59 had deserted. Two months later, almost 300 more had disappeared. Only 500 officers and men embarked for overseas.²³ Understrength, poorly trained, lacking discipline, the Inspectors General repeatedly recommended that battalions raised in this phase of recruiting be sent overseas as drafts to be amalgamated into previously organized battalions.

But an unorganized recruiting system and competition between battalions for men were not the only problems encountered by recruiters in the patriotic phase. By the winter of 1915-1916 the Government's plans for domestic war production were falling into place and there was a steadily rising demand for manpower in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. An Inspector General noted that recruiting for the 232nd, a Saskatchewan battalion, had been "very poor." "The reason assigned, [was] not so much the scarcity of men in the country but to the demand for labour at an excessively high rate of wages."²⁴ This was true across rural Canada and especially in the west where wages for farm labour skyrocketed in the latter war years and elaborate schemes were developed to import agricultural workers from the United States.²⁵

It was no less true in Canada's cities where, as in the earlier phases of recruiting, the recruitment of men for the CEF was concentrated. By late 1915 war contracts were accumulating in ever increasing number; the Shell Committee

had been replaced by an agency of the British Ministry of Munitions, the Imperial Munitions Board, and hundreds of contracts for military supplies for the Canadian Government were being distributed by the War Purchasing Commission.²⁶ The result was a remarkable explosion of industrial activity in every region of Canada, accompanied by corresponding growth in other sectors of the economy from mining to transportation to finance.

Because government statisticians used different bases to measure the number of industrial workers employed before 1917, no reliable figures on the size of the industrial workforce are available for the early war years. But Department of Labour estimates of unemployment among unionized workers indicate unemployment of union workers was below the national average in Halifax, St. John, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, and Edmonton in at least 7 of the 11 quarters from June 1916 to December 1918. Other indicators point to a similar trend. Between 1915 and 1917 the average rate of return on capital invested in manufacturing increased in every province; it doubled in Quebec, more than doubled in Nova Scotia and Ontario and almost tripled in Manitoba and Alberta. Using 1917 as a base year, value added to manufacturing increased more than 10% nationwide in 1918 and by 12% in Ontario and Saskatchewan, 16% in New Brunswick and 35% in British Columbia.²⁷ Crude as these indicators are, they strongly suggest that industrial production, and its consequent draw on manpower in the urban areas of Canada, rose sharply from 1916 on and cut deeply into the potential manpower supply for military service.

The organizers of infantry battalions, therefore, not only had to compete for men among themselves, but also with the factories and shops of Canada. Beyond that, as the Canadian Corps grew in size and responsibility, opportunities for enlistment in other branches of the service, many of them considerably less risky than the infantry, expanded greatly, as did recruiting activity for the British flying services, the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps.²⁸ The result was a precipitate decline in enrollment in infantry battalions in urban areas, ending with the meagre contribution, after June, 1916, of 172 men from Winnipeg and 297 from Toronto.

Rural areas, where farmers were constantly badgered by the Government to increase their acreage and production did no better. The five non-urban battalions raised in Ontario after June 1916 contributed a total of 1124 men, the strength of a single battalion, to overseas service. In western Canada only one battalion, the 249th in Saskatchewan, was recruited after June 1916. In the following year it sent 550 men to Quebec for further training.²⁹

But, if the Government's military manpower and war-time production policies were working against each other, and if infantry recruiting had collapsed by the late spring of 1916, why did the Government wait for another year to introduce the Military Service Act? Many factors delayed the decision. The Government, for example, seems to have based its military manpower policy upon monthly enlistment figures which grossly understated the forthcoming infantry manpower crisis by taking no account of wastage through discharge or desertion during the training of men in Canada.³⁰ But even the use of embarkation rather than enlistment statistics could have been misleading. Because of the long period of time between the date when a battalion was recruited and it embarked, thousands of men recruited in late 1915 and early 1916 were only being sent overseas in late 1916 and early 1917. Thus, Borden and his colleagues could easily have concluded in the spring of 1917 that the infantry manpower crisis was less serious than, in fact, it was. Finally, as depressing as earlier casualty rates were, it was only in 1917 that the fully developed Corps, fighting as a complete unit, suffered casualties at a truly alarming rate.

Borden made the fateful decision to impose conscription during his trip home from the Imperial War Cabinet meetings in the late spring of 1917. At those meetings, and in private talks with Lloyd George and other members of the British Government, he had become privy, for the first time during the war, to the secret information and projections of the British on the duration of the war. Undoubtedly the sombre news influenced his decision. Even more was he influenced by the tragic spectacle of row upon row of bed-ridden wounded Canadian boys in the hospitals he visited in France and Britain. His commitment to their cause and their sacrifice was total and unquestioning. He was answering the "call from the wounded", "the men in the trenches and those who have fallen" he explained on May 18, 1917 when he announced that there would be conscription.³¹

The announcement touched off a furious debate in the House of Commons. The passage of the Military Service Act and the subsequent formation by Borden of a Union Government to implement it have been the subject of equally intense argument among politicians and historians ever since, as they have calculated the effects of conscription upon French-English relations, farmers, trade unions and the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

Some facts are beyond dispute. Among the men of military age in Canada the response was overwhelmingly negative. Of the 401,882 Class I registrants, males aged 20

to 32 who were single or widowers with no children, no less than 93.7% immediately applied for exemption. And tens of thousands more failed to register and became defaulters. The number of registrants who volunteered for service or reported by order in the initial phase of implementation of the Act was tiny, 4.5% of registrants nationally, varying from 10.5% in British Columbia to 1.6% in Quebec. In every province and region of Canada, not just in Quebec, it was evident that popular enthusiasm for military service had been bled dry.³²

Many advocates of conscription argued that a nationally directed compulsory military manpower policy was the only way to achieve a balanced allotment of military responsibilities between sectors of the economy and among regions of the country. Some, playing upon long-standing animosities between French and English Canada, and obsessed by Quebec's low rate of contribution to the voluntary recruiting effort,³³ went further to claim that the Military Service Act would, at last, force French Canadians to assume their share of the military burden. Driven by the passions of war, few were prepared to concede that demographic and historical factors went far to explain why Quebec (and, to a lesser extent the Maritime Provinces) had contributed comparatively fewer soldiers to the war effort than Ontario and the western provinces. As noted above, the voluntary recruiting system, at least in its first and second phases, was dependent upon the local militia units and was heavily biased in favour of recruiting single men. The significantly higher proportion of single males of military age, both native Canadians and British immigrants, in the West and in Ontario, and the deep roots of the militia in Ontario society help to account for the high rates of recruitment in both regions. By contrast, the proportion of males of military age who were married was well above the national average in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces and the militia exercised much less influence in the societies of the Maritime Provinces and had frittered away by neglect whatever modest attractions it had once had in French Canadian society.³⁴ The bias towards recruiting in urban areas also helps to explain why French Canadians failed to respond to the voluntary recruiting effort. Not only did the vast majority of French Canadians live outside the two largest cities of Quebec,³⁵ but only one quarter of the battalions recruited in the Montreal and Quebec districts sought to attract French Canadian recruits.³⁶ In short, in the Maritime provinces, and even more so in Quebec, the smaller proportion of single males of military age in the population, a concentration on urban recruiting and a legacy of neglect of French Canadians in the Militia go far to account for the failure of men in those regions to respond to the voluntary recruiting effort.

Conscription did tend to balance out the military manpower contribution of the regions. Though still below the national average of 5.6% of the military age group made available for service under the Military Service Act, Quebec's contribution of 5% matched Ontario's 5.1% and approximated the 5.5% contribution from the Western Provinces.³⁷ But it was grudgingly given. The number of defaulters was exceedingly high, even when account is taken of confusion in the counting and classification of defaulters in the Hull office of Military District 3 and in Districts 4 and 5.³⁸ Only 1.6% of Quebec's Class I registrants reported for service; 98% applied for exemptions. And Appeal Tribunals rejected only 9.3% of exemption claims as compared with 13% in the Maritime and Western regions and 15% in Ontario.³⁹

Too much, however, can be made of Quebec's, or French Canada's opposition to conscription, implying, as it does, that there was substantially more support for the Military Service Act in other regions of the country. That doubtless was true among the politicians supporting the Union Government and the voters in Ontario and Western Canada in the 1917 election. It certainly was not true among the Class I registrants in any region of the country. Among them, one broadly based group, the farmers of Canada, illustrates the point. In comparative terms they had been left alone during the voluntary phases of recruiting and they were no more willing to be coerced than they had been to be coaxed into military service. Promised exemptions by the Unionist Government candidates in the 1917 election campaign, 97.4% of the farmers who were Class I registrants applied for exemptions. Only 12.6% of those claims were refused by the Tribunals established under the Military Service Act.⁴⁰

The Government's solicitous regard for agrarians apparently came to an abrupt end, however, when Sir Robert Borden announced the cancellation of all exemptions and the call up of all 20-22 year old Class I registrants in April, 1918. Farmers in every region of the country were outraged and charged that the exemption promise had been a cheap political trick. It mattered not that the call up was Borden's response to the roll back of Allied armies before the German spring offensive on the Western Front. A Nova Scotia farmer complained to his Member of Parliament that "this conscripting farmers is the worst slur on the conservative government yet."⁴¹ District registrars for the Military Service Act reported that the cancellation of exemptions was "generally unpalatable", "created a measure of consternation" and a "feeling of resentment" among farmers.⁴²

But the effect of the cancellation upon the farming community was, in fact, not as severe as it appeared. Registrars were instructed to take care to avoid conscripting hardship cases, to grant and renew harvest leaves, and to grant leaves of absence on compassionate grounds. More significant still, registrars were ordered "to call the men with urban addresses in priority to those living in country districts." Reflecting upon the effect of the cancellation in his final report, the registrar in Halifax "did not observe that the farming industry was seriously handicapped by this call, and the fishing industry was very slightly affected. Large industrial concerns in the mining and steel centres were more seriously affected."⁴³

The otherwise comprehensive report of the Director of the Military Service Act does not indicate how many young farmers were called for service as a result of Borden's announcement. But if we assume a constant proportion of 20-22 year old farmers to all 20-22 year olds with exemptions, 31.9%, through the process of cancellation and calling up, then only 17,146 young farmers were called up.⁴⁴ If we add farmers who reported for service and who had exemption claims denied to those whose exemptions were cancelled, 42,098 farmers, 25.3% of farmers who registered, were called for service under the M.S.A. 71,363 non-farmers reported for service or had their exemptions denied or cancelled, 29.1% of non-farmer registrants. In western Canada the bias towards farmers was much sharper. 23.3% of western farmer registrants and 39.3% of non-farmers were called for service.⁴⁵

Thus, if the administration of the Military Service Act tended to bring more balance into the manpower contributions of the regions of Canada, it was less effective in balancing the contribution of farmers and non-farmers to the military manpower effort. In fact, the more liberal policy toward farmers that existed during the voluntary recruiting period was codified in the regulations made under the Military Service Act both before and after the call up of the 20-22 age group. In part the favouritism of agrarians was accidental; voluntary recruiting tended to centre upon urban areas of high population density. In part it was a matter of design; ever increasing agricultural production for export was an essential component of the Government's war policy.

But so too was industrial production for the war effort and our examination of the recruiting of infantry reveals that the conflict between military manpower policy and industrial policy surfaced during the winter and early spring of 1915-1916, long before the agrarians raised their

powerful protest against the Military Service Act. Indeed, given the patterns of voluntary recruiting, that conflict undermined the voluntary recruiting system and precipitated the conscription crisis.

* * *

The history of Canadian manpower policy in the Great War, climaxing in the conscription crisis, has been characterized by a distinguished military historian as a story of "broken promises."⁴⁶ That it was; from Borden's 1914 pledge that there would be no conscription to the 1917 election promise to exempt farmers. Yet, from another perspective, it could just as convincingly be called a story of unrequited faith: faith, initially, that the war would quickly end; faith that the patriotic response of the people of Canada would enable the country to send as many men as necessary to the Front and, at the same time, be a major supplier of war material; faith that even with an inadequate bureaucracy and little planning somehow, somehow, everything would come out right. Most especially, faith in the principle of voluntarism.

In the end, faith was not enough. Applied to the military manpower policy in an ever more decentralized system of voluntary recruiting, it was dashed by the duration of the war, the appalling wastage of men at the Front, and the Canadian Government's own wartime economic policies. But even when coercion became necessary, the legacy of faith in voluntarism tempered the coercive nature of the Military Service Act. Under the liberal exemptions policy in the Act, 86.8% of all claims for exemption were allowed: only 28% of all Class I registrants were called for military service.

Reflecting upon Borden's decision in 1916 to raise the authorized force level of the CEF to 500,000 men, Sir Thomas White, the Minister of Finance, wrote that "We simply went on faith, feeling instinctively that means could be found to enable us to carry it out."⁴⁷ That simple confession spoke volumes about Canada's military manpower policy, from the guns of August to Armistice Day.

Footnotes

The authors would like to thank Miss Barbara Wilson of the Public Archives of Canada for her advice and assistance in the preparation of this essay.

1. Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919, vol. 1, 104. See also Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 31.
2. Cited, Duguid, Official History, Appendices, no. 149, 122-23. For other accounts of the chaos and the accomplishment of the training at Valcartier see Duguid, Official History, chs. 1-2, Nicholson, CEF, ch. II, and Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, vol. 2, 1914-1937, 12-15.
3. Nicholson, CEF, 482-84; Metro Toronto Library, Baldwin Room, Neil Family Papers, "Harry" to "Dear Bros and Sisters", November 10, 1918.
4. On Currie see H.M. Urquhart, Arthur Currie: Biography of a Great Canadian (Toronto, 1950); J.A. Swettenham, To Seize the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World War I, (Toronto, 1965); A.J.M. Hyatt, "Sir Arthur Currie and Conscription: A Soldier's View", Canadian Historical Review, L, 3, September, 1969, 285-96; and R. Craig Brown and Desmond Morton, "The Embarrassing Apotheosis of a 'Great Canadian': Sir Arthur Currie's Personal Crisis in 1917," CHR, LX, 1, March, 1979, 41-63.
5. On the Overseas Ministry see the fine history by Desmond Morton, of the Overseas Ministry and the CEF 1914-1920, (forthcoming, Toronto 1982).
6. Nicholson, CEF, Appendix "E", SS1. Colonel Nicholson's figure of 96,379 on strength includes 16,296 draftees on unexpired harvest or compassionate leave. On conscription and the implementation of the Military Service Act see, inter alia, J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto, 1977). Chs. 1-3; Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921. A Nation Transformed (Toronto, 1974) ch. 13 and Brown, Borden, 2 chs. 8-10.
7. The history of the Imperial Minister's Board is described in David Carnegie, The History of Munitions Supply in Canada 1914-1918 (New York, 1925) and in Michael Bliss's excellent biography, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Times of Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart., 1888-1939 (Toronto, 1978) chs. 10-13 and 15.

8. For a brief sketch of the Canadian economy during the Great War see Brown and Cook, Canada, 1896-1921, ch. 12.
9. Cited, J.C. Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1914, (Toronto, 1915), 217.
10. Cited, Brown, Borden, 2, 22.
11. Ibid.
12. Colonel Duguid's figures indicate that 616,557 enlisted in the CEF, either voluntarily or by compulsion. Of these, 421,510 or 68.4% served overseas. Some explanation of the difference may be found in remarks to the House of Commons by Sir Edward Kemp on July 6, 1917. He then explained that 76,000 of the 425,000 who had volunteered for service had been discharged in Canada. The largest groups discharged were medically unfit (33,887), absentees struck off (13,081) and men "not likely to become efficient (5,345). Duguid, Official History, 51; Canadian Annual Review, 1917, 307, 311.
13. See Appendix "A" and Duguid, Appendices, no. 84, 51-53.
14. In this paper we are not using the contemporary Canada Census distinction between urban and non-urban populations. Instead, we use a much more limited definition of urban recruiting that developed from recruiting patterns from 1914 to 1917, distinguishing between battalions recruited exclusively in defined urban areas and those recruited over larger areas. So defined, our definition of urban includes Quebec City and Montreal in Quebec; Toronto, Hamilton and London in Ontario; Winnipeg and St. Boniface in Manitoba; Regina, Moose Jaw and Saskatoon in Saskatchewan; Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta; and Vancouver, New Westminster and Victoria in British Columbia. The pattern of recruiting is defined in the reports of the Inspectors General on the battalions raised and because no battalions were raised exclusively in urban areas in the Maritime region, all battalions from that region have been classified as non-urban. Obviously, however, this classification, which is necessary for consistent analysis, greatly undervalues the recruitment of men in urban areas across Canada.
15. See Charts A, B and C and 6th Census of Canada, 1921, Vol. 2, Table 24 and Table 25.

16. See Chart D.
17. RG 9, II, B5, vol. 5-7 (Inspectors-General Reports on CEF Battalions), Reports on Battalions 19-86. On the 41st Battalion see Desmond Morton, "The Short Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion, CEF", Queen's Quarterly, LXXXI, Spring, 1974.
18. Canadian Annual Review, 1916, 308.
19. On the Speakers Patriotic League and related organizations see Barbara M. Wilson, editor, Ontario and the First World War, 1914-18, A Collection of Documents, (Toronto, 1977), xxix-xxxvii and 8-21 and R. Matthew Bray, 'Fighting as an Ally': The English-Canadian Patriotic Response to the Great War", CHR, LXI, 2, June, 1980, 141-68.
20. In addition, seven special function Forestry and Railway battalions were raised nationally or in more than one region.
21. Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQ 593-3-25.
(Embarkation Officer's Report for the CEF).
22. PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7. (Inspector General's Reports).
23. PAC, RG 9, II BS, vols. 5-7.
24. PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
25. See The Agricultural Gazette of Canada, III, 1916, 245-48, 351; IV, 1917, 387-93, 493; and V, 1918, 864-67, 940-44 and Eleventh Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture of the Province of Saskatchewan, Regina, 1916. After the entry of the United States into the war in 1917 the supply of American farm labour was greatly restricted. As partial compensation for that, and for the movement of agrarian labourers into the industrial work force in Canada, a "Soldiers of the Soil" movement was organized in most provinces in 1917-18.
26. See, for example, RG 14, D2, vol. 37, Sessional Paper 149, "Second Report of the War Purchasing Commission, Jan 1, 1917 to March 31, 1918" which lists the bidders for and the 2467 contracts awarded during that period.

27. Calculated from quarterly reports in the Labour Gazette, 1916-1919 and from statistics on manufacturing in Canada Year Book, 1922-23, 415-16.
28. See Gilbert N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada Vol. 1, Ottawa, 1952 and S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War; The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Vol. 1, Toronto, 1980.
29. PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
30. See footnote 12.
31. Brown, Borden, II, chs. 7-10.
32. See Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1919, no. 246, 86 and Chart E.
33. Across Canada 12.33% of the military age group (males 15 to 44 years of age in 1911) had enlisted in infantry battalions and embarked for overseas service before the implementation of the Military Service Act. By region the rates were: Maritimes, 9.96%; Quebec, 4.69%; Ontario, 14.42% and Western Canada, 15.52%. See chart A.
34. See Morton, Ministers and Generals, passim and Canada and War. A Military and Political History, Toronto, 1981, chs. 1-2.
35. See 5th Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 2, 357-65.
36. In contrast, in New Brunswick, where recruiting was not concentrated in identifiable urban areas, five of the seven infantry battalions contained large numbers of Acadian recruits.
37. See Chart F.
38. See Sessional Paper 246, 1919, 138-40; 145-48.
39. See Chart E. It should not be assumed that reference to Quebec in this paragraph refers only to French-speaking Canadians living in the Province. The statistics available for administration of the MSA in Quebec do not differentiate between French and English speaking registrants. Moreover, the 98% rate of claims for exemptions indicates the unpopularity of conscription among all Class I registrants.
40. See Chart G.

41. Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia, M.G. 2, E.N. Rhodes Papers, vol. 580, no. 8951, letter to Rhodes, May 9, 1918.
42. Sessional Paper no. 246, 1919, 139, 149, 136.
43. Ibid., 132, 17, 136.
44. Total 20-22 with exemptions = 104,149
Total 20-22 farmers with exemptions = 33,284 or 31.96%
Total 20-22 exemptions cancelled = 65,610
31.96% total = 20,969
Total 20-22 gp. called for service = 53,649
31.96% total = 17,146
45. Calculated from Charts F and G.
46. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, chs. 1-3.
47. Cited, Brown, Borden, II, 34.

CHART A

MILITARY AGE GROUPS:

MALE POPULATION 15-44 YEARS OLD IN 1911

PROVINCE OR REGION	15-44 MALE POPULATION	% TOTAL
PEI	19,715	1.0
Nova Scotia	111,184	5.9
New Brunswick	77,904	4.1
Maritime Provinces	208,803	11.1
Quebec	442,703	23.4
Ontario	638,079	33.9
Manitoba	132,571	7.0
Saskatchewan	167,608	8.9
Alberta	129,444	6.9
British Columbia	162,229	8.6
Western Canada	591,852	31.3
CANADA	1,888,825	100.0

Source: Canada Year Book, 1913, 82-84.

CHART B

MALES 15 AND OVER - CANADIAN, BRITISH
AND FOREIGN BORN IN 1911

PROVINCE OR REGION	NUMBER	% CANADIAN BORN	% BRITISH BORN	% FOREIGN BORN
PEI	31,370	96.68	2.61	.70
Nova Scotia	166,870	89.27	7.58	3.17
New Brunswick	116,626	92.80	4.35	2.84
Maritime Provinces	314,866	91.32	5.88	2.81
Quebec	627,002	89.00	5.46	5.54
Ontario	925,948	71.42	19.42	9.16
Manitoba	172,989	43.21	30.50	26.29
Saskatchewan	206,889	38.61	23.90	37.49
Alberta	162,346	31.30	25.22	43.48
British Columbia	205,657	28.78	34.59	36.62
Western Canada	747,881	35.38	28.65	35.96
CANADA	2,623,820	67.68	17.08	15.24

Source: 6th Census of Canada, 1921, Vol. 2, Table 24, 118-19.

CHART C

SINGLE MALES 15 AND OVER - CANADIAN, BRITISH
AND FOREIGN BORN IN 1911

PROVINCE OR REGION	NUMBER	% CANADIAN BORN	% BRITISH BORN	% FOREIGN BORN
PEI	12,952	97.79	.67	1.54
Nova Scotia	72,600	90.93	5.59	3.49
New Brunswick	50,840	93.92	2.90	3.17
Maritime Provinces	136,392	92.69	4.12	3.18
Quebec	287,115	90.59	3.96	5.44
Ontario	380,689	75.10	16.29	8.61
Manitoba	82,660	55.76	23.76	20.47
Saskatchewan	110,505	44.92	18.93	36.14
Alberta	91,174	37.51	21.34	41.16
British Columbia	84,492	39.17	32.77	28.09
Western Canada	368,831	44.19	23.78	32.03
CANADA	1,175,285	71.18	14.24	14.59

CHART D

STRENGTH OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS RAISED IN CANADA BEFORE MILITARY SERVICE ACT

Time Period of Organization	Full Plus One or More Drafts	Full	Full to Half Strength	Less Than Half Strength	Disbanded	
Aug-Sep 1914 First Contingent 17		16	1 ^x			^x 17th Battalion had sailing strength of 665. Duguid <u>Appendices</u> , #84, pp. 50-51.
Oct 14 - Sep 15 71	37	32	2			
Oct 15 - Dec 15 85		25	52	7	1	
Jan 16 - Jun 16 72	2 [*]	13 ^{**}	29 ^{***}	21	7	⁺ Includes 5 special function battalions raised across Canada.
Jul 16 - 13			3 ^{****}	8	2	^x Excludes 2 battalions raised for Siberia in 1918. ⁺ Includes 2 special function battalions raised across Canada.
258	39	86	87	36	10	

* Both special functions.

** 2 special functions.

*** 1 special function.

**** 2 special functions.

Calculated from RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQS 93-3-25 (Embarkation Reports)

CHART F

INFANTRY MANPOWER MADE AVAILABLE TO CEF AS % OF 15-44 AGE GROUP IN 1911

	15-44 Age Gp in 1911	MSA													
		1st Contingent		Militia Recruiting 10/14 - 1915		Patriotic Recruiting 10/15 - 1917		Made Available for Service		Served in CEF		Total Made Available for CEF		Total Served in CEF	
		Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp	Number	% Age Gp
Maritime Provinces	208803	836	.4	7472	3.6	12476	6.0	14778	7.1	10599	5.1	35582	17.0	31403	18.0
Quebec	442703	3064	.7	10750	2.4	6968	1.6	22288	5.0	19050	4.3	43040	9.7	39832	9.0
Ontario	638709	6044	.9	34376	5.4	51668	8.1	32676	5.1	27087	4.2	124764	19.5	119175	18.7
Western Provinces x	591852	9335	1.6	37105	6.3	45386	7.7	52446	5.5	26619	4.5	124272	20.9	118445	20.0
CANADA +	1888825	19299	1.0	89703	4.7	123966	6.6	105016 ++	5.6	96379 ++	5.1	337984	17.9	329347	17.4

x Includes bns raised interprovincially 10/14 - 1917.

+ Canada figures include 7 nationally raised Forestry and Railway bns 1916 and 1917.

++Nicholson figures, CEF, 551 which include those on harvest leave at armistice.

CHART G

FARMERS UNDER MILITARY SERVICE ACT BY REGION

	Farm- ers Reg'd	As % Reg'd	Exemp- tions Claimed	As % Farm- ers Reg'd	Al- lowed Medi- cal	As % Farmers Claimed	Other Claims Al- lowed	As % Farmers Claimed	Claims Disal- lowed	As % Farmers Claimed	20-22 CLASS				Re- ports for Ser- vice	As % Farm- ers Reg'd	As % Total Reg'd
											With Farm Exempt	As % Total Claim	Farm- er Reg'd	As % Total Reg'd			
Maritimes	17012	36.2	16438	96.6	3837	23.3	10422	63.4	2179	13.3	2138	13.0	13.0	4.5	574	3.4	1.2
Quebec	36947	32.0	36916	99.9	2834	7.7	26715	72.4	7267	19.7	13713	37.1	37.1	11.9	131	0.4	0.1
Ontario	45706	36.6	45058	98.6	11960	26.5	29657	65.8	3441	7.6	8786	19.5	19.2	7.0	648	1.4	0.5
Prairie Provinces	64537	67.1	61689	95.6	7396	12.0	46836	75.9	7457	12.1	8562	13.9	13.3	8.9	2848	4.4	3.0
Western Provinces	66819	58.5	63669	95.3	8224	12.9	47883	75.2	7562	11.8	8647	13.6	12.9	7.6	3150	4.7	2.8
CANADA	166484	41.4	162081	97.4	26855	16.6	114677	70.8	20449	12.6	33284	20.5	19.9	8.3	4503	2.7	1.1
PAGE	102		102		103		103		103		101				102		

Source: Sessional Paper 246, 1919.

ALBERT SÉVIGNY ET LA PARTICIPATION DES
CANADIENS FRANÇAIS À LA GRANDE GUERRE

[Réal Bélanger]

La crise de la conscription fut tout simplement l'apogée d'un profond conflit entre la majorité anglophone, dédiciée fermement à gagner la Grande Guerre, et une minorité québécoise nationaliste convaincue que la guerre ne concernait aucunement le Canada. Le débat devint acerbe à cause de l'étrange alliance unissant les Conservateurs, qui supportaient l'Empire, aux nationalistes du Québec, qui avaient battu les Libéraux de Sir Wilfrid Laurier dans l'élection générale de 1911. Parmi ces nationalistes se trouvait Albert Sévigny. Élu à la fois parce qu'il était conservateur et qu'il avait dénoncé l'impérialisme à la tribune, Sévigny se retrouva ministre dans le gouvernement le plus impérialiste que le pays ait jamais connu. En moins de trois ans ce gouvernement allait conduire le Canada, cœur et âme, dans la guerre la plus terrible jamais entreprise par l'Empire britannique.

L'opposition du Canada français à la conscription, en 1917, est assez bien connue de la plupart des Canadiens. Réal Bélanger, biographe de Sévigny, nous la raconte d'un nouveau point de vue: celui d'une personne qui a choisi d'être loyale à la fois au Québec et au Canada.

Le 4 août 1914, le premier ministre du Canada, Sir Robert Laird Borden, et ses ministres réunis en Conseil apprennent que l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne sont officiellement en guerre. Automatiquement, le Canada, colonie britannique beaucoup plus préoccupée jusqu'alors de ses propres affaires internes, est en guerre. Aussitôt, et quoiqu'il sache le pays non sérieusement menacé, le gouvernement réagit. Jugeant que l'essentiel consiste à appuyer la défense de l'Angleterre engagée dans une lutte à finir et considérant que le Canada, bien que peu préparé militairement, ne peut se dérober, le gouvernement conservateur de Borden met en place toute une série de mesures visant à assurer la participation du pays. Parmi celles-ci, se détache, le 6 août, l'autorisation de lever un contingent de volontaires pour le

service outre-mer.¹ Commence alors pour le Canada l'une des périodes les plus dramatiques de sa brève histoire.

La déclaration de la guerre et les premières décisions gouvernementales sont accueillies avec enthousiasme par la plupart des Canadiens. S'il n'y a rien de surprenant dans l'attitude des Canadiens anglais majoritaires au pays, il en va autrement des Canadiens français représentant 28,5% de la population canadienne et regroupés principalement dans la province de Québec dont ils forment 80% de la population.² Traditionnellement, en effet, les Canadiens français ont répugné à s'engager dans les guerres et ont manifesté un esprit anti-militariste certain.³ Or, en août 1914, leur réaction s'inscrit en marge de cette tradition. Leur enthousiasme dépasserait même celui des habitants de la très britannique ville de Toronto. À Montréal comme à Québec, les deux principales villes de la province francophone, les foules se rassemblent le soir du 4 août, chantent La Marseillaise et le Rule Britannia et écoutent avec fébrilité les orateurs enflammés leur parler de la défense de l'Empire britannique et de l'obligation pour le Canada de porter secours à l'Angleterre et à la France. La presse et l'influent clergé catholique se joignent à cette euphorie: "Faisons notre devoir" lancent-ils d'un commun accord.⁴ Même Henri Bourassa, le prestigieux chef du mouvement nationaliste canadien et directeur du journal Le Devoir, si opposé jusque-là à toute participation aux guerres impériales, se rallie à l'approbation générale.⁵ En somme, un climat de quasi unanimité règne alors au Québec au sujet de la participation militaire du Canada à la guerre, participation qui, répète-t-on, doit être obtenue par la seule voie du volontariat.

Dans ce contexte, les hommes politiques, regroupés principalement soit dans le parti conservateur dirigeant le pays depuis 1911 soit dans le parti libéral formant l'Opposition officielle, s'associent d'emblée à ces manifestations et décrètent même une trêve des partis. Parmi eux, se trouve Albert Sévigny, un jeune député conservateur canadien-français originaire de la province de Québec. À peine âgé de 33 ans en 1914, ce fils de cultivateur devenu avocat puis député est une figure bien connue du monde politique québécois dans lequel il évolue depuis 1902. Ambitieux et pressé de remplacer les "anciens" de sa formation politique, Sévigny a su donner tôt à sa carrière un profil qui ne cadrerait pas toujours avec celui de la majorité des hommes politiques de son temps. En effet, il s'est d'abord attaché au parti conservateur tant fédéral que provincial pour lequel il a combattu ardemment lors de plusieurs campagnes électorales et sous la bannière duquel il a même brigué en vain les suffrages en 1907; mais, par la suite, Sévigny s'est séparé de

son parti pour joindre les rangs d'un groupe de conservateurs dissidents appelé les "conservateurs-nationalistes". À ce titre, il a mené des luttes retentissantes au cours des années 1910-1911 et s'est même fait élire lors des élections fédérales de 1911 pour représenter la circonscription québécoise de Dorchester à la Chambre des communes du Canada. Peu de temps après, cependant, il revint dans le giron du parti conservateur de Borden au sein duquel il milite en ce début d'août 1914.

Le soir même de la déclaration de la guerre, c'est sans hésiter qu'Albert Sévigny se déclare en faveur de la participation devant une foule des plus réceptives réunie à Québec. Il proclame alors:

"Toutes les divisions cessent en France et en Angleterre. Tous les partis s'unissent pour faire face à l'ennemi. Ici, nous voyons le spectacle des citoyens de toutes les origines accueillant avec joie la nouvelle de la déclaration de la guerre contre l'Allemagne. Et je suis sûr que si, demain, nous sommes appelés à aller combattre, tous les Canadiens, à quelque race qu'ils appartiennent, répondront bravement à l'appel".⁶

Et la foule d'applaudir avec ferveur les paroles du député glorifiant ainsi la loyauté à l'Angleterre et à la France. Pourtant, trois années plus tard, ce député, devenu pratiquement le seul ministre francophone du Cabinet Borden, sera brutalement chassé de la politique active par cette même population qui refusera de modifier la participation volontaire à la guerre en participation obligatoire arrachée par conscription.

Pour éclairer, comprendre et mesurer les conséquences de l'évolution de la position d'Albert Sévigny face à la participation des Canadiens français à la Grande Guerre, pour mieux cerner comment il en viendra progressivement en conflit direct avec ses compatriotes, nous considérerons, dans un premier temps, les prises de position de Sévigny antérieures aux années de guerre puis nous suivrons le cheminement de sa pensée de 1914 jusqu'au début de 1917 pour terminer par l'étude de sa position au moment de l'imposition de la conscription militaire.

Les antécédents contradictoires

Les premières prises de position connues d'Albert Sévigny sur la participation canadienne aux guerres impériales remontent à 1910 au moment des délicates discussions autour

du projet de création d'une marine de guerre canadienne. Proposé par le gouvernement libéral de Sir Wilfrid Laurier, le 12 janvier 1910, le projet stipule, entre autres, que cette marine de guerre placée sous l'autorité du gouvernement canadien pourrait, en cas de circonstance critique, passer sous contrôle impérial par un décret ministériel que le Parlement devrait ratifier.

Pour Sévigny, alors jeune avocat conservateur de la ville de Québec, ce projet est inacceptable. Il en va de même pour un noyau de nationalistes québécois dirigés par Henri Bourassa ainsi que pour un groupe de députés conservateurs québécois fédéraux qui se séparent de leur chef sur cette question et se réunissent autour de Frédéric Debartzch Monk pour combattre le projet de loi.⁷ Progressivement, Sévigny se joint à l'alliance formée à cette occasion entre les nationalistes et les conservateurs dissidents lesquels estiment que l'entreprise de Laurier, coûteuse et inutile, modifie la nature des liens du Canada avec l'Empire et va conduire inévitablement le pays à se "battre sur toutes les terres et toutes les mers du monde en faveur du drapeau anglais". Et cela, ils ne peuvent l'accepter, à l'instar, pensent-ils, de la majorité des Canadiens français. En conséquence, ils exigent la tenue d'un plébiscite qui permettrait au peuple souverain de se prononcer sur le projet de loi.⁸

À Vaudreuil, le 21 août 1910, dans le cadre d'une série d'assemblées tenues afin de sensibiliser le Québec aux effets néfastes du projet devenu loi, Sévigny se fait explicite devant un auditoire formé de Canadiens français pacifiques, rivés à leur petite paroisse et effrayés par tout ce qui touche aux guerres. En créant une marine, s'écrie alors Sévigny, Laurier détruit nos gains constitutionnels et nous jette d'un coup dans l'impérialisme militaire qui nous exposera aux vicissitudes de la paix et de la guerre entre les grandes puissances du monde et aux rigoureuses exigences du service militaire tel qu'il se pratique en Europe:

"On veut nous imposer un régime politique, renchérit-il en s'inspirant de l'ex-premier ministre du Québec Honoré Mercier, qui, par la conscription, pourrait disperser nos fils depuis les glaces du pôle jusqu'aux sables brûlants du Sahara (...), nous (condamner) à l'impôt forcé du sang et de l'argent, et (arracher) de nos bras, nos fils, l'espoir de notre patrie et la consolation de nos vieux jours, pour les jeter dans les guerres lointaines et sanglantes que nous ne pourrions ni empêcher, ni arrêter."

Puis, qualifiant de leurre le péril allemand, Sévigny estime que "la vraie raison de cette politique, c'est que les populations de l'Angleterre sont fatigué (sic) des lourds impôts dont on grève leur budget pour l'entretien et l'augmentation de leur flotte de guerre (...). Alors on a songé aux colonies et voyant le Canada prospère, on a décidé de lui faire assumer une partie de cette lourde responsabilité financière". Dramatiquement, il ajoute: "Comme l'Angleterre a besoin d'hommes autant que d'argent, on a mis une clause dans la nouvelle loi de façon à ce que, sur l'ordre du Roi, l'on puisse faire lever des soldats au Canada et les embarquer sur "notre flotte" pour aller servir de chair à canon aux Japonais, aux Chinois, ou aux autres puissances qui seront en guerre avec l'Angleterre". Enfin, conclut-il, "on n'a pas jugé à propos de consulter le peuple sur une loi de cette importance. On a aimé mieux, dans la députation libérale de la province de Québec, vendre notre autonomie pour un plat de lentilles, pour un modeste traitement de \$2,500. par année".⁹

Paroles cinglantes, percutantes, qui impressionnent l'assistance à un point tel que l'orateur qui suit Sévigny ne peut s'empêcher de le remarquer et de le féliciter chaleureusement pour cette allocution qualifiée de "magistrale" le lendemain par Le Devoir.¹⁰ Éloquent, Sévigny réussit à rétrécir les débats portant sur la marine à trois mots clé: la guerre lointaine, la conscription et la chair à canon. Il sait que ces mots frappent l'imagination populaire et il les exploite. Partout, par la suite, au cours des assemblées de l'été et de l'automne de 1910 qui attirent de nombreux Canadiens français, il ressassera inlassablement les mêmes arguments qu'à Vaudreuil.

Ses paroles les plus acerbes, cependant, c'est dans la circonscription de Drummond-Arthabaska qu'il les prononce lors d'une élection partielle fixée par Laurier au 3 novembre 1910. La troupe des conservateurs et des nationalistes s'y rassemblent à la hâte et braquent la campagne électorale sur la marine de guerre qui, à brève échéance, disent-ils, conduira les Canadiens français à la conscription militaire. À Tingwick, le 31 octobre, Sévigny lance bien fort que:

"The Laurier Cabinet is a Cabinet of Imperialists who want to sacrifice Canada's interests and plunge us into wars with which we have nothing to do. The Navy Bill is an attempt by Ontario and the Provinces of the West to coerce Quebec and enslave our people forever. What has England ever done for you? She has no need of your help. She is strong enough to defend

herself. Laurier's ideal is to make you the vassals of the majority in the West. You must protest by your votes against the slave traffic. You must protest against helping England in her wars; unless you do conscription will come next."

Puis à Arthabaska, le 1^{er} novembre, il renchérit en criant "The Navy belongs to His Majesty. Is that a Canadian Navy? Who is His Majesty? Have we any Majesty here?"¹¹ Ces discours aussi fougueux qu'explosifs sèment le désarroi et la panique parmi la masse des cultivateurs de la circonscription de Drummond-Arthabaska qui battent le candidat de Laurier en dépit des efforts déployés par ce dernier pour nier tout lien entre le projet de marine et la conscription.

Et Sévigny continue ainsi avec tout autant d'agressivité que de pathos lors des élections générales fédérales de septembre 1911 à l'issue desquelles l'électorat canadien chasse Laurier du pouvoir au profit du conservateur Borden. Au Québec, vingt-sept députés conservateurs sont élus dont Sévigny qui représente la circonscription rurale et agricole de Dorchester.¹² De ce nombre -- le plus élevé depuis 1896 -- la majorité est séparée de Borden sur la question navale et se trouve très liée aux nationalistes. Bien que la campagne n'ait pas porté sur un seul thème, il est indéniable que l'engagement de la majorité des conservateurs québécois dissidents de faire abroger la loi de la marine de guerre avec ses conséquences sur la participation aux guerres étrangères a contribué pour beaucoup à leur victoire.¹³

Pourtant, il ne s'écoulera même pas deux années avant que les Canadiens français du Québec notent une évolution dans la pensée de ces "conservateurs-nationalistes". Albert Sévigny, pour l'un, donne l'impression d'une volte-face remarquable qui en surprend plusieurs. En effet, lorsqu'en décembre 1912, le premier ministre Borden, qui n'a toujours pas abrogé la loi navale Laurier, veut à son tour venir en aide à l'Empire en versant \$35,000,000 pour la construction de trois vaisseaux de type dreadnought, Albert Sévigny, cette fois, se range avec Borden et se rallie à l'importance de défendre l'Empire menacé par l'Allemagne.

"J'appuie cette contribution, déclare-t-il, parce que le Canada fait partie de l'Empire britannique et parce que je crois que nous avons besoin de la suprématie de la marine anglaise pour le Canada comme pour le reste de l'Empire. La marine anglaise ne nous a jamais coûté un sou, ni un homme, ni une goutte de sang. Trouvez-moi un seul pays qui a vécu en paix

comme le Canada depuis cent ans. Et si vous me répondez que nous ne devons pas cette paix à la puissance de l'Angleterre, nous ne sommes pas d'accord, mais je crois sincèrement que cette puissance est d'importance vitale pour l'avenir de notre pays et c'est à l'avenir qu'il faut songer (...)."14

Le député de Dorchester, qui avait été l'un des plus fervents opposants à toute forme d'aide à l'Empire avant 1911, modifie donc radicalement sa pensée. Les nationalistes de Henri Bourassa, horripilés par ce changement, accusent Sévigny d'opportunisme et de trahison.¹⁵ Entre lui et ces amis d'hier, l'idylle est bien terminée; les nationalistes n'attendent que l'heure de la vengeance. Pour l'instant, cette rupture n'atteint pas Sévigny pour qui, semble-t-il, l'important réside désormais dans l'avenir du Canada au sein d'un Empire britannique fort. Tel est le message qu'il livre à ses compatriotes le soir du 4 août 1914.

Un partisan du volontariat: 1914 - début de 1917

Le soir du 4 août 1914, la population francophone du Québec manifeste certes un enthousiasme qui en étonne plusieurs. L'émotion suscitée par le déclenchement des hostilités et la conviction générale en la courte durée de la guerre expliquent sans doute cette attitude. Mais des interrogations subsistent. Combien de temps durera cet enthousiasme des Canadiens français? Correspondera-t-il à un recrutement soutenu? Déjà, dès les premiers mois de la guerre, certains faits laissent présager des problèmes futurs. En septembre 1914, par exemple, l'on ne compte qu'environ 3% de Canadiens français parmi les 36,267 volontaires composant le premier contingent offert à l'Angleterre. À ce moment, bien sûr, cette faible proportion ne tourmente ni les dirigeants politiques canadiens ni les responsables du système de recrutement décentralisé mis en place au pays. Peu de temps s'écoulera, cependant, avant que cette situation ne vienne troubler leur fragile quiétude.¹⁶

Progressivement, en effet, au cours des années 1915 et 1916, alors que la guerre se fait longue et meurtrière, alors que le gouvernement, bien qu'excluant la conscription, se dit prêt à tous les sacrifices pour sauver l'Empire et la civilisation, allant même jusqu'à augmenter à 500,000 le nombre autorisé des effectifs humains, les Canadiens français reviennent à leur position traditionnelle au grand dam des Canadiens anglais qui les accusent de déloyauté. En mai 1916, le sénateur James Mason avance même devant le Sénat que les Canadiens français n'ont fourni que 4,5% des recrues, chiffre qui, à peu de chose près, sera confirmé aux

Communes en juin 1917.¹⁷ Le recrutement des Canadiens français se révèle donc nettement décevant et l'Événement, l'organe francophone du parti conservateur à Québec, le constate sans détours en mai 1916:

"Il faut bien se rendre à l'évidence, écrit-il. La campagne de recrutement dans la province de Québec est un fiasco presque complet. C'est le temps de dire que le nombre de recruteurs est plus considérable que celui des recrues. On a parlé du cas d'un lieutenant-colonel, qui, après deux mois de campagne et des dépenses extraordinaires, n'avait encore raccolé qu'un seul volontaire. Depuis, ce brave a pris la poudre d'escampette. Après vingt-deux mois de guerre, il serait par trop naïf d'essayer de justifier ce fait extraordinaire par des considérations locales. Il vaut mieux admettre publiquement cette vérité: La (sic) grande majorité des Canadiens-français (sic) est hostile à l'idée de toute participation à la guerre".¹⁸

Cette hostilité devient d'ailleurs plus agressive à mesure que s'accroît l'animosité des Canadiens anglais dont plusieurs, regroupés dans diverses ligues de recrutement, réclament avec vigueur l'imposition de la conscription afin d'obliger les Canadiens français à servir. En 1916, par exemple, des Montréalais vont jusqu'à disperser violemment des postes de recrutement et à manifester en scandant des slogans anticonscriptionnistes. "Nous nous ferons peut-être écraser, dit l'un de leurs leaders, mais nous n'accepterons jamais la conscription. Notre peuple est insulté tous les jours. Canadiens français, il est temps de nous faire respecter."¹⁹ Ces paroles et incidents témoignent inévitablement des signes des temps.

La réaction des Canadiens français s'explique à plusieurs égards. Il existe évidemment des causes "secondaires" tels les profits illicites sur les contrats de guerre qu'empochent les amis du ministre de la Milice et de la Défense, Sir Sam Hughes, ou encore les mauvaises conditions du camp installé dans la plaine de Salisbury en Angleterre.²⁰ Mais plus encore, c'est l'attitude de plusieurs Canadiens anglais qui choque les Canadiens français et freine leur zèle. Les autorités militaires dirigées par Hughes, par exemple, donnent entre autres l'impression de vouloir exclure les Canadiens français des postes de commande et semblent hésiter à accepter la formation de bataillons qui leur seraient exclusivement réservés. Qui plus est, à cette même époque, les Canadiens anglais des autres provinces, particulièrement

ceux de l'Ontario, refusent d'octroyer à leur minorité francophone le droit de se faire instruire sans restriction dans leur langue. Et cette discrimination, les Canadiens français, inspirés par les nationalistes de Henri Bourassa désormais opposés catégoriquement à la guerre, ne peuvent l'accepter. Avant de défendre l'Empire, se disent-ils, sauvons d'abord les nôtres contre les "Boches d'Ontario".²¹

À ces motifs de désaffection, s'ajoutent d'autres causes profondément liées à l'âme même de ce peuple encore rural, et qui semblent se manifester davantage en 1916. Outre le fait que les Canadiens français sont bien plus éloignés sentimentalement de la France que les Canadiens anglais le sont de l'Angleterre, ces francophones du Québec ressentent alors vivement qu'ils

"sont citoyens d'Amérique, non d'Europe, d'Asie, d'Afrique ou d'Océanie, ils ignorent la "grande politique" chère aux puissances européennes; ils ont une aversion marquée pour le militarisme sous toutes ses formes; ils sont opposés par histoire et par traditions à toute participation à des guerres extérieures; il ne se sentent aucun devoir ni envers la France ni envers l'Angleterre."²²

Formé en majorité d'agriculteurs très attachés à leur sol et façonnés par les discours d'hommes politiques glorifiant depuis 75 ans cet esprit particulier et les traditions, ce peuple ne veut tout simplement pas aller se faire exterminer dans des guerres lointaines où il n'a rien à faire. Et Albert Sévigny, qui a pourtant lui-même contribué, avec d'autres "conservateurs-nationalistes", à renforcer cet esprit dans les années 1910-1911, va désormais tenter de neutraliser ces raisons et d'enrayer le mouvement de non-participation à la guerre. La chose ne sera pas facile.

C'est principalement par le biais d'assemblées politiques qu'à l'instar de la majorité des autres hommes politiques, Albert Sévigny, devenu, en 1915, vice-président des Communes puis président l'année suivante, décide d'agir et de faire connaître sa pensée. Au cours de l'été et de l'automne de 1915 et de 1916, il se rend dans sa circonscription de Dorchester essayer de convaincre la population. Railleur, Le Devoir l'a cependant mis en garde l'incitant à ne pas commettre de lapsus qui lui feraient répéter ses discours d'avant-guerre.²³ Le 29 août 1915, à Saint-Anselme, l'une des paroisses les plus importantes de son comté, plus de 3,000 personnes l'entendent parler de la guerre et des responsabilités de chaque Canadien. Sévigny reprend alors les propos des chefs politiques conservateurs et libéraux. La

guerre actuelle, déclenchée par une Allemagne assoiffée de domination, déclame-t-il au départ, est plus qu'un simple conflit entre les nations: c'est la lutte de "la civilisation contre la barbarie". Glorifiant la participation canadienne et ceux qui se sont enrôlés "sans être forcés de prendre les armes", Sévigny fustige, par la suite, ceux qui prétendent que le Canada n'a rien à faire dans cette guerre. "Je crois, précise-t-il, qu'ils prouvent, en agissant ainsi, qu'ils n'aiment pas leur pays. Car il ne faut pas oublier que nous avons pris les armes pour défendre ce que nous avons de plus cher, notre liberté et nos biens contre la tyrannie allemande". Enfin, faisant allusion à la lutte des franco-ontariens pour leurs écoles, le député de Dorchester exige l'union de tous afin que les Canadiens français puissent conserver leur droit et leur langue au Canada.²⁴

Plus qu'en 1915, c'est en 1916, au moment où les rumeurs de conscription commencent vraiment à poindre, que Sévigny incite surtout ses compatriotes à s'enrôler. Reprenant avec plus de vigueur ses propos de l'année précédente, il proclame bien haut

"qu'il ne (faut) pas qu'il (soit) dit que les Canadiens-français (sic) sont restés les bras croisés dans l'effroyable tourmente qui dévaste le monde. Comme Canadiens-français (sic), nous devons faire notre part pour deux raisons: parce que nous appartenons à l'Empire Britannique et parce que nous sommes les descendants des Français, de ces fils de France qui se sont révélés encore une fois les plus grands héros du monde."

Mettant vivement en garde les Canadiens contre une victoire allemande qui ruinerait le pays, le président des Communes insiste à nouveau pour que tous appuient l'Angleterre dont la haute protection permet aux agriculteurs de passer cette "terrible période de la guerre dans la paix et l'abondance". En somme, claironnera constamment le député de Dorchester, "le devoir de l'heure présente est d'aider (...) par nos vœux sincères, par nos travaux, par l'enrôlement (...) ceux qui se sentent assez de dévouement pour aller défendre les traditions des Canadiens-français (sic) sur les champs de bataille où le sort des armes décidera de notre avenir".²⁵

Même si, aux yeux de Sévigny, la participation volontaire à la guerre est maintenant devenue un devoir pressant, les électeurs francophones de Dorchester, qui l'écoutent paisiblement, ne sont pas pour autant prêts à le remplir.

Tant et si bien que malgré les efforts déployés, les résultats sont pratiquement nuls. Le Soleil, l'organe officiel des libéraux francophones de Québec, en impute la faute à Sévigny lui-même et à ses collègues "ex-conservateurs-nationalistes" qui ont trahi leurs électeurs:

"la présence de MM. Coderre et Blondin (deux "ex-conservateurs-nationalistes") dans le Cabinet fédéral, la nomination de M. Sévigny au poste important de député-orateur de la Chambre des communes sont un encouragement pour tous les fauteurs de troubles (...). Leur participation à l'administration est une provocation. C'est une invite à la résistance. Leurs discours en 1911 ont fait école; ce sont eux les grands coupables (...). Qu'ils s'enrôlent les premiers (et) alors seulement nous croirons à la sincérité de (leur) repentir et de (leurs) déclarations impérialistes."²⁶

Mais le député de Dorchester, quoique d'âge militaire, n'offre pas ses services. Il préférera consacrer ses énergies à encourager régulièrement le recrutement de ses congénères et deviendra même vice-président d'une association créée à cette fin. Qui plus est, Sévigny s'acharnera à convaincre les Canadiens français qu'il n'est pas question d'imposer la conscription au pays. Lorsqu'à l'automne de 1916, par exemple, la Commission du Service National, récemment créée en vue d'améliorer le recrutement et de satisfaire aux besoins de l'agriculture et de l'industrie, décide de procéder au recensement de la main-d'oeuvre du pays, Sévigny appuie de sa présence sur les estrades ceux qui, comme Borden, viennent dire aux Canadiens français que le recensement -- et les cartes à remplir à cet effet -- ne constitue pas un prélude à la conscription.²⁷ Et cette assurance donnée à ses compatriotes, c'est explicitement et avec insistance qu'il la confirmera, en janvier 1917, au moment de sa nomination à titre de ministre du Revenu de l'Intérieur alors que, comme le veut la coutume, il doit faire entériner cette promotion par ses électeurs de Dorchester.²⁸

Les libéraux ayant décidé de contester cette élection, la campagne devient vite le forum où sont débattues les deux questions fondamentales de l'heure au Québec, soit la participation intensive du Canada à la guerre et la conscription militaire. Dans les assemblées contradictoires pathétiques auxquelles assistent des foules d'agriculteurs toujours très nombreuses, les deux candidats, aidés par une batterie d'organiseurs, proclament sans retenue leurs convictions:

"Le Service National, vocifère Lucien Cannon, le candidat libéral, est préliminaire à la conscription, et avec le chef de mon parti, je suis opposé à la conscription (...). Les cartes du service national (sic) (...) sont un cheminement vers la conscription, soit industrielle, soit militaire (...). La seule protection qui vous reste contre la conscription, c'est la parole de M. Sévigny et il vous a donné des promesses en 1911. (Quant à la participation), je (n'y) suis pas opposé (...). Mais il y a cependant des considérations nationales et canadiennes. Allons-nous ruiner notre pays, en hommes, en argent et en ressources pour l'Angleterre? Je dis non sans hésitation; si vous éliminez M. Sévigny, il n'y aura point de limites dans les sacrifices que le Canada sera obligé de faire."

Sévigny réplique fermement en déclarant que la participation canadienne à la guerre est maintenant devenue, en ces débuts de 1917, "une question de vie ou de mort". Quant au Service National et aux "cartes qui (...) demandent certaines questions", "vous êtes absolument libres d'agir comme vous l'entendez". Et, ajoute-t-il aussitôt, "il n'est pas question de conscription, et personne n'encourt de danger à ce sujet (...)". Le député de Dorchester va même jusqu'à se présenter, avec ses collègues ministres francophones du Cabinet Borden, comme le seul rempart contre la conscription, et affirmer qu'avec le parti conservateur les Canadiens français ne subiront jamais la conscription.²⁹ Impressionnantes et péremptoires, ces déclarations, liées évidemment à toutes les autres promesses, convainquent les électeurs qui réélisent Sévigny le 27 janvier, la journée même où, au Conseil de ministres à Ottawa, il est cependant dit que "conscription to be used later if necessary".³⁰

Bien que le nouveau ministre se permette de souligner avec exagération combien son élection démontre clairement que "le peuple de la province de Québec est en union avec celui du reste du Canada dans la guerre actuelle", il est plus juste de croire que ce vote signifie tout au plus que l'opinion publique canadienne-française n'est pas encore cristallisée contre la politique de guerre de Borden axée sur le volontariat. Mais que se produisent des changements majeurs dans cette politique, conformément aux désirs de nombreux Canadiens anglais, et le pays pourrait connaître des divisions profondes. Advenant une telle situation, un ministre "junior" comme Albert Sévigny, sans importance et sans l'influence nécessaire au Conseil des ministres pour contrecarrer de tels plans, pourrait affronter les pires

difficultés.³¹ Au moment même où le premier ministre canadien s'apprête à quitter le pays pour aller à Londres discuter en profondeur de la guerre et de ses nécessités, la tension monte dans l'ensemble du pays et au Canada français en particulier.

Un partisan de la conscription de 1917

Devant les nécessités inhérentes à la guerre, devant la faiblesse du recrutement comparée aux pertes subies et suite aux propos échangés avec les dirigeants britanniques, les officiers et les soldats canadiens cantonnés au front, Borden revient de Londres convaincu que la conscription militaire du peuple canadien ne peut plus être évitée si l'on veut atteindre le chiffre des 500,000 hommes promis. De plus, pour le premier ministre, cette nécessité militaire s'accompagne d'une nécessité politique engendrée par le "strong and vehement" sentiment conscriptionniste des huit provinces à majorité anglophone du pays, sentiment pour le moins aussi important que celui des francophones du Québec. D'ailleurs, le légaliste Borden, partisan du "national development" avant tout, demeure persuadé que, malgré les réticences, la population canadienne tout entière se ralliera à cette mesure au moment où elle deviendra officiellement loi du pays. Ajoutant donc ces considérations immédiates à celles déjà exprimées depuis 1914 quant à la défense de la "civilisation", Borden passe aux actes. Le 17 mai 1917, deux jours après son retour à Ottawa, le premier ministre convoque une réunion du Conseil des ministres. Faisant fi des réactions négatives, voire explosives, que l'on peut attendre du Québec, Borden annonce aux ministres présents son intention d'imposer la conscription, puis demande leur opinion. Surpris, les ministres francophones restent bouche bée.³² Ils comprennent vite que l'heure du choix le plus important de leur carrière politique vient de sonner.

Quand arrive son tour, Albert Sévigny, se fondant tant sur les propos dramatiques de Borden au sujet de la "Russian revolution" que sur le fait "that the French had mutinied and that the British faced the enemy practically alone", reconnaît sans vergogne, en écho à tous ses collègues, la nécessité de la conscription. Puis, prononçant des paroles lourdes de conséquences et de clairvoyance, il s'engage à demeurer solidaire de son parti sachant fort bien pourtant qu'il commet là un suicide politique et que son parti déjà très faible se détruit pour les 25 prochaines années au Québec. Enfin, et probablement dans le but d'atténuer les problèmes dangereux qu'il appréhende dans sa province et pour sa carrière, il propose, avec son collègue Esioff-Léon Patenaude, "that the matter should be discussed

with Sir Wilfrid Laurier".³³ Ainsi, Albert Sévigny, l'"ex-conservateur-nationaliste" si opposé à toute conscription militaire, nouveau ministre réélu parce qu'adversaire déclaré de tout projet de cette nature, accepte désormais l'impossible solution pour tout député francophone du Québec. Et le lendemain, lorsque le premier ministre, sans en avoir discuté auparavant avec le chef de l'Opposition, dévoile ses intentions à la Chambre, débute l'une des périodes les plus critiques de l'histoire canadienne.

En effet, dès qu'ils sont connus du public, les propos de Borden suscitent les réactions les plus vives chez plusieurs Canadiens. Mais c'est surtout au Québec que se cristallise l'opposition à cette conscription sélective, opposition dominée par une violence dont les étincelles risquent de provoquer une véritable révolution.³⁴ Conduits par une presse francophone globalement anticonscriptionniste, les Canadiens français ne tardent pas à manifester leur complet désaccord avec la politique de Borden. Partout au Québec, des assemblées de protestation se tiennent aussitôt, des manifestations spontanées se produisent: dans la rue, dans les foyers, tous parlent de résistance à la loi.³⁵ Au cours de l'une de ces réunions populaires à Waterloo, dans la circonscription de Brome, le bouillant tribun nationaliste Tancrède Marsil va même jusqu'à lancer devant une foule enthousiaste qu'"avant d'avoir la conscription, nous aurons la révolution" et que le peuple du Québec préfère voir "deux ou trois mille hommes tués dans (ses) rues (...), plutôt que d'envoyer en Europe trois cent mille hommes".³⁶ Alors que certains s'acharnent à multiplier les scènes tumultueuses, à huer les noms de Sévigny, Blondin et Patenaude et à fracasser les vitres en plusieurs endroits, d'autres pétitionnent ou se forment en Ligue anticonscriptionniste. Dorchester, la circonscription du ministre Sévigny, n'échappe pas à cette activité. Lors d'une réunion d'envergure tenue le 31 mai à Saint-Anselme, les agriculteurs, sans exception aucune selon Le Soleil, ont appuyé vigoureusement une résolution fustigeant la conscription militaire, puis ont exigé la tenue d'un référendum et d'une élection générale sur cette question. Commentant cette assemblée, l'organe libéral ne peut s'empêcher de mettre Sévigny en garde: "(Si vous êtes en faveur de la conscription), ne retournez jamais dans Dorchester, car non seulement vous perdriez votre mandat de député, mais vous risqueriez d'y laisser votre peau".³⁷ Malgré cet avertissement, ces protestations, et bien que deux millions de Canadiens français se rangent vigoureusement en bloc contre la conscription en cette fin de mai et ce début de juin 1917, Albert Sévigny demeurera fermement aux côtés de son chef.

En effet, en dépit des menaces de mort qu'il reçoit du Québec, en dépit d'articles injurieux parus dans certains journaux, en dépit de la démission dramatique de son collègue Patenaude qui craint pour l'unité nationale, Sévigny, bien qu'inquiet, maintient sa décision du 17 mai jusqu'à la Chambre des communes où Borden dépose officiellement son projet de loi le 11 juin. Le 25 suivant, dans un de ces discours où l'émotion et le pathos ne laissent que difficilement percevoir une rigueur intellectuelle, le député de Dorchester fixe pour la postérité les raisons de son appui. La saisissante conclusion de son discours résume parfaitement sa pensée:

"Pour nos glorieux ancêtres, morts au champ d'honneur; pour nos frères qui sont morts ou sont prêts à mourir dans les tranchées; pour la cause sainte de la justice, de la religion, de la démocratie et de la civilisation; pour que nos enfants et petits-enfants soient fiers de nous comme nous le sommes de nos ancêtres; pour avoir l'union entre les deux races que Dieu a placées dans ce jeune et beau pays; pour que nos compatriotes des États-Unis, qui nous donnent un si bel exemple, soient fiers de nous; pour que la France vive avec notre chère langue française; pour que l'Empire britannique soit encore la première puissance du monde et nous donne l'orgueil de porter encore fièrement notre titre de sujet britannique; pour que le Canada et le continent américain ne soient jamais menacés par l'Allemagne, et pour être au triomphe et non pas isolés et même méprisés quand sonnera l'heure de la victoire, pour tout cela je dis qu'il vaut la peine de donner jusqu'à son sang et que les autres disent ce qu'ils voudront moi je réponds: j'accepte."³⁸

Ce "j'accepte" aux conséquences si lourdes n'est prononcé en Chambre que par deux autres Canadiens français du Québec, soit Pierre-Édouard Blondin et Joseph-Hormidas Rainville dont l'appui lors du vote du 5 juillet grossit à 63 la majorité du gouvernement. Le principe de la conscription vient alors d'être accepté officiellement. Ces 63 voix, cependant, traduisent une autre réalité qui se gravera pour longtemps dans la mémoire des Canadiens français. Au cours de cette nuit du 5 juillet 1917, la Confédération canadienne vient aussi de se séparer en deux clans: d'un côté, la province de Québec francophone, de l'autre, les huit provinces anglaises. De fait, en dehors de la province de Québec, il n'y a que 10 votes anticonscriptionnistes, dont 3 de Canadiens français ou d'Acadiens. En outre, tous les conservateurs canadiens-français du Québec, à l'exception de Sévigny, Blondin et Rainville, ont voté avec Laurier tandis que

les libéraux des provinces anglaises, à 7 exceptions près, accordaient leur appui à Borden. Reconnue et dénoncée par la plupart des journaux québécois, la division raciale atteint alors son point culminant au pays au moment où l'on vient tout juste de fêter le cinquantenaire de la Confédération.³⁹ Le Québec s'isole donc dans la Confédération canadienne comme Sévigny, Blondin et Rainville s'isolent eux-mêmes dans leur collectivité.

Dans ces circonstances, pourquoi Albert Sévigny se rallie-t-il à la conscription? Plusieurs motifs peuvent l'avoir conduit à l'accepter. D'abord, parmi ceux que Sévigny lui-même a donnés officiellement soit à la Chambre soit aux journalistes lors d'entrevues, nous sommes porté à en admettre certains: l'importance pour la minorité francophone de ne pas se trouver isolée ou encore le souci de ne rien ménager afin de maintenir l'union entre les deux races du pays peuvent avoir réellement influencé le jeune ministre. Puis, au-delà de ces raisons "publiques" que l'on ne peut décemment dissocier de tout le reste, il en existe une autre liée cette fois à la vie politique elle-même et qui a pu jouer un rôle dans cette décision, à première vue aberrante et malhabile. Il nous apparaît juste de croire que la réaction de Sévigny a pu être guidée aussi par la loyauté à son chef et à son parti, loyauté, cependant, qu'il est bien difficile de distinguer de ses intérêts personnels. Quelques années plus tard, à un moment où il aura tout à gagner à s'exprimer ainsi, Sévigny le dira explicitement. Qu'il suffise, par exemple, de citer cette lettre du 26 novembre 1920 adressée à Borden dans laquelle il déclare: "Mon dévouement, ma loyauté, mes sacrifices pour vous et le parti m'ont conduit à ce que je suis aujourd'hui" ou encore cette autre du 1er décembre 1919 où il signale à nouveau à Borden: "You (Borden) are far above intrigues of any kind, and you will never allow that one who has sacrificed everything because of his loyalty and faithfulness to you, should become the victim of certain people" ou enfin celle-ci datée du 9 décembre 1919 alors qu'il rappelle au premier ministre: "I hope, dear Sir Robert, that circumstances will enable you to be of service first to those who were loyal, when extremely difficult conditions did not prevent them from risking their lives and sacrificing everything to remain faithful to their chief and do their duty with him".⁴⁰ Sans fortune, plutôt enclin à ne pas perdre tous les fruits des efforts déployés depuis ses premiers balbutiements en politique, Sévigny n'a, en somme, que fort peu de liberté de manoeuvre et il se réfugie dans le parti dont il a secondé presque sans faille les mesures depuis 1912.

Par ailleurs, même si Sévigny croit la conscription nécessaire et s'y rallie, cela ne signifie pas qu'il approuve la façon avec laquelle Borden procède pour parvenir à ses fins ni l'application de cette mesure dans le contexte si troublé qui agite le Québec. Véritable mouvement de masse s'inscrivant dans la suite logique de celui des années 1910-1911 que Sévigny et les "conservateurs-nationalistes" avaient contribué à inspirer, mais beaucoup plus intense, dramatique et violente, la résistance du Québec fait craindre le pire à Sévigny. Ne prédit-il pas à Borden, le 17 mai, que l'introduction de la conscription le tuera politiquement et détruira le parti au Québec pour les 25 prochaines années? Plus précisément, il est permis de croire que Sévigny, jugeant bien la mentalité des francophones du Québec violemment opposés à la conscription, préférerait que Borden s'entende, d'abord, avec Laurier avant de rendre publique son intention d'imposer la conscription. Cette démarche pourrait amener le chef de l'Opposition à se joindre à un gouvernement de coalition favorable à la conscription et par la suite, fort de l'union des deux partis, à tenter de convaincre la population du Québec du bien-fondé d'une telle mesure; toutefois, en cas de refus de la part de Laurier, il faudrait être assez clairvoyant pour écarter la conscription.⁴¹ Or, Borden, faisant fi totalement de l'opinion de Sévigny, ne consulte pas Laurier et veut diriger à sa guise la marche à suivre. Sévigny lui-même révélera plus tard, et de façon fort explicite, son opinion profonde sur cette question délicate et ne se gênera pas pour blâmer l'attitude de Borden. Le général J.A. Clark rapporte ainsi à Arthur Meighen, un ex-collègue de Sévigny, les propos de ce dernier:

"He (Sévigny) blamed Sir Robert Borden for the situation which has developed in Quebec. He recalled Sir Robert's return from England in 1917 with word of the Russian revolution, that the French had mutinied and that the British faced the enemy practically alone. Sir Robert stated that conscription would be necessary. He, Sévigny, expressed his willingness to fall in line though it probably meant the end for him politically. After discussion it was decided that the matter should be discussed with Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The following day Sir Robert announced to Parliament the decision which had been reached relative to conscription. He did not see Sir Wilfrid for some days afterwards. He believes that if Sir Robert had seen Sir Wilfrid before making an announcement to Parliament Sir Wilfrid's supporters would have brought pressure to bear upon him which would have resulted in a decision to join the Union Government."⁴²

À Meighen, alors qu'il lui exprime les raisons de la réaction désastreuse du Québec à l'occasion de l'élection générale de 1926, Sévigny ajoutera: "Depuis 1917, le parti récolte ce qu'il a semé (...). C'est peut-être une consolation de penser que nous sommes des victimes du devoir que nous avons rempli alors que nous étions en guerre, mais il me semble que nous aurions pu continuer à faire tout notre devoir en tenant compte des conditions de 1917 et en prévoyant l'avenir".⁴³ Ainsi, même s'il croit à la nécessité de la conscription, Albert Sévigny désapprouverait durant cette période critique la façon d'agir de Borden qui va carrément à l'encontre des sentiments du Québec. Certes, son désaccord s'estompe complètement, alors, devant la décision du chef, mais il n'en témoignerait pas moins d'un aspect jusqu'à maintenant inconnu de la pensée du jeune ministre sur la conscription militaire au Canada et révélerait que Sévigny ne s'isole pas -- comme c'est le cas pour son chef -- des francophones du Québec parce qu'il ne comprend pas leur mentalité.⁴⁴ Ce serait donc en homme politique bien conscient de la portée de sa décision, bien conscient des erreurs de stratégie de son chef qu'Albert Sévigny, peu influent au Conseil des ministres, choisit d'être répudié par tout son peuple.

Et répudié, Sévigny l'est de façon magistrale par une province de Québec déchaînée. Furieuse, faisant fi de toutes les conséquences néfastes de ses gestes, la population francophone du Québec décide de résister par tous les moyens à la conscription. Sous la conduite des nationalistes, Bourassa en tête, et avec la participation des libéraux de plus en plus en accord avec les nationalistes sur cette question, les Canadiens français, alimentés de discours, d'articles de journaux, de chants et de brochures, réagissent tout au cours de l'été 1917. Alors que certains continuent de pétitionner ou se forment en Ligue de la patrie canadienne, Ligue de la Liberté ou encore Ligue des constitutionnels, d'autres pensent à fomenter des grèves et à séparer le Québec de la Confédération, d'autres établissent dans les paroisses des comités "pour défendre par tous les moyens constitutionnels et légaux les jeunes gens qui seraient atteints par la loi de conscription", ou organisent leur fuite dans les bois. D'autres, plus agressifs, parlent même de faire sauter le Parlement d'Ottawa et dynamitent la maison de Lord Atholstan, propriétaire du Montreal Star, favorable au projet. Plus profondément encore, c'est dans les assemblées publiques de toutes sortes que leur frustration et leur déception se révèlent des plus intenses. À l'issue de plusieurs rassemblements, "les foules, écrit l'historien Mason Wade, (parcourent) les rues en criant "À bas Borden!" et "Vive la révolution!", brisant les vitres et tirant des

balles à blanc. Un certain Élie Lalumière se (vante même) d'entraîner 500 hommes pour résister activement à la conscription".⁴⁵

Dans ce contexte survolté, les trois députés canadiens-français qui ont voté en faveur de la conscription n'échappent évidemment pas à la rage de leurs compatriotes. Sévigny, cible de choix, est constamment pris à partie durant ces longs mois d'été. Son nom est maintes fois hué dans les assemblées anticonscriptionnistes et on va même, à Montréal, jusqu'à le brûler en effigie. Qualifié de traître et de Judas, il subit alors les foudres de son peuple: "À bas Sévigny" devient un slogan repris par les Québécois de partout. Des brochures paraissent le caricaturant même comme un vil voleur; des affiches, ayant pour titre "À bas les têtes maudites" dont Sévigny fait partie et au centre desquelles figurent un crâne de mort et des os en forme de croix, ornent plusieurs vitrines et poteaux. Raillé dans sa propre circonscription électorale par les libéraux et par une foule de 2,000 personnes qui l'attendent de pied ferme le 1^{er} juillet, il doit, par ailleurs, selon Le Canada et Le Soleil, s'enfuir à la hâte de Valleyfield, le 28 juillet, pourchassé par une foule qui le dénonce comme un "traître" et un "renégat". Sa vie et même celle des siens sont constamment mises en danger durant l'été de 1917. Les menaces d'empoisonnement et d'enlèvement succèdent aux fuites rapides devant des gens qui veulent lui faire un mauvais parti -- à Murray Bay, par exemple, où il doit cacher sa femme et ses enfants, il passe proche de se faire écharper -- ou encore aux deux lapidations que subit sa résidence de Québec. Cette fulmination du peuple québécois contre la personne de Sévigny et les siens est alors si intense que la police doit tous les protéger. Le député de Dorchester vit alors des heures affreuses qui le troublent profondément.⁴⁶

Cette situation, loin de s'améliorer, s'aggrave même à l'occasion de l'élection générale du 17 décembre de 1917 alors que Sévigny, devenu pratiquement le seul ministre francophone du gouvernement d'Union formé en octobre pour appliquer la conscription, accepte de se représenter devant ses électeurs.⁴⁷ Fruit, en somme, de l'incapacité des deux principaux partis politiques à s'entendre sur la conduite de la guerre, cette élection vise nettement à déterminer si la population canadienne endosse la conscription et le gouvernement d'Union qui continue l'isolement du Québec. Or, le Québec exacerbé, subissant sans cesse les foudres du Canada anglais -- foudres d'ailleurs poussées aux extrêmes au cours de la campagne électorale -- n'est pas d'humeur à discuter

de l'acceptation de la "loi maudite". Et Albert Sévigny, méprisé par presque tous les Canadiens français, qui ne représente plus rien dans sa province et si peu à Ottawa, en fait les frais.⁴⁸ Dans une de ces campagnes où les passions dégénèrent tôt en violence, où la très grande majorité des candidats unionistes ne parviennent même pas à s'exprimer -- on parlera de campagne à huis clos -- le ministre évitera de justesse le massacre lors de la seule assemblée qu'il convoque dans sa circonscription. Ses électeurs, pourtant pacifiques il y a à peine 10 mois, n'arrivant pas à comprendre l'attitude de leur député "qui a nettement manqué à sa parole", le chassent brutalement du comté en le tirant au fusil.⁴⁹ Sévigny se réfugie à Montréal, dans la circonscription de Westmount-Saint-Henri, mais la réception n'est pas plus accueillante. Banni par le Québec "qui (voterait) même pour un poteau télégraphique qui (serait) contre la conscription", Albert Sévigny paye de sa défaite la note amère de ses choix sur la participation canadienne à la guerre. Au soir du 17 décembre 1917, si le parti de la conscription triomphe facilement au pays, il subit au contraire une défaite cuisante au Québec où pas un seul candidat francophone unioniste n'est élu. Les Canadiens français du Québec se sont engagés dans une direction tandis que les Canadiens anglais ont choisi l'autre. C'est l'impasse politique.⁵⁰ Une division profonde déchire le Canada et Albert Sévigny en est devenu l'une des victimes.

Conclusion

La position d'Albert Sévigny sur la participation des Canadiens français à la Grande Guerre laisse perplexe. Ses choix, compte tenu de son opposition vigoureuse à toute participation aux guerres impériales quelques années seulement auparavant, peuvent en dérouter plusieurs. Après s'être rallié à l'enthousiasme général au tout début des hostilités, il en viendra progressivement à considérer la participation des Canadiens français comme un "devoir" pressant (1915-1916), puis comme une "question de vie ou de mort" (janvier 1917) et, enfin, comme une nécessité absolument obligatoire. Il acceptera même la conscription de ses compatriotes allant de la sorte à l'encontre de leurs sentiments profonds.

D'emblée, l'impression qui reste de l'étude attentive des faits et gestes de Sévigny dégage un opportunisme que les gratifications du système de partis canadien ont su habilement combler. Utilisant en quelque sorte le sentiment antimilitariste et anticonscriptionniste des Canadiens français comme un appât pour se faire élire, Albert Sévigny abandonnerait par la suite ses convictions afin d'accéder le

plus rapidement aux plus hautes fonctions. Cette façon d'agir est cependant devenue, à la longue, un piège pour lui car les besoins de la participation à la guerre s'intensifiant, il a été acculé à défendre des choix impossibles dans un Québec qui croyait de moins en moins à l'Empire, de moins en moins au "sacrifice" et au sens du "devoir" du député caméléon. Ses justifications ne convainquirent pas ses compatriotes bien ancrés dans leur tradition.

Outre ces raisons et celles déjà mentionnées dans le cours de cette brève étude, il nous apparaît nécessaire de considérer une autre dimension dans les choix d'Albert Sévigny, dimension liée, cette fois, à l'évolution de sa perception du nationalisme canadien. Avant 1911, Sévigny avait toujours vécu au Québec, dans un territoire très localisé, alimenté par les idées du sans cesse influent Henri Bourassa et de son mouvement nationaliste dont l'un des principes prévoyait "l'abstention de toute participation du Canada aux guerres impériales en dehors du territoire canadien". En 1911, il arriva à Ottawa et commença alors à évoluer sur une scène politique beaucoup plus vaste et complexe qu'il ne l'avait sans doute soupçonné auparavant: indéniablement, à la longue, le Canada dut lui apparaître sous une optique différente, et des aspects jusque-là inconnus du pays lui furent sûrement dévoilés. On n'a qu'à penser, par exemple, au caractère hétérogène de ce pays façonné par les nombreuses et diverses revendications de ses différentes régions. Que dire aussi des aspirations des Canadiens anglais, de leur attachement à l'Empire et à la mère-patrie britannique. Mieux encore, au contact de Borden et de ses collègues anglophones, il nous semble juste de croire que Sévigny put découvrir cette sorte de "nationalisme" -- identifié par certains comme pur impérialisme -- qui privilégie un rôle accru du Canada dans l'Empire afin de maximiser au plus haut degré le développement global du pays.⁵¹ Il a pu s'y rallier convaincu de respecter ses aspirations profondes. Progressivement, le futur ministre du Revenu de l'Intérieur a pu modifier ses orientations des années 1910-1911 pour les faire passer désormais par un Canada fort où les provinces, unies aussi par le lien des races, pourraient permettre à ce pays de se créer une place d'honneur parmi les nations du monde. Conséquent avec lui-même, Sévigny a pu se rallier à la nécessité de ne pas isoler le Québec dans le Canada, et cela tant dans l'intérêt de sa province natale que de son pays. Alors que certains considérèrent qu'il trahissait ainsi ses concitoyens, nous pouvons présumer que Sévigny, logiquement, pensait plutôt assurer leur survie et leur importance. Pour avoir tenté de sauvegarder l'unité nationale et de prévenir l'isolement du Québec, il aurait donc, dans cette optique, été accusé abusivement des pires

maux. Même si bien peu de documents peuvent confirmer cette interprétation, il nous apparaît juste de la soulever comme l'un des facteurs qui a pu orienter les choix d'Albert Sévigny concernant la participation des Canadiens français à la Grande Guerre.

Notes

1. Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938, t. I, pp. 455-458; G.W.L. Nicholson, Le corps expéditionnaire canadien 1914-1919, Ottawa, Roger Duhamel, Imprimeur de la Reine et contrôleur de la papeterie, 1963, pp. 3-7.
2. Cinquième recensement du Canada 1911, Ottawa, C.H. Parmelee, Imprimeur de sa Très Excellente Majesté Le Roi, 1913, vol. II, pp. 4, 86, 162, 256.
3. Lors de la guerre Sud-Africaine (1899-1902), par exemple, le Québec, formant 30% de la population canadienne, n'a fourni que 3% des enrôlés: Carman Miller, "A Preliminary Analysis of the Socio-Economic Composition of Canada's South African War Contingents", Histoire Sociale, vol. VIII, no 16 (Novembre 1975), p. 222; voir aussi Desmond Morton, "French Canada and War, 1868-1917: The Military Background to the Conscription Crisis of 1917" dans J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff, ed., War and Society in North America, Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Thomas Nelson and Sons (Canada) Limited, (c 1971), pp. 84-103 et Jean-Yves Gravel, L'armée au Québec, un portrait social 1868-1900, Montréal, Boréal Express, 1974, pp. 32-35.
4. Mason Wade, Les Canadiens français de 1760 à nos jours, traduit par Adrien Venne avec le concours de Francis Dufau-Labeyrie, (Montréal), Le Cercle du Livre de France, (1963), t. II, pp. 46-47; Oscar Douglas Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Toronto, S.B. Gundy Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 435; L'Événement, 5 août 1914, p. 1; Le Soleil, 5 août 1914, p. 4; L'Événement, 10 août 1914, p. 7.
5. Au moment de la déclaration de la guerre, Bourassa est en Europe. C'est le 8 septembre qu'il se prononcera: Le Devoir, 8 septembre 1914, p. 1; les seules voix discordantes au Québec au début d'août proviennent de deux nationalistes, Armand Lavergne et Omer Héroux, qui déclarent que le seul devoir des Canadiens est de défendre le Canada: L'Événement, 5 août 1914, p. 1 et Le Devoir, 6 août 1914, p. 1, 7 août 1914, p. 1.

6. L'Événement, 5 août 1914, p. 1.
7. Compte-rendu officiel des Débats de la Chambre des communes du Canada, session 1909-1910, vol. 1, pp. 1829-1835 (À l'avenir, nous n'indiquerons plus que les mots: Les Débats); le groupe de députés conservateurs québécois se sépare de Borden car ce dernier trouve, en somme, que le projet n'aidera pas suffisamment l'Empire: Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden..., t. I, pp. 268-283; sur l'alliance des conservateurs et des nationalistes, voir Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny et le parti conservateur 1902-1918, thèse de Ph. D., Université Laval, 1979, pp. 80-84; Archives nationales du Québec (ANQ), Fonds Henri Bourassa, Bourassa à Monk, 27 janvier 1912, microfilm no 2, 599E, 599F; le chef des conservateurs dissidents est Frédéric Debartzch Monk, député de Jacques-Cartier.
8. Le Devoir, 22 janvier 1910, p. 2; Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec. Mgr Bruchési, Montréal, Éditions Bernard Valiquette, (s.d), t. XV, p. 133.
9. Le Devoir, 22 août 1910, p. 3.
10. Ibid.
11. Ces paroles de Sévigny, bien que rapportées ici en langue anglaise, sont alors prononcées en langue française: J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, Toronto, The Annual Review Publishing Company Limited, 1910, pp. 196-197 (À l'avenir, nous n'indiquerons plus que The Canadian Annual Review, et l'année); sur cette élection partielle, voir Douglas J. Wurtele, "The Drummond-Arthabaska By-Election of 1910", The Dalhousie Review, vol. 40, no 1 (Spring 1960), pp. 14-32 et Paul Bernier, Ernest Lapointe, député de Kamouraska 1904-1919, La Pocatière, La Société historique de la Côte-du-Sud, 1979, pp. 65-78.
12. Les conservateurs de Monk et les nationalistes de Bourassa vont même conclure une alliance électorale avec l'impérialiste formation de Borden dans le but de vaincre Laurier au Québec: voir Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., pp. 114-119, ou encore Michael E. Carroll, Henri Bourassa and the "Unholy Alliance" of 1911, thèse de maîtrise, Carleton University, 1969, 75 p. qui ne partage cependant pas complètement ce point de vue.
13. L'autre thème concerne la réciprocité commerciale avec les États-Unis. Il est aussi beaucoup discuté au Québec mais avec moins de passion.

14. Propos émis au journal Le Devoir quelques mois après les discussions tenues à la Chambre: Le Devoir, 24 septembre 1913, p. 1 et 2 octobre 1913, p. 2; Les Débats, session 1912-1913, vol. 1, pp. 687-706; sur les circonstances entourant ce débat, voir Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden. A Biography: 1854-1914, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, (c 1975), vol. 1, pp. 230-247. À noter que Sévigny n'est pas le seul des "conservateurs-nationalistes" à agir ainsi puisque huit autres adoptent la même attitude; Archives publiques du Canada (APC), Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 27 novembre 1912; F.D. Monk, ministre des Travaux publics, démissionne alors.
15. Par exemple, Le Nationaliste, 1^{er} décembre 1912, p. 1 et Le Devoir, 10 mars 1913, p. 1.
16. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 23; notons que, dans l'ensemble, les Canadiens d'origine forment moins de 30% de ce premier contingent.
17. Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden..., t. I, p. 528; G.W.L. Nicholson, Le corps expéditionnaire..., p. 126; Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921. A Nation Transformed, (Toronto), McClelland and Stewart Limited, (c 1974), (Coll. The Canadian Centenary Series), p. 217; Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden. A Biography: 1914-1937, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, (c 1980), vol. II, pp. 22, 33; J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises..., pp. 24, 28; The Canadian Annual Review, 1916, p. 304; notons que tout au cours de 1916, on constate une baisse graduelle des enrôlements au Canada.
18. L'Événement, 26 mai 1916, p. 6.
19. R. Matthew Bray, "Fighting as an Ally: The English-Canadian Patriotic Response to the Great War", The Canadian Historical Review, vol. LXI, no 2 (June 1980), pp. 147-161; L'Événement, 25 août 1916, p. 7.
20. Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden..., vol. II, pp. 24-27, 36-38; Borden, évidemment, réagira à ces scandales, voir Ibid. et Michael Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire. The Life and Business Times of Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart. 1858-1939, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, (c 1978), pp. 242-256.

21. Elizabeth H. Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918, New York, Columbia University Press, 1937, pp. 104-105; en outre, les structures de la Milice canadienne n'ont pas incité les Canadiens français à s'intéresser aux questions militaires: Desmond Morton, "French Canada...", pp. 93-94; sur le problème ontarien, voir Margaret Prang, "Clerics, Politicians and the Bilingual Schools Issue in Ontario. 1910-1917", The Canadian Historical Review, vol. XLI, no 4 (December 1960), pp. 281-307; c'est à partir de janvier 1916 que Henri Bourassa s'oppose davantage à la guerre: voir, par exemple, René Durocher, "Henri Bourassa, les évêques et la guerre de 1914-1918", Communications Historiques, 1971, La Société Historique du Canada, pp. 261-269; Henri Bourassa, Le Devoir et la guerre. Le conflit des races, Montréal, Imprimerie du Devoir, 1916, pp. 1-45.
22. Jacques Michel, La participation des Canadiens français à la grande guerre, Montréal, Editions de l'A.C.-F., (1938), p. 48.
23. Le Devoir, 21 juillet 1915, p. 1.
24. L'Événement, 30 août 1915, pp. 1, 5.
25. Ibid., 30 octobre 1916, p. 1.
26. Le Soleil, 20 juillet 1916, p. 8; Ibid., 6 août 1915, p. 4.
27. L'Événement, 28 janvier 1916, p. 8; J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises..., p. 43; il faut dire en outre qu'à l'extérieur du Québec, les unions ouvrières craignent aussi la conscription: Martin Robin, "Registration, Conscription and Independent Labour Politics, 1916-1917", The Canadian Historical Review, vol. XLVII, no 2 (June 1966), pp. 101-118; à Montréal, Borden et son groupe se font chahuter alors qu'à Québec, ils peuvent s'exprimer dans le calme: APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 6 décembre 1916; L'Événement, 7 décembre 1916, p. 1; Ibid., 9 décembre 1916, pp. 1, 8.
28. Pour la nomination d'Albert Sévigny à titre de ministre du Revenu de l'Intérieur, voir APC, Fonds Borden, Journal Personnel, 3 janvier 1917 au 8 janvier 1917 et Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., pp. 265-274; pour sa réélection, Sévigny aurait évidemment pu choisir une autre circonscription que Dorchester.

29. Laurier hésite beaucoup avant de lancer son parti dans la lutte car il craint l'exagération des propos concernant la participation des Canadiens français à la guerre. D'ailleurs certaines des paroles émises par Cannon au cours de la campagne ont été rabrouées par Laurier: voir APC, Fonds Laurier, L.O. David à Laurier, 8 janvier 1917, MG26G, vol. 705, p. 194425; pour plus de détails sur la campagne, voir Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., pp. 275-292; Le Devoir, 19 janvier 1917, p. 2; John English, The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System 1901-1920, Toronto and Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, (c 1977), p. 126.
30. APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 27 janvier 1917; déjà, en fin décembre de 1916, Borden avait laissé entendre à des représentants ouvriers qu'il pourrait éventuellement imposer la conscription; Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden..., t. II, pp. 616-617; APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 26 décembre 1916.
31. Le Devoir, 29 janvier 1917, p. 2; L'Événement, 29 janvier 1917, pp. 1, 7; pour le peu d'influence de Sévigny au sein du Conseil des ministres, voir Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., pp. 293-296.
32. Pour la position de Borden, voir Les Débats, session 1917, vol. 2, pp. 1583-1584 et Ibid., session 1917, vol. 3, pp. 2240-2252; APC, Fonds Borden, Borden à Mgr Paul Bruchési, 31 mai 1917, MG26H, vol. 219, pp. 123407-123410; Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden..., vol. II, pp. 76, 84, 91-92; Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, The Door of Opportunity, Toronto, Vancouver, Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, (c 1960), t. I, p. 117.
33. Les arguments qui convainquent Sévigny apparaissent dans APC, Fonds Meighen, J.A. Clark à Meighen, 14 septembre 1953, MG26i, vol. 218, p. 140406; APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 17 mai 1917; nous avons démontré dans Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., p. 307 que Borden avait attribué à Blondin les propos tenus alors par Sévigny; au Québec, le parti conservateur de Borden est faible: on se demande s'il pourra y faire élire 2 députés: APC, Fonds Borden, C.-E. Gault à Borden, 23 mai 1916, MG26H, vol. 28, p. 11192.

34. Voir Martin Robin, "Registration...", pp. 101-118 et W.R. Young, "Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19", The Canadian Historical Review, vol. LIII, no 3 (September 1972), pp. 289-320; Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden..., vol. II, pp. 84-85; du Canada anglais, Borden reçoit alors plusieurs lettres et télégrammes de félicitations.
35. Mason Wade, Les Canadiens français..., t. II, p. 144.
36. Le Soleil, 4 juin 1917, p. 1.
37. Ibid., 1^{er} juin 1917, p. 1.
38. Ibid., 28 mai 1917, p. 10; Le Devoir, 4 juin 1917, p. 6; sur la démission de Patenaude, voir APC, Fonds Borden, Patenaude à Borden, 8 juin 1917, MG26H, vol. 86, pp. 43955-43957; Les Débats, session 1917, vol. 3, pp. 2711-2718.
39. Ibid., pp. 3167-3178; Joseph-Hormidas Rainville est vice-président des Communes; notons que les libéraux fidèles à Laurier se rallient à ce dernier qui s'oppose au projet et demande le référendum.
40. APC, Fonds Borden, Sévigny à Borden, 26 novembre 1920, MG26H, vol. 282, p. 158366; Ibid., Sévigny à Borden, 1^{er} décembre 1919, MG26H, vol. 137, p. 72542; Ibid., Sévigny à Borden, 9 décembre 1919, MG26H, vol. 137, p. 72544.
41. Sévigny est bien convaincu que Laurier "can end the disturbance in Quebec": APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 24 mai 1917.
42. APC, Fonds Meighen, J.A. Clark à Meighen, 14 septembre 1953, MG26i, vol. 218, p. 140406.
43. Ibid., Sévigny à Meighen, 29 septembre 1926, MG26i, vol. 87, pp. 050414-050421; Meighen est alors chef du parti conservateur canadien.
44. Le légaliste Borden ne comprend pas alors la mentalité du Québec et les raisons qui le poussent à résister à la conscription devenue loi du pays. Une lettre qu'il adresse à Mgr Bruchési de Montréal le montre bien: voir APC, Fonds Borden, Borden à Mgr Paul Bruchési, 3 septembre 1917, MG26H, vol. 219, pp. 123422-123424.

45. Jean Provencher, Québec sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918, (Trois-Rivières et Montréal), Les éditions du boréal express, (c 1971), pp. 28-29; J. Charlebois, La conscription. Tristes dessins et légendes tristes, Montréal, Éditions du Devoir, 1917, 16 p.; Henri Bourassa, Paul Émile Lamarche et al, The Case against Conscription, Montréal, Éditions du Devoir, 1917, t. I-VI; Mason Wade, Les Canadiens français..., t. II, p. 157; L'Événement, 9 août 1917, pp. 1, 8.
46. Le Soleil, 30 juillet 1917, p. 1 et 2 août 1917, p. 1; APC, Department of the National Defence, Military District no 5, Gauvin au Directeur du recrutement, 13 septembre 1917, RG24, c 156, vol. 4517; APC, Fonds Borden, Journal personnel, 25 juillet 1917; APC, Fonds Borden, Jeanne L. Sévigny à Borden, 24 décembre 1919, MG26H, vol. 137, pp. 72568-72569.
47. Sur le gouvernement d'Union, voir John English, The Decline..., chapitre 8; Sévigny garde son poste de ministre du Revenu de l'Intérieur. Il existe un autre ministre francophone dans ce gouvernement d'Union: il s'agit de P.E. Blondin qui s'est enrôlé et a quitté le pays. Sévigny est, somme toute, assez peu influent dans ce Cabinet. Seul ministre francophone à participer aux délibérations du Conseil des ministres, il sera pourtant exclu des 2 comités les plus importants de ce gouvernement: Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden..., t. II, pp. 758-759; il faut dire que Borden, qui dirige ce gouvernement d'Union, a cherché en vain à y faire entrer des Canadiens français de prestige, à commencer par Laurier lui-même qui refusa de s'y intégrer.
48. Sur cette élection, voir Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden..., vol. II, chapitre 10; Réal Bélanger, Albert Sévigny..., pp. 356-384.
49. The Canadian Annual Review 1917, pp. 608-609; Le Devoir, 1^{er} décembre 1917, p. 3; c'est la constatation à laquelle sont parvenus dix citoyens de Dorchester qui ont connu Albert Sévigny et que nous avons rencontrés à l'été de 1972; cette seule assemblée dans Dorchester se tient à Saint-Anselme, le 11 novembre 1917; Le Soleil, 12 novembre 1917, p. 1.

50. APC, Fonds Ernest Lapointe, Pouliot à Lapointe, 24 octobre 1921, MG273B10, vol. 1, p. 497; les unionistes gagnent au pays par 153 sièges contre 82; sur ces 82 sièges libéraux, tous sauf 20 proviennent du Québec: les unionistes ne remportent que 3 sièges au Québec, là où la population est à forte dominance anglaise. Ailleurs au Québec, ces unionistes se font battre par des majorités considérables.

51. Michel Brunet, Histoire du Canada par les textes (1855-1960), Montréal et Paris, Fidès, 1963, p. 64; Carl Berger, The Sense of Power. Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism (1867-1914), Toronto and Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 1970, p. 9.

FROM SUBORDINATE TO ALLY: THE CANADIAN CORPS
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY, 1914-1918

[Stephen Harris]

Although Canada entered the First World War as a dutiful, though enthusiastic, element of a worldwide British Empire, her participation transformed her to the status of a junior but sovereign ally. As the Borden government appreciated, Canada's voice in imperial and allied policy-making depended on the effectiveness of her military contribution. Since Borden was critical of the higher direction of the war, the volume of Canada's voice mattered.

A critical feature of Canada's military experience from 1914 to 1918 was the working out of an efficient command structure in the face of obstacles, many of them self-created. Just as important was the assertion of a Canadian will to autonomy through her Corps in France at the expense of unity and uniformity in the British Expeditionary Force. Steve Harris argues that the emergence of the Canadian Corps, and its ancillary organizations, as a compact, efficient and self-contained military organization set a pattern for how Canadians might seek to work as a junior ally in future conflicts.

When the call comes, our answer goes out at once, and it goes out in the classical language of the British answer to the call of duty.

That reply, Leader of the Opposition Sir Wilfred Laurier continued in August 1914, was 'Ready, Aye Ready!'¹ Canadians generally responded to the outbreak of war in much the same frame of mind. Thirty thousand men answered the call to arms, cheered on by noisy crowds as they marched through bunting-draped streets on their way to the mobilization centre at Valcartier, Quebec. Parliament, by contrast, was profoundly silent in the first two weeks after war broke out. It was not recalled to declare Canada a belligerent, and it did not even decide the nature of her participation, as Laurier had once argued it must.² Instead, a fortnight after the event, the House of Commons and Senate were left to ratify the fait accompli of Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden's Conservative Cabinet -- the decision to despatch a

Canadian Expeditionary Force (C.E.F.) over whose ultimate destination the government admitted 'having nothing whatsoever to say.'³ It did not matter. Canada was at war because Britain was at war, and Canadians of every political stripe agreed that the Dominion should stand by the Mother Country as a loyal and faithful subordinate.

Things were different in 1919, when Borden insisted that Canada should take part in the peace negotiations and have her own seat on the League of Nations. Despite initial misgivings, the international community, including the United Kingdom, recognized the rights and responsibilities the Dominion had won for herself, and so met Borden's demands. Gone were the days of Canada's automatic subordination to Great Britain in matters of peace and war.

The impact of the Great War on Canada's political development has long been acknowledged by historians. The Dominion's army at the front, the Canadian Corps, has also had a large place in the story of Canadian nation-building. Writing in 1933, Borden reflected that 'the development of constitutional relations through which Canada and other Dominions have entered the portal of full nationhood ... was due to the valour, the endurance and the achievement of the Canadian Army in France and Belgium which inspired our people with an impelling sense of nationhood never before experienced.'

When the Dominions, with Canada in the lead, insisted upon recognition at the Peace Conference, at the beginning of 1919, and when [French Premier Georges] Clemenceau learned that these Dominions had put a million men in the field or in training, he said that this record was enough for him, and so Canada and the other Dominions at the Conference entered into the Society of Nations to take their place in the concert of the League.⁵

F.H. Underhill had already said as much, noting shortly after the war that the Canadian Corps:

was the greatest national achievement of the Canadian people since the Dominion came into being; and its story is to be cherished not only as the proof of Canadian military capacity but as the noblest example yet given of the ability of Canadians to ... accomplish great ends ... The four years' career of her fighting troops in France forms the real testimony to Canada's entrance into nationhood, the visible demonstration that there has grown upon her soil a people not English nor Scottish nor American but Canadian.⁶

The memory of the Canadian Corps was indeed cherished. Some recalled the first gas attack at Ypres in April, 1915, when it appeared that the Allied line would have broken but for the gallant stand of Canada's 1st Division. There was pride in the achievements of 1916 and 1917, when the Corps began to develop its reputation under its first two commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Edwin Alderson and Sir Julian Byng, both British regulars. Also firmly entrenched in Canadian memory were the victories won under the leadership of the Corps' last commander, the Canadian-born militiaman, General Sir Arthur Currie: Hill 70, Passchendaele, and especially the string of successes in the last hundred days of the war. From the battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918 (the 'Black Day' of the German army) to the entry into Mons on 11 November, the Canadian Corps had been at the forefront of operations, and many boasted that its soldiers, together with the Australians, had been the shock troops of the Allied armies in the most decisive battles of the war.

But of them all, one day stood out. On Easter Monday 1917 the Canadians had stormed Vimy Ridge and pushed the enemy off the high ground, succeeding where previous attempts had failed. With all four divisions together in the assault for the first time, the Corps' endeavours that morning set the tone for its future battles. The men at the front realized that they were part of something special, something distinctively Canadian, and they were seized with a spirit of victory then that they never lost. It was at the summit of Vimy Ridge, therefore, that Canada built her grandest war memorial, and to many it was there that the Canadian nation was born. Donald Goodspeed has written:

The Canadian Corps was to win other outstanding victories, but none so caught the popular imagination or were so peculiarly identified with Canada as the taking of Vimy Ridge. As is usually the case in such matters, the popular instinct was absolutely right. No matter what constitutional historians may say, it was on Easter Monday, April 9, 1917, and not on any other date, that Canada became a nation.⁷

The assertion that 'Canada became a nation' on this one day, and no other, is too strong. Fourteen years had to pass before the Statute of Westminster gave formal recognition to Canada's political autonomy. Quite apart from such fine points of constitutional law, the introduction of conscription in Canada only a few weeks after the battle tore the fragile national fabric into its two component fibres.

Even if the rent was not beyond repair, the First World War became a source of discord as much as a unifying force. Perhaps this is why Vimy Ridge has not meant as much to Canadians as the ill-fated landings at Gallipoli have to Australians. Associated with a larger event that accentuated the divisions between Canada's two founding peoples, Vimy could not serve as the symbol of national pride, spirit, and identity; instead, it has been all but forgotten as its veterans have passed from the scene and as Canadians of succeeding generations have found other things to celebrate and have searched for other symbols of unity.

Even if the Canadian Corps' legend has not provided 'the stuff'⁸ of which nations are made, its very existence had an enormous impact on the political initiatives that helped transform the British Empire into a Commonwealth of autonomous states. Given the precedent of the Boer War, in which Canadians served overseas under Canadian command, and the Dominion's growing sense of self-awareness, the Canadian Government could not leave the care of so many of its soldiers to the United Kingdom, nor remain disinterested in the conduct of the war once it had decided to make such a massive military contribution. That kind of total Imperial control would have been both unpalatable and politically inexpedient. Borden was therefore compelled to take action to maintain a satisfactory measure of domestic control over Canada's armed forces. As things turned out, when he did so he was also taking important steps toward autonomy and independence.

But this is not the full story. As Borden himself acknowledged, the solid bargaining position gained for Canada from the size of her military effort was strengthened by the demonstrated quality of the Canadian Corps on the field of battle. Canada's political evolution thus cannot be divorced from the success of her soldiers in France and Flanders. This paper will examine both these elements, beginning with the changes in Canada's political status, moving to the reasons for the maturation of the Canadian Corps as an effective fighting force, and then examining its influence on Canada's constitutional position in the Empire-Commonwealth. We shall see that developments in the political and military spheres were closely related, if not thoroughly interdependent.

The fundamental question -- would Canadians serve in a Canadian formation? -- was answered early on. Although the War Office would probably not have objected to the absorption of Canada's battalions into one Imperial army, Canadian preferences for a separate Dominion contingent were met

without any hesitation. Despite the fact that the C.E.F. was technically an 'Imperial' force subject to British Army discipline and regulations until 1916, Canadian units would fight in a Canadian division (and later a corps) and Canada retained control over administrative matters such as pay, reinforcements, and to some extent at least, appointments and promotions. The relationship between the commander of the Canadian contingent and the Dominion Government was more complex. The War Office told Major-General Alderson that direct contact with Ottawa was 'not permissible', but common sense dictated otherwise; after all, the Canadian Government had raised and was paying for the C.E.F. In the end practice became principle: the senior commander of the Canadian contingent was held accountable to the Canadian Government and was free to communicate directly with it. From the beginning, however, it was understood that operational matters and the higher direction of the war would remain British or Anglo-French responsibilities.⁹

Borden still took care to elaborate a Canadian casus belli. The Dominion, he said, was fighting in her own right.¹⁰ This did not mean that he was actively seeking immediate participation in deliberations affecting major questions of policy. He did however seem to be giving notice that, since the Canadian Expeditionary Force was not strictly speaking a colonial contingent, Canada's political role should also not be limited to that of a mere colony. As he told the Canadian Club of Montreal, the country's 'evolution' would not attain "full' development until Canada had some sort of voice in Imperial policy.¹¹ Presumably her political involvement would grow as her military commitment expanded.

The Minister of Militia and Defence, Major-General Sam Hughes, had no quarrel with any of this. He had not spent his entire militia career exalting the Canadian citizen-soldier (and haranguing the British regular) to have the War Office take charge of Canada's military forces at the moment of supreme peril. He also had more personal motives for supporting his prime minister's insistence on Canadian control. Having created the expeditionary force, but unlikely ever to achieve his ambition of commanding the Canadian contingent, Hughes was determined that the overseas army should not lose his mark. For the moment he accepted a British regular as commander of the 1st Division and other British officers for the staff, but he looked to the day when one of his men -- Arthur Currie, Richard Turner, VC, M.S. Mercer, or perhaps his own son, Garnet -- would rise to the top.¹²

The doctrine of Canadian control served Hughes well in the interim. Although anxious to secure his influence over the C.E.F., he was able to argue that he was in fact seeking to improve Canada's political position, and so was given a free hand to do more or less as he wished. He appointed an old friend, Colonel J.W. Carson, as his personal representative in London, while other close associates found themselves in administrative positions in England or liaison appointments at British headquarters in France. Although things were eventually to go very wrong when loose definitions of authority permitted this overseas administration to become a tangled web of intrigue and muddle, these moves could be defended at the time as protecting the separate identity of the C.E.F. Designed primarily to reward friends or extend his personal influence, Hughes' policies nevertheless gave the Canadians their own training, support, and administrative echelons in the United Kingdom while providing the Minister of Militia and Defence with direct access to senior British officials in London and in France.¹³

Borden, by comparison, achieved very little in the purely political realm of imperial relations during the first two years of the war. Although he had been full of confidence that Canada had reached a 'new stage' in her 'nationhood' in February 1915,¹⁴ that illusion had been shattered by August. Despite a brave (or wistful) speech in London, in which he told his audience that the 'old order' had 'in some measure passed away' now that 'the issues of peace and war' concerned 'more than the people of these islands,'¹⁵ attitudes in Great Britain had not changed. Officials there still behaved as if Canada were a Crown Colony, and they offered only the slightest assistance when her prime minister sought information on the imperial war effort.

Borden was understandably upset by such disregard of a government that had already mobilized 150,000 men. Nonetheless, on 30 October 1915 he increased the size of the C.E.F. to 250,000, paving the way for the formation of the 3rd and 4th divisions that winter and spring. If this was an attempt to buy the right to consultation, it failed miserably. Bonar Law, Colonial Secretary in Asquith's government, offered the excuse that there was no practical way to recognize 'the right of the Canadian Government to have some share of the control in a war in which Canada was playing so big a part.'¹⁶ For technical constitutional reasons, therefore, Canada was to have no voice in imperial policy.

Despite this set-back, Borden delayed his reply until 4 January 1916, three days after he had announced a further increase in the Dominion's military commitment to 500,000 men. In a letter to Sir George Perley, acting Canadian High Commissioner in London, the prime minister complained bitterly that the British could hardly expect Canada to:

put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy automata. Any person cherishing such an expectation harbours an unfortunate and even dangerous delusion.

But this was precisely what Whitehall appeared to be doing. The British, Borden continued, were arrogating to themselves alone 'the methods by which [the war] should be carried on,' notwithstanding their acknowledgement that the Dominion governments had 'large responsibilities to their people for conduct of war.'¹⁷

This was a strong message, but only a week later Borden instructed Perley not to forward it to the British Government. He was ill at the time, which may have affected his thinking. Or, as Colonel C.P. Stacey suggests, the prime minister may have concluded that only grand gestures entailing an increased military commitment would convince Whitehall to change its ways and to begin consultation with Dominion leaders. As it was, the British response to the new manpower limit remained unsatisfactory, emphasizing the difficulties inherent in sending sensitive information to Ottawa.¹⁸ yet, for almost a year Borden took no further action and made no more complaints, in part because Asquith had nothing to offer, and in part because he was distracted by two problems involving Sam Hughes.

The first of these was a munitions profiteering scandal from which Hughes emerged relatively unscathed. Borden had been embarrassed, however, and he seems to have begun to lose patience with his sometimes erratic minister at about this time. When his equanimity was tested once more in late summer, the prime minister did not hesitate to act. Fed up with the multitude of complaints about incompetence, favouritism, and disarray in the Canadian military administration overseas, Borden instructed Hughes to travel to London, study the situation, and recommend a possible solution. True to form, the defence minister implemented his own scheme to restore order without first consulting the prime minister. Concerned that Sir Sam was not taking things seriously, and afraid that his remedy would only prolong the problem -- the

Acting Overseas Sub-Militia Council Hughes proposed included many old faces from the previous regime -- Borden rebuked his colleague for his peremptory action, only to find himself bitterly attacked in return. This was too much for the prime minister, who immediately asked for Hughes' resignation. That done, he named the acting High Commissioner in London, Sir George Perley, to head a new cabinet department, the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, and directed him to bring order to affairs there. Perley thereupon brought Major-General Sir Richard Turner back from France and appointed him to command all Canadian forces in Great Britain.¹⁹

The unprecedented appointment of an overseas minister to Cabinet meant that for the first time the C.E.F. would have ready access to its responsible minister. As the same time the consolidation of military administration and training under Turner put an end to the haphazard and counter-productive decentralization that existed before. Together these two developments were of great benefit to the forces at the front, upon whose reputation Borden would eventually capitalize. For the moment, however, the Dominion's participation in the higher direction of the war still depended entirely upon the British.

The attitude of Westminster changed dramatically in December 1916. Asquith's government fell, and the new prime minister, David Lloyd George, announced that he intended to invite the Dominion premiers to an Imperial War Conference, during which they would also attend special War Cabinet meetings to discuss military policy in general. Whatever Lloyd George's motives may have been -- to find allies in his conflict with the British general staff or, as he admitted himself, to persuade the Dominions to commit more men to France -- Borden later described these measures as having transformed Canada 'from colony to nation.'²⁰ Canadian involvement in the larger issues was in fact limited to the time Borden could afford to spend in London, but even so he had every reason to be satisfied with the results of these meetings. The Imperial War Cabinet engaged in wide-ranging discussions, especially of the manpower problem, while the War Conference passed a resolution sponsored by Borden that recognized the right of Dominions to a reasonable voice in foreign policy as 'autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth.' Although the complex constitutional machinery required to make this a permanent part of the imperial relationship was to be left until after the war, Canada had at least become more than a 'subordinate helper.' Her prime minister had been consulted and been given access to extremely sensitive information while he was in London.²¹

The next round of meetings in the summer of 1918 made few new statements of policy, but they were if anything even more significant from the standpoint of practical Dominion participation in decisions affecting the conduct of the war. Furthermore, the most dramatic development resulted from Borden's actions on 13 June, the third day of the War Cabinet sittings. Having long suspected the quality of British military leadership on the Western Front, and having had these doubts confirmed by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps commander, Borden made blunt accusations about the Empire's conduct of the war in front of his War Cabinet colleagues. The costly struggle for the muddy ground at Passchendaele the previous winter lay at the heart of his bitterness, but his indictment was of the British Army in general. 'There was a lack of preparation and foresight' in its operations, Borden charged; there had been a 'conspicuous failure to remove incompetent officers'; and there had been an equally conspicuous disregard of younger and more talented men. Although he acknowledged that the past had to be forgotten and allowed to 'bury its dead,' he nevertheless warned the Imperial authorities to 'get down to earnest endeavour and hold this line until the Americans can come in.' If there was no improvement his course of action would be clear. 'Not a Canadian soldier will leave the shores of Canada,' he told Lloyd George, 'so long as the Canadian people entrust the government of their country to my hands.'²²

Lloyd George seized upon this intervention as an excuse to establish a committee of Dominion premiers to assess Imperial military policy. He, too, was critical of British high command, and he had been searching for an alternative to the unimaginative style of operations on the Western Front. Canada's military record, and Lloyd George's high regard for the way Currie conducted operations with a view to saving lives*, were convenient instruments in the British Prime Minister's conflict with his own generals and that part of the British Establishment unwilling to accept major alterations in the higher direction of the war. Lloyd George

* See the War Memoirs of David Lloyd George. Vol. VI (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936), 3423-4 for Lloyd George's opinion of Currie and the Australian, Monash. Both he wrote, were 'brilliant military leaders' who had 'a natural aptitude for soldiering' and both had brains. It is possible that had Lloyd George been able to dismiss Haig, one of these two would have become Commander-in-Chief and the other his Chief of Staff. See Preston, Canada and 'Imperial Defense', 495.

used Borden's statements quite openly to substantiate the need for a major review of policy. As a result, the Canadian Prime Minister was soon involved in strategic planning for 1919, while the performance of the Canadian Corps became a matter of political as well as military significance when he sought British support in his bid to sign the peace treaty for Canada and to secure a seat in the League.

Canada's growing military prowess thus played a role in loosening the ties of imperial political subordination. The reverse was also true. The political decision at the outbreak of the war to give the C.E.F. separate status within the British armies had allowed the Dominion's military forces to realize their fighting potential. In contrast to British practice, Canadian divisions were not transferred from one headquarters to another, but remained within the Canadian Corps, so that its commanders and staff officers came to know each other well. At the same time, however, the evolution of the Canadian Corps as a battleworthy formation also required a more regular system of civil-military relations. Ironically, before that could occur it would be necessary to free the C.E.F. from the excessively close control exercised by the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, the very political authority who had given the expeditionary force life and vitality in the first place.

* * *

The Canadian army sent overseas in 1914 was Sam Hughes' creation, and he insisted that it reflect what he considered to be the superior military virtues and values of the country's part-time soldiers. This meant, among other things, that his troops would carry Canadian equipment wherever possible: the Ross rifle, a fine precision sporting rifle unequal to the rigors of military use; the infantryman's leather Oliver-pattern harness, already roundly criticized in South Africa; boots that were anything but water-resistant; and a bizarre shovel-shield combination of Swiss design patented by and named for his secretary, Ena MacAdam.²³ Most were replaced with British equipment as soon as the C.E.F. reached England, but it was a measure of Hughes' nationalism (or parochialism) and his ego that he interpreted this as disloyalty -- to him and to Canada.²⁴

This attitude had been clear from the beginning of the war. When Canada mobilized in August 1914 Hughes ignored the plan laid out by the British officers serving on the Canadian general staff, and issued instead his own call to arms. He therefore formed the battalions of the Canadian

Expeditionary Force, and he appointed their officers. British reactions to the latter were hardly positive. Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, a father of the British tank forces, and certainly no conventional soldier, remarked that the first Canadian contingent he watched disembark at Devonport would be a fine formation 'if the officers could be all shot.'²⁵ General Alderson agreed that the officers were 'very ignorant,' had 'no power of command' and were the weakest link in the force.²⁶ There was less criticism of this sort from Canadians, of course, but there was some. Currie, for example, was bothered by the way 'every squirt of a politician' worked so assiduously to secure the greatest possible advantages for himself or his friends, while the permanent force officers whom Hughes had purposely left out of the expeditionary force complained bitterly at their lot. Readiness and willingness to utilize political connections for personal gain were, it must be remembered, part and parcel of the Canadian militia tradition, as was the general tendency to disparage the capabilities of the regulars.³⁷ Neither was likely to disappear immediately upon the outbreak of war.

Once senior Canadian officers had experience at the front, however, they began to realize that military efficiency would be adversely affected if these old ways continued, and if Sam Hughes clung to control of the C.E.F. After all, it was they who knew modern warfare best, and it was they who had first-hand information on the performance of their subordinates. There was, they maintained, no room for ministerial vetoes on personnel matters, for self-serving appeals to Ottawa by those who believed they had been overlooked or unfairly treated, or for the political games played before the war. All these denigrated experience, knowledge, and experience obtained through real soldiering at the front.²⁸

The Canadian military administration set up by Hughes in England was of no assistance in dealing with these complaints; in fact, it probably made matters worse. At best it lacked cohesion. Colonel Carson, appointed as Hughes' personal representative on supply matters, appropriated for himself the unofficial title of vice-minister of militia, and asserted his authority over the broader concerns which that title implied. Brigadier-General MacDougall, meanwhile, asked for and received the appointment of General Officer Commanding the Canadians in Great Britain. Once the 2nd Division left for France, its original commander, Major-General Sir Sam Steele, was given a training division in England independent of MacDougall. Later Brigadier-General Lord Brooke, a favoured Briton, was appointed to a similar command although he was nominally under Steele.

The result of all of this was almost inevitable. Carson's support for Hughes and his assertion of authority as 'vice-minister' caused consternation at the War Office and in the C.E.F. At the same time the three training authorities in England began to travel separate paths. Not only did they not always listen to advice from Canada or the front, but they also failed to coordinate policies among themselves because there was no one officer on the spot to whom all were responsible. Furthermore, each of the training division commanders was an ambitious officer. In the end, they began to treat their reinforcement and support formations as permanently organized units instead of as servants of the Corps, so that at times the rear echelon actually acted as the Corps' master. But no amount of complaining would induce Hughes to listen to the critics at the front instead of his own men in England.²⁹

At the same time the senior officers in France had to contend with the minister's determination to control appointments and promotions in the Corps. Hughes defended his stand on the grounds that it served the doctrine of civilian control over the army, but too often he rewarded only his friends. At first the dispute centred on a group of majors and lieutenant-colonels who had accompanied the first contingent as supernumeraries at the minister's insistence, and who later expected to serve in France in their rank when casualties made room for them. With better, experienced, men available in the front-line battalions, whom the commanders on the spot wished to promote, the War Office joined the latter in urging that these 'decayed and useless' supernumeraries be sent home.³⁰ Hughes would not hear of it; he had made promises. Although such intervention by the British could have been construed as unwarranted Imperial interference in Canadian affairs, even Borden acknowledged the legitimacy of their complaints, and during one of Hughes' frequent absences from Ottawa the prime minister persuaded Cabinet to pass an order-in-council authorizing the commanders in France to make promotions without reference to Ottawa.³¹ Still Hughes would not act against his friends, or adhere faithfully to the terms of the Cabinet decree. The number of complaints mounted.

Hughes' response was typical. He persuaded Cabinet to restore his authority over personnel matters, probably by reference to the principle of Canadian control.³² But his private motive, as illustrated in a letter to Carson, was to protect his power to reward those whom he wished to favour. For under the order-in-council, the many 'authentic' and (as he described them) 'unbiased reports from officers, non-commissioned officers and men in narratives to their friends

... as well as to the minister direct' would have been superseded by regular army fitness reports about which he could do very little.³³ Once Hughes had the support of Cabinet he was free to warn the new Corps Commander in August 1916, Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, to promote no one without checking with him. After all, the minister contended, he had never made a mistake in recommending or refusing an appointment.

The two British commanders of the Canadian Corps generally accepted Hughes' wishes, but the Canadian divisional commanders often objected to the minister's overbearing interference. Disgusted by the self-serving attitude of supernumeraries posted to his units, Currie (who led the 1st Division) asked Carson in December 1915 when Canadian authorities would 'stop playing and realise that we are at least serious?'³⁵ That same month Turner, commanding 2nd Division, was upset at having to accept young officers direct from Canada into his battalions, and he drafted a personnel policy that would have guaranteed his prerogative to find junior officers from among the better NCOs.³⁶ Each protested as well against Hughes' attempt to use the doctrine of Canadian control to replace British staff officers serving on the corps and divisional staffs by Canadians who, for the most part, had no staff training.³⁷ Both were ignored. But in April and May 1916 they were joined by two unlikely allies, Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Odlum, a Victoria newspaper proprietor and close associate of Garnet Hughes who would soon command the 11th Brigade, and Major-General David Watson, another Hughes protegee promoted to command the 4th Division in preference to a highly recommended regular officer. Odlum was particularly annoyed with Hughes' practice of commissioning soldiers without reference to their superior officers,³⁸ while Watson informed Carson that divisional commanders must be free to choose their own staff and subordinate commanders.³⁹

Up to now such complaints from the front had little effect in Ottawa, but by the autumn of 1916 Borden was prepared to listen. The shell scandal had already weakened Hughes' political position, and other evidence confirmed that the problems overseas were becoming serious. Newton Rowell, Ontario Liberal leader, told Borden in September that he found much opposition to Hughes during a visit to the Corps,⁴⁰ and George Perley asked the prime minister in October whether a defence minister so isolated from the front was in any position to make recommendations on appointments and promotions overseas.⁴¹ That same month Hughes was asked to resign, primarily because of his unilateral action in the matter of reforming overseas administration.

But soon afterward Borden acknowledged that his former colleague had abused ministerial powers by favouring friends at the expense of experienced officers. The practice had been a 'grave error,' he told Perley, and it was to be corrected as soon as possible.⁴²

It was corrected, but neither immediately nor totally. Perley replaced Hughes as minister responsible for the armed forces overseas on 31 October 1916, and on 2 January 1917 he announced that all future appointments within the Corps would be based on professional criteria as defined by the military staff.⁴³ Old habits died hard. Ottawa was still inundated with requests for favours, and in some cases officials were unable to resist the pressure. Borden himself was guilty on a least one occasion, as he exerted considerable influence to give Garnet Hughes command of the 5th Division, while Robert Rogers, Minister of the Interior, led a group attempting to block Brigadier-General A.C. Macdonnell's promotion to command the 1st Division when Currie left to take over the Corps. For his part, Hughes' successor as militia minister, Sir Edward Kemp, tried to maintain the practice that permitted young lieutenants appointed and trained in Canada to go directly to battalions in France even though this pre-empted commissioning from the ranks in the field. Perley could do nothing to stop the appointment of Hughes, but he successfully resisted the rest, all the while arguing that the politicians in Ottawa should 'mind their own business.'⁴⁴ Later he accepted Corps advice on reinforcement policy and, most important of all, he ensured that while Canadian officers would be appointed to the operational staffs in France, this would not happen until they had qualified for their posts. As a result, the policy of Canadianization had no adverse effect on the Corps' operational efficiency.

For all his efforts, Perley did not produce a system without friction. He was never able entirely to resolve the rivalry between Currie, who jealously guarded his prerogatives, and Turner who, believing he had been promised the Corps and then passed over, now refused to act as Currie's cypher. And, in the opinion of the defence minister, Sir Edward Kemp, Perley had surrendered too much power to the military.

When Kemp replaced Perley as Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada in October 1917, one of his objectives was to restore the proper civil-military balance as he saw it. This produced a certain amount of tension and ill-feeling between London and Corps Headquarters, but even so he was just as willing as his predecessor to stand up to

both Canadian and Imperial authorities against policies which Currie feared would destroy the Corps' military efficiency. In January 1918, for example, Kemp sided with Currie against the creation of a five-division Canadian army even though this angered the powerful lobby in Ottawa that saw an enlarged expeditionary force as a means of securing a battlefield command for Garnet Hughes. (Indeed, the minister agreed with Currie's plan to break up the 5th Division, already in England, in order to provide reinforcements for the Corps.) Later, in the most crucial test of autonomy during the war, Kemp put the full weight of his position behind Currie's objections to Sir Douglas Haig's request to allocate Canadian divisions piecemeal to shore up other commands when the British line sagged during the German attacks in March 1918. The Corps Commander was less pleased with Kemp's part in establishing a Canadian Section at General Headquarters in France between April and June 1918 because he regarded that organization as something of a ministerial watch-dog, which conjured up dark images of Sam Hughes' administration. The appointment of Brigadier-General J.F.L. Embury mollified him. Embury acted as liaison officer between Kemp and Haig, and between Currie and Kemp, and so helped to institutionalize Canadian control over her forces at the front. Since it defined Canadian responsibility over matters affecting organization, reinforcements, and senior appointments, the agreement on the Canadian Section was, as Desmond Morton has written, 'the kind of arrangement that anyone should have expected from a junior but sovereign ally,' and so was a logical extension of Currie's policies.⁴⁵

Such decisions paid dividends when the time came to go over to the offensive in August 1918. The Corps was strong, well-trained, and better rested than the British armies; it had experienced, battle-proven commanders at all levels, most of them Canadian; and the staff, also increasingly Canadian, was becoming more competent with each operation. These were the direct result of Perley's, Kemp's and Currie's actions, which had protected the formations at the front against politically motivated appointments of neophyte officers, and from the replacement of excellent British staff officers by inexperienced Canadians purely for the sake of having Canadian officers in these positions. Permitted by the two overseas ministers to evolve at a pace more or less set by its battlefield commanders, the Corps was ready to play its role as a shock formation and to reinforce in the last hundred days of the war the reputation already won at Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele. It was this record that Borden had behind him at the Imperial War Conference and War Cabinet meetings, and when he proposed that Canada have

separate representation at the peace conference. For this reason, C.P. Stacey's statement that Canada's soldiers in World War I were 'a different group of nation-builders ... in ill-fitting khaki' who did much to further the work of the Fathers of Confederation is very apt.⁴⁶

The relationship between Canada's political and military evolution during the Great War was thus symbiotic. While Generals Alderson and Byng may have sensed that the Canadian Corps fought better because it was a distinctive national formation, Currie knew that he profitted greatly from the Canadian Government's insistence that the C.E.F. remain separate from the British Army and that Canadian units and formations invariably serve together. As a result, he allowed no tampering with the Corps, whether by Canadian or British officials, for fear that its esprit de corps, its morale, and its fighting qualities would be eroded. It is the mark of the man, and of his belief in a strong, well-balanced, and well-staffed four division corps, that Currie steadfastly opposed the despatch of a fifth division to France, even though this may have cost him the command of a two-corps army and opened the way for political intrigue against him at home.*

Sam Hughes' contribution to this process cannot be overlooked. He was a driving force behind the C.E.F.'s separate status, and he did discover worthy leaders like Currie by dipping into the large pool of militia officers in August 1914. Unfortunately, the minister's ambition, his long-standing antipathy to British regulars, and his desire to keep control of the expeditionary force led him to interfere in matters better left to the battlefield commanders. He also permitted a thoroughly inefficient administration to grow up in England by selecting friends for high office whom he knew would not be critical of his policies; if their advice happened to conflict with his predilections he simply ignored it. This so handicapped those serving at the front that many of his appointees, including former friends and admirers, reacted with undisguised glee when they learned of his resignation. As one officer put it:

* There is no certainty that the despatch of a fifth division to the front would have created an army command for Currie, although this was assumed to have been likely after the war. In 1916-1917 the Australians had put forward a proposal to create an Australian Army at the front and were told by Haig that even six divisions was not sufficient for the establishment of an army headquarters. See C.E.W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France during the main German Offensive, 1918 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937), 5 ff.

There is a new contentment among us all. We walk with sprightlier step ... clear eyes ... cleaner cut. The Mad Mullah of Canada has been deposed. The Canadian Baron Munchausen will be to less effect ... The greatest soldier since Napoleon has gone to his gassy Elbe, and the greatest block to the successful termination of the war has been removed. Joy, Oh Joy!⁴⁷

Sam Hughes, in other words, had outlived his usefulness.

Canada's militia tradition also helped the C.E.F. at the beginning of the war. Less bound by tradition or inappropriate lessons from past campaigns than the British Army, it gave the officers and men of the expeditionary force freer reign to use their native talents and abilities to solve problems and overcome obstacles. Such acceptance of common sense and initiative may have accounted for innovations like the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade (led by an ex-patriate Frenchman, Brutinel), the highly efficient engineer organization in the Canadian Corps, and the readiness with which Canadian officers embraced the idea that detailed information about operational objectives should be passed to the other ranks. To exploit such advantages, however, Currie had to articulate an approach to war that emphasized careful preparation and training, and depended upon Brigadier-General A.G.L. McNaughton's sophisticated counter-battery artillery techniques to save lives in set-piece attacks.⁴⁸ As a result, the amateurism that had marked Sam Hughes' concept of soldiering in the pre-war militia had to be played down. Education, training, and most important of all, experience on the battlefield became prerequisites for promotion, while the importance of a competent staff was universally recognized.

All this was understandable. Those who led men in battle and were responsible for saving lives ultimately realized that there were no substitutes for professional knowledge, experience, and proficiency. These would win victories and prevent casualties. Once this sense of professionalism was recognized by the political authorities and allowed to flourish, the officers and men of the Corps were able to contribute more fully as 'nation-builders' in furthering Canada's development from subordinate to colleague within the British Empire, and from colony to nation in the world.

The same could not be said of Canada's sailors and airmen during the Great War. The Royal Canadian Navy carried out the traditional tasks of a colonial service, providing men for British ships and manning about a hundred vessels

for coastal patrol. Fleet units were out of the question. At the same time the Canadian Government was content to leave control of Canadian shipping in the hands of the British Admiralty. Evidently there was no clearly enunciated doctrine in Ottawa requiring national control of all the country's armed forces.⁴⁹

The story of Canada's contribution in the air illuminates this lack of doctrine even more clearly. Over twenty thousand Canadians were trained as flyers between 1914 and 1918, but for most of the war they had no service of their own. There were a few attempts to create a Canadian air force; however, the government was generally persuaded that the military effort was best served if Canadians remained in the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Naval Air Service, and eventually the Royal Air Force. Moreover, when British authorities wished to establish a flying training organization in the Dominion, they were given a free hand. RFC Canada (later known as RAF Canada) had minimal participation on the part of the Canadian Government. It was only in June 1918, at the initiative of the Canadian Overseas Ministry, that an embryonic, self-contained Canadian Air Force was created in England. However, it barely survived the war, being disbanded in June 1919.⁵⁰

The experience of Canada's seamen and airmen thus contrasted sharply with that of her soldiers, and it underscored the significance of the Canadian Corps' contribution to national development. For not only had the Corps reinforced Borden's bid for international recognition of Canada's emergence as an autonomous Dominion within the British Commonwealth, but its semi-independent status with the British armies at the front became the framework by which all three services would operate in the Second World War and later. In short, the Canadian Corps helped to legitimize the existence of purely Canadian armed forces that would serve under national command in co-operation with, not subordinate to, friends and allies.

Notes

1. Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: a History of Canadian External Policies. Vol. I: 1867-1921. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 176.
2. See C.P. Stacey, 'Laurier, King, and External Affairs,' in John S. Moir, ed., Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald Grant Creighton. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), 88-9.

3. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 21 August 1914.
4. On the post-war negotiations see Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 240-284 and R. Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 287 ff.
5. Quoted in Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 239.
6. Quoted in Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 58-9.
7. D.J. Goodspeed, The Road Past Vimy: The Canadian Corps, 1914-1918. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 93.
8. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 238.
9. See G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. (Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 32ff. See also Richard A. Preston, Canada and 'Imperial' Defense: A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's defence organization, 1867-1919. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 462 ff. Note, however, that the desire to extend Canadian control did not apply to the Canadian flying service in World War I, to Canada's munitions industry, or even to the Control of Canadian merchant shipping. All these remained colonial left-overs.
10. Robert Craig Brown, 'Sir Robert Borden, the Great War, and Anglo-Canadian Relations', in John S. Moir, ed., Character and Circumstance, 201-224. See also Brown's recent biography of Borden, Borden Laird Borden: a Biography. Vol II: (Toronto: Macmillan, 1980.)
11. Quoted in Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 183.
12. See Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 18 ff, and Archer Fortecue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919. Vol. I. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938), 93 ff.
13. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 203 ff.
14. Borden's speech to the House of Commons, 4 February 1915, quoted in Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Vol. I. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), 532.

15. Quoted in Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs Vol. II. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), 30.
16. Ibid, 620-1, quoting Bonar Law to Perley, 3 November 1915.
17. Ibid, 622.
18. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 192.
19. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 205-211. See also Desmond Morton, Canada and War: A Military and Political History. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), 67.
20. Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Vol. II, 77. See also Brown and Cook, Canada, 1896-1921, 282, and Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography. Vol. II, 77, 82.
21. See R. Craig Brown and R. Bothwell, 'The "Canadian Resolution,"' in Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell, eds., Policy by other means: essays in honour of C.P. Stacey. (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, and Co., 1972), 167-178. See also Preston, Canada and Imperial 'Defense', 202 ff. Four days after his return from the conference Borden imposed conscription in Canada.
22. Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography, 136 ff, and Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 220.
23. On equipment, see Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 25-7.
24. On the Ross see Duguid, Official History, Vol. I. Appendices and Maps, 75-98.
25. Quoted in Anthony J. Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller: The Intellectual General'. (London: Cassell, 1977), 37.
26. Alderson to the Duke of Connaught (Canadian Governor General), 4 December 1914, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Borden Papers, MG 26 H1(a), vol. 49, 'OC223-235(1), 22857.
27. Currie to Sam Matson, 29 September 1914, PAC, Borden Papers, vol. 361, Currie file. On the pre-war militia see Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

28. Stephen John Harris, 'Canadian Brass: The Growth of the Canadian Military Profession, 1860-1919,' (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1979), ch. 5.
29. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 201 ff.
30. War Office notes to the Canadian Government, April 1915, PAC, RG 24, vol. 2518, file HQC 1550.
31. See PC 2138, 16 September 1915, and Chief of the General Staff to Adjutant General, 28 July 1915, PAC, RG 24, vol. 1125, file HQ 54-21-50-1.
32. Hughes to Governor General in Council, 15 January 1916, *ibid.* See also Preston, Canada and 'Imperial' Defense, 470 ff.
33. See Hughes to Carson, 26 May 1916, *ibid.*
34. Villiers diary, 17 August 1916, PAC, Villiers Papers, MG 30 E236, vol. 4. P.F. Villiers was a staff officer in France. He reported that while Byng told Hughes that he would be glad to give the minister information about appointments, he would resign if Hughes interfered.
35. Currie to Carson, 21 December 1915, PAC, RG 24, vol. 1246, file HQ 593-1-64.
36. Turner to Carson, 7 December 1915, PAC, RG 9 III, vol. 34, file 8-1-87.
37. Turner to Alderson, Currie to Alderson, and M.S. Mercer to Alderson, all 11 December 1915, PAC, RG 9 III, vol. 43, file 8-5-8B.
38. Odlum to Carson, 1 April 1916, PAC, RG 9 III, vol. 31, file 8-1-70.
39. Watson to Carson, 12 May 1916, PAC, RG 9 III, vol 44, file 8-5-8E.
40. Rowell to Borden, 18 September 1916, PAC, Kemp Papers, MG 27 II D 9, vol. 157, file R-9.
41. Perley to Borden, 12 October 1916, PAC, Perley Papers, MG 27 II D 12, vol. 6, file 173.
42. Borden to Perley, 2 November 1916, PAC, RG 25 A2, vol. 270, file P-6-94.

43. Perley to Borden, 2 January 1917, PAC, RG 9 III, vol. 73, file 10-8-16.
44. Harris, 'Canadian Brass,' 204 ff. See also J.L. Biggar to W.N. Ponton, 7 June 1917, PAC, Ponton Papers, MG 30 E 96, vol. 15.
45. Morton, Canada and War, 79, Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 378 ff, and Preston, Canada and Imperial 'Defense', 481 ff. On Currie in general see A.M.H. Hyatt, 'The Military Career of Sir Arthur Currie,' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1964), and Kenneth C. Eyre, 'Staff and Command in the Canadian Corps.' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Duke University, 1967).
46. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 171.
47. Creelman diary, 19 November 1916, PAC, Creelman Papers, MG 30 E 8. J.C. Creelman was an artillery officer appointed by Hughes to command an artillery brigade in the First Contingent. He added that although he did not like to kick men when they were down, he would gladly 'break nine toes' to get at Hughes.
48. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 440 ff.
49. See Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: its Official History. Vol. I. Origins and Early Years. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), 237-282.
50. See S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. I. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 579 ff.

FROM INTEGRATION TO SEPARATION:
THE RCAF'S EVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE

[William McAndrew]

The growth of a Canadian air force between the two world wars reflected a number of peculiar Canadian problems. Not least among them was the integration of armed forces to save money, a pattern that has repeated itself since the Second World War.

The organization resulting from legislation in 1922 was quite different from the 1968 experience, and it would be a mistake to apply the 'lessons' of integration after the First World War to unification after the Second. One point of interest, however, does bear remarking. The circumstances that favoured integration in 1922 were domestic in nature. As William McAndrew demonstrates, world crisis in the thirties forced Canada to abandon the arrangement because it imposed unacceptable restrictions on the military activities of an expanding air force.

Canada's armed forces were integrated within a single ministry of National Defence in 1922. As James Eayrs has described, Prime Minister Mackenzie King's first administration picked up an idea being considered in both London and Washington and, with little thought other than saving money, the Canadian parliament quickly passed the necessary legislation. Professor Eayrs has also engagingly recounted the inter-service wrangling which followed, when Commodore Walter Hose and G.J. Desbarats, the Deputy Minister, led the Royal Canadian Navy in a successful skirmish against the centralizing notions of the keen but limited Major General James MacBrien. MacBrien's command attributes were more attuned to the brigade operations he had conducted with considerable verve on the western front than to the booby-trapped political trenches he found in post-war Ottawa. While he fancied himself Chief of Staff in the new headquarters dominated by the militia, his responsibilities were never clearly spelled out, and MacBrien found that he was unable to consolidate his position as the sole channel of military advice to the government. In practice he was no more than Chief of the General Staff of the militia.

But included within the purview of the militia, as a result of the defence reorganization, was the fledgling Canadian Air Force. There the air service remained until just before the Second War when a conjunction of circumstances forced a separation of the two services. In most countries the coming of age of independent air forces was accompanied by ringing declarations of the mystique and potential of air power, and usually by considerable public debate and fanfare. In contrast, the RCAF's independence evolved at the pace of an Ottawa spring thaw; slowly, incrementally, step by pragmatic step.¹

The Royal Canadian Air Force emerged as part of Canada's regular military establishment over the summer of 1922 more by accident than design. Immediately following the Armistice, the government of Sir Robert Borden had ordered the demobilization of the recently organized Canadian Air Force, then training in Britain, and turned the task of defining post-war aviation policy over to an autonomous Air Board. The Board's first priority was the civil sector, entirely neglected during the war years, and not until late in 1919 did it turn to the question of military aviation. Then, in a carefully reasoned statement which emphasized the need for building the nation's air power on a solid civil base, the Board proposed organizing a regionally administered, non-permanent air force which would be sufficiently widespread to accommodate the aeronautical interests of most of the thousands of young Canadians who had learned to fly during the war. Well within Canada's militia tradition, and much less expensive than a fully equipped regular force, the Canadian Air Force offered an ingenious solution, and also avoided contentious political questions concerning its possible employment. But while accepting the Board's advice, the government provided the new military service with only questionable legal underpinnings, giving the CAF neither separate ministerial representation in cabinet, nor specific legislation which would firmly establish its distinctiveness. Instead the cabinet simply authorized an order in council which relied on a clause of the Air Board Act empowering the Board "to employ" such staff as it required.²

From the outset the naval staff objected to the creation of a new military service in this indefinite, unorthodox fashion. "To suppose that by this expression Parliament authorized the raising and maintenance of a large military force with all the usual military privileges of life and death, imprisonment, discipline etc., merely has to be suggested in order to see its futility," they complained; "The truth of course is that this section [Section 5 of the Air

Board Act] authorizes the employment of a civil air staff."³ Nevertheless, while the soldiers gained legitimacy through their Militia Act, and the sailors by their Naval Service Act, the airmen came into the new department with no legal stature except that derived from a dubious statement embodied in legislation that was now redundant. It was hardly a promising beginning.

When the new Department of National Defence became responsible for both civil and military aviation in 1922, the CAF might, presumably, have remained a separate service, either regular or non-permanent, or it could have reverted to the subordinate relationship the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service had had during the First War.⁴ The Canadian naval staff certainly inclined to the latter alternative, having concluded earlier that "the time seems inopportune to establish an independent air force [which] would have practically no scope for its activities except in case of war with the United States and such a war is not in contemplation at the present time. In any other war aerial activity would be limited to co-operation with the army or navy."⁵ The first Minister of National Defence, George P. Graham, had no discernible opinions on aviation; he wanted only to save money through consolidating the armed forces, thought "the coordination of the Air Force ought not to be difficult in working out", and turned the details over to MacBrien and the militia staff.⁶ The soldiers, like the sailors, shared a decidedly paternalistic attitude towards the airmen, and why not? CAF officers were youthful -- most still in their twenties -- of junior rank, inexperienced in higher command and in a service whose military significance was a matter of debate. MacBrien thought the air force would be able to function with a modest headquarters of five officers and ten clerks because it could rely on the experience of the more senior militia staff.⁷ His deputy, Brigadier A.G.L. McNaughton, summed up the conventional military wisdom;

The best opinion inclines to the view that the Air Force is still in the stage of an auxiliary arm; it adds an increment to the power of the Army and Navy, but by itself can do little. The value of the work performed in the air is in direct proportion to its subordination to the wishes of the naval or military commanders concerned. And, while it is conceded that the progress of science and invention may ultimately make the Air Force capable of undertaking independent operations, it is recognized that time is not yet.⁸

MacBrien asked his Judge Advocate General to review the legal implications of incorporating the air force into the existing militia structure. The JAG duly reported that the Canadian Air Force was presently functioning under a mix of provisions in the Air Force Act (Imperial) and King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia. With integration, he pointed out, problems would inevitably arise when members of the militia and air force served together unless they were governed by common regulations. Moreover, the jurisdiction over airmen which could be exercised by District Officers Commanding would have to be clarified, as would the scope of the Militia Pension Act. "The joint administration of both Forces," he noted, "might prove difficult and complicated if it was carried out under an entirely distinct set of legislation, etc., for each force so administered."⁹

The regulatory system, the JAG suggested, would depend on what sort of air force MacBrien wanted. There was the British example, based on the premise that "the functions of an Air Force are so entirely dissimilar to those of a land force that special and distinct legislation is desirable for the government of such force."¹⁰ A separate Canadian Air Force would, therefore, require specific legislation. The alternative was to make the CAF a corps of the militia (under section 22 of the Militia Act which authorized the Governor in Council to create corps as he wished), a course the JAG preferred as both the militia and air force would be in the same government department.

In Canada [he argued] ... in view of the creation of the Department of National Defence, the situation is different, (from Great Britain), and if, as a result of the amalgamation of the various Departments, the Canadian Air Force will become to all intents and purposes a Force corresponding to what was the Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing, then the administration of both the Air Force and the Militia under one set of regulations appears to be desirable.¹¹

As he weighed the options, MacBrien was also influenced, ultimately persuasively, by the culmination of the acrimonious argument in London over the fate of the RAF. Its conclusion was bound to affect Canada since from at least 1907 the country had accepted the principle of common imperial military organizations based on British models. When the Royal Navy and British army failed in their attempts to have their aerial arms returned to the fold, and the RAF's service independence was assured, the terms of the debate in Canada were significantly altered. If the RAF was to be

independent, surely the CAF had to follow. Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, MacBrien's predecessor as CGS and now an Air Vice Marshal and Inspector General of the CAF, had quickly recognized the importance of the British decision. He sent MacBrien an extract from the parliamentary debate in which the British government announced its conclusion, telling him that to ensure imperial standardization Britain "has the best right to specify the form, which organization should take," and that "therefore, ... -- within limits imposed by local conditions -- the CAF should be organized on a system uniform with that of the RAF."¹²

By the end of the year MacBrien agreed. He appointed a staff committee to produce regulations for the air force which would combine the essentials of both Canadian militia and RAF practices, informing them that "It is considered wisest for the status of the Canadian Air Force to be kept as close as possible to the Royal Air Force."¹³ When the committee reported early in January with an acceptable regulatory compromise, MacBrien informed the Adjutant General, "It is intended that the Air Force will be a separate Service from the Navy and Militia, and that it will be divided into permanent and non-permanent sections."¹⁴

The CAF's autonomy was given a symbolic lift with the addition of the 'Royal' prefix in 1923, but MacBrien's departmental fiat began rather than finished the process of defining the degree of independence the air force would enjoy. It was in an anomalous situation; neither as independent as the RAF nor as subordinate as the United States Army Air Corps. The RCAF granted its own commissions, wore its distinctive uniforms, maintained operational control of its flying activities and shared an aviation ethos common to all air forces. But from the first it was made clear that while the RCAF's Director -- a mere Group Captain -- had broad discretionary internal authority, he would "when necessary, take the question up with the Chief of the General Staff."¹⁵ The CGS set overall policy and retained command responsibility; the air force was "treated in the same way as any other Directorate of Militia Headquarters."¹⁶ This was to be the case "until such time as the Royal Canadian Air Force has grown considerably ...;"¹⁷ then, "when its expansion so warrants, its administration will conform to the other services of the departments."¹⁸ Timing was left to circumstances.

Possibly the RCAF's senior officers resented their subordinate status, but they did not make an issue of it. In the 1920's there seemed little need for them to do so. Except for basic flying training and a few hundred annual hours of primitive army and navy cooperation exercises, the

air force was entirely occupied with conducting civil operations -- forest fire patrolling, aerial photography, crop dusting, transportation in remote regions and the like. Not until 1936 did the RCAF number more than 1,000 all ranks, and its flying operations were readily controlled through a command system centralized in RCAF Headquarters. The militia administrative structure provided the air force with what it needed except for peculiar aeronautical requirements for which the service had its own technical, research and supply branch. Similarly, both at NDHQ and regional Military Districts, the air force was simply plugged into the familiar militia 'A' (administrative) and 'Q' (supply) staff channels, and on balance integration probably benefitted the RCAF in these formative years. The small organization was left to concentrate on its flying while the militia supplied it with rations, uniforms, pay, transport, medical and other services.¹⁹

So long as the RCAF remained small, with but a minor role in the military establishment, administrative difficulties were easily managed. But in the early thirties two equally incongruous influences fundamentally altered the air force's roles and functions, and forced reconsideration of the service's relationship with the militia. The first, briefly stated, was economic depression which forced the government of R.B. Bennett virtually to eliminate civil flying operations. From a high of five millions in 1930-31, funding for the air force's varied civil tasks fell to \$190,000 two years later.²⁰ Then, in 1936, all the RCAF's obligations towards the civil sector were transferred to the new Department of Transport, and the removal of its civil responsibilities left the RCAF free to concentrate on building a military air force.

The second factor was the world Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1932. On any international scale Canada's participation in the disarmament talks was insignificant. They turned out to be important for Canadian military planning, however, because the militia staff undertook a major review of the country's defence requirements in order to determine a negotiating position for the Geneva discussions.²¹ For the Chief of the General Staff, now General McNaughton, the timing was fortuitous and he seized the opportunity to implement a major reorganization of the militia by cutting its bloated establishment from 15 to a more realistic seven (paper) divisions. "By this step," Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee shrewdly observed, "The Government could take the credit for a large reduction in establishments, and the army would be the more efficient for the reduction."²²

McNaughton also wanted to enlarge the RCAF's role in the revised defence structure. His earlier narrow views had changed considerably in the decade since integration when he had quickly recognized the value to the defence department in having air force pilots employed on useful civil works, especially the survey and mapping programme being implemented across the country.²³ McNaughton was also a pragmatist and had concluded that air defence was becoming progressively a more important factor in defence planning, particularly when financial restrictions were forcing hard decisions. Prior to the opening of the Geneva talks, therefore, he had the air staff prepare its first air defence plan. It called for the organization of seven permanent and 12 non-permanent squadrons with the primary role of protecting the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. As planning proceeded, it became evident that, unlike the militia, which could well await a formal declaration of war before mobilizing, the air force would have to have operational squadrons in place beforehand. As McNaughton described the scenario;

The outbreak of hostilities, under present conditions, would today, possibly, and tomorrow probably, be signaled by an immediate attack by air. Indeed, such an attack might be made before a formal declaration of war had been made. It is conceivable that attempted air attack from an aircraft carrier might not be kept secret, but direct attack (by transoceanic flight) could easily be kept secret, as the destination of aircraft cannot be gauged as can that of a Naval or Military Force. Therefore, there would not be time for any Canadian Air Force to expand in sufficient time to meet an attack.²⁴

McNaughton concluded that the RCAF's combat readiness would have to be developed even at the expense of the older services. He was highly disturbed, consequently, when informed while in Geneva that the government planned to decimate his budget, which meant that "The Air Force, of course, is entirely shot to pieces."²⁵ He hurried home and until retiring in 1935 maintained a continuing if frustrating effort to salvage what he could. While arguing his case before Treasury Board and others, McNaughton repeatedly emphasized the air force's increasing importance. As he confided to Sir Maurice Hankey, Canada could no longer rely for its coastal defence on the Royal Navy, and "The Canadian navy as presently constituted is not an answer to any problem of Canadian defence."²⁶ Furthermore, as he pointed out to the Prime Minister in June 1933, it would be prohibitively expensive to obtain the ships the navy would require for an adequate fleet. He advised that it would serve no useful

purpose to scale all three services down proportionately as funding was cut back. A tiny navy could do nothing and, consequently, "having regard to efficiency it would be necessary to concentrate on the absolute essentials, i.e., the Militia Forces and the Air Force."²⁷ Of these two, "it appears to me that the most important element in defence which should be retained is the nucleus Air Force." In McNaughton's view:

... Air Forces even in small numbers are a definite deterrent in narrow waters and on the high seas in the vicinity of the shore; they can be developed with considerable rapidity provided a nucleus of skilled personnel in a suitable training organization is in existence; pilots engaged in civil aviation can be quickly adapted to defence purposes; civil aircraft are not without value in defence, and any aircraft manufacturing facilities are equally available to meet military as well as civil requirements. That is, from a comparatively small current expenditure a considerable deterrent can be created in a relatively short time, and this is particularly the case in Canada where aviation plays a large part in the economic life of the country, a part which is increasing naturally at a rapid rate.²⁸

This was a ringing endorsement of the RCAF's unaccustomed stature from one who, by force of intellect and personality, dominated Ottawa's military establishment. Even he was unable to loosen purse strings, however, and political sanction of an expanded air force defence role was not forthcoming until the summer of 1936 when the new Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, shocked himself by reading a dreary summation of Canada's defence needs. Prepared by McNaughton before his retirement, the paper disclosed "a complete lack of any defence", King recorded in his diary; "I feel we must get aircraft equipment and look after our coasts -- defend our neutrality, and be prepared to mobilize industry, and arrange for effective cooperation of Government departments."²⁹ The three service chiefs reinforced his initial reaction when they briefed the newly constituted Defence Committee the next day. King recalled;

The impression left on my mind was one of the complete inadequacy of everything in the way of defence -- the need in view of changed methods of warfare, of having some coasts [sic] armament against raiders, chance attacks by sea and air. It is going to be extremely difficult to do anything effective without a cost which this country cannot bear. We have been

wise in placing our reliance mainly on policies which make for peace. The Military authorities ruled out altogether, as useless, any attempt to protect ourselves against the US and were wise in confining their statements to the need of the security of Canada within itself, and defence of our own neutrality.³⁰

Convincing himself was an important first step, but King then had to persuade his Cabinet, party caucus and parliament of the urgent need for action. This required intricate juggling to overcome formidable political restrictions which hindered the framing of any Canadian foreign and defence policies. Complicating historic difficulties, latent European antagonisms were smoldering dangerously. In October 1935 Italy had invaded Ethiopia and the world reaction set the League of Nations in an uproar; five months later Hitler occupied the Rhineland. Canadian opinion, as elsewhere, was far from unified, and it was divided further by the bitter ideological dimensions of the Civil War in Spain. Direct Canadian involvement in any of these, particularly at the behest of traditional imperial ties, was bound to provoke internal dissension and disrupt the ever fragile state of Canadian unity. Foreign entanglements implied possible military commitments and King had to tread warily not to antagonize isolationists, while also avoiding charges of leaving the country militarily vulnerable. As King's biographer has written, "If Canada did become a belligerent it would need forces that were equipped and trained; the government would be held responsible if the country was unprepared Increased defence expenditures, however, might provoke a domestic crisis which would be as dangerous to the government as being unprepared if war came."³¹

In this situation the air force had distinct advantages over the other services. The navy was not only very expensive to arm, it was considered hopelessly anglophile and imperial minded. The army was similarly marked because the only realistic scenario for its employment was as part of an expeditionary force on the First War model. Increasing the military capability of either threatened to awaken barely slumbering political differences in Canada which were better left alone. But the air force was different. Its mission was home defence, a role all but the most ardent isolationists had difficulty opposing.

The Prime Minister undertook the difficult task of mobilizing his political troops, and the services jointly prepared a comprehensive "appreciation of Canada's future liabilities, outlining the means and arrangements necessary

to meet these contingencies, and suggesting the successive steps on the part of each service, which would meet the requirements of a balanced and co-ordinated programme of development."³² The cost of the five year rearmament scheme was \$200 million, with \$65 million for the first year. In its usual fashion the cabinet halved the initial appropriation, but the air force managed to obtain an unprecedented \$12 millions, a three-fold increase from the year before.³³

By the summer of 1936, then, the RCAF found itself not only militarily useful but politically acceptable; consequently it remained the favoured service until the war, with the responsibility of providing the first line of the nation's defence. It is unnecessary to belabour the enormous gap throughout these years between military intentions and the air force's capabilities of fulfilling them. All it had for equipment were a number of assorted civilian aircraft, a few obsolete Siskin fighters and Atlas army-cooperation machines, and some obsolescent Wapiti bombers and Shark torpedo bombers. It was not a force to strike terror into the heart of an aggressor, nor would it be until well on into the war.³⁴ Nevertheless, theoretical defence obligations spurred growth and, as the air force expanded, it gradually became clear that its needs and interests were beginning to diverge from those of the militia. The difference in their respective mobilization schedules has been noted. In addition, familiar staff channels became clogged or short circuited by unfamiliar demands placed on them.

Precise staff channels had never been drawn. In 1926 the RCAF's Director, Group Captain J.S. Scott, had requested they be clarified but the militia staff declined "to enter into an elaborate definition of the A.G. [Adjutant General] and Q.M.G. [Quartermaster General] duties." They simply informed Scott that "as far as N.D.H.Q. [National Defence Headquarters] is concerned [they] should naturally be carried out by or under authority of the A.G. or Q.M.G. as the case may be."³⁵ The matter rested for almost ten years until a new Quartermaster General, Brigadier T.V. Anderson, was astonished that he was "unable to find laid down anywhere what duties the Q.M.G. should carry out in connection with the R.C.A.F." He suggested it would be helpful if his duties were made more specific, emphasizing that he was "quite prepared to assume any duties properly authorized, but I do not desire to assume responsibilities which I am not authorized to assume."³⁶ Unfortunately, the CGS, Major-General E.C. Ashton, was too busy to attend to the matter. But when six months later Anderson brought up the subject once more -- noting that "frequently I find the lack of a policy in the

question raised to be embarrassing," -- Ashton found, extraordinarily, that his own authority over the air force was just as vague. "The situation has never been defined for C.G.S., A.G. or Q.M.G.," he informed his colleagues, "and now M.G.O. [Master General of the Ordnance] will have responsibilities through Ordnance Services."³⁷

The senior air officer, Air Commodore Croil, also wanted clarification. In August 1935 he proposed a major re-organization of the department's command and administrative system, which would take account of the RCAF's new responsibilities.³⁸ He first reviewed for Ashton the ramshackle structure which had evolved piecemeal over the years. Some of his units were controlled in all respects by his own headquarters; others, including all reservists, came under his staff for training and technical purposes but were administered by military districts. Some districts had Air Staff Officers to advise militia commanders on aeronautical matters, but they could exercise only indifferent control over many units which operated for much of the flying season away from their home bases.³⁹

Croil suggested two alternatives. One was to provide complete staffs representing all "the branches of the Air Force staff, i.e., the Air Staff, Personnel Staff, and Equipment Staff, with armament, photography and signal advisers and the requisite clerical staff in 10 Military Districts"⁴⁰ This course, he thought, had certain disadvantages; it would be an inefficient use of scarce officers and airmen as some staffs would have very few units to administer, and it would not meet the problem posed on the east coast instance, where three military districts embraced what the air force considered to be one operational zone. The second option, his preferred one, was to decentralize air force command through four autonomous regional air defence areas; West Coast, West Central, East Central and East Coast. This, Croil judged, would offer a number of advantages. Four rather than ten subordinate staffs would be needed, recruiting could be localized, mobilization planning simplified, supply channels clarified and the flexibility and range of air units acknowledged. The militia would retain control of common services -- medical, pay, engineering and rations -- and provide them to RCAF units on demand from the nearest district.⁴¹

Inter-service harmony can hardly have been enhanced when General Ashton ignored Croil's case for rationalizing the command and control structure through decentralization. The CGS chose, instead, to perpetuate inefficiency by modestly increasing the air staffs of some of the military

districts, while leaving the system itself undisturbed.⁴² But Croil's disappointment must have been partially relieved a few months later when he met the new Liberal Defence Minister who told him that he intended "to make all three services of equal status."⁴³ The Minister, Ian Mackenzie, made no firm commitment, and Croil did not press the point, but he consulted the Deputy Minister, Major-General L.R. LaFleche, who sympathetically advised him to bide his time and "continue until change occurred progressively."⁴⁴ Croil's first opportunity appeared within a year over the matter of claiming for the RCAF a share in determining overall defence policy more in keeping with its expanding responsibilities.

Until the RCAF began its conversion from a civil to a military air force, its Director (designated in 1932 the Senior Air Officer) had been but a minor player in the defence planning stakes at Ottawa. Together with the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster General, he had been made an Associate Member of the Defence Council, an advisory body established in 1922 to advise the Minister, but the Council met infrequently and was generally ignored by successive governments. In practice policy was set by the senior militia officer.⁴⁵ The RCAF Director was also made a member of the Joint Staff Committee when it was formed in 1927 "for the purpose of co-ordinating effort in pursuit of a common policy and, especially, to ensure the cooperation of the Forces (Sea, Land and Air), in the event of war or other emergency."⁴⁶ But during General McNaughton's seven year tenure as CGS, which ended in 1935, the JSC was similarly ineffectual. McNaughton informed the members that the Committee "was not vested with any executive authority but functioned entirely in an advisory capacity," and it met only five times before he retired.⁴⁷ McNaughton, like MacBrien before him, preferred to make his own decisions.

General Ashton succeeded McNaughton, just as the RCAF was beginning to define its military role, and Croil moved to establish a stronger air force presence. His first innocuous break occurred in a routine bureaucratic way in the spring of 1936 when the militia staff circulated a proposal revising the composition of the Defence Council. They wished to take account of the new titles of the senior naval and air force officers, as well as make the Master General of the Ordnance an Associate Member.⁴⁸ The Adjutant General intended the amendment simply to update pertinent legislative and regulatory authorities but General LaFleche returned it, suggesting that the Senior Air Officer be elevated to the status of Member. When Ashton demurred, cautiously advising that change should be confined to a minimum for the

present, LaFleche sought the views of the navy and air force. The Chief of the Naval Staff was unequivocal; "... as a member of the Defence Council I am of the opinion that the SAO should be a member of that Council."⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, Croil agreed. Because national defence was the direct concern of all three services, he replied, all must be equally represented in its planning, and

... cooperation can only be achieved if the requirements and views of the three services receive just consideration. It is felt that each service should be free to express its views and none should be dominated by another. It is clear that unless the Air Force is given a seat on Defence Council, its requirements and views are not brought to the attention of the Minister, and therefore of the Government, as clearly and convincingly as those of the other services. As a consequence, the possibility of a true appreciation of defence requirements is jeopardized.⁵⁰

The Defence Council itself considered the merits of the respective arguments at one of its rare meetings on 8 July. General Ashton wanted the Council kept small; if necessary it might form separate service sub-committees which could meet with the Minister to consider special militia, naval or air force requirements of no particular concern to the others. If this were done, associate membership could be discarded altogether as

... there appears to be no reason why all Members of Defence Council should not be on an equal standing as Members subject only to the seniority of their rank and appointment. This arrangement would meet the point raised by the Deputy Minister in regard to the standing of the Senior Air Officer without making an invidious distinction and promoting him to a full Member and leaving the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General and Master General of the Ordnance, who are his seniors, in the junior position of Associate Members.⁵¹

The CGS then spoke of the RCAF's pretensions to service equality. This was completely unnecessary, he stressed; effective command of the two services was best achieved with himself acting "as Chief of Staff of both Army and Air, thereby assuring co-operation between these two services which, in peace and war, are so closely related." General Ashton thought the air force had been well served financially, the militia having "willingly reduced its appropriations to meet the demands of the Air." Furthermore, his financial

administration had produced savings which could not be assured if separation occurred, especially as "The tendency of officers of the Air Service, as far as I am aware, is to give little consideration to the question of expenditure ..." He concluded in the same vein;

One of the greatest points of criticism to which this Department as a whole is constantly subjected is the size of the staffs employed and I believe that every effort should be made to keep down unnecessary expense in this regard. While there has at times been some slight friction with the Air Force it has usually arisen from control of this nature. There is, in my mind, no reason for the Air Force to develop an inferiority complex on account of this arrangement. The Senior Air Officer, at present, develops his plans, produces his own estimates of expenditure and these are carefully reviewed by the Chief of the General Staff before they are sent forward.⁵²

The subject evidently touched a raw militia nerve. The CGS, no matter how valid his administrative reasons for retaining control over the air arm, was equally bothered by the possible disruption of well established hierarchical arrangements, seniority being taken most seriously in any small peacetime military force. Ashton's arguments, however, fell on deaf ears. The issue went to the Minister for decision, and a week later he approved LaFleche's broader change. Croil became a Member of the Defence Council.⁵³

Parity of membership on the Council was largely a symbolic step towards service equality, but it strengthened Croil's position. He had his staff search the record to determine the limits of militia control over the air force, and establish its legal and institutional legitimacy.⁵⁴ As the CGS had already learned before them, they found that whether through oversight or by design the nature of the army-air force relationship defied precise definition. In 1922 everyone had assumed the RCAF to be a simple militia directorate and, therefore, there had been no need to identify spheres of jurisdiction. At the same time the RCAF's eventual independence had been acknowledged when it was made a distinct service. The problem lay in finding a mutually acceptable timetable for separation.

In the spring of 1937 Croil attempted, once more, to persuade the reluctant Ashton that the time had arrived. His argument, as expressed in one of his memoranda of this period, was that the government's initial purpose had been distorted over time.

The original intention in bringing the three Services together into one Department was to effect an economy in the provision of the common requirements. The authority ordering this concentration did not include or suggest any merging of the three Services into one homogeneous whole. That it was intended that each of the three services should retain its individuality and control in policy and administration is apparent. It is presumed that the intention was also that, insofar as the common provision of the common requirements is concerned, these should when practicable be handled by the Service best equipped to handle the particular work for the other services. This procedure, it is felt, was not intended to embrace all aspects of the 'common requirements'. For instance, there is no argument in favour of concentrating in the hands of one Service, matters which can be equally well carried out by the existing personnel of the other services. Only where a saving in staff is concerned should concentration be carried out.⁵⁵

Croil cautioned that all three services had to avoid treading on the prerogatives of the others; he also warned there was a danger in curbing the natural growth essential to "adequate organization in peace," under the threat of war.⁵⁶

General Ashton was too busy to give Croil's plea his serious attention. He was preparing to leave for London, with Croil and the Chief of the Naval Staff, as part of the Canadian delegation to that year's Imperial Conference.⁵⁷ The General Staff, however, provided ammunition for the air force in the latest of the many mobilization studies which the Militia was generating at this time. This particular appreciation reflected the concern of Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, the Director of Military Operations and Planning, with the ineffectiveness of the government's Defence Committee as a mechanism for coordinating inter-departmental preparations for war at the highest political level. His paper, 'The Higher Direction of National Defence', made several specific recommendations, but the part which must have intrigued Croil were Crerar's proposed organization charts. They included the Senior Air Officer as a member not only of the Defence Council but, additionally, of a new 'Chiefs of Staff Committee.'⁵⁸ Croil reacted strongly.

The present organization of the Department of National Defence was ordered by the Minister of the Department at the time of the inclusion of the R.C.A.F. when that force was considered to be lacking in the

necessary experience to enable it to direct its policies efficiently. Some twelve years have passed since that time and the R.C.A.F. now possesses an adequate staff of fully trained officers, well qualified to administer and direct its policy. It is considered desirable therefore that the organization of the Department be now amended so that the fighting services will be on an equal footing; the respective head of each service to be directly responsible to the Minister for the efficiency of administration and control of his service.

This memorandum cannot be supported by me unless it includes a recommendation for the establishment of the R.C.A.F. as a separate service along the lines previously discussed. My reason for this stand is that unless the matter is fully dealt with in conjunction with your proposals for re-organization of the Department, it may be difficult to introduce this important point at a later date.⁵⁹

In May 1937 the service Chiefs took Crerar's paper with them to London and while there jointly submitted a revised version to the Minister. It recommended that "the three services be now placed on an equal footing, and the respective heads of each Service should each be directly responsible to the Minister for the efficiency, administration and control of his particular Service." Their covering letter underscored the point; "The proposals it puts forward presupposes the adoption of the recommendation of full service equality." Croil and the others signed in their capacities of Members of the Joint Staff Committee.⁶⁰

The gears of change ground slowly, however, and for whatever reason Mackenzie failed to respond to the Joint Chiefs. Problems associated with expansion accumulated and when Croil returned from London he found that his programme was being seriously hindered. The first tangible steps to deploy air units had been taken late in 1936 when the air force staff alerted the Commanding Officer of No. 4 (FB) Squadron in Vancouver to prepare a full scale reconnaissance of the British Columbia coast to site new bases for seaward patrols. The survey got underway in the new year, but Croil complained when he returned from London, without an air force headquarters nearer the scene to exercise local coordination and control, "the preparation and execution of plans for defence have not been given the attention they warrant."⁶¹ In November 1937 he brought out his two year old

proposal for decentralizing RCAF command through regional air headquarters. The existing command arrangement made no sense, he urged;

Briefly, the present system applied to the air force units at present in British Columbia is as follows: The Military District Headquarters in Victoria is held directly responsible for the control and administration of all activities of the Non-Permanent squadron in Vancouver. District Headquarters is further held responsible for matters of discipline, pay, medical and engineering services pertaining to the Permanent squadron in Vancouver but not for technical maintenance, training or employment, the responsibility for which lies with the staff of R.C.A.F. Headquarters of National Defence Headquarters.

There exists, therefore, the unique situation of two units of the same service, intended for the defence of the coast and located in the same place, administered and controlled under two entirely different systems, which is clearly illogical and not conducive to efficiency or economy.⁶²

Furthermore, Croil stressed, the confusion was going to be compounded when British Columbia received its full complement of air units; three more squadrons, an equipment depot, an ammunition holding unit and a repair depot. Consequently,

Bearing in mind the extensive responsibilities of the air force in the preparation and execution of plans for the maintenance of neutrality and operations in war on the Pacific Coast, the necessity for the co-ordination of all air force activities under an air force commander is evident, if any progress is to be made in such vital matters.⁶³

This time Croil bypassed the Chief of the General Staff, sending his recommendations directly to the Deputy Minister with the "request that the subject of this memorandum be placed before the Honourable the Minister at the earliest possible moment for his favourable consideration."⁶⁴ LaFleche agreed, as did Mackenzie, who, three weeks later, minuted "Approved for Pacific Coast Development. Further expansion to be further considered."⁶⁵

Mackenzie asked the Deputy Minister to sort out the details with Croil and Ashton and "find a solution to the points of difference in the proposal to establish an R.C.A.F

Western Air Command."⁶⁶ While they agreed in principle with the measure, the army and air force had quite different views over the scope of the proposed Air Command's jurisdiction. The CGS thought the Air Commander should properly "be responsible for all matters pertaining to operations and training," but objected to his assuming full control of all activities.⁶⁷ It would create unwarranted expense, he thought, if the RCAF established its own ordnance service as the SAO wished. Similarly he wanted to have the militia retain engineering services; but Croil said he needed an air force engineer to supervise his air base and airfield construction programme because army officers were rotated too frequently for them to acquire experience in unique air force requirements. The SAO preferred even a civilian engineer whom he could keep on the same works, a solution LaFleche finally imposed, and which Ashton deemed "indefensible."⁶⁸ The most fundamental difference lay with the CGS's insistence that overall responsibility for command and discipline remain with the militia, that "it was necessary that the Air Command should be under the D.O.C. [District Officer Commanding], as that officer had the maximum powers in the area."⁶⁹ The commander of Western Air Command (WAC) was to be a Group Captain and Ashton could not accept him as having powers equal to the Brigadier commanding the Military District. Croil disagreed, and "pointed out that in an Air Command, the Air or other Officer Commanding had powers equal to those of a D.O.C., and that therefore, for this purpose it was unnecessary for the D.O.C. to come into the picture."⁷⁰ The discussions went on until March 1938 when, despite Ashton's objections, Group Captain G.O. Johnson was appointed Air Officer Commanding with full authority over his air force units.⁷¹

Croil's success, finally, in establishing an autonomous regional air command was a major step towards rationalizing an unwieldy control structure, as well as taking the RCAF closer to full service independence. The need for a comparable headquarters on the Atlantic coast, which could coordinate the deployment of aircraft from Halifax to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, was then made painfully clear in September when the RCAF despatched what few aircraft it had available to the region at the time of the Munich crisis. In the midst of a hurriedly improvised response to the possibility of war, the Minister authorized the organization of Eastern Air Command. At the same time responsibility for training was delegated to a new Air Training Command located at Toronto.⁷²

The Munich crisis also prompted Mackenzie to convene the Defence Council. In view of the pressure which had been

building for the past few years, it was perhaps inevitable that the subject of inter-service relationships would be raised. General Ashton took the initiative, asked for guidance on the matter of his responsibilities to the RCAF, and recommended "that an immediate decision should be reached in this regard."⁷³ The Deputy Minister intervened to remind Mackenzie of the Joint Staff Committee's petition which had recommended independent status for the air force, and told him "He considered the time had come when the Air Service should be placed in a similar position to the Naval Service."⁷⁴ The Minister was non-committal, but four days later Ashton made clear that he was now as unhappy with the existing situation as Croil. "Matters have been dealt with entirely without his knowledge," Ashton complained; "It is manifestly unfair to continue to impose responsibility in this regard on the C.G.S. unless the situation is more clearly defined. It is requested, therefore, that he either be relieved of all responsibility or that more definite instructions be issued than those now existing."⁷⁵

Croil saw Ashton's memorandum and followed it with one of his own, pressing the RCAF's case on the Minister. He reminded Mackenzie of their first meeting when Mackenzie had promised eventual service equality. The break might be made now, he suggested, by accepting the CGS's request that he be relieved of the onerous task of supervising the air force. This would also be in the RCAF's best interests. "It is felt that there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of Air Force matters in the Militia mind," Croil advised, adding tactfully; "It is also felt generally, but undoubtedly wrongly, that there is a desire in some quarters to oppose the growing importance of the Air Force which leads, not to opposition, but to a tendency to delay or postpone matters which are urgent insofar as the Air Force is concerned." Here he cited the inaction on both his 1935 proposal to form Air Commands and the year-old Joint Staff Committee submission. No radical change was needed, he emphasized. The militia could retain control of most services, but to achieve greater efficiency and improve morale the air force needed to take charge of its own destiny.⁷⁶

Events now unfolded rapidly. General LaFleche gave his view that "In the interests of the Department and of the three Services, I respectfully recommend that policy of liberation be applied to the Royal Canadian Air Force."⁷⁷ The Minister informed Ashton that he "would greatly appreciate it if the C.G.S. and S.A.O. would work out a definite recommendation in regard to transferring the control of the Air Force to the Senior Air Officer."⁷⁸ Ashton then asked Croil to specify the services he would like the militia to supply

the air force; and the air staff quickly completed a detailed scheme transferring a range of duties and responsibilities.⁷⁹ This was submitted to Mackenzie, who approved, and the effective date was set for 19 November 1938.⁸⁰ The first three Air Force General Orders were then issued simultaneously. AFGO No. 1 authorized the air force to publish its own orders separate from those of the militia; the second provided that "The control and administration of the Royal Canadian Air Force will be exercised and carried out by the Senior Air Officer who will, in this respect, be directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence." The third created the Air Council, with the SAO as President, and the Air Staff Officer, the Air Personnel Staff Officer and the Chief Aeronautical Engineer as members. The council, modelled on the RAF's, was to be a means "To afford each of these heads of divisions the opportunity of advising on Air Force policy," and a forum for exchanging views between the staff branches.⁸¹

Only one item remained. In December, at a meeting of the Joint Staff Committee,

Admiral Nelles moved, that before addressing itself to the agenda which had been prepared, the Committee itself might consider the appropriateness of recommending to the Minister that the Senior Air Officer should now be known as the Chief of the Air Staff. The effect of such a change would be simply to bring the name of his office into line with that of the Chief of the General Staff and that of the Chief of the Naval Staff.⁸²

An appropriate memorandum was duly drafted and gained ministerial approval within a few days. General Ashton was probably happy to have the problem behind him; he had retired the month before.

Inexorably, the RCAF had evolved from a quasi-autonomous militia directorate to a fully independent service as its defence responsibilities expanded. The possibility of eventual separation had been acknowledged from the beginning with its timing left open, and, in the somnolent twenties, preoccupied with civil operations, the air force had little cause to question its subordination to the militia. When it shed its civil role for an active military one, however, the RCAF's interests began diverging from the army's, and it was functionally inefficient to exercise control of air force units through militia districts. The mobility, flexibility and range of air force operations demanded regional air headquarters which could effectively

coordinate the deployment of both regular and non-permanent units. Greater defence responsibilities generated expansion and produced demands for service independence. Notably absent in the Air Force's arguments were extravagant rhetorical claims about the efficacy of air power and its alleged capacity for displacing the older services in modern war. Rather, the air staff's concerns were severely pragmatic; they had to cope with the mundane minutiae of day to day administration accompanying growth, and attempt to gain a greater share in making the defence policy they were expected to implement.

The militia and air force viewed the question of control from opposite ends of the same telescope, the former emphasizing the need to make haste slowly, the latter pressing for change. The militia was in an inherently stronger position but the air force had the initiative. An incomplete historical record makes it difficult to judge whether the militia's stance derived from a natural bureaucratic resistance to change, or was deliberately obstructionist. General Ashton stressed economy as a reason for leaving things as they were, but he seems to have been just as concerned with the impact of RCAF independence on the militia seniority list. Like many of his contemporaries his view of the air force remained in the First World War mould. He looked at the air arm as a distinctly lesser part of the army, composed of young, junior officers much in need of the guidance of their military elders. By the late thirties, however, a combination of political, military and technological circumstances came together in Canada to make this an untenable position. The RCAF had come of age.

Notes

1. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, I; From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964). See also, C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, I, 1867-1921 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977). On MacBrien, see Norman Hillmer and William McAndrew, "The Cunning of Restraint: General J.H. MacBrien and the Problems of Peacetime Soldiering," Canadian Defence Quarterly, (Spring, 1979), 40-47.
2. The Air Board's statement was embodied in P.C. 395, 18 February 1920 and is reprinted in Eayrs, loc. cit., 332-334. On early aviation policy see William J. McAndrew, "The Evolution of Canadian Aviation Policy Following the First World War," Journal of Canadian Studies (Fall-Winter, 1981), 86-99.

3. Commander R.M. Stephens to the Director of the Naval Service, 22 June 1921, D Hist 181.008 (D5685).
4. The Department of National Defence Act (1922, C. 34, S. 1) assumed the powers and the obligations of the Air Board Act except that which authorized the appointment of an Air Board which was now disbanded. Soon after, the Aeronautics Act (1022, C. 34, S. 7) legitimized the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Defence over civil aviation.
5. Deputy Minister of the Naval Service to the Chairman of the Air Board, 25 February 1920, with enclosure, "Occasional Paper No. 24: Remarks on a Canadian Naval Air Force," PAC, RG 24, vol. 5666, NS 63-1-1.
6. Graham to Deputy Minister and CGS, 13 March 1922, PAC, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, vol. 109.
7. MacBrien, "Reorganization of the Canadian Air Force," 26 January 1922, ibid. MacBrien, "Royal Canadian Air Force, Policy and Organization," 14 September 1923, D Hist 76/37.
8. McNaughton to CGS, 4 March 1922, McNaughton Papers, vol. 109.
9. JAG to CGS, 24 October 1922, RG 24, vol. 6522, Hq 420-18-74.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Gwatkin to MacBrien, 11 April 1922, D Hist, J.A. Wilson Papers, A 11. On the protracted inter-service struggle in Britain see H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976); Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966).
13. CGS to JAG, 12 December 1922, R.G. 24, vol. 6523, Hq 462-23-1. There were two air force officers on the committee, Flight Lieutenants G.O. Johnson and F.J. Mawdesley.

14. CGS to AG, 23 January 1923, ibid. MacBrien added that King's Regulations for the RAF (1918) would be adopted for the CAF, and suggested that they be consolidated in one volume with KR and O for the Canadian Militia. The JAG advised that air force and militia regulations would be better kept separate. JAG to DST, 27 February 1923, ibid.
15. CGS to Headquarters, Canadian Air Force, 6 July 1922, D Hist 76/39.
16. Ibid. Aviation files accumulated by the Air Board were absorbed by the Department of National Defence's Central Registry.
17. Chief of Staff to Deputy Minister, 8 August 1923, copy in D Hist 76/37.
18. Chief of Staff to Minister, 14 September 1923, ibid.
19. RCAF Headquarters was headed by the Director, with three Assistant Directors: for organization and training; for technical matters; and for civil aviation. The last was a civilian, John A. Wilson who had been Secretary of the Air Board. Organization details were adjusted several times over the period; see Wing Commander F.H. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1972).
20. Until the 1927-28 fiscal year the aviation appropriation was consolidated. From that year it was separated into its civil and military parts. In 1932-33 the civil vote was \$190,000 and the military \$1,560,000. Comparatively, militia funding was reduced by about 20 percent, the air services by 75 percent. "The Big Cut", as it became known, forced the RCAF to release 78 officers (from 178) and 100 airmen (from 700) and a number of civilian employees. A convenient compilation of air force manpower and funding statistics is in D Hist 76/31. See also, Hitchins, 259-275.
21. The government formed an inter-departmental committee to prepare for the negotiations. It included O.D. Skelton from the Department of External Affairs, General McNaughton and Commodore Walter Hose. It, in turn, created a staff committee on which Wing Commander A.A.L. Cuffe represented the RCAF.

22. Sir Maurice Hankey, "Impressions of Canadian Defence Policy - December 1934," CAB 63/81 (copy in D Hist). On McNaughton's militia reorganization see, General Staff, "Memorandum on the reorganization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia," 29 January 1931, RG 24, vol. 2740, HQS 5902 (I).
23. McNaughton's biographer gives him perhaps more credit for promoting the early development than is warranted, but he did provide considerable support. See, John Swettenham, McNaughton, I, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968).
24. McNaughton, "The Defence of Canada," 28 May 1935, copy in D Hist 74/256 (I). The RCAF plan was drafted by Squadron Leader G.V. Walsh; see, Walsh to Group Captain J.L. Gordon, "Memorandum - Peace Organization and Establishment Considered Necessary to Meet Minimum Requirements for National Defence," 18 July 1932, D Hist 76/33. The number of permanent squadrons was subsequently raised to 11.
25. Colonel H.H. Matthews to McNaughton, 19 February 1932, quoted in Eayrs, loc. cit., 290.
26. Hankey, "Impressions ..." loc. cit.
27. Quoted in Eayrs, 274-275.
28. Ibid.
29. PAC, Mackenzie King Papers, diary, 25 August 1936.
30. Ibid., 26 August 1936. King noted; "Commodore Croil of the Air Force impressed me very favourably -- he used his memo as notes, and made a good presentation -- not ready or agile, but sound and convincing."
31. H.B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1932-1939: the Prism of Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 181.
32. "Minutes of the Joint Staff Committee," 27 July 1936, D Hist 193.009. The appreciation was drafted by a committee composed of Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, Commander H.A.C. Land and Group Captain L.S. Breadner. A copy of the appreciation and the planning papers accompanying it are in "Senior Air Officer File," D Hist 74/256.

33. Main estimates for the 1937-38 fiscal year of \$34,091,873.42 were increased by supplementary funding to a total of \$36,194,839.63. The RCAF's share was \$11,391,650 up from \$4,685,028.
34. At the outbreak of war in 1939 the RCAF had a total of 270 aircraft, including obsolete machines in storage. Ninety-two were service types of which only the 19 Hawker Hurricanes could be considered modern. See Hitchens, 381-382.
35. DCGS to Director, RCAF, 21 January 1926, copy in D Hist 76/37.
36. QMG to CGS, 11 July 1935, ibid.
37. QMG to CGS, 15 January 1936, with CGS's minute, ibid.
38. SAO to CGS, 27 August 1935, RG 24, PARC box No. 829218, Hq 895-1 (I).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. The air staff was to be made a separate staff branch on the same basis as the GS, AG and QMG branches. It would communicate through the DOC on air staff and technical subjects; other administrative detail would continue to flow through the 'A' and 'Q' branches. AG to DOC, MD No. 4, 16 November 1935, D Hist 76/37.
43. SAO to Minister, 19 September 1938, RG 24, microfilm reel C5103, Hq C 7679. In this letter, three years later, Croil reminded Mackenzie of their earlier conversation.
44. Ibid.
45. P.C. 1252, 1922. The purpose of the Defence Council was "To advise the Minister on all matters of defence, including or relating to the Militia, the Military, Naval and Air Services of Canada, and on all matters referred to it by the Minister." It replaced the old Militia Council. See, also, C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970).

46. MacBrien recommended the creation of the Committee three weeks before his retirement and it was authorized with his successor's concurrence on 9 June 1927. It was a revision of the Naval and Military Committee formed before the First War and renamed the Defence Committee in 1920. See CGS to Minister, 6 May 1927, RG 24, PARC Box 266198.
47. Joint Staff Committee, "Minutes of Special Meeting," 8 August 1929, ibid.
48. The appointment of MGO had been allowed to lapse during the 1920's and the new CGS, Major-General Ashton, wanted it reactivated. The naval chief now was named The Director of the Naval Service and Chief of the Naval Staff. The Director of the RCAF had been designated Senior Air Officer in 1932. The changes in designation had not been recorded, formally, in much of the departmental legislative and regulatory paperwork. AG to Deputy Minister, 29 April 1936, with minutes of CGS, QMG and MGO, RG 24, Vol. 6541, HQ 650-77-1.
49. CNS to Deputy Minister, 22 May 1936, ibid.
50. SAO to Deputy Minister, 27 May 1936, ibid.
51. CGS to Minister, 9 July 1936, D Hist, 112.1 (D 77).
52. Ibid. The Deputy Minister had also suggested making the Judge Advocate General an Associate Member, a notion with which the CGS disagreed as he held only the substantive rank of Major (temporary Colonel), and an appointment to the Defence Council "would give him status senior to all District Officers Commanding." To the CNS's suggestion of placing naval staff officers on the Council, the CGS responded that while the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General were responsible for 54,155 soldiers, their naval counterparts looked after only 1885 sailors. Ibid.
53. P.C. 1742, 17 July 1936.
54. See the appropriate references in D Hist 76/37.
55. SAO to CGS, 16 April 1937, copy in ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. CGS minute on ibid.

58. The paper, drafted by Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Pope, proposed an organization modelled on the British Committee of Imperial Defence. RG 24, vol. 2697, HQS 5199-K.
59. See Crerar to CGS, 19 March 1937, and Croil to Chairman, JSC, nd, in ibid.
60. JSC to Minister, 1 June 1937, D Hist 112.3M2 (D 511).
61. Croil to LaFleche, 3 November 1937, quoted in "The Narrative of Western Air Command," D Hist 74/3 (I).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., Mackenzie minute of 22 December 1937.
66. See "Memorandum of Conference held in the office of the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Wednesday, February 16th 1938," ibid.
67. "R.C.A.F. Western Air Command," in ibid. This was General Ashton's account of the 16 February meeting.
68. "Memorandum of meeting", 21 July 1938, ibid.
69. Memorandum of 16 February Conference, ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. See G.O. 30, 15 March 1938, and telegram SAO to Group Captain G.O. Johnson, nd, both in ibid. The problem of relative ranks was solved when Croil was promoted Air Vice Marshal in the summer of 1938, and later the Air Officers Commanding Air Commands were made Air Commodores. Staff rank levels were raised proportionately.
72. SAO to Deputy Minister, 21 September 1938, with draft General Order enclosed, copy in Air Historian's file, RG 24, PARC box No. 826453. On the response to the Munich crisis see the "Minutes of the Joint Staff Committee", D Hist, 193.009.
73. "Minutes of Meeting of Defence Council", 12 September 1938, PAC, Ian Mackenzie Papers, vol. 32, file X-52.

74. Ibid.
75. CGS to Minister, 16 September 1938, RG 24, microfilm reel No. C5103, Hq C 7679.
76. SAO to Minister, 19 September 1938, ibid.
77. Deputy Minister to Minister, 20 September 1938, ibid.
78. Minister to CGS, 24 September 1938, ibid.
79. CGS to SAO, 28 September 1938, and JAG to CGS, 4 November 1938, ibid.
80. CGS to Minister, 10 November 1938, with Mackenzie's minute, ibid.
81. The AFGO's were not issued until December but backdated to the effective date of 19 November 1938. Copies in RG 24, PARC box 829218, Hq 895-1 (I).
82. "Memorandum," Joint Staff Committee, 13 December 1938, copy in ibid.

ALLIANCE WARFARE 1939-1945:
CANADA'S MARITIME FORCES

[W.A.B. Douglas]

During the First World War, the Canadian Corps set a pattern for working with allies that the Canadian Army in the Second World War attempted to follow. Two other armed services, barely in embryo in the earlier conflict, had to develop very different bases of co-operation. The Royal Canadian Navy, suspect from its birth in 1910 as a colonial dependent of Britain's Royal Navy, forced into greater dependency for training, doctrine and equipment by meagre inter-war funding, used the war years to achieve its own independence and significance.

The navy, like the Royal Canadian Air Force, struggled for Canadianization in doctrine and command almost in spite of government policies and as a function of improving efficiency and combat effectiveness. Its emergence, argues W.A.B. Douglas, was complicated by Canada's subordination to two powerful allies, the United States as well as Britain, and the policy of her own wartime government to limit Canada's military commitment to fit both the need for victory and the country's own financial and manpower resources.

Even though the Second World War was a conflict more widespread and terrible than that of twenty-five years before, Canada was something of a spectator on the fringe of events for the first three years. The Canadian army remained for the most part under training or employed as a defence garrison for Britain. Of the thousands of Canadian airmen graduating from the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, a very large proportion was being absorbed into Royal Air Force squadrons without special Canadian identity. Canadian naval and air forces engaged in maritime warfare were suffering from a shortage of the best equipment, and from what their commanders believed to be an inadequate recognition of the importance of their role. In negotiations with the United States about hemispheric defence, American political and military authorities had at first assumed that Canada possessed little if any mandate beyond its own territories.

Little wonder that great deeds on the Western Front in 1914-1918 remained vivid in Canadian memory. "Our object", wrote the Commander of Canadian Ships and Establishments in the United Kingdom, in May 1942, "is to build up a Canadian Naval Tradition and prestige which should be valuable to Canada in postwar years, as have been the traditions and prestige of the Canadian Corps, earned by hard fighting in the spearhead of the attack in the last war."¹

Captain Agnew was not just speaking for himself; he was confirming the sense of his instructions from his naval superiors. And the same thing, in essence, was being said at the same time by leading representatives of the other two services. In March 1942, General A.G.L. McNaughton, commanding the Canadian Corps overseas, urged the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa to ensure that the Royal Canadian Air Force would provide tactical air support for the Canadian army when the time came to invade Fortress Europe. The same officer had remarked in 1941 that the autonomy of Canada was worked out during the Great War on the battlefields of France, and it was McNaughton who in 1943 opposed dividing the Canadian Army in order to send a Corps to the Mediterranean. McNaughton believed, and the official historian of Canadian war policies subsequently came to the same conclusion, that the greater the concentration of national forces the better the national government could exercise control over them. It was with this in mind that in May, 1942, the Minister of National Defence for Air told the British Undersecretary for Air that "the ultimate Canadian objective ... is really an independent air force in the same way as the U.S.A."²

The RCAF would subsequently make notable contributions to every phase of the air war, particularly in strategic bombing operations. The service won the battle for "Canadianisation" -- control of its own members overseas -- but it failed to form identifiable Canadian formations above the squadron or wing level in Fighter Command, Coastal Command or the Tactical Air Force.* Only in Bomber Command did a Canadian group -- Six Group -- come into being. The army had more success. Following a tragic débacle at Hong Kong and their bloody repulse at Dieppe, Canadian troops won a satisfactory harvest of battle honours in Sicily, Italy and northwest Europe. The commander of the Canadian army overseas was unable to exercise immediate authority over the Canadian divisions in Sicily and Italy, but General H.D.G. Crerar eventually took command of the First Canadian Army in

* Nor would the Air Ministry allocate the one predominantly Canadian tactical wing to the Canadian Army.

northwest Europe with a degree of independent control as great as that enjoyed by General Currie, who had commanded the Canadian Corps in the First World War.³

The RCN was to play a very large part in the Battle of the Atlantic. It was the only service to be given responsibility for a separate theatre, the Canadian Northwest Atlantic. Since the army had already achieved independent status in 1918* and the air force had not been able to win as much autonomy overseas as it wanted, it was the navy that experienced the most remarkable transformation during the Second World War. The circumstances under which Canada became a "full partner" in the Battle of the Atlantic influenced the shape of its maritime forces and made them for the first time a major element of the nation's defence establishment.

Between the wars the army held the field in Canadian strategic thinking. The navy, too small to provide effective defence for the nation's coastlines, had to resist elimination. When rearmament began in 1936 it enjoyed a modest expansion. The objective stated in 1939 was a fleet of eighteen modern destroyers, eight anti-submarine vessels, sixteen minesweepers and eight motor torpedo vessels, capable of working effectively with other Dominion navies but intended primarily for the defence of Canada's two coastlines, Atlantic and Pacific. The Atlantic Ocean formed a natural defensive barrier and although there was a genuine fear of aerial bombing in North American political circles, the scales of attack deemed possible warranted only modest sea and air forces. Four destroyers were available at Halifax in 1939; the presence of British capital ships after the outbreak of war brought the naval defence of the eastern seaboard up to the necessary strength. In view of this situation the sensible course, one that Canadian and British naval authorities had always foreseen, was to place RCN ships at the disposal of the Admiralty. That was the advice of the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Percy W. Nelles, but it was politically unacceptable. Instead, the Cabinet

* The army built on this precedent. When a Canadian brigade went to Korea in 1951 the commander received a far more specific directive than General Crerar had received in 1944. Crerar's instructions had stressed the desirability of "unified Canadian control". Brigadier J.M. Rockingham's instructions read: "The principle of the separate entity of the Canadian Force ... shall at all times be maintained". (H.F. Wood, Strange Battleground, Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa, 1966) 90.

War Committee decided, and an Order in Council decreed, that the Royal Canadian Navy was to "cooperate" with the Royal Navy.⁴

The word was not carefully defined and meant different things to different people. It made the position of the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, Captain H.E. Reid, RCN, anomalous at the beginning of the war. The Chiefs of Staff Committee had defined the navy's role as the protection of shipping in Canadian waters with auxiliary forces, and foresaw that as the navy grew Canada would be able to increase its assistance to Britain. The RCN preferred to focus on its operations in support of the Royal Navy, which demanded concentration on convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare, with a commitment to offshore operations. Captain Reid, however, found himself excluded from such activities when Rear Admiral L.E. Holland, RN, commanding the Third Battle Squadron, arrived to assume what amounted to operational command. When this British officer interfered with local defence arrangements Reid made a vigorous protest, supported by the Chief of Naval Staff and Minister of National Defence. Personalities played a large part in the incident, and it was resolved by simple administrative measures, but so long as the RCN remained a small force designed for local defence the likelihood remained strong that "cooperation" would be interpreted as "subordination" by the senior officer present.⁵

After the fall of France in June 1940 the prospects changed. Canada responded immediately to Britain's request to send all RCN destroyers to the defence of the United Kingdom. They were now at the disposal of the Admiralty and in the thick of the war. Furthermore, the Cabinet approved a vast shipbuilding program and gave the RCN authority to recruit up to a total of 15,000 men, an increase of over fifty percent.⁶ At the same time joint planning with the United States began, both to allow for the possibility that British naval and air forces would be neutralized by a German victory in Europe, and for American entry into the naval war in support of the Allies. The American members of the PJBD gained the distinct impression at this time that the Canadians accepted the need for American strategic direction in the western Atlantic. The President himself said in May 1941 that since "Canada is really devoting its war effort to sending as much in the way of men and materials across the ocean as possible", the United States should exercise command over all operations involving both nations in the western hemisphere.⁷

By March 1941 Anglo-American staff conversations in Washington (the ABC-1 talks), combined with developments in the European war, had altered Canadian perceptions still further. The Battle of Britain had been won. The sea approaches to Britain, although subject to heavy German air and submarine attack, had been kept open by the efforts of the Royal Navy and Coastal Command, RAF. Two Canadian destroyers had been sunk and a third damaged by torpedo in those operations. During the spring of 1941 the Chiefs of Staff, following certain Admiralty warnings, had formed the appreciation that although the support of Britain overseas was still the best defence for Canada, the western Atlantic was soon going to need reinforcements. Naval Service Headquarters asked for the return of four Canadian River Class destroyers and the allocation of twelve long range flying boats to Eastern Air Command RCAF, which had nothing but medium range aircraft. The official request went to the British government in the form of a message from the Canadian to the British Prime Minister, and it was turned down for good strategical reasons. Concentration of the limited forces available in the more dangerous eastern waters of the Atlantic was still the best course. The Admiralty reply went on to point out that the Canadian request had unaccountably failed to take defence of shipping into consideration. Since the service establishments in Canada were organized around home defence needs, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had submitted requirements in relation to expected scales of attack on Canada more than defence of shipping, and the official request to Britain had duplicated this wording. The Canadian Naval Staff had, however, been discussing defence of shipping with the Admiralty over the past several weeks: their Lordships' comment was turning the knife in the wound.⁸

Ottawa was already suspicious about the intentions of Britain and the United States. Canada had nothing but an unofficial observer at the ABC-1 talks. Since he was not allowed to attend joint sessions, there were no full reports of proceedings, and the Chiefs of Staff believed that the United States was arranging to exclude Canadians from all positions of control in Newfoundland. By the end of March, after appropriate representations, the British and American governments had recognized Canada's special interest in that region but Canadian fears were not stilled. The joint Canadian-American plan for hemispheric defence, ABC-22, gave Canada strategic control only over "coastal and inshore patrol vessels and aircraft in the inshore waters of Canada and Newfoundland".⁹

It is quite clear from extended discussions over the summer of 1941 that Canada was to have a role subordinate to the United States in the western Atlantic, but Canadian naval planning still proceeded under the assumption that the RCN formed part of an imperial navy. The ties were strong. This was particularly evident in equipment policy and plans for the control of shipping. On 20 May, 1941, the Director of Naval Plans, Captain F.E. Houghton, endorsed the Chief of General Staff's appreciation that Canada's front line was in the British Isles. Naval policy over the next nine months, he recommended, should be firstly to maintain that front line, secondly to protect shipping, and thirdly to defend Canada's harbours and coasts.¹⁰

Events conspired at this moment, however, to produce the Newfoundland Escort Force. It was a stopgap measure that both established a strong Canadian presence in the north Atlantic and reinforced the British connection. Its origins probably lay in the signal traffic about defence of shipping between Ottawa and Whitehall during March 1941. As soon as the Chief of Naval Staff received an indication that the Admiralty was ready to expand anti-submarine forces in the west, and to return Canadian ships from the eastern Atlantic, Admiral Nelles took urgent steps to place these forces under Canadian command. Possibly the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, already intended to do this, but the presence of Captain L.W. Murray, now the Commander Canadian Ships and Establishments in the United Kingdom, permitted Nelles to send a message to Murray advising him of developments and urging him to support the Canadian proposal by a personal visit to the First Sea Lord. Murray, who had served under Pound, made his representations with the result that Pound recommended Murray himself for the appointment. At the same time the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner, managed to persuade the Air Ministry to spare nine long range Catalina flying boats for operations in the western Atlantic.*¹¹

* It is interesting to note that Admiral Karl Doenitz withdrew his U-boats from the western Atlantic in June and that they did not return until September. It seems quite possible that if such a move had been foreseen neither the Admiralty nor the Air Ministry would have released sea and air forces to Newfoundland until later in the year, at which time the United States would itself have been ready to start escorting convoys. (D Hist, BDU War Diary, June 1941).

Both naval and air force officers tried to build up the Newfoundland Escort Force on the British model, but they had to allow for several missing ingredients. They were within a British theatre of command, Western Approaches. Unlike the Royal Navy and Coastal Command, however, they could not work together from relatively close bases under a central operational authority in the Admiralty. There could be no daily telephone conferences like those in England between the Operational Intelligence Centre in Whitehall, Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches at Liverpool and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal Command, north of London. The RCN and RCAF, assisted by United States naval aircraft at Argentia and a United States Army Air Corps Squadron at Gander,* operated from widely separated bases with very poor communications. Neither Naval Service Headquarters nor Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa were operational commands, although there was the nucleus of an operational intelligence centre in Naval Service Headquarters. Coordinating intelligence required agreement between the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff. Getting it to Newfoundland was not easy. Indeed, from the very beginning communications difficulties tended to isolate Newfoundland. Climate and distance compounded the problem.¹²

The navy was better off than the air force because it could call upon the experience of men who had served in destroyers previously sent overseas, and the RCN was devoting most of its resources to coastal and ocean convoy. Outweighing these positive factors was the insatiable need for more escorts. That made it impossible to respect "the paramount importance of training in the building up of what now amounts to practically a new service." The air force had not prepared for the kind of distant ocean operations required in support of ocean convoys, and in 1939 Canada had committed the lion's share of RCAF resources to the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Canada had a statutory obligation to send almost all newly trained Canadian aircrew overseas, and none were being returned from what the Allies agreed was the main theatre of war to what they had defined as an "inactive theatre". Except for visits by senior officers to Coastal Command in the spring of 1941, there was no first hand experience in Eastern Air Command of anti-submarine warfare.¹³

* RCAF relations with the US Army in Newfoundland got off to a bad start, and cooperation did not really become satisfactory until early 1943. (US Naval History Division, Strategic Records Division, Box 187, Newfoundland).

The escort force and its air support became operational in spite of every difficulty, thanks to the improvising genius of sailors and airmen alike. That it did not achieve outstanding efficiency is hardly surprising. For several months convoys enjoyed the benefit of superior British intelligence and for the most part sailed safely around U-boat patrol lines. In September, however, Doenitz once more sent his submarines west, and subsequent shipping losses placed Canadian sea and air forces in a rather bad light. British attention was taken up at this time, however, by the signing of the Atlantic Charter. On 15 September the Newfoundland Escort Force became part of the new American organization in the western Atlantic. It was for the United States Navy, in consultation with the British and Canadians, to decide how to implement WPL 51. This American naval plan* was the result of the ABC-1 talks and subsequent discussions over the summer of 1941.¹⁴

Canada's response to the American takeover was, on the face of things, somewhat paranoid. The "gut reaction" was that Canada had been fighting at Britain's side for two years, knew more about war requirements than the United States, and resented the surrender of authority to inexperienced American officers. Murray was particularly bitter about his subordination to an American Rear Admiral and actively lobbied for his own promotion or, failing that, for the appointment of a Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy to St. John's. He vented his spleen on Britain for "selling Canada down the river", and on Naval Service Headquarters for acting with such pusillanimity towards the Admiralty. This was a family squabble, however; to his United States Navy colleagues at Argentia he showed nothing but immediate good will. He established an excellent working relationship with the Commander of Task Force 4, Rear Admiral A. LeRoy Bristol and, after Bristol's death in 1942, Rear Admiral R.M. Brainard, USN.¹⁵

In 1941 the RCN accepted the logic of subordination to the USN because successful naval operations depended upon unified command. According to WPL 51 Canada would take part in ocean convoy much as before, retaining control of coastal convoys and local defence forces. The air force reacted differently, much to the surprise of USN authorities in Washington, and even to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa. Air Vice Marshal N.R. Anderson, the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, angrily refused to accept direction from the United States Navy. Air Marshal Breadner stood behind Anderson, and the Minister of National Defence for

* It was superseded by WPL 52 on 29 Oct 41 (Dziuban, 124).

Air, C.G. Power, carried the airmen's case to the Cabinet War Committee. What triggered Anderson's anger was the announcement that USN aircraft would be assuming responsibility for all ocean convoys, leaving coastal and inshore patrols to the RCAF. Canadian airmen did not in his view deserve to be displaced from valuable work which they had been doing successfully for two years, and for which many had already given up their lives. They wanted, like Coastal Command, to cooperate with, rather than under, the navy. Such an attitude should not have surprised officers of the United States Navy because naval control was no less foreign to Canadian airmen than it was to the U.S. Army Air Corps. In fact the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral H.R. Stark, gave in gracefully to the argument that unified command was only required by ABC-22 in cases of dire emergency.¹⁶

The American concession permitted Canada to buttress the idea that Newfoundland was more in the Canadian than the American military ambit. The events that transformed a European into a global war in December 1941 further strengthened the Canadian position. Conscious that they had in Newfoundland an asset of exceptional strategic importance, Canada's military representatives to the PJBD drew up a paper at the end of the year for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, arguing that "Newfoundland is a forward area of Eastern Air Command lying along the Great Circle approach to Canada, supported in depth by the Maritimes." There had to be a single system for air defence. Incorporating Newfoundland into Canadian home defence, furthermore, would give the air force a much stronger base for operations in conjunction with Coastal Command of the RAF.* Controlling a chain of seaports and airfields indispensable to North American supply would also work to Canada's advantage, especially since the Battle of the Atlantic seemed sure to intensify, and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor would probably lead to withdrawal of American ships and aircraft.¹⁷

In February the Mid Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) superseded the Newfoundland Escort Force. It consisted of fourteen escort groups of long range destroyers and corvettes, five groups operated by the Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief

* Certain RCAF airfields, incidentally, were earmarked for civil aviation on the transatlantic route, a concern that was never far from the thoughts of policy makers in Ottawa. (Paul Bridle, Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfoundland, (2 Vols, Ottawa, 1974) Vol I, pp 1063-1184).

Western Approaches, five by C.T.F. 4*, Rear Admiral Bristol, and four by the Flag Officer Newfoundland (FONF)**, Rear Admiral Murray. Germany's declaration of hostilities against the United States had by this time unleashed Doenitz' U-boats on the eastern seaboard of North America. Disastrous shipping losses forced the Americans to withdraw the destroyers from two of their groups, reallocating the Canadian corvettes to Mid Ocean groups under FONF, and to the Western Local Escort Force (WLEF) between Halifax and Newfoundland, under the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, Rear Admiral G.C. Jones, RCN. Jones in turn was obligated to allocate some of his escorts to convoys on the United States seaboard. One of the British groups from the Mid Ocean Escort Force was sent down to the Caribbean. Further reorganizations throughout the year resulted in there being only one American group at Newfoundland. By November the WLEF and the MOEF consisted of 38 British, twelve Canadian and two American destroyers, 51 Canadian and 38 British corvettes, eight Canadian minesweepers and one U.S. Coast Guard Cutter.¹⁸

As Canadians were swift to point out, their naval forces were now predominant in the northwest Atlantic. The same could be said of their air forces. By late November 1942 the RCAF had four anti-submarine squadrons in Newfoundland, three of which were long range flying boat or amphibian squadrons, as well as five anti-submarine squadrons on the mainland of eastern Canada. There were two USN flying boat squadrons at Argentia and two US Army B-17 squadrons at Gander. Until February 1943, however, the US Army conducted its operations independently of the RCAF, which provided all convoy coverage to the north and east of Newfoundland.¹⁹

This was a generous Canadian contribution to the Allied cause, but it was a much heavier load than naval and air establishments had been expected to carry. There were unending demands to provide more escorts for each convoy, to supply more trained men for the new ships coming off the ways, to give more adequate air cover for sea forces. Naval recruiting was highly successful but training could not meet requirements. Corvettes and minesweepers in most cases were down to one or two fully trained officers and men for each vessel at sea. Training courses ashore often barely covered the rudiments of naval knowledge. The RCAF, already seriously short of aircrew for its Home War Establishment, could

* Task Force 4 was renumbered 24 on 2 Mar 42. Admiralty message to AIGI 323 A(B2), 1430Z/7/3/42 in D Hist, NHS files, 8441-24.

**The appointment was upgraded from Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Forces (CCNF) to FONF on 2 December 1941.

not afford to set up Operational Training Units for Eastern Air Command squadrons. On isolated airfields where communication with the rest of the world demanded a major effort, there was limited knowledge of the latest tactical doctrine. Sometimes there was recrimination between sea and air forces about the provision of air cover or cooperation of ships and aircraft. And there was a tendency on the part of Murray's hard pressed staff to give the benefit of the doubt to ships or groups which had not performed as well as they should have done in harrowing convoy battles.²⁰

Officers of the naval staff in Ottawa, more than a thousand miles away, arrived at different priorities than Flag Officer Newfoundland. They rapidly became out of date in their appreciation of equipment problems. The extreme urgency of fitting high frequency direction finding arrays in escort vessels does not appear to have fully dawned upon signals officers in Ottawa until September 1942. Canadian radar was an achievement which Ottawa's policy makers took pride in, and they naturally tended to thrust it upon the fleet. Unfortunately, Canadian radar was less effective than equipment available from Britain, a fact which was not immediately apparent. It was only after urgent representations from Newfoundland that the naval staff approved the fitting of British equipment. Even then, they went to great lengths to retain old Canadian sets. They also ensured that newly designed Canadian radar would go into new Canadian ships.* On 30 November 1942 the naval Board approved giving the admiralty authority to proceed with alterations and additions for Canadian ships in British home waters. A recorded comment by Captain G.L. Stevens, Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction, reflects the nature of discussion behind the decision: "C.N.E.C. pointed out that this provision would not discourage Canadian inventive genius, but would take advantage of the best experience of the Admiralty".²¹

* The National Research Council accomplished a great deal in the development of radar during the war, and did manage to overcome many of the difficulties encountered. However, even the most successful Canadian naval radar, the RX/C centimetric set, still caused serious servicing problems in 1944. HMCS Valleyfield was torpedoed while her RX/C was unserviceable. (W.E. Knowles Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada, 1939-1946 (Waterloo, Ont., 1981) 47-66; NHS-8000 - Valleyfield, D Hist).

Headquarters ultimately set policy, and policy reflected the navy's most urgent requirements. It also reflected organizational conflict within the service. Huge expansion stirred competing ambitions. By mid-1942 the service had swollen to 40,000 personnel. In October 1942 the Cabinet authorized further growth to about 55,000. The Naval Board placed on record its commitment to ocean escort above all other requirements, then to combined operations and the loan of men to the Royal Navy. There were hints of other objectives, some stated and others, like the establishment of a fleet air arm, disavowed. The new Tribal class destroyers under construction would have more sophisticated roles than convoy escort; it might be possible to acquire coastal flotillas for operations overseas and even to move into big ship operations.²²

The air force had different problems because defence of shipping in the northwest Atlantic was still not its main commitment. It is true that the need to reinforce Eastern Air Command for anti-submarine operations added to the importance of the Home War Establishment, but so did two other competing requirements: air defence of Canadian points of strategic significance, and defence of the Pacific coast when Japan's entry into the war began to exert additional pressures, political as well as military, on the Cabinet. Unlike the navy, the air force had not been able to resolve the clash between territorial defence requirements and the defence of shipping simply by placing the major effort on anti-submarine warfare. In 1942 that would have placed the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, in a peculiar position relative to his opposite numbers in the navy at Halifax and St. John's. At least part of his independence stemmed from his responsibility for all phases of air activity, not just maritime patrol, in the Maritime provinces and Newfoundland.²³

Modernization of air anti-submarine forces suffered delays in all theatres, American and British as well as Canadian. The competing demands of strategic bombing restricted the supply of Very Long Range patrol aircraft to all air forces. This situation was magnified in Canada because Britain and the United States received higher priority in the allocation of the latest equipment. Throughout 1942 most Canadian squadrons could only operate effectively out to a distance of about 350 miles from base, compared to about 600 miles for American squadrons fitted with B-17s and PBVs. The area of greatest danger lay in the mid ocean area, east and north of Newfoundland. Since the U.S. Army was not acting in direct support of convoys this meant that only one RCAF squadron of Catalina flying boats was available for

long range convoy support operations in the vital region until reinforcements arrived in November. It would only be by extraordinary exertions that RCAF officers in Ottawa, Washington and London persuaded the RAF to divert a few VLR Liberator aircraft to Canada in March 1943.²⁴

U-boats thrived in the western and mid-Atlantic. They stayed away from British Home Waters. Observers from Britain visited North America and made suggestions based on their own experience for reorganizing forces and changing tactics. Most important were the helpful recommendations for a fully fledged Operations Intelligence Centre (OIC), including a Submarine Tracking Room (STR), to be established at Naval Service headquarters in Ottawa. Like the Newfoundland bases, Canadian radio intercept stations enjoyed geographic positions of great strategic significance. The distances between them created good base lines for high frequency direction finding, and they had already made an important contribution to Allied naval intelligence. Partly thanks to the efficiency of these stations, administered through the Foreign Intelligence Section created at NSHQ, the RCN and RCAF were receiving timely information about U-boat movements. Ottawa also passed its intercepts to the Admiralty's Operations Intelligence Centre for analysis and use by the Submarine Tracking Room in Whitehall. In a series of battles where radio intelligence had become the single most indispensable weapon, establishing a Submarine Tracking Room in Canada was a major step in arriving at self-sufficiency for Canadian anti-submarine forces. Without a tracking room the Trade Division, already well established at Naval Service Headquarters, would have been forced to rely on Washington or London for intelligence, and control of convoys would have always remained in American or British hands.²⁵

In 1942 the relationship between Intelligence and command did not manifest itself clearly in the western Atlantic. OICs began to function effectively in Ottawa and Washington at about the same time. This happened just as the German navy introduced its new "Triton" code and thus cut off information previously acquired by decrypts and deciphering of German naval radio traffic in the mid ocean area. This "blackout" lasted from January to December, 1942, eliminated the accurate position reports relayed from the Admiralty, and made high frequency direction finding the principal source of intelligence for the STR. Relying largely on their own raw data, both OIC Ottawa and OP-20-G, the USN operations intelligence centre in Washington, began to promulgate overlapping reports, creating duplication and friction. There were moments when naval authorities in Ottawa and Washington were barely on speaking terms, and the

British Admiralty Delegation in Washington took the American side.²⁶

There was also confusion in Canada. Not until November, following a scathing criticism by one of Coastal Command's peripatetic experts, did various Canadian organizations abandon the loose "mutual cooperation" adopted in 1941 for a vigorous and centrally controlled anti-submarine policy. Even then in the eyes of the Admiralty the Canadians had far to go. The impact of American shipbuilding on the naval war had not yet become evident and losses were still much too high. In Naval Service Headquarters the planners might well argue that generous contributions, like the seventeen corvettes lent to the Royal Navy for TORCH operations, further sapped their limited resources. The British answer would have been that RCN corvettes under efficient British control with ample air cover made a better contribution than they could in the northwest Atlantic under mixed Canadian and American control. In a desperate search for solutions to the convoy problem, solutions that included the unacceptable idea of a Supreme Commander for the North Atlantic, the Admiralty decided that Canadian and American escort groups in the Mid Ocean Escort Force should be replaced by British groups on the Newfoundland to Ireland run. The Canadians would be given special training and used on the Gibraltar-United Kingdom run, where continuous air support would lessen the consequences of Canadian "inexperience", (a euphemism that the RCN found particularly galling). If there were any doubts in Whitehall about this course of action, they were wiped out by the disastrous outcome of ON 154's passage under Canadian escort in December 1942. Fourteen out of 34 merchant ships were sunk.²⁷

Admiral Nelles was hurt by the Admiralty's decision, especially since the proposals arrived at a moment that could not have been more inconvenient. Since early 1942 Canadian naval and air force authorities had been convinced that the American task force commander was an unnecessary link in the chain. The Naval Staff in Ottawa had been building up its case for removing that link, and by the fall of the year had gained the ear of Admiral Ernest R. King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Once American agreement had been reached Nelles could propose the creation of a separate Canadian command with reasonable expectation of Cabinet agreement. Rather than confront the Cabinet War Committee with evidence of serious naval shortcomings, therefore, he was less than frank with his Minister, Angus L. Macdonald. Instead of giving the real reason for withdrawing Canadian groups from the St. John's-Londonderry run -- a desperate need for more training -- he said reorganization of convoy groups was essential to combat critical oil

shortages created by the North African campaign. That was true enough, but he placed undue emphasis on British planning errors and threw in the gratuitous statement that "this is the third, but most serious, attempt on the part of the Admiralty to get operational control of our ships". He then played on current frustration about the lack of Canadian military involvement in active theatres of war by suggesting the eastern Atlantic was about to become the real hot spot of the submarine war. Incidentally, he pointed out, Canadian ships would also receive the benefit of excellent training facilities available in the eastern Atlantic. It was not until the summer of 1943 that sources outside naval headquarters, almost certainly from the staff of British and American naval commanders in Northern Ireland, informed Macdonald of the full extent of Canadian naval weaknesses in training and equipment.²⁸

Nelles advised accepting the Admiralty proposals on condition that the ships be returned within four months. It is not surprising that he wanted them back quickly, because the size of Canada's contribution had been one of his principal arguments for the need of a convoy conference, and the requirement to discuss command relations with the USN. It is only fair to add that Nelles recognized the issue at stake, that if Canada was to play a part in the naval war it should be one "we have come to look upon as a natural responsibility ... which geographically we are well placed to undertake."²⁹

Nelles left it to the Americans to propose their own withdrawal from the northwest Atlantic, although he told Rear Admiral V.G. Brodeur, Naval Member of the Canadian Staff in Washington, that he could discuss it with his British counterparts.* Whether this happened is not certain, but Brodeur had a strained relationship with the British Admiralty Delegation. He reflected a growing concern in the RCN about British attitudes. Admiration for the Royal Navy continued unabated, but Canadians were trying hard to cut the apron strings. Naval Service Headquarters dealt directly with the Navy Department, and Nelles with King.³⁰

* The British reaction to King's message was that "The Canadians have always resented the presence of an American Admiral in what they regard as their own front garden and will undoubtedly welcome this proposal." (Adm 1/2663).

The argument with Washington about promulgating U-boat situation reports led to a personal correspondence between the two admirals, and it coincided with several other developments likely to have influenced the American Commander in Chief's opinion about the disposition of naval forces. Early in January the convoy TM-1, bound for the Mediterranean, with a mixed escort of British and US destroyers, lost seven out of nine oil tankers. Shortly after, at the Casablanca Conference, British naval delegates urged upon Admiral King the need for more fast destroyers to escort such convoys on southerly routes. On his return to the United States he had evidently formed an unfavourable opinion of his own organization in Newfoundland compared to the much better arrangements of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force in the eastern Atlantic. Famous for his dislike of mixed national forces, he proposed American withdrawal from Newfoundland and the northern convoy routes, a course of action already being hinted to him by the Canadians, as the best solution to the whole convoy problem. It would release USN destroyers for southerly routes and it would resolve the difficulties created by a plethora of independent command authorities in Newfoundland. Admiral Nelles was aware of King's intentions at the beginning of February. He immediately ordered Rear Admiral Murray, who was now Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, to prepare his organization for a Commander in Chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic (CinCCNA) which would include the Western Local Escort Force, the Newfoundland Naval Command and Eastern Air Command.³¹

On 30 April 1943, as the result of decisions taken at the Atlantic Convoy Conference during the first two weeks of March, Admiral Murray became Commander-in-Chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic with headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia. But that was not the end of the matter. Autonomy ensured that Canadian naval and air forces would play a distinctly national role in the Battle of the Atlantic. International recognition did not guarantee that those forces would enjoy equality in any future alliance. This was demonstrated after Doenitz had admitted defeat and withdrawn his wolfpacks from the convoy lanes in May 1943. There was a brief flare-up in the autumn, when Canadian forces based in Newfoundland performed very well, then the centre of gravity shifted away. The convoys continued, the escorts became ever more heavily Canadian, but most of the success enjoyed by Canadian ships and aircraft now occurred in the eastern Atlantic under British command. These Canadian exploits received no mention in the British summary of the anti-submarine war published as a Command Paper in 1945.³²

International recognition did not remove national interservice conflict, either. The position of AOC, Eastern Air Command relative to CinCCNA had to be worked out, much as Coastal Command and the Admiralty had to come to terms in 1941. Excellent personal relations between Murray and his air force colleague, Air Vice Marshal G.O. Johnson, overcame the constitutional disagreements that tended to arise between the two services. Coordination of the RCN and RCAF proved adequate to the task; after November 1943, however, the task became so much more simple that there was not much to measure effectiveness by. The one important difference was that the best ships and aircraft, for the first time in the war, became available in adequate quantities to Canadian maritime forces. Bolstered by their new strength the RCN and RCAF started to look beyond the defence of shipping in quest of worthwhile contributions that would justify the continuing expansion of their forces.

This was less of a problem for the air force than the navy. Although Eastern Air Command was now the only separate RCAF command playing a major part in the shooting war (Western Air Command, on the Pacific coast, was a very quiet zone after June 1942, and Canadian squadrons in Alaska were under United States command), the RAF continued to ask for substantial Canadian contributions to the strategic air offensive against Germany and other overseas operations. Furthermore, home defence had long been an important air force task in the eyes of Canadian governments. The navy's planners looked back to the RCN's pre-war battle for survival and saw that a purely home defence role could easily result once more in crippling retrenchment. As early as 1940 they had begun trying to redefine Canadian naval objectives. The events of 1941 and 1942, crowned by the establishment of a Canadian theatre commander in 1943, showed them the way. Finally, it was prospects of increased activity in the Pacific, and the creation of a Post Hostilities Problems (PHP) Committee in June 1943, that provided the opportunity to achieve new objectives by laying foundations for a modern balanced fleet.³³

Papers produced for the PHP Committee became the basis of major policy decisions by the Naval Staff and Naval Board for the rest of the war. At the most crucial planning period the embarrassing revelations about inadequate naval equipment and training came to the Minister's attention, but this may have been a blessing in disguise. It created conflicts between the Minister and Chief of Naval Staff that sparked upheavals in the entire headquarters organization, forcing headquarters and command staff officers into a better relationship, one that speeded up modernization. It also

resulted in the disappearance of Nelles from the Ottawa scene when Angus L. Macdonald relieved him and appointed Rear Admiral G.C. Jones in his place. Nelles was foremost among the "Imperial Navy" men who worried the Canadian Prime Minister because he thought they wanted to make reckless commitments to great power confrontations. This had formed the basis of a perennial conflict between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Naval Staff.³⁴

At the Quebec conference in 1943 and at several Cabinet meetings in the subsequent year, Mackenzie King and his naval advisers acted out that conflict. In the process the RCN successfully expanded its objectives. It was now to become a big ship navy (including two cruisers and two aircraft carriers) capable of independent task force operations with six main tasks: repelling all but heavy task-force attacks in adjacent oceans, contributing to the maintenance of the sea-lanes, cooperating in hemispheric defence, preventing un-neutral acts in territorial waters, supporting a world security organization and supporting national policies and interests. Mackenzie King remained very dubious about Macdonald's intentions in advocating cruisers and aircraft carriers, but he came to accept the navy's reasoning. The argument was most lucidly expressed in a paper on the Post War Strategic Security of Canada. The nation had to avoid dependence on United States forces on the one hand, and on the other should not be placed in the position of being prevented from entering a war as an ally of Britain because of United States interests. Canadian forces thus ought to be sufficient to preserve territorial integrity "seaward from the coast to a distance at least half the maximum flying range of modern ship-borne aircraft". They should be able to protect lines of communication "essential to the maintenance of a high level of prosperity by the Canadian economy".³⁵ In the naval war plan for 1944 it was the concern for autonomy expressed in such planning papers that won Cabinet approval for further expansion, to over 90,000 personnel. The extent to which the Prime Minister had become a believer is suggested by his diary entry for 11 October 1944. In spite of what he considered the navy's underhanded methods of procuring aircraft carriers, and although he knew they were really the basis of a postwar fleet unit, he wrote: "I nevertheless see the wisdom of making effective whatever we do ... The contribution in war against Japan has been cut down from 25,000 men afloat to 13,500 ... I have felt that this was a contribution which was appreciable and to which exception could not be taken by the people whereas anything smaller ought not be really effective."³⁶

By conceding that point for the navy, King accepted autonomy in maritime as he had previously done in land and air warfare. Autonomy demanded the projection of national strength into major war theatres, not simply the defence of territorial waters with auxiliary forces. Ships and aircraft should be on equal terms with more powerful allies. Failing that, at least the national effort should command international respect. This was a major departure from 1939 principles. King never lost his deep suspicion of naval motives, but it had become difficult to resist the logic of naval arguments. It was, after all, the logic of functionalism that a nation's right to be heard bore a direct relation to the contribution it could demonstrably make to "the particular object in question".³⁷

In 1945 as in 1918 the size, significance and quality of Canada's military contribution was a source of national pride. It would have been a great shock in the flush of victory to learn that important responsibilities had been won in spite of, rather than because of, the performance of Canadian armed forces. The fact nevertheless remained that in the Second World War, as we have seen was the case in the First, politics had a great deal to do with the role of the armed forces. For the navy, and for the Home War Establishment of the air force, it was political concern for Canada's position in Newfoundland that aroused and maintained Ottawa's interests in strengthening military, naval and air forces in the Crown Colony. That was the essential foundation of modern Canadian maritime forces. Having said that, and having acknowledged the severe limitations of Canadian ships and aircraft until late in the war, one must go on to emphasize that military imperatives coincided with political interests. Nobody had foreseen the extent of the U-boat threat in western parts of the ocean. When, after some early reluctance, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were persuaded of Canada's need, they exerted great efforts to bring the RCN and RCAF up to the necessary strength and standard to act independently. A strong Canadian presence in the North Atlantic, desirable from all points of view in 1943, thus became possible, and the way became paved (perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not) for American withdrawal from the northern convoy routes. When that happened Canadian forces found themselves, for the first time, truly essential elements of a strong maritime alliance. Subsequent expansion of maritime forces was relatively easy to justify. Whether Canada would be able to maintain that position was not certain. It was clear, however, that Canadians thought subordination to the United States even less desirable than subordination to their old and long-suffering ally, Great Britain.

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CANADIAN WOMEN AND CANADIAN MOBILIZATION
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

[Ruth Roach Pierson]

To the extent that women have figured in Canadian military history, they have illustrated the assumption that their interests were advanced by a major role in the work-force in both World Wars, the grant of suffrage in Canada and most of the provinces between 1916 and 1918 and the modest innovation of day-care in the Second World War. Women in uniform challenged stereotypical assumptions that the military services were properly a male preserve.

The truth, as always, was more complex. Ruth Roach Pierson argues that even in the Second World War, women played a tightly restricted role in uniform and that male assumptions governed policies as divergent as the role of female officers and the control of venereal disease. At a time when manpower scarcity was almost the governing factor in Canada's war policy, the participation of women was governed by constraints which even contemporaries regarded as anachronistic. Apart from exploring the roots of a female role which has expanded almost out of recognition in recent years, Pierson's article underlines the inhibiting role of unreflected social and cultural values in shaping military policy.

In the 1930's the waging of war was thought of as a male activity and the military services as male institutions. Women's admission to the Canadian armed forces during the Second World War was a challenge to those assumptions. But was that challenge sufficiently serious to alter those assumptions or were the assumptions sufficiently resilient to bend while under pressure and then relax back into place when the pressure was removed? As those assumptions were related to the sexual division of labour and male over female hierarchy within other economic and social institutions, changes which might have been effected by women's entry into uniformed service were, of necessity, linked to and dependent upon changes in the larger society.

If the identification of combat as a male activity was practically universal, that of male with uniformed service was not. Nursing sisters had served as uniformed and commissioned members of the Canadian forces since the Boer War¹ and women had formed unofficial Women's Home Guards and Women's Auxiliary Army Corps units, to perform patriotic service during the First World War.² In the aftermath of the Munich Crisis of the fall of 1938, a group of women in British Columbia revived the idea of women's voluntary service corps. Modeled after the official women's Auxiliary Territorial Service of the British Army, the British Columbia Women's Service Corps hoped to develop into the official women's auxiliary service of the Canadian Army.³

Women's unofficial paramilitary groups mushroomed in Canada with the actual outbreak of war. An estimated 6,700 women were believed to be enrolled in such organizations by 1941. Some, in imitation of or affiliation with the B.C. Women's Service Corps, called themselves the Alberta and Nova Scotia Service Corps, others took such names as the Saskatchewan Auxiliary Territorials, the Women's Volunteer Reserve Corps of Montreal (nicknamed the Canadian Beavers), le Corps de Réserve National féminin, la Réserve canadienne féminine, and the Canadian Auxiliary Territorial Service (C.A.T.S.) of Ontario.

Women who joined these organizations received training in military drill and etiquette, in physical education and in jobs they believed women could perform for the armed services, such as military clerical work, transport driving and motor vehicle maintenance, first aid, map reading, wireless and visual telegraphy, and cooking in large quantities. A few corps even offered rifle practice and squad drill with arms. Army or ex-army men provided much of the specialized instruction. The organizations were self-supporting and members had to outfit themselves. Some could afford only arm bands; others boasted a corps "uniformed very smartly and neatly" in, for instance, "blue-grey tunic and skirt, with maple leaf badges in gold, black beret, grey hose and black brogues".⁴ Corps leaders assumed military titles of rank, such as colonel, major and captain, and organized themselves into hierarchies of command topped by an officer commanding or chief commandant. Obviously such women were attracted by the mystique of the military and regarded much of its regimentation, structure, trappings and tasks as not incompatible with their womanhood.

These organizations bombarded the Departments of National Defence and National War Services with requests for official recognition to legitimize their uniforms and titles

of rank and bring them financial assistance. Some clamoured to be sent overseas to help in Britain's home defence, but an Order-in-Council prohibited Canadian civilian women from entering the war zone.⁵ The campaign for official recognition reached its peak with a nation-wide tour to assess the strength of the women's paramilitary movement carried out from October to December 1940 by two leaders of the B.C. Women's Service Corps. It culminated in their presentation to Ottawa of a brief outlining the extent of Canadian women's preparedness to give military service and a strong statement of their desire for some commitment from the Department of National Defence.

It is doubtful whether anything official would have come of the keen desire of these women to render service in uniform to their country had not the Canadian Armed Forces begun to feel the pinch of a threatening manpower shortage. As early as June 1940 National Defence Headquarters began looking into the possibility of putting women into uniform and using them in support staff positions to release men for Active Service elsewhere. The British government inquired in February 1941 as to whether the Women's Auxiliary Air Force of Great Britain could "be allowed to recruit personnel in Canada for service with the R.A.F. transferred schools", (called in Canada the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan schools) or if not whether the R.C.A.F. would "form its own women's service"⁶ to perform ground duties at those schools. While this inquiry from the U.K. prompted the Departments of National Defence and War Services to prepare the machinery for raising a Canadian women's air service,⁷ the shortage of clerks in the Army was becoming more pressing. National Defence and War Services concluded that they could not ignore the woman power represented by the volunteer corps. In the end they opted against granting official recognition for the existing corps, deciding instead to use them as unofficial recruiting grounds for the official women's services.

The decision to create women's corps entailed more of an abandonment of the male exclusiveness of the military services than the presence of nursing sisters had. The step was taken gradually and not without reluctance. The first branch of the armed forces to open its doors to women (other than nursing sisters) was the Royal Canadian Air Force. Although by an Order-in-Council dated 2 July 1941 the women's air service was made an integral part of the air force from the start, it was originally called the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force (C.W.A.A.F.) and only redesignated the Royal Canadian Air Force, Women's Division, in February 1942.

The second branch to move was the army. On first formation, by an Order-in-Council of 13 August 1941, the Canadian Women's Army Corps was set up as a separate body, supplementary to but not an integral part of the Canadian Militia and not under military law. So long as the C.W.A.C. was not legally military, its officers could not be commissioned and their titles and badges of rank had to be different from those authorized for military use. In imitation of the British Army's Auxiliary Territorial Service, the titles for officer ranks in the C.W.A.C. were 2nd Subaltern (the equivalent of 2nd Lieutenant), Subaltern (Lieutenant), Junior Commander (Captain), Senior Commander (Major), Chief Commander (Lieutenant Colonel), and Honorary Controller (Colonel). For badges of rank the French emblem of the fleur de lys and the British emblem of the rose were originally considered, but in the end the Canadian symbols of the maple leaf and beaver were chosen, in combinations ranging from one maple leaf for a 2nd Subaltern to one beaver and two maple leaves for an Honorary Controller.

The separate but supplementary status proved administratively cumbersome, but the Major-General in the office of Adjutant-General was committed to preserving the male exclusiveness of the military. His replacement in February 1942 by a man more flexible on that question smoothed the way to incorporating the C.W.A.C. within the Canadian Army (Active). Order-in-Council P.C. 1965 of 13 March 1942 abolished the separate status of the C.W.A.C. and placed it on Active Service and under military law as part of the Defence Forces of Canada.

The third and last branch to admit women was the Royal Canadian Navy which waited a full year longer than the air force to establish its women's service. The Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (W.R.C.N.S.), authorized on 31 July 1942, remained the smallest and most selective of the three women's services. "Although the W.R.C.N.S. was not an auxiliary service it tended at the beginning to remain a separate organization, due to the influence of the W.R.N.S. and the fact that R.C.N. officers had no experience in dealing with women and were willing to leave many matters to them. Only by degrees were these misgivings dissipated and the Wrens absorbed into the general scheme of things."⁸

The usefulness of female labour to the armed forces had never really been in question. In some districts officers commanding who had supplied instructors to unofficial women's paramilitary groups had in turn welcomed the unpaid labour of these female volunteers as clerks, drivers, and

telephone operators for their military units. In the offices of National Defence Headquarters, military districts and naval and air bases, a growing number of women were working for pay as permanent and temporary civil servants. Having their labour much more completely at the disposal of the forces was the advantage gained by putting female employees into uniform and under service discipline. One woman who served with the C.W.A.C. in Regina has recalled that whenever a battalion was getting ready to move out, all "the girls" who could type would be called back after dinner to work all night preparing the men's overseas dossiers. Not a word was spoken; there was "just the clack of these typewriters", dozens of old Underwoods.⁹ Civil servants could have claimed overtime; for servicewomen it was simply duty.

But the abandonment of male exclusivity did not lead to women's thorough or equal absorption into the Canadian military. When the Adjutant-General's Branch at NDHQ was first exploring the possibility of creating official uniformed women's corps in October 1940, it canvassed the opinions of all Officers Commanding Military Districts, the Commandant of Royal Military College, the Commandant of the Ottawa Area, and all Branches and Directorates at National Defence Headquarters. These responses expressed considerable caution, if not serious doubt, even when the urgent need for womanpower was granted. In the ways in which they sought to hedge round the employment of uniformed women with conditions, one can discern at least three major categories of concern: that male primacy be preserved; that a sexual division of labour be maintained; and that the mixing of the sexes be guarded. Indeed one could say that these three qualifications fairly accurately anticipated the main areas of tension created by admitting women to military service.

The Adjutant-General's circular letter of October 1940 had asked its recipients to consider eight categories for possible employment of female personnel: clerk, telephone operator, cook, cook's helper, officers' and sergeants' mess waiter, canteen helper, and possibly M.T. (mechanized transport) driver. The replies reflected a conviction that only a limited number of jobs would be suitable for women. Few reports contested the feasibility of using members of a women's corps for clerical duties or telephone operating. Constraints suggested in connection with kitchen, mess and canteen duties had to do with making sure that a man ultimately be kept in charge, or that the sexes not be indiscriminately integrated. The limitations placed on the use of women as M.T. drivers stemmed more directly from a sense of women's physical or sensory inferiority. The consensus was "that women are quite competent" to drive "the

lighter motor vehicles", staff cars, ambulances, motor cycles and station wagons, but that "the handling of trucks and heavier vehicles is beyond the strength of the average woman." Some mentioned as further limiting factors "winter driving conditions in Canada", "night driving", and "indifferent roads and great distances". Nor was it recommended that women be used as M.T. drivers at Training Centres, for there, one of the primary duties of M.T. drivers was "to train personnel for reinforcements" and it was not felt that women "would prove satisfactory as instructors."

Those replies to the Adjutant-General's inquiry indicated the general pattern of employment for women in the C.W.A.C. which would prevail from the Corps' formation in August, 1941, through to the end of the war: the use of women in subordinate service jobs "where the physical strain is not too great" and for the purpose of releasing men "for employment in forward formations and units." The major change would come in the number of occupations for which women would be considered. Some of those canvassed in October, 1940, had already suggested job categories suitable for women beyond the eight mentioned in the A.G.'s letter, chief among them dental assistant, tailoress, and storekeeper. One had even predicted rightly that

much of the prima facie objection to employing women on certain duties and in certain places would be overcome and a change in the mental attitude towards women so employed would become apparent if a recognized corps of women were organized.

Indeed, the number of occupations open to women who joined the Forces increased as the war dragged on. The first set of Regulations for the Canadian Women's Army Corps listed some thirty. The Women's Division of the R.C.A.F., which began with eleven basic trades, had fifty by February 1943¹⁰ and sixty-five by the end of the war.¹¹ It was the introduction of trades training which extended the number of specialized technical trades open to servicewomen. One variety of recruitment propaganda boasted of the "many and varied" trades at which female recruits could be trained and played up "the more spectacular", "unusual and interesting" jobs, such as that of night vision tester in the C.W.A.C. operating a machine which tested men's ability to see in the dark. Among the most glamorous and desirable jobs for women in the Royal Canadian Air Force were those in control towers where personnel directed and recorded flight activity. An airwoman with the coveted trades classification of Clerk Operational might sit with headset on in direct communication with a

Radar Station, plotting the positions of the aircraft on a table grid-map or in a signals room tapping out messages to aircraft in the vicinity.¹²

But dramatizing servicewomen's employment in non-traditional trades had limited appeal. Initial recruitment for the women's services drew heavily on those who were already members of unofficial women's paramilitary organizations. Their officers were given preference in building up the officer's corps of the new women's services, and many regular recruits also came from their ranks. The Officer Commanding the Winnipeg Women's Auxiliary Corps contended in November 1941 that 65% of the "girls" in active service in that city had been members of her organization.¹³ By 1943, however, the supply of women in volunteer corps who were both qualified and eager to serve had long been exhausted. As more and more women were needed, recruitment met resistance and monthly enlistment figures dropped. Concerned about the increasing opposition to women's military service, the National Campaign Committee which coordinated public relations for all three branches of the armed services granted authorization to two opinion surveys early in 1943. One was a general public opinion survey conducted by a commercial agency, and the other, carried out by the Directorate of Army Recruiting, canvassed the opinion of C.W.A.C. other ranks.¹⁴ Both documented the fact that a large segment of the Canadian public, including eligible young women and their families and friends, disapproved of women joining the forces. One source of this disapproval was the fear that military service would cause a young woman to lose her femininity.

Recruitment officers of all three services developed new recruitment pitches to ameliorate this fear. One was to assure the potential recruit (and her family and friends) that servicewomen were not called upon to do anything "unwomanly". This line emphasized that "it was not a case, in most instances, of women doing men's work in the Services," but rather of servicemen, "prior to enlistment of women", having had to do "women's work". The Army, Navy and Air Force, in other words, would not require young female recruits to perform any jobs unsuitable for women, but rather ones which women were used to doing in the civilian world. "If a woman can drive the family car, she can drive a staff car" is an example of the reassurance this recruitment line offered.

Such reassurance was not on the whole misleading, as the women's services never acquired a pattern of employment much at odds with the male-female division of labour in the larger civilian society.

By March 1945, members of the C.W.A.C. were represented in fifty-five different trade classifications in addition to the general duty assignments carrying no trades-pay, such as driver without technical training, laundress, medical orderly, batwoman, canteen helper, waitress, and office orderly. Even among tradeswomen, the overwhelming majority were assigned to office or kitchen duty. Of the almost 6,000 C.W.A.C. tradeswomen stationed in North America in March 1945, fully 70% were employed in the two occupations of clerk (62.4%) and cook (8%). More than 85% (86.7%) are accounted for if one adds the 6.9% who were storewomen, 4.5% switchboard operators; 2.7% postal sorters, and 2.2% dental assistants. Driver mechanic was the one non-traditional occupation that had any significant number of C.W.A.C. in it: 111 for another 1.9%. The remaining 11.4% were distributed among the other forty-six trades. Next highest in concentration were keyboard operator (with 77), fixed wireless operator (69), tailoress (66), bandswoman (66), and nursing orderly (65). Occupations with the lowest concentrations included butcher (7), shoemaker (7), lithographer (2), welder (2), saddler (1), pharmacist (1), and masseur (1). After VE Day there would be one official artist (Molly Lamb Bobak). The secretary in uniform was the typical C.W.A.C..

The other two services did not deviate in the main from this pattern of female employment. Demand throughout remained highest for clerical help and cooks. The Navy in 1943 was in need particularly of cooks, stewards and laundry maids. In the words of one recruiting officer: "The domestics are the back-bone of the WRENS."¹⁵ "Certainly during the Second World War," the historian of the W.D.'s has written, "the hierarchy of the R.C.A.F. thought that a very proper place for women in the Service was in the kitchen."¹⁶ By and large, the overwhelming majority of uniformed women employed by the Army, Air Force or Navy, were assigned to jobs which had already become female niches in the civilian labour market or were extensions of mothering or housework.

Nor was this employment pattern out of keeping with the desires or expectations or work experience of applicants. According to an analysis of the type of women applying to join the C.W.A.C. up to mid-summer 1942, of the over 75% who were employed at the time of making application, 24% were domestic servants, 24% office workers, 15% store clerks, 10% factory workers, and 4% professional women and teachers. Approximately 70% had had some high school education, while only 6% had attended university. Thirty-six percent of those seeking admission wanted office work of some kind, 19% wanted duties in the mess or canteen, 15% wanted

to be drivers, and 10% store clerks.¹⁷ It remained as much the exception to the rule for a servicewoman to desire a non-traditional job as for the Services to assign her to one.

A sexual division of labour with respect to work processes represented on both sides of the divide was carried over more or less intact from civilian society into military life. Nor did women's entry into the armed forces alter another division of labour by sex even more deeply entrenched in western society: that between the official arms-bearers and the non-arms-bearers. When the formation of official women's corps was under consideration, the only purpose envisioned for them was to supply female labour to the support staff, not to the fighting force. With the creation of the women's services, however, the division of labour between support work and combat did not thereafter simply follow the dividing line between the sexes. As even in wartime the support staff of a modern military service comprises a larger proportion of personnel than does the fighting force, and as the women's services constituted even at peak strength only a tiny proportion of the total strength of their respective branches, the largest percentage of male personnel still served behind the lines in non-combatant roles. Nevertheless, there was a fundamental division of labour by sex: between front line combat, from which women were excluded, and support work, to which women were admitted as replacements for some men. Women had penetrated that sacrosanct male preserve, the military, but had not broken the male monopoly on the primary purpose of the military, the provision of an armed fighting force.

In preserving the male exclusivity of armed service, the Department of National Defence was acting in harmony with social convention and conviction. The only evidence of women strongly desiring admission to jobs classified as operational comes from the handful of women in Canada with pilots' licenses who were eager to put their flying skill at the service of their country. They were to be disappointed. Some signed up with the Women's Division of the R.C.A.F., its motto "We Serve That Men May Fly" notwithstanding. A few joined the British civilian Air Transport Auxiliary, formed to ferry aircraft from "anywhere to anywhere" and open after 1940 to women pilots.¹⁸ That men were by nature suited to dangerous, life-risking jobs while women were naturally adapted to monotony and behind-the-scenes support work was a belief reflected in these remarks by one air force officer on the suitability of airwomen for the trade of parachute rigger.

Take parachute packing. To a man it's a dull, routine job. He doesn't want to pack parachutes. He wants to be up there with one strapped to his back. But to a woman it's an exciting job. She can imagine that someday a flier's life will be saved because she packed that parachute well. Maybe it will be her own husband's life or her boy-friend's. That makes parachute packing pretty exciting for her and she does a much more efficient and speedy job than an unhappy airman would.¹⁹

But for a moment in the summer of 1942 a shifting of the line between male and female regarding weapons usage was under consideration. All four Senior Army Officers at NDHQ were prepared, owing to manpower shortages, not only to welcome women into a wider range of support jobs, but to contemplate employing them "in the actual handling and firing of anti-aircraft guns". Although this policy was never implemented, it is worth noting how limited a violation of the taboo against putting women in combat was being contemplated: women were being considered for service not with front line combatant units, but only on anti-aircraft batteries involved in coastal home defence. In justifying the policy, the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons undoubtedly would have become crucial, as in this caption to a photograph in Saturday Night showing members of the Women's Home Defence Corps in Britain learning to use service rifles "with a view to gaining admittance to the Home Guard": "While Britain still believes that use of offensive weapons in warfare is a man's job and always will be, nevertheless her women are taught how to defend themselves." Even had servicewomen been used on Ack-Ack batteries in Canada, there was no consideration given to extending their basic training to include arms drill. Fighting for one's country would still have remained an exclusively male activity.

Insofar as CWACs were eventually detailed to operational duties, they were employed with coastal defence units in both Atlantic and Pacific Commands as "operators of predictors and fire control instruments." Starting in the spring of 1943, C.W.A.C. personnel were trained for service with Anti-Aircraft Regiments as kinetheodolite operators (testing the accuracy of height finders, range finders, anti-aircraft guns, and coastal defence guns) and as gun operations room broadcasters and plotter - telephonists. Servicewomen's participation in operational duties thus circumscribed, C.W.A.C. recruitment literature could still assure the young woman who was thinking of enlisting: "No, not actually on the firing line. You do not pull any triggers or throw any hand grenades."

The subordinate position entailed by women's exclusion/exemption from combat is summed up in the mottos of the women's services: "We Serve That Men May Fight"; "We Serve That Men May Fly"; "We are the Women Behind the Men Behind the Guns". Male primacy was also preserved with respect to pay and benefits in the services.

At the time of the formation of the women's services, basic pay all ranks was set at two-thirds that of men holding equivalent rank in the army, air force, or navy. On enrollment or enlistment, a female recruit received ninety cents a day ordinary pay in comparison with a male recruit's \$1.30. This inequality extended to the officer corps: for instance, while a Chief Commander (later regularized to Lieutenant Colonel) in the C.W.A.C. received \$6.70 per day, her male counterpart drew ten dollars. Various rationales were given for this inequality. One was the expectation that it would take at least three women to replace two men. Another was that, as the pay scale in the women's services was not to be competitive with that for women in the Civil Service, the expense for services provided free of charge in the armed forces, such as clothing, food, lodging and medical and dental care, needed to be deducted from the comparable female civil servant's salary and the result was two-thirds male basic military pay. Also trades pay, once it was introduced for female personnel, was on a schedule substantially lower than that for servicemen at the same level in the same trades classification.

Nor were dependent's allowances equal for male and female military personnel. Although early thought on the subject had been to exclude married women from military service, on their formation the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force and the Canadian Women's Army Corps were opened to married as well as unmarried women provided they were not encumbered with dependent children. (Dependent sons were defined by the Air Force as under 16, by the Army as under 17; dependent daughters were defined by both as under 18.)²⁰ That proviso eliminated the need for dependents' allowances to children of women in the services. But women in the forces were initially not provided with allowances for any other dependents, be they husbands, mothers, fathers, sisters or brothers. And the woman married to a serviceman who herself joined up ceased to be eligible to receive a wife's separation allowance.

These inequalities in pay and benefits were cause for complaint at the time on the part of female officers and other ranks. National Defence Headquarters was aware of their negative effect on prospective female recruits. The

opinion surveys of 1943, both that of the general public and that of the cross-section of C.W.A.C. other ranks, indicated that poor pay and allowances contributed to the reluctance of young women to join the forces. Civilian women took up the cause of their sisters in uniform. Responding to petitions and resolutions sent forward from Local and Provincial Councils, the Executive of the National Council for Women made representations to the Department of National Defence and to the Prime Minister, in May and again in December, 1942, urging an end to the disparities in pay and benefits between servicewomen and servicemen.

What made the inequality particularly glaring was that in many instances the servicewoman had stepped directly into a position vacated by a man and was told she was doing as good a job if not better than the soldier, sailor or airman she had replaced. "Although it had been considered originally that the ratio of replacement might be three to two, in practice it was to work out to one for one in most trades; indeed, in a few instances two airwomen were able to replace three airmen."²¹ Furthermore, while women accepted into the Army, Navy or Air Force were not supposed to have dependent children, the complete lack of provision of dependents' allowances hurt "many girls" who had "been contributing to family income".²²

The Department of National Defence was sensitive to the criticism, especially given the evidence that it was one factor deterring recruitment. On 24 July 1943 the Minister announced that adjustments would be made in pay and allowances for women in the services. Basic pay was to be raised to 80 per cent of that paid to men in the same rank, the pay increase retroactive to 1 July. Trades pay for servicewomen was to be equalized. Furthermore, a wife of a serviceman could henceforth retain her separation allowance when she herself joined up (and thus the servicewoman married to a man in the forces was put on an equal footing with other servicemen's wives). Finally, allowances would now be paid for the dependent parents, brothers and sisters (but not husbands or children) of servicewomen. Although the new provisions did not remove all inequalities, the Services were ahead of private industry in narrowing the gap between men's and women's pay and benefits. District C.W.A.C. Officers at their conference in April 1944 pronounced personnel well-satisfied with the changes.²³ Nonetheless, a survey carried out in 1944 found servicewomen still aggrieved that their pay was not equal to that of the men they relieved.²⁴ Also, the changes had left intact male economic primacy and a conception of the wife but never the husband as dependent.

By mid 1942 recruiting officers had come up against more difficult obstacles than lower pay. Circulation of rumours impugning the morality of servicewomen was effectively discouraging enlistment. The fear of what might happen if the sexes were integrated within the military services seemed justified by the consequences. There were cases of V.D. and "illegitimate" pregnancy among servicewomen. The incidence of V.D. was calculated as 25.8 per thousand members of the C.W.A.C. in 1943. A comparable statistic calculated for the Army as a whole (including the C.W.A.C.) was 32 per thousand in the same year. There were no comparable civilian statistics. The incidence of pregnancy among unmarried members of the C.W.A.C. for the period December 1943 through 1944 was 32.01 per thousand strength in Canada, 14.27 overseas. The civilian rate for a similar age group (18-28) was approximately 10.4 per thousand in 1941.²⁵

Alarming as the rates were to all concerned, they nonetheless established that only a tiny percentage of servicewomen had become pregnant out of wedlock or contracted V.D. Yet the rumour-mongers, exaggerating their charges of immorality out of all proportion to the actual facts, sought to tar the entire C.W.A.C. and Women's Division of the R.C.A.F. with the same brush. The W.R.C.N.S. was spared most of the calumny, largely because it had been able to create the impression of being very selective and thus of having as member only "the better type of girl".²⁶ The Wartime Information Board made a study of the "whispering campaign" and in its report of March 1943 concluded that "the frequency, persistency and wide distribution" of the rumours suggested "a strongly entrenched prejudice against the Women's Services".²⁷ One example of the slanderous stories was that the first recruits "were girls from the Red Light districts", another was that "over 18% of the women have become pregnant since joining".²⁸ The Wartime Information Board explained the imputation of "immorality" historically: sexual respectability was "woman's vulnerable point, the traditional focus of attack by those who resent any extension of her prerogatives". Wearing a uniform, marching, standing at attention and saluting were all traditionally masculine behaviour. The woman who behaved so appeared unconventional, "unwomanly", and it was thus easy to assume that she would have broken with moral convention as well. The general public opinion survey of 1943 revealed that opposition to women's joining the forces was particularly strong in French-speaking Canada, where Church and culture sanctified women's primary commitment to home and family; but a more worrisome finding of that survey together with the one of C.W.A.C. opinion and the W.I.B. study, was that servicemen headed the list of "ill-will groups". Resentment at women

"pushing themselves into a strictly male preserve" was one explanation for the servicemen's opposition. Another was discovered in the bitter denunciations of the women's forces: clearly some servicemen overseas wrote in their letters home: "the man in service wanted assurance that his woman was holding the fort while he was away and would be at home and unsullied when he returned."²⁹ It was the opinion of the Wartime Information Board that "the Women's services provide perhaps the most difficult publicity problem of the whole Canadian war effort." Both the R.C.A.F. and the army took swift disciplinary action against any serviceman found guilty of spreading rumours defaming women in uniform. Officers in charge of recruitment and public relations decided not to refute the rumours by citing opposing facts, but to play up the positive aspects of women's life in the services, to stress the high moral character of servicewomen, and to advertise parental approval of a daughter's joining the services.

Although the incidence of V.D. among male soldiers was higher than that among members of the C.W.A.C., and although in one study servicemen made up 86.3% of the putative fathers named by CWACs discharged for "illegitimate" pregnancy, the male Army, by virtue of the double standard of sexual morality, was not made the object of a vicious "whispering campaign" to discredit it on moral grounds. It was almost expected of men in the forces to have a fling: any consequent "illegitimate" pregnancies were unfortunate, but primarily the woman's responsibility; any consequent V.D. infection was socially undesirable and, when the rate got high, cause for alarm and a massive campaign to control its spread. But men did not risk acquiring a bad reputation by joining the forces.

Similarly servicewomen exposed to venereal infection ran greater risks than servicemen.³⁰ This was least the case with respect to medical care. Although initially female personnel with V.D. were discharged from the services in contrast with venereally infected servicemen who were retained and given medical treatment, after six months of this disparity, the policy of retention and treatment was extended equally to servicewomen. The change indicates a commitment to equity and justice on the part of the decision makers at NDHQ. That commitment came into conflict, however, with the necessarily male orientation of the overwhelmingly male military service and society's double standard of sexual morality. In concern over the spread of V.D., the wartime emergency heightened the tendency of men in uniform to see the military world as threatened by the civilian, and since the men in the services vastly outnumbered the women, the

tendency was also to see men in need of protection from women, although that perspective also held sway in civilian V.D. control programmes.

The sexual double standard confirmed female culpability, for according to it, women were either chaste or promiscuous, virtuous or sinful, pure or fallen. And in making the single misstep from one side of the great divide to the other, a woman turned from being an innocent in need of protection into a "menace" threatening men and society. Those in charge of the V.D. control programme in the services were not free from this way of seeing things. Thus the policy to refrain from practices which stigmatized venereally infected personnel proceeded more swiftly and smoothly with regard to servicemen than servicewomen. Also, while servicemen were provided with condoms, chemical prophylactic kits, and "Early Preventive Treatment" centres, servicewomen exposed to V.D. were left to become casualties. The mainstay of V.D. control in the women's services was education, but in deference to gentility, the facts were presented less forcefully than in the educational literature and films for men. Furthermore, the main scare tactic used to dissuade women from sexual contact with men was the threat of social disgrace, while for men it was the bogey of the diseased and predatory female. At the same time that provision of prophylaxis for men presupposed the existence of women who would "participate in promiscuity", the double standard made of such women a handy scapegoat on which V.D. could be blamed. The double standard thus put servicewomen into a double bind: it denied them effective protection against V.D. in deference to their innocence, but then it slapped them with the label "loose" or "easy" or "promiscuous" if they became infected.

As for the status of the women's services, within their respective branches, they remained subordinate as befitted their subservient functions. The Canadian Women's Army Corps within the Canadian Army is a case in point. Although after March 1942 it had "been absorbed in the Armed Forces of Canada," the C.W.A.C. remained a segregated Corps, its members retaining a status different from that of male members of the Canadian Army. The term "soldier(s)" was still reserved for male other ranks; the collective term for "all ranks in the C.W.A.C. other than Officers" was "Volunteer(s)". The degree to which members of the C.W.A.C. came under military law was limited by modifications and exemptions spelled out in the revised C.W.A.C. Regulations of 1942. For instance, the severest penalties (death, penal servitude, imprisonment, detention) were not to be inflicted. Also while members of the C.W.A.C. now had the right to

elect trial by court martial and C.W.A.C. officers were eligible to sit as members of courts martial at trials of C.W.A.C. personnel, no C.W.A.C. officer could be appointed President of a Court Martial.

In general, measures were taken to preserve wherever possible the male-female hierarchy of authority. Although the revised C.W.A.C. Regulations of 1942 and a reorganization of C.W.A.C. companies in August, 1943, extended the disciplinary powers of C.W.A.C. Commanding Officers over C.W.A.C. personnel, "Officers of the Canadian Women's Army Corps" were to "have no powers of punishment over Officers, Warrant Officers and soldiers of other Corps." As manpower supplies grew tighter and "an increasing number of C.W.A.C. officers came to be used as replacements for male officers in static staff appointments in Canada and the United Kingdom",³¹ C.W.A.C. officers were placed from time to time in positions of command over male as well as female personnel. Three paragraphs in the revised C.W.A.C. Regulations of 1942 laid down the rules of precedence and command which were to obtain between officers of the C.W.A.C. and officers and other ranks of other Branches and Corps of the Army.

5. Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers shall rank with Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in other branches of the Army according to the dates of their appointments in their respective ranks, but where such appointments bear the same dates, Officers and Other Ranks of the Canadian Women's Army Corps shall rank junior.
- 6(a) Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Army, of Corps other than the Canadian Women's Army Corps, shall have power of command over personnel of the Canadian Women's Army Corps who are junior to them by rank, appointment or seniority.
- (b) Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Canadian Women's Army Corps, shall have power of command only over Officers and Other Ranks of other Branches of the Army as may from time to time be placed under their command.

In other words, all determinants of rank being equal, the C.W.A.C. officer, non-commissioned officer or private was junior to their male Army counterparts. And while male Army officers and N.C.O.'s always enjoyed power of command over

C.W.A.C. personnel junior to them, C.W.A.C. officers and N.C.O.'s could exercise power of command over junior male Army officers or male other ranks only as occasion warranted.

The changes in status and power which Corps Command underwent from first creation of the C.W.A.C. to its dissolution in 1946 provide a history in cameo of the changing fortunes of the Corps. To serve as first commander, National Defence Headquarters looked to the Nursing Service of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps for a woman experienced in military affairs and administration and chose Matron-in-Chief Elizabeth Smellie. Her first duty as Officer Administering, C.W.A.C., was to tour every Military District in Canada in search of women qualified to form the initial nucleus of administrative officers and N.C.O.'s for the C.W.A.C. Her recruiting ground was the commandants of "local women's corps" and other leading women in the communities. Appropriately her first selection, recommended as Staff Officer for Military District No. 11, was Joan B. Kennedy, Controller of the B.C. Women's Services Corps, and destined to be Matron Smellie's successor as O/A, C.W.A.C.

If anything, the C.W.A.C.'s incorporation into the Army brought an initial downgrading of Corps Command. In the fall of 1942, C.W.A.C. Corps Headquarters was dissolved, C.W.A.C. administration having been apportioned out among the appropriate Branches and Directorates of NDHQ, and the position of Officer Administering, C.W.A.C., abolished. Lt.-Col. Joan Kennedy was now given the title of Director, C.W.A.C., but the terms of reference of her directorate were never formally approved. The Corps Headquarters had been "replaced by a Directorate which was never legally authorized", and the Officer Administering, C.W.A.C., "by a Director with little official power."

Corps Command was further eroded in May, 1943, when the unauthorized Directorate was abolished and in place of a Director, C.W.A.C., two Senior Officers' appointments were made, that of Lt.-Col. Joan Kennedy as General Staff Officer Grade 1 in the Directorate of Military Training to advise on all C.W.A.C. training and that of Lt.-Col. Margaret Eaton as Assistant Adjutant-General, C.W.A.C., to coordinate all C.W.A.C. matters handled by the directorates of the A.G.'s Branch. The C.W.A.C. had thus been left with no official head within its own Corps.

But a year later, for reasons of Corps morale, that decapitation was reconsidered. On 28 April 1944, Margaret Eaton was promoted to Acting Colonel and appointed to the

new position of Director-General, C.W.A.C. This time the terms of reference of the Director-General, C.W.A.C., were formally authorized: she was "under the Adjutant-General" and "responsible to him for the well-being and efficiency of the C.W.A.C. as a Corps and of its personnel." Nonetheless, although she was to "be consulted by all Branches" on matters of C.W.A.C. policy and administration, and in such matters had direct access to the Minister, the final term specified:

The duties and functions of the Director-General, C.W.A.C., will not alter the responsibility of the various Branches and Directorates of the Army for the training, administration, organization, spiritual and medical care, welfare, accommodation and clothing of the C.W.A.C., subject always however to the obligation to consult the Director-General....

Margaret Eaton must have won the respect and confidence of National Defence Headquarters to have been elevated at thirty-one to the position of Director-General, C.W.A.C. She came from the Timothy Eaton family and, when first approached to become an officer of the C.W.A.C., had demurred on the grounds that her only qualifications were that she "knew the best night clubs in London and hunted with the best packs". But after promotion to the position of Director-General, C.W.A.C., it was precisely her high social standing, as she herself has observed, that put her in such a "strong position vis à vis the boys": it was difficult for the male officers, no matter how high their title, to pull rank on her. The top ones, she has recalled, never addressed her as Colonel but rather always as Miss Eaton.³² Her powers as Director-General, C.W.A.C., albeit ultimately consultative, were not inferior to those held by the heads of other Army Corps, such as the Service Corps or the Corps of Military Staff Clerks. Indeed, in one respect, her position carried a privilege beyond that granted even to the Director-General of Medical Services: direct access to the Minister as well as to the Adjutant-General. Nonetheless, there was one important difference. Her male counterparts were of the same gender as the Senior Officers over them, while overarching the C.W.A.C. at every point was a higher authority exercised by members of the opposite sex. And those higher positions were closed to all Army women, excluded or exempted as they were from field training and segregated, except for the Nursing Sisters and female doctors of the Medical Corps, within the Canadian Women's Army Corps.

Upon Margaret Eaton's relinquishing of the appointment of Director-General, C.W.A.C., on 29 October 1945, it was the wish of the Adjutant General that the title of DG/CWAC lapse with her retirement. Although her designated replacement, Lt. Col. Daisy I. Royal, fought hard for promotion to the rank of Colonel and use of the title of Director; C.W.A.C., or failing that, of Officer Administrating, C.W.A.C., the strength of the Corps was steadily diminishing and advice in the Adjutant General's branch was that promotion should be discontinued. During the next few months the title and power of the head of the C.W.A.C. was gradually downgraded, and on 19 January 1945 Lt. Col. D.I. Royal was informed of the Adjutant General's ruling that "the head of the CWAC Section at NDHQ shall in future be known as 'Staff Officer' and that under no consideration are the terms 'Director' or 'O.A.' to be used."³³

On the whole, the expendability of women's labour in the public sphere was nowhere more dramatically illustrated at the end of the Second World War than in the armed forces. In the course of 1946, all three women's services were disbanded. Men and women in both the R.C.A.F. and the Canadian Army proposed the inclusion of Women's Corps in Canada's post-war Reserve Forces, but the Cabinet did not give approval to the proposal.³⁴ The Air Force, however, retained a small nucleus of female Messing Officers under the aegis of the R.C.A.F. Medical Services. Only the impact of the Korean War in the 1950's brought the decision to enlist women again in the Regular Forces, first in the air force in 1951, then in the army in 1954, and finally in the navy in 1955. The Second World War experience was a clear case of last hired, first fired, and not just of individual women, but of almost an entire group of women. It demonstrated that women could serve as a reserve army of labour for the armed forces just as well as for the civilian labour market.

But Canada's ex-servicewomen, however, were not to be simply turned out into the cold. Canada's generous rehabilitation programme for ex-service personnel was touted in March 1945 as "the most comprehensive of any yet advanced by any country". After the women's services were brought into being, the legislation enacted to provide post-discharge benefits for members of the armed force was extended to include women. The new Department of Veterans' Affairs created a position of Executive Assistant to the Director General of Rehabilitation to specialize in the programme's application to women and, in January 1945, appointed Dr. Olive Russel to fill it. A Ph.D. in psychology, years of experience in vocational guidance, and recent service in the C.W.A.C. as Army Examiner of female personnel qualified her well for the

job.³⁵ Her new duties included speaking before women's clubs across the country to solicit cooperation in the task of re-integrating ex-service personnel into civilian life. In her standard speech she would point to the second page of the booklet "Back to Civil Life" where it stated that women were "fully eligible" for the armed service rehabilitation benefits and opportunities, and claim confidently that:

if there is any other legislation that goes as far at abolishing sex discrimination and the granting of equal status to women, as does this Canadian legislation pertaining to ex-service women, I should be glad to have tell me of it.³⁶

And she was justified in making that claim. Ex-service women were equally eligible with ex-service men for the \$100 clothing allowance, the rehabilitation grant of 30-days pay and allowances, and the war service gratuity in the amount of \$7.50 for every 30 days of service in the western hemisphere and/or \$15.00 for every 30 days of service overseas. For help with buying a home, repairing a house, buying furniture, or starting up a business, female as well as male veterans could apply for "Re-establishment Credit", a sum of money which varied according to length and location of service. There was also to be no discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the benefits and opportunities available to veterans for university education, or vocational, technical or other non-university training. The Pension Act was specifically amended to apply also to female members of the armed forces and technically women were fully eligible for the benefits of the Veterans' Land Act, the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, and the Civil Service Act which provided for Preference for Veterans. Dr. Russell acknowledged one minor exception to all this equality of status and opportunity: the out-of-work benefits provided by the Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order were not available to a married ex-servicewoman whose husband was deemed capable of maintaining her.

There were, however, other sex-typed inequalities. As pensions were based on service pay and servicewomen's pay was only four-fifths that of servicemen's the pension rates payable to former members of the C.W.A.C., the R.C.A.F., W.D., or the W.R.C.N.S. were four-fifths of the standard pension schedules. Furthermore, the preference to be shown ex-service personnel in the Dominion Civil Service applied only to those who had seen active service overseas or on the high seas and thus placed women at a disadvantage, since only approximately 7,000 had been posted to overseas duty and none had seen service on seaborne vessels. Also the

Canadian Vocational Training programme which the Department of Labour set up for former war industrial workers as well as ex-service personnel, sex-biased its offering by emphasizing as specially suitable to women the courses for Household Employees and in Practical Nursing, and the one on Home Making and family living designed primarily for women who were married or intending to marry. Although Dr. Russel insisted that the emphasis on the importance of homemaking "must not be regarded as a reason for Counsellors or Rehabilitation boards to exert pressure on women to take such courses, nor be used as grounds for refusing them other kinds of training or opportunities suited to their individual capabilities, skills, and interests", the few women eventually appointed as V.A. counsellors in Rehabilitation Centres could hardly have stemmed the return to domesticity and the conventionally feminine of the post-war world.³⁷

Within these limitations, however, ex-servicewomen would appear to have made as much use of rehabilitation benefits as possible. Of the almost 50,000 former members of the women's services, more than 25% took advantage of the training and education benefits, a higher ratio than that of male veterans. Over ten thousand availed themselves of vocational training or high-school courses to prepare for university or to meet educational requirements for jobs. More than 2,600 enrolled in university, with what Dr. Russell regarded as "encouragingly large groups in Public Health, Social Service and Education."³⁸ Whether they were guided by counsellors or were exercising free choice, fully 85% of those taking vocational training chose the following top five out of the 91 occupations for which courses were available: commercial (which included training for work as secretaries, stenotypists, clerks and office machine operators); dressmaking; hairdressing (or "Beautician" work); nursing; and prematriculation. A good half chose to be trained for one of the jobs under the heading "commercial", and more trained as "beauty operators" than the market could easily absorb. In 1945, 16,000 were already listed as married which may account for the fact that as of March 31, 1950 less than 3% of female as compared with 15% of male veterans had drawn on the out-of-work allowances. Also 88% of the \$6,250,000 in re-establishment credits claimed by women veterans went for home furnishings and equipment, which was evidence to the Deputy Minister of Veterans' Affairs that ex-servicewomen were "fulfilling their function as home makers".³⁹

Under the Veterans' Land Act it was possible to get generous long-term financial assistance in buying a farm or rural or semi-rural small holding. But ex-service personnel had to qualify, and it was assumed that not many women

would. For buying a farm, one had to have had practical experience in farming or be willing to prove real interest and suitability by working with a farmer until the administrators of the Act were convinced. It was slightly easier to qualify for assistance in purchasing a small lot of land from one to three acres on the outskirts of a city, town or village, as all that was needed was proof of a permanent job and the intention of settling down. The loan for a small holding was thus regarded as more accessible to women who might want a house and garden of their own and who could prove that they were capable of assuming two-thirds of the cost. Relatively few women, in the final analysis, benefited under the Veteran's Land Act, to be exact only 147 as of the early 1950's, 107 of whom were married. One hundred and one of the total had qualified for small holdings, and only 46 for farms.⁴⁰

* * *

Although the creation of the women's services was heralded at the time as a history-making event, women's entry into the armed forces of Canada during the Second World War had a less revolutionary effect on gender relations than might have been expected. Women who joined the R.C.A.F. (W.D.), C.W.A.C., or W.R.C.N.S. were understandably impressed by the novelty of the enterprise and deservedly proud of their service to Canada's war effort. But scrutinized closely, in retrospect, one can see that women's admission into the military service was cautious and carefully circumscribed.

The caution and circumscription were dictated as much by the larger society as by the military men's interest in preserving a male monopoly of key posts in the services and their conviction that fighting, the ultimate purpose of the army, navy, and air force, could be carried on only by men. Women as well as men both inside and outside the forces were wary of challenges to the established division of labour by sex and the patriarchal hierarchy of authority. There is evidence of a fear that servicewomen would lose their femininity and the "whispering campaign" which imputed promiscuity to servicewomen fed on irrational resentment of women's incursion into a once all-male sphere.

The paramount purpose of the women's services remained throughout to supply a pool of subordinate labour under military discipline as replacements for men needed for more important duties. The subordination of women in the civilian labour market carried over into the military employment of women: the concentration of women in jobs drawing lower pay, requiring less skill, and involving less

exercise of authority or control. Only servicewomen's lower pay and benefits were contested by organized protest, with some positive effect. No protest was mounted against the assignment of the vast majority of women in uniform to subordinate service jobs identified as women's work in civilian life. On the contrary, the fact that women were needed by the military principally to do "women's work" had facilitated acceptance of the idea of women's corps in the first place and was later used to make female enlistment palatable to a dubious public.

The assurance that servicewomen were needed mainly as clerks and cooks also meant that they were not needed for combatant duties. The largest proportion of men in the forces in the Second World War also served safely in support and rear echelon positions. They, however, whether holding down a desk job or driving a supply truck, had all been put through training in combat duty and the bearing and firing of arms. Servicewomen could take up rifle shooting and target practice with small arms only as a recreational activity. Exclusion from combat duty and the official bearing of arms remained the most salient feature of women's military service during the Second World War, whether in the R.C.A.F. (W.D.), the C.W.A.C., or the W.R.C.N.S.

The armed might of the military is not wielded by the rank and file but by the high military command. The ordinary infantryman, sailor or airman is not by virtue of his bearing arms in a position of power within the forces. On the contrary, he is in a position to be used as cannon fodder by the high command, who do exercise the power and whose power consists in the aggregate of men and material at their disposal. Members of the women's services were exempted from use as cannon fodder. That exemption was protective in intent. The taking of life was seen as incompatible with woman's role as bearer of life. Women were protected from having to kill in combat and, on the whole, Canadian servicewomen were protected from being killed in combat.

But they were not protected from the risks of exposure to V.D. as effectively as the men were. And while the educational component of the V.D. control programme for men stressed their need for protection against infected and predatory women, the equivalent for women contained no mention of women's needing protection against sexually demanding, aggressive, or overpowering men.

Furthermore, the protective exemption of women from combat precluded the rise of female officers to positions of high command in the military services as a whole. Moreover, arms bearing duty, despite the risk of maiming and death it

carries, bestows authority and an aura of power on the officially armed over the officially unarmed. Hence, the wholesale exclusion of women from arms bearing meant the retention of an at least symbolic authority and power by the male sex as a whole over the female sex as a whole as well as the preservation of a male monopoly on the armed might of the state.

Finally, while the rehabilitation programme for ex-service personnel was advertised as perfectly egalitarian, inequalities were built into it which stemmed from society's classification of wives as dependent. And as reflected in the servicewomen's decision on how to spend their "Re-establishment Credit" or use their educational benefit, one can see the pressures of the post-war society at work channeling women into homemaking or the service sector of the paid labour force. Meanwhile, the military services returned to being all-male institutions (with the exception of nursing sisters) and the waging of war had remained an exclusively male activity throughout.

Footnotes

1. See G.W.L. Nicholson, Canada's Nursing Sisters (Toronto: Samuel Steven, Hakkert & Co., 1975), pp. 18-47.
2. See Ontario and the First World War 1914-1918: A Collection of Documents, edited with an introduction by Barbara M. Wilson, the Champlain Society for the Government of Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. lxxxvi-lxxxviii.
3. Unless otherwise cited, documentation for the following discussion of women's paramilitary groups and the Canadian Women's Army Corps during the Second World War can be found in Ruth Roach Pierson, "'Jill Canuck': CWAC of All Trades, But No 'Pistol Packing Momma'," Historical Papers/Communications Historiques, 1978, pp. 106-133.
4. Letter of 19 Nov. 1941 to J.T. Thorson, Minister of National War Services, from Esther R. Hewett, Deputy Controller and Provincial Adjutant, Alberta Women's Service Corps, DH, DND, 951.059 (D16).
5. Letter of 19 June 1941 to J.T. Thorson, Minister of National War Services, from Gloria Queen-Hughes, Officer Commanding, Women's Auxiliary Corps, Winnipeg, Manitoba, DH, DND, 951.059 (D16).

6. "'Manpower' Problems of the Women's Services During the Second World War", Report No. 68, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, by J.M. Hitsman, 17 June 1954, DH, DND, AHQ Rpt. (D68), hereafter cited as the Hitsman Report.
7. Confidential Letter of 29 April 1941 from Secretary to the Cabinet War Committee to the Associate Deputy Minister, Dept. of National War Services, PAC, RG 44, Vol. 33, Women's Voluntary Services General, Vol. 1.
8. Hitsman Report, p.5.
9. Interview with Beryl Eileen Beeson (Steel), W12005, M.D. 12, 8 November 1979, in Edmonton, Alberta.
10. National Selective Service Conference re Recruitment of Servicewomen, 15, 16, 17 February 1943, PAC, RG 24, Reel No. C-5322, file HQS 9011-11-5.
11. Hitsman Report, p.6.
12. Mary Ziegler, We Serve That Men May Fly: The Story of the Women's Division Royal Canadian Air Force (Hamilton, Ontario: R.C.A.F.(W.D.) Association, 1973), pp. 53, 68-69.
13. Letter of 18 November 1941 to J.T. Thorson, Minister of National War Services, from Allison Armstrong, Officer Commanding, Winnipeg Women's Auxiliary Corps, DH, DND, 951.059 (D16).
14. For a discussion of these reports, see Ruth Roach Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women: The Canadian Women's Army Corps in World War II," Atlantis: A Women's Studies Journal, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1979 - Part II: CRIAW Issue), pp. 245-266.
15. See above, footnote 10.
16. Ziegler, p. 50.
17. Memo of 4 December 1942 to D.A.G.(C) from H.H. Sunley, DAR 2nd, PAC, RG 24, Reel No. C-5303, file HQS 8984-2.
18. Godfrey Winn, "Through Fair Weather and Foul, Britain's... Women Ferry Pilots Fly that Men May Fight," Saturday Night, Vol. 58, 28 November 1942, pp. 4-5; D.K. Findlay, "Anywhere to Anywhere," Maclean's Magazine, 15 April 1943, pp. 12-13, 57, 61.

19. Ziegler, pp. 66-67.
20. Information for the Use of Women Who Wish to Apply for Enrolment as Full-Time Auxiliaries in the Canadian Armed Forces (Ottawa: King's Printer, August 1941), copy at DH, DND, 951.059 (D16).
21. Hitsman Report, pp. 6-7.
22. "Reasons applicants have given for not being interested in enlistment", n.d., but presumably late 1942 or early 1943, PAC, RG 27, Vol. 1523, file no. 21-16, part 1.
23. Minutes of Conference of District C.W.A.C. Officers, 18, 19, 20 April 1944, Appendix 29, C.W.A.C. Preliminary History DH, DND, 113,3C1 (D1).
24. "Recommendations For An Advertising and Promotion Campaign to Stimulate French Canadian Enlistment in the Canadian Women's Army Corps", submitted 2 February 1945 to Colonel Mary Dover, Assistant Director of Recruiting, NDHQ, from Hector Fontaine, Advertising Agencies of Canada, War Finance Advertising Group, DH, DND PARC, Box 4824, S-2730 -- 1/15, vol. 1.
25. Confidential communication of 9 February 1945 to District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 13, Calgary, Alta., D.O.C., M.D. No. 10, Winnipeg, Man., D.O.C., M.D. No. 6, Halifax, Nova Scotia, from Brigadier A.C. Spencer, A/Adjutant-General, PAC, RG 24, Reel No. C-5296, file HQC 8972. For further discussion of the "whispering campaign", see Ruth Roach Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women", loc. cit.
26. Hitsman Report, p. 14.
27. "Immorality of Service Women", Wartime Information Board -- Reports Branch, confidential memorandum, 19 March 1943, DH, DND, PARC, Box 4824, S-2730 -- 1/15, vol. 1.
28. Hitsman Report, pp. 12-13.
29. Collection of 40 postal intercepts dissuading women from joining the services and/or from volunteering for overseas service, attached to memorandum of 17 August 1943, DH, DND, PARC, Box 4824, S-2730 -- 1/15, vol. 1.

30. For documentation for this discussion of the V.D. control programme in the C.W.A.C., see Ruth Roach Pierson, "The Double Bind of the Double Standard: VD Control and the CWAC in World War II," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 31-58.
31. Hitsman Report, p. 6.
32. Interview with Margaret Eaton Dunn, London, England, 9 May 1978.
33. Memorandum of 21 Oct. 1945 to Adjutant General from H.D. Graham, Brigadier, DGA(A); Memo. of 24 Oct. 1945 to DAG(A) from Colonel M.C. Eaton, DG/CWAC; Memo. of 30 Oct. 1945 to DAG(A) from Lt. Col. D.I. Royal, DD/CWAC; Memo. of 19 Jan. 1946 to D. Org., through S.O., C.W.A.C., from J.R.R. Gough, Brigadier, D.A.G.(B), PAC, RG 24, Reel No. C-5257, file HQC 8684-4.
34. Letter of 12 Oct. 1946 to Headquarters, Western Command, from Lieutenant-General, Chief of the General Staff; letter of 18 Oct. 1946 to the Secretary, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, from F.P. Worthington, Major-General, GOC, Western Command, H.Q., Western Command, Edmonton, PAC, RG 24, Reel No. C-5302, file HQS 8984.
35. "Rehabilitation of Persons from the Armed Forces with Special Reference to Ex-Service Women," Address to the Business and Professional Women's Club, Ottawa, 13 March 1945, by Olive Ruth Russel, Executive Assistant, Rehabilitation Branch Department of Veterans' Affairs, PAC, MG 31, K13, Vol. 1.
36. Ibid.
37. Letter of 9 July 1945 from Olive Ruth Russell to Mr. J. Andrew, Rehabilitation Information Committee, Wartime Information Board, Ottawa, PAC, MG 31, K 13, Vol 1.
38. Women's Rehabilitation Annual Report 1946-47, Draft prepared by Dr. Olive Ruth Russell, PAC, MG 31, K13, Vol. 1.
39. Walter Sainsbury Woods, "Chapter 15: Women's Rehabilitation," Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation): Being a History of the Development and Carrying Out of a Plan for the Re-establishment of a Million Young Veterans of World War II by the Department of Veterans' Affairs and its Predecessor the Department of Pensions and National Health (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953), pp. 254-256.
40. Ibid., pp. 256-257.

FROM WORLD WAR TO LIMITED WAR: CANADIAN-AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION FOR DEFENCE

[Lawrence R. Aronsen]

In both world wars, a considerable part of Canada's war effort was channelled into creating the industrial capacity to produce shells, aircraft and other munitions of war. In turn, munitions production for her major allies helped a debtor nation finance a major military effort and to emerge from two world wars in a more healthy, if economically dependent, position than most major belligerents.

Larry Aronsen has explored Canadian industrial mobilization during both the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War, opening areas of research which have generally been neglected by Canadian economic historians and political scientists. He examines how far a Canadian "military-industrial complex" emerged from the defence expenditures of a crucial period in Canadian economic development and how far it differed, as befitted a junior ally and a branch-plant economy, from its American model.

For Canadians living in the 20th century, war has set in motion a host of contradictory phenomena, developing through what appears to be a dialectical process. State intervention has increased in an economic system purportedly based on laissez-faire principles. A new sense of Canadian identity and national purpose has emerged, yet divisive regional, ethnic, and class forces have been unleashed. Diversification and extensive industrialization strengthened the economy, but increased the dependency on a foreign economic power. Canada participated in two wars as a member of the British Commonwealth, but the result was to hasten continental integration with the United States.¹

Central to the developing Canadian-American relationship in the twentieth century, in fact, is the growing complexity of military and economic ties, especially the efforts made to coordinate the economies of each country for defence production. This chapter, therefore, will examine in some detail the organizational framework created to integrate the North American industrial defence sector, the

economic and strategic factors that underlay its evolution, and the overall impact on continental ties through trade and investment. Chronologically, the focus will be on the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. Such an undertaking bears upon the study of modern warfare on the one hand, and Canadian-American economic relations on the other.

To date much of the writing on war and the factors which make for military strength has emphasized the training of armed forces, skill and use of weapons, communications, sheer numbers, circumstances, and strategic/tactical considerations.² The organizational aspects of defence with particular reference to industrial mobilization have not been extensively dealt with.³ Although it is difficult to measure precisely, the industrial capacity of the victorious allies and their ability to collectively mobilize it for war production was a contributing factor to the outcome of the First World War, a decisive factor during the Second World War, and possibly a deterrent preventing limited war from escalating into total war after 1945.⁴

Then again, as table I and II suggest, wartime conditions encouraged expanded trade relations and to a lesser extent facilitated additional capital investment in what has been described as the "Northern Frontier."⁵ Canadian-American economic integration has been explained as a function of geographic proximity, complementary economic systems, tariff policy, and similar cultural and political traditions.⁶ It is also a function of war. War brought changes that generally weakened the British connection. Canada's Conservative Prime Minister Robert Borden abrogated reciprocity in 1911, but under his government imports from the United States were five times higher by 1918.⁷ The Liberal government rejected Customs Union in 1948, but by 1952 Business Week observed that Canada and the United States were "one economic unit" and businessmen and politicians "act as if there weren't any border at all."⁸

Although the Canadian Government was concerned about the mounting international crisis in the latter part of the 1930's, there was no substantive effort made to mobilize Canadian industry for defence production until 1940. In 1937 Canada received a small order to produce airframes for Great Britain and in 1938 the John Inglis company of Toronto received a contract to build 5,000 Bren Guns. Other military-related equipment produced included wireless sets, anti-gas respirators, and some military vehicles. But the arms industry would remain insufficient in size and diversity owing to the limited requirements of the Canadian military, and the lack of long term war contracts with Britain. Moreover, to

produce a wide variety of war equipment Canada would have needed to import many of the materials from the United States, something that was restricted under the Neutrality Acts until 1939. Finally, the state of "phoney war" from the Fall of 1939 to the Spring of 1940 suggested all out mobilization might not be necessary after all.⁹

Across the border the Roosevelt Administration recognized the importance of preparing American industry for war as early as 1938, but domestic isolationist pressures and the reluctance of business to retool restricted any attempts at comprehensive planning. The government did, however, create a basic institutional framework that would lay the groundwork for the wartime economy of the national security state. Thus in 1939 the War Resources Administration was created followed by the National Defense Advisory Commission in 1940, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply in 1941.¹⁰ After considerable debate Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act in the Spring of 1941, and at the end of the summer that year Churchill and Roosevelt met off the coast of Newfoundland to outline the goals of the Atlantic Charter. The stage was being set for hitherto unparalleled developments in Canadian-American industrial mobilization for defence. They would produce one of the most successful efforts in the history of wartime relations between allies.

The fall of France, the humiliating retreat of the allied forces from Dunkirk, and the growing fear that Germany was planning campaigns directed against North America had provided the background to the first pillar in the structure of the Canadian-American relationship. In August 1940, at an historic meeting in Ogdensburg, a small town in upstate New York, President Roosevelt suggested to Prime Minister Mackenzie King that the two countries begin immediately to coordinate their defence policy on a continental basis. King agreed to the proposal and after some difficult negotiations the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) came into being.¹¹

It was also at this period, which marked the height of the massive Luftwaffe bombing attacks on British industries, that Commonwealth war planners decided to concentrate more defence production in Canada. Thus began a massive industrial mobilization in Canada, and for this the country had to rely at first on the United States for production technology, organizational expertise, and the import of a wide variety of defence related commodities. In 1940, therefore, Canada imported \$744 million in goods from the United States, exporting only \$451 million, thereby precipitating a severe drain on the country's gold and dollar reserves. The

balance of payments problem was further complicated when Great Britain late in 1939 imposed currency controls on convertibility, making it impossible for Canada to exchange its surplus pounds into American dollars. This of course interrupted the long term historical pattern in which Canada had always exported more to Britain and converted the pounds to dollars to make up for the unfavourable trade balance with the United States.¹² The solution to these problems was to become the economic counter-part of the Ogdensburg Agreement.

The beginning of a continental approach to defence production was formally announced in April 1941 when Roosevelt and Mackenzie King issued the Hyde Park declaration. Both leaders agreed on the general principle that in mobilizing the resources of the North American continent for local and hemisphere defence and for continuing the assistance to Great Britain and the other allies, the United States and Canada were to provide each other with the defence articles which each was "best able to produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programs should be coordinated to this end."¹³ In the first year, the agreement provided for \$200 to \$300 million of commodities to be exported to the United States, which was to be expanded as the war progressed. Between 1940 and 1945 the total sales of war equipment and supplies between Canada and the United States amounted to nearly \$5 billion, and in the last year of the war Canada actually exported more to its neighbour than it imported. This trade surplus, the first one in the twentieth century, underscored the benefits of economic continentalism, a lesson not lost in the minds of postwar economic planners.

The organizational machinery designed to coordinate industrial production dates back to an early meeting of the PJBD when it was agreed that a Joint Economic Committee (JEC) would be created to draft plans and proposals to coordinate the expanding industrial programs in each country. From its inception in June 1941 the JEC was primarily a policy planning agency lacking in executive power.¹⁴ Its function was twofold: to study and advise on more effective wartime economic coordination and to recommend steps that would lessen the impact of reconversion of the wartime economy after the hostilities had ended. The Committee's work in the latter area was negligible since other departments quickly came to assume the responsibility for postwar reconversion planning. Of greater significance were the early plans drawn up for industrial mobilization to prevent the dislocation and waste of manpower, materials, and duplication of effort in production capacity. For example, at the

beginning of the war Canada undertook to produce several types of combat planes and two types of tanks. These items were produced more efficiently in the United States and at the second meeting of the JEC in August 1941 it was decided that Canada would for the next year concentrate its production on training aircraft, Bren gun carriers, and machine guns for export to the European allies as well as to the United States.¹⁵ The JEC also aided in the coordination of policy in the area of export control, transportation, and manpower allocation. As the two economies began to mesh their gears, more specialized agencies with executive functions were needed to oversee the complicated division of production in North America. Consequently most of the JEC's formal work came to an end late in 1942.¹⁶

An early report of the PJBD recommended that before Canadian and American defence production could proceed on a "rational basis" it was necessary to assess the supply of strategic materials, where they were located and in what quantity, and how they should be allocated. Such a task could only be undertaken by an organization with executive powers in order to implement the proposals and plans of the PJBD without going through existing political and bureaucratic channels. Created in May 1941, the Materials Coordinating Committee (MCC) operated on the assumption that North America be considered "one continental pool" for strategic materials.¹⁷ Almost immediately after its inception the MCC arranged for a contract between the Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd., and the Metals Reserve Company, providing for the delivery to the United States of 170,000 tons of aluminum. To facilitate the transaction the Federal Loan Agency made a capital advance to the American government agency which was part of the larger policy to pay cash where possible for the purchase of Canadian materials. The Canadians for their part filled the order promptly. When American members of the MCC reported a nickel shortage arrangements were made to expand Canadian production of the metal by some 36 million pounds over the following two years. Similar agreements were made for lead and zinc while Canadian officials benefited through MCC planning by receiving increased quotas for the import of oil and coal.¹⁸

The next stage in the coordination of North American War production was the creation of the Joint Defence Production Committee, later renamed the Joint War Production Committee (JWPC). The expectation that Britain's industrial plants would continue to be heavily bombed proved exaggerated by the end of 1941. This left Canada with excess capacity for the production of some types of ammunition and equipment such as .303/.300 gauge shells and Bren gun carriers that

could be used by Canada, Britain, and the United States. This, in addition to the "dollar gap" problem, underlay Canada's interest in institutionalizing continental industrial production. As for the United States, its de facto involvement in the European war, and the agreement at Hyde Park to provide some Lend Lease money for the purchase of Canadian equipment used by Britain, were the factors behind that country's interest in continental industrial integration. Thus in November 1941 after a series of meetings between key defence production officials in the spring and summer of that year, the JWPC came into existence and had its first meeting a week after the bombing of Pearl Harbour.¹⁹

Having similar executive powers as the MCC, the JWPC was a policymaking body which, according to Canada's Minister of Munitions & Supply, C.D. Howe, had the general function of maximizing war production in the shortest possible time "irrespective of national boundaries."²⁰ As the war progressed the executive committee of the JWPC met less frequently. After 1942 overall policy more and more came to be coordinated within the framework of the Combined Production and Resources Board (Canada, the United States and Great Britain) as well as the American War Production Board and the Canadian Department of Munitions & Supply.²¹ Most of the subcommittees organized along specialized industrial lines.

Not having a counterpart during the First World War, the creation of these sub-committees was a major new advance in continental integration. Secret technical information was exchanged for the first time as part of the extensive planning to avoid duplication and to accelerate production. Where possible standardization was encouraged to make possible the exchange of component parts for assembly. The coordination of transportation (railway and St. Lawrence River shipping) handled in collaboration with the MCC helped to remove bottlenecks, thereby quickening the exchange of supplies and avoiding production delays. The effectiveness of the JWPC was augmented by the elimination of tariffs, import duties, and customs on war related materials crossing the border. This in turn wiped out a longstanding historical barrier between the two countries. Through a series of broad Orders in Council, Canada permitted entry, free of duty and taxes, for practically all war production goods purchased by the Department of Munitions and Supply and related agencies. For its part, the United States, under the provision of an Executive order, suspended tariff barriers on all supplies imported by government departments. Not surprisingly, trade

expanded greatly (See Table I) and the effect of these war-time agreements contrasted sharply with the economic nationalism manifested in Canada's rejection of Reciprocity in 1911, the United State's imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, and the 1934, "Buy America Act."²²

It was through the organizational framework of the JWPC Aircraft subcommittee and the rapidly growing transnational corporate infrastructure (Boeing and Fairchild) that the North American aircraft industry was able to maximize its production capacity.²³ As the statistics for the aircraft industry in Table III suggest, the results were not short of spectacular. In short, the continental integration of the industry allowed for extensive technology transfer, standardization, and the implementation of a "rational" division of production.

Canada originally had plans to produce all components for its aircraft industry, but within a year of America's entry into the war the Joint War Production officials decided that Canada would concentrate on making airframes and import most of the engines from the United States, thereby making a great saving in the use of machine tools and equipment. On the other hand, Canada would supplement its neighbour's shortages of aluminum parts, propellers and the manufacture of specific types of airframes; e.g. the Curtis dive bomber and the Consolidated PBY5 flying boat. This production formula enabled Canada to reduce its initial aircraft manufacturing program of fifteen separate types of airplanes to seven, thereby allowing full play of economies of scale and uniform production runs. For example, early in the war Canada produced four different types of Anson training aircraft, but the JWPC cut the production to one model, using Canadian airframes and American engines. This formula proved to be so successful that it was later adopted after the Second World War in the F-86 fighter program.²⁴

In contrast to the JWPC aircraft sub-committee, the tasks of the JWPC tank-automotive sub-committee were much less complicated. Given the fact that production was undertaken primarily by American subsidiaries (2/3 of all contracts were let to Ford and General Motors), it was possible to take full advantage of the parent companies technological and managerial expertise, not to mention the time saved by the coordination of production schedules on both sides of the border.²⁵ Another advantage of the automotive industry was the production of fewer types of models and the vehicles that were produced could, with minor changes like installation of right-hand drive, be distributed to the Commonwealth forces.

When the United States began to mobilize its own auto industry in 1942, the JWPC implemented guidelines whereby Canadian manufacturers, which were really American subsidiaries, would be given equal priority in the allocation of materials such as steel and rubber. So efficient was the joint mobilization the major problem of the JWPC came to encounter was how to deal with the excess capacity that was generated. In early 1943 it became apparent to joint industrial mobilization planners that there would be surplus of medium sized tanks produced in the United States. Consequently, an earlier order of 1,300 of these tanks placed in Canada was cancelled. The JWPC tank-automotive sub-committee immediately made arrangements to absorb the loss of this order by providing for the Canadian shipment of 300 self-propelled gun mounts.²⁶

The need to equip the quickly expanding Allied armies and to re-equip the British Army after Dunkirk brought about the almost instantaneous development of the Canadian arms production program.²⁷ With the entry of the United States into the war armament production was complicated by new demands for increased capacity and export to a country using slightly different weapons systems. To coordinate armament production in response to American requirements necessitated use of a variety of JWPC sub-committees; tank-automotive, small arms and ammunition and artillery. Starting with the assumption that, where possible, existing Canadian plant capacity would be expanded, production planners eliminated the need for the establishment of new plants in the United States. The sub-committee also decided what arms they would produce, in what quantity and how they would be distributed among the Commonwealth countries, the United States and the other allies. Canada was to produce essentially two kinds of weapons systems but, where possible, to concentrate production on common types such as the Bren gun, certain anti-aircraft guns, and small calibre ammunition. To avoid duplication of effort, specialization was adopted, and this policy was most effective in the export of weapons to the United States that were eventually shipped to Great Britain under lend-lease provisions. The pattern that emerged was that the United States would receive about 30 percent, the Commonwealth countries and other allies 55 percent, and the Canadian Forces about 15 percent of production. To expand Canadian capacity, arrangements were also made through the sub-committees to import more American machinery and machine tooling equipment which could be used to produce two types of munitions.

Some production bottlenecks were to develop in the first year particularly in the area of material supply. Working in close collaboration with the MCC, the sub-committees made arrangements to ensure an adequate supply of critical materials such as aluminum, copper, lead and zinc to the Canadian industries.²⁸ By 1943 most problems had been ironed out and Canada found itself in the interesting position of producing arms with American machinery, transporting them across the Atlantic in American designed ships built in Montreal, protected en route by British aircraft equipped with American engines, assembled by an American company in Toronto or Vancouver.

After resolving the early problems of materials shortages, production bottlenecks, and export markets, the Canadian-American experiment in joint industrial mobilization worked much better than was originally thought possible. After a year of cooperation, the output of both countries exceeded that of the total war production of the Axis countries by one and a half times.²⁹ Although the Combined Production Boards, which coordinated the programs of Great Britain and the United States and later included Canada, were impressive in their own right, the Canadian-American relationship was unprecedented and unequalled among all the belligerents (Axis and Allied) during the Second World War.³⁰ The massive technology transfer through the expansion of American subsidiaries and organizations such as the JWPC were an important contributing factor to the most rapid industrial expansion in Canada's history. The financial arrangements made at Hyde Park quickly resolved the pressing balance of payments problem and in 1945, as previously noted, for the first time in the twentieth century Canada exported more to the United States than it imported. Most importantly, the economic integration which made Canada precariously dependent on the United States did not require any significant political concessions. Based on this remarkable wartime record Canadian planners after the war concluded that economic continentalism would not compromise political sovereignty and this became a central assumption in formulating postwar economic development policy.³¹ Similarly, American businessmen and political leaders would agree with Dean Acheson's assessment of the wartime experience that because of the "magnitude and success of our wartime economic relations" with Canada, they were of the "utmost importance in the postwar period."³²

From 1945 to 1949 the military and economic relations of the North Atlantic triangle countries (Canada, the United States, and Britain) evolved into a broader multilateral framework through the creation of the International Monetary

Fund (Bretton Woods, 1944), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (Geneva, 1947) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels, 1949). At the same time the bilateral continental integration of Canada and the United States during the Second World War continued at an accelerated rate. In May of 1945 an agreement was reached whereby "the general principles underlying the Hyde Park declaration (should) be continued on a fully reciprocal basis for the remainder of the war and the same spirit of cooperation between the two countries should characterize their treatment of reconversion and other problems of mutual concern as the transition to peacetime economy progresses."³³ Despite the fact that no organizations were created to coordinate the demobilization and reconversion of the North American economy, Canadian and American officials made a concerted effort to avoid any serious disruptions in their economic relations. It was a significant contrast to the indifference of the post First World War period.

The joint commitment to economic continentalism was quickly put to a test in 1947/1948 when Canada, faced with a severe drain of its gold and dollar reserves, considered negotiating a new bilateral trade agreement going far beyond the 1935 and 1938 agreements. After preliminary negotiations with Washington officials, a Customs Union as well as a less comprehensive trade agreement were eventually rejected. As an alternative, Canada imposed some restrictions on currency conversion, erected temporary import quotas, and requested a \$300 million loan from the United States. Instead of retaliating, as it likely would have after the First World War, the United States granted the loan, agreed to import more Canadian strategic materials, and made provision for the use of Marshall Plan money for the "off-shore" purchase of wheat and other products. The special consideration Canada received has been referred to as "exemptionalism" and can be viewed as evidence of the willingness to continue the "spirit of Hyde Park." It also reflected the growing need for the Dominion's resources, the concern that an imprudent foreign economic policy could adversely affect the rapidly expanding branch plants and subsidiaries, and the strategic value of the north in relation of American national security.³⁴

The postwar demobilization and reconversion to a civilian economy obviated the need for joint planning and coordination of defence production until the onset of the Cold War in 1947. From the perspective of Canadian and American defence planners the nature of technological war, the failure of the Great Powers to create mechanisms in the United Nations to provide adequate security, and the growing suspiciousness of Soviet intentions, would at least require

that the two countries maintain a level of military preparedness from 1945 on. Before the NATO treaty of 1949 was signed, there was a level of cooperative defence planning that, according to Canada's Defence Minister, Brooke Claxton, "went much further than has ever been (publicly) divulged."³⁵ At the end of 1945 Canadian and American representatives to the PJBD proposed to continue the functioning of the wartime board. During the war the two countries agreed not to pass information on to the Soviet Union regarding the atomic bomb (Manhattan project), and in December of 1945 they broadened the agreement to include all technical and intelligence information related to defence matters.³⁶ Most importantly, the two countries approved the continuation of planning and coordination of their armed forces for the defence of the northern half of the western hemisphere. It was for this purpose that the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was created in May of 1946.³⁷

The planning conducted by the MCC addressed the problem of how to absorb the shock of a Soviet conquest of Britain and continental Europe (The Black Plan). Attention was also paid to continental defence. Provisions were made for the exchange of personnel, defence research information, and the reciprocal use of military facilities. The continental defence plan during World War Two, ABC 22, was updated and joint military manoeuvres in the Canadian north were carried out. As early as 1947 a plan was proposed for a ring of early warning stations across the Arctic which eventually came to fruition under the NORAD agreement of 1957. The need for these precautionary measures was further justified on the basis of political and strategic intelligence reports which reached Washington and Ottawa in 1947 and 1948 suggesting that, while the Soviet Union was not prepared for total war, there was a grave danger that conflict could erupt from miscalculation or as one Canadian report noted "short-sighted diplomacy."³⁸

The intensification of the Cold War and the pressing dollar gap crisis set the stage for the revival of joint industrial planning and eventual coordination of industrial production for defence. In 1949 the Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee (JIMPC) was created followed by a series of production agreements between 1950 and 1953. Based on their wartime experience military planners on both sides of the border shared the view of General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "a nation's economy is its ultimate strength."³⁹ One of the outstanding military facts of the postwar period, as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal pointed out, was "America's productive

capacity" supplemented by the resources and industrial capacity of its closest allies; countries such as Canada.⁴⁰ At the beginning of the Cold War North America again adopted the status of being the "arsenal of democracy" and it would, according to A.G.L. McNaughton, Chairman of the Canadian section of the PJBD, require the "intimate cooperation of not only air, land and sea defence, but in all aspects of industrial mobilization for defence -- manufacture of weapons, standardization, and resource development."⁴¹

The re-organization of the Canadian and American national security bureaucracies throughout 1947 and 1948 reflected the importance of industrial mobilization for defence. Under the National Security Act passed by the American Congress in 1947, provisions were made for the creation of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) and the United States Munitions Board (USMB).⁴² In Canada, the Cabinet Defence Committee recognized the need for an organization to collect data and formulate plans for the utilization of manpower, national resources, and industry in the event of a national emergency. Thus in April 1948, by Order in Council, the Industrial Defence Board came into existence.⁴³ The first overture that the two countries should collaborate in the initial stage of planning their industrial mobilization was made at a meeting of the PJBD in November 1947. The initiative was carried forward in April 1948 when the USMB contacted the Canadian government and arrangements were made for IDB officials to meet with their USMB and NSRB counterparts in Washington in June of that year. At a follow-up meeting in November, the foundation was laid for the creation of the JIMPC which was publicly announced in April of 1949.⁴⁴

Aside from the obvious benefits of coordinating industrial and resource production to add to the hemisphere's total military strength, there were specific economic and strategic factors. For Canadian officials there was the possibility of obtaining expanded markets in the United States to offset the deficiency of American dollars in 1947/1948. Moreover, as a Cabinet Defence Committee memo noted there was the problem of surplus industrial capacity. "This characteristic -- a great capacity and a small requirement -- makes it impossible for us to be self-contained in our planning. We cannot base our planning, as most countries do, on the requirements of the Services, because our Services need so little in most lines in relation to our capacity that we would not be justified in setting up production."⁴⁵ Of course American officials were sensitive to the Canadian dilemma, but in the end it was the need for Canadian strategic resources that drew their attention northward. The depletion

of certain key resources during World War II, the expanded civilian consumption after the war, and the beginning of the stockpiling program in 1946 underlay their interest in continental industrial mobilization for defence. Moreover, geographic proximity and Canadian political stability in a world increasingly marked by nationalist upheavals made the northern Dominion, in the words of a research report prepared for the Department of Defense, "almost as good emergency insurance as resource production in continental United States..."⁴⁶

At the first regular meeting of the JIMPC held in Washington in June of 1949 it was acknowledged that the word "Planning" would be added to the official title of the Committee. If a future crisis should arise (e.g. a Soviet invasion of Europe) the JIMPC would evolve into a Committee having executive powers similar to the JWPC of World War Two. Problems of an organizational nature were discussed, these being; the structure and function of the technical sub-committees, liaison with other governmental agencies, and the overall operating procedures. It was decided that the principal Committee was to be headed by two joint chairman, drawn from the following: (1) the chairman of the USMB; (2) the chairman of the NSRB; (3) the chairman of the IDB; and (4) the Canadian Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce. To be effective the Principal Committee was scheduled to meet twice a year (alternating between Ottawa and Washington) while the technical sub-committees would meet more frequently.⁴⁷ The sub-committees, like their counterparts in the JWPC were organized along industrial lines, the main ones being: Aircraft, Chemicals, Explosives & Synthetic Rubber, Combat vehicles, Communications & Electronics, Non Ferrous and Light Alloys, and Arms and Ammunition. Unlike the World War II sub-committees, they could not determine or initiate action having only the power to make recommendations through channels laid down in the respective governments.⁴⁸ In addition to the agencies responsible for industrial mobilization for defence in each country, the JIMPC worked closely with the PJBD and in some respects was viewed as an adjunct to it. Progress reports of the JIMPC were tabled at regular meetings of the PJBD and from time to time its officials were invited to attend meetings of the Board to discuss problems of an economic nature in relation to the overall defence needs of the continent. A PJBD report in May 1950 indicated that the lines of communication established with the JIMPC were "mutually advantageous" and that its work was being "satisfactorily carried out."⁴⁹

Although the organizational framework was established and executive officials in each country attached the highest priority to joint industrial mobilization cooperation, progress remained slow for a number of reasons. One of these was uncertainty as to the characteristics of some of the weapons that should be adopted as standard. A second was the reimposition of the Buy America Act requiring the armed forces of that country to procure their arms and equipment from American sources. A third was the natural reluctance of defence establishments to discard large stocks of useful equipment. With the updating of new weapons systems beginning in 1949 and the transfer of large quantities of Canadian equipment of British type design to Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and other NATO countries in 1950, the latter problem was relatively easily resolved.⁵⁰

As Canada began to update and modernize its military equipment and expand its production facilities two problems that proved to be of some intractability were: what type of weapons systems would be adopted by the Canadian forces, and what type of weapons would Canadian industry produce for export. The difficulties arose from a longstanding disagreement among the allies over the adoption of common types of weapons systems. A partial solution for Canadian arms manufacturers during World War II was to concentrate production on weapons that could be interchanged as easily as possible between the United States and Great Britain, but as the weapons became more complex this interchangeability became more and more difficult to achieve. The solution for Canadian industrial defence planners was to push for standardization of allied weapons systems, and failing this concentrate on the production of American designed equipment for export and adoption by its own forces. Some progress in the former was made in 1948 when the United States, Canada, and Great Britain negotiated a pact to adopt a common screw thread in all industrial production. "The standardization of screw threads may sound trivial" observed Canada's General McNaughton, "but it was one of the greatest things we ever did."⁵¹ During the Second World War much of Canada's equipment was built to British designs, but the source of supply for parts was the United States. This of course required redesigning of equipment at considerable cost. A common thread would bring considerable efficiency through reducing time lost waiting for spare parts and money would be saved by elimination of duplicate inventories of American and British nuts, bolts, and screws.⁵²

Unfortunately for Canadian industrial defence planners there was, with a few notable exceptions such as the F-86E jet fighter, little progress made in overall standardization of military equipment among the NATO allies. If NATO

equipment was to be partially standardized it would be either American made or of American design. The direction for the Canadian arms industry was obvious. Given Britain's postwar military decline there was little opportunity for export to that traditional market. From 1950 to 1954 Canada would export nearly three times as much military equipment to the United States in contrast to World War II when it exported nearly one and a half times more to Britain than its southern neighbour.⁵³ Another notable change was that after 1949 the Canadian forces adapted to an unprecedented extent a wide range of American designed equipment from small calibre field weapons to advanced aircraft.⁵⁴

To re-equip and expand its armed forces, Canada in 1949 and 1950 would have to import about five times as many arms as it would export to the United States.⁵⁵ Although the 1947/48 balance of payments crisis was at last resolved in 1950 by way of off-shore purchases using Marshall Plan dollars, American investment, and raw materials purchases for the stockpiling program and civilian industries, Canadian officials feared that problems would soon arise again if the United States did not buy more military equipment manufactured in Canada. Furthermore, given the potential excess capacity of the Canadian arms manufacturing sector, it was necessary for the United States to increase defence procurement from its northern neighbour.⁵⁶ The solution from the Canadian perspective was to ask the Truman Administration to rescind the "Buy America Act" on the import of defence items as it did during the Second World War. American officials in the NSRB, the USMB, and the White House were sympathetic to the Canadian requests for expanded imports, but the focal point of resistance was the Congress. To overcome this problem, the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent and his Defence Minister, Brooke Claxton, made a series of speeches in the United States emphasizing that in order for both countries to reach full industrial defence production to meet the widening Communist threat, Congress would have to repeal or modify the aforesaid "Buy America Act."⁵⁷ It was also anticipated the JIMPC would eventually acquire executive powers to coordinate defence production by establishing a division of labour and implementing quotas on the exchange of materials. Unlike the Second World War experience, their expectations would not be entirely realized.

Important as economic considerations were, at least from the Canadian view, the developments in Canadian-American industrial mobilization for defence from 1950 to 1953 have to be analysed in the context of what was perceived to be the greatest threat to national security and the best way to deal with it. In January of that year, the

National Security Council (NSC) released its much discussed report, NSC 68, to the Truman Administration. The NSC pointed out that a dramatic increase in military spending was necessary to deter the Soviet Union from further aggression and, if necessary, to engage in limited war to "compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives."⁵⁸ While NSC 68 provided an assessment of the general security requirements of the United States, the MCC, which by 1950 had become a separate joint defence planning organization, submitted to its assessment of the needs of North American continental defence. Two reports were completed in the Summer of 1950 (ACAI 9 & 10) indicating that, by 1951, the Soviet Union would have 25 to 45 atomic bombs, but would not have an adequate delivery system until 1952/53. Given Soviet intentions and its projected strategic capability, war, if it was to break out, would come in two to three years. Certain measures, noted the reports, should be taken immediately in preparation. The MCC recommended that both countries develop an early warning radar system in the north, install an adequate interception force, and update civil defence procedures, to deploy the necessary aircraft and electronic equipment, the two countries should also begin to coordinate their research and production in these areas.⁵⁹

According to North American defence planners, the decisive evidence that the Communist bloc had aggressive intentions and would use force to realize their goals came in June 1950 when the Korean peninsula erupted in civil war. Until then NSC 68 was a policy in search of an opportunity and its strongest proponents would agree with Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that "Korea came along and saved us."⁶⁰ As a result of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea defence preparations in both Canada and the United States were significantly accelerated and new agencies, organizations, and policies were established by each country. The "Buy America Act" was, to the disappointment of Canadian officials, not repealed, but the USMB under orders from the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, revised the regulations allowing Canada to export between \$15 million to \$25 million in arms to the United States.⁶¹ While a step in the right direction, Canadian officials viewed the gesture as being somewhat niggardly because at the time the American government's emergency defence appropriation totalled about \$10 billion, of which approximately \$6 billion was allocated for supplies.⁶² It did offer some hope that there would be greater procurement in the future and the Canadian government could at least begin making plans for its next stage in its postwar rearmament program, the creation of the Department of Defence Production in April of 1951.

In response to the crisis of the summer of 1950, the JIMPC met in August to map out a specific blueprint as a guide for the use of continental industrial and material resources for defence, to widen the field of common action in industrial preparedness, and to make provision for the free movement of munitions and essential supplies between the two countries. Based on the principles established under the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941, the Committee report was sent to President Truman and Prime Minister King in September and was finally ratified on October 26, 1950. The six principles codified in the agreement were as follows:

1. To gain an "optimum production" of defence materials, the two governments will coordinate their efforts for determining their joint requirements and carrying out their programs of production and procurement.
2. They will employ coordinated controls over the distribution of scarce raw materials and supplies.
3. Whatever emergency controls are found necessary for the joint effort will be designed and administered "to achieve comparable results in each country," with each government consulting the other before imposing such controls "to the extent possible".
4. Technical knowledge and productive skills shall be freely exchanged between the two countries "where feasible".
5. Trade barriers will be minimized.
6. The two governments will consult whenever financial or foreign exchange problems are created by the employment of any of the above principles.⁶³

All aspects of industrial defence production were covered in the above agreement except the production of atomic energy and the technical skills involved. Almost immediately after the signing, steps were taken to put the principles into practice.

There was a general consensus among Canadian and American planners that the six principles could be implemented within the existing organizational framework about to be created by the Department of Defence Production (DDP) in Canada and the USMB. The JIMPC, from its inception in 1949, had operated as a planning agency and it was agreed early in 1951 that the activities of the committee be suspended. Later that year, an effort was made to reactivate the JIMPC,

but it would never acquire executive powers to determine policy.⁶⁴ To further clarify trade in defence items, the DDP and the United States Department of Defense exchanged notes in February 1952.⁶⁵ Provisions were made to standardize procedures and policies for the procurement of military supplies in Canada by United States government departments. In addition to the imposition of profit limitations, the notes established that contracts placed in Canada would be through the Canadian Commercial Corporation which in turn placed contracts with specific industries.⁶⁶ These improvements in conjunction with the passage of the United States Mutual Security Act which raised from \$100 million to \$500 million as the amount available to finance defence contracts placed in foreign countries, together with the elimination of tariffs on defence sub-contracts allotted abroad, contributed to the substantial increase in value of American defence contracts in Canada from 1951 to 1954. (See Table IV)

Canadian and American Defence planners also concentrated their attention on the pricing, production, and allocation of raw materials. The basic assumption underlying policy in this area was stated by C.D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and Commerce: "With our joint resources and our combined industrial potential, we can build on this continent a strong North American economy that will be a bulwark against oppression in all its forms."⁶⁷ Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Stuart Symington, Director of the NSRB, asked Congress to expand the stockpiling program begun in 1946. In September of that year the Defence Production Act was passed under which \$500 million was appropriated, exceeding the total stockpiling expenditures over the last four and a half years. To satisfy the demand a number of measures were taken. Congress gave the Department of Defence the authority to import critical raw materials duty free and impose restrictions on domestic demand through the implementation of a priority system.⁶⁸

In a move to assess the state of international reserves and needs, Washington took the initiative to organize an International Materials Conference held in February and March of 1951.⁶⁹ Canada not only played an active role in this Conference but also began a series of bilateral discussions with the United States to coordinate a continental raw materials policy. In November of 1950, C.D. Howe announced that a new agreement was concluded with the United States under which controls would be instituted over the distribution of scarce strategic materials and supplies to assure an optimum production of goods essential to continental defence. Both countries coordinated the implementation of priority schedules for the allocation of materials and agreed

to give each other equal treatment under the program. They also agreed to restrict consumer credit and to curb the upward trend of residential construction to reduce the consumption of critical materials.⁷⁰

In July of 1951 a raw materials sub-committee under the reactivated JIMPC was created to coordinate pricing and the exchange of resources. American interests would be served through the stabilization of prices while Canada would benefit by getting a commitment to a guaranteed market. Both countries recognized that under conditions when their economies were already operating at full capacity because of the continued high postwar civilian demand, if a continental materials policy was not adopted they could be imperiled by uncontrolled inflation. It would result in "economic defeat" observed C.D. Howe, "which would be almost as disastrous as military defeat."⁷¹

Throughout the Korean War the JIMPC sub-committees' major function remained at the level of planning and coordinating defence production, having no executive powers. The limited nature of the war, the effectiveness of existing agencies and those created on an ad hoc basis, and the extensive control of the Canadian manufacturing sector by American companies precluded the need for more formal joint industrial organizations. It was through the transfer of capital, technology, and managerial expertise on a level even greater than the Second World War, that the American transnational companies made a substantial contribution to the Canadian industrial defence mobilization program. From 1945 to 1953 direct American investment in Canada expanded at an unprecedented rate in the history of the two countries; rising from \$2.3 billion to \$5.2 billion. (See Table II) A Department of Defence Production study indicated that of the fifteen top defence contractors from 1951 to 1958, eight were American companies operating in Canada.⁷² These companies were located in the key sectors of the Canadian economy; notably the aircraft, automobiles, chemicals, and electrical and electronic industries. By producing for the North American market and sales abroad under the Mutual Aid Act, the transnationals helped alleviate the run on dollar reserves in 1950/51. Dollars flowed into Canada from sales abroad and dollars were saved by producing defence equipment in Canada rather than having it imported from the United States. Furthermore, these companies provided greater geographic diversification of defence production at a time when North America was increasingly faced with the threat of a surprise bomber attack from the Soviet Union.

Measured in terms of national security and total value of contracts, the Canadian aircraft industry became the leading defence industry. In July 1948 an IDB report noted that the aircraft industry was in a very precarious position due to the fact that it could not survive on commercial orders. It therefore recommended that the government retain in Canada a viable aircraft industry as part of the essential defence. Because the industry did not have the capacity to build all the components and all types of aircraft needed by the R.C.A.F. and because of the R.C.A.F.'s limited overall requirements, it was not economical to establish the industry independently of other countries. Therefore the best solution was to integrate the aircraft manufacturing potential of Canada with that of other "friendly nations."⁷³ Two companies, A.V. Roe of Canada Ltd., a British firm located in Toronto, and Canadair, an American firm located in Montreal, emerged as the largest aircraft manufacturers. In 1949, Canadair and Northrop Aviation of California reached an agreement to build the three-engine American-designed "Raider" aircraft for the Canadian and international market. Two years later Canadair expanded its plant to produce the North American Aviation F-86E, the Lockheed T33 jet trainer, and the Beechcraft T36A.⁷⁴ The United States Department of Defense approved the production of these aircraft in Canada because it would facilitate closer integration of the North American Defence system by means of interchangeable parts equipment and similar training and tactical doctrines. A.V. Roe, on the other hand, received the contract to build the CF100 all weather jet interceptor. The plan was of Canadian design, reflecting the specific requirements of a northern country, but approximately 50 per cent of the funds allocated to the program went to subcontractors, primarily large American transnational corporations.⁷⁵

Unlike the aircraft industry, the automobile industry's defence contracts were quite small relative to the total capacity. It should be noted that no British companies located in Canada to handle the expanded defence contracts and the growing civilian market, an indication of the favorable competitive position of the American industry. Over 90 percent of the defence production was taken by the "Big Three" (Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors) and all equipment (chassis and engines) was standardized with American equipment. In the immediate postwar period the industry successfully reconverted to peacetime production and by 1950 it had grown to the point where Canada was the world's third largest producer of motor vehicles, the third largest exporter, and the largest importer of parts and equipment.

Peak defence production was reached in 1952 when over 10,000 American-type military vehicles were ordered by the Canadian armed forces and some 6,600 units (mostly trucks) were ordered by NATO countries, primarily the United States.⁷⁶ Working through the JIMPC subcommittees and other defence production agencies, Canadian and American planners decided that the Canadian auto industry should be considered with the American industry as an integral part of the North American industrial defence complex. Engineering and production know-how were to be freely exchanged, materials priorities allocations were to be coordinated, design would be standardized, and a specialized division of production established. In contrast to the Second World War, Canada during the early stage of re-armament would not produce tanks, armoured cars, and self-propelled guns, but would concentrate on trucks and jeeps. Should an emergency arise, for example the Korean War escalating into total war, plans were drawn up to reduce civilian consumption and following the pattern established in the last war, the auto companies were to expand and diversify production of all types of armoured vehicles.⁷⁷

In the post-war period, the electronics industry emerged as one of the fastest growing sectors in the Canadian economy. From 1947 to 1955 the gross value of electronic production in Canada rose by 460 percent compared with a rise of 91 percent in the Gross National Product. As the industry's submission to the 1957 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects noted, the postwar re-armament program provided an important stimulus to its remarkable growth.⁷⁸ The Department of Defence Production (DDP) estimated that from 1951 to 1954 approximately \$560 million was allocated for the purchase of electronic equipment in Canada and the United States. The peak year came in 1952 when the DDP placed orders worth approximately \$194 million in the United States and about \$136 million went to American subsidiaries in Canada.⁷⁹ Military related production, including radar, radio, and sonar systems, was of American design, thus allowing the inter-changeability of parts. This was of obvious value in joint defence projects such as the North American early warning radar system, not to mention enhancing the marketability of Canadian produced equipment south of the border. Because of their pre-eminent position in the field, the two companies that received the largest share of contracts were the American firms, Canadian General Electric and Westinghouse.

In 1947 the government imposed an excise tax on the sale of radio sets, contributing to a sharp decline in the industry's production. The Radio Committee of the Canadian

Industrial Preparedness Association immediately petitioned Ottawa to remove the tax, to expedite the licensing of C.B.C. television stations in Toronto and Montreal, thereby stimulating consumer demand for receiving sets, and to assist the industry in creating a defence preparedness program. These measures would keep a research and development nucleus functioning, thus preventing further deterioration of the technical staffs and production facilities. The Radio Committee pointed out that the advanced position of the industry in the United States was due in the main to the fact that the Department of Defense had underwritten many millions of dollars in industry research and development and by this means kept the American radio and electronic industry in a state of preparedness.⁸⁰ Recognizing the need to act, the government in 1949/1950 moved to license the T.V. stations, reduced the excise tax, and increased its defence contracts. It continued to play an important role in assisting the industry when it negotiated the building of a northern early warning system with the United States in 1953/1954, arguing that Canadian produced components be considered for adoption. There was some resistance expressed to this in the American House and Senate, but ultimately concessions were made because Canada was sharing the cost of the program, allowing use of its territory, and the companies that would benefit the most were American-owned subsidiaries.⁸¹ Again as in the auto, chemical, oil, and to a lesser extent the aircraft industries, re-armament contributed to the continental integration of the Canadian and American economies.

In summary, then, it was through the complex infrastructure of the transnational corporation and agencies in the DDP, NSRB, and the USMB, that industrial defence production was coordinated after the Second World War. Looking back on the history of the JIMPC from 1949 to 1953, it is clear that the organization did not meet the early expectations of Canadian and American defence planners. Although the general principles and machinery for joint industrial mobilization were established, a report to the Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee pointed out that it "would take a great deal of determination on the part of those in both countries to give effect to the principles and to make the machinery work."⁸² This determination would only develop under the extreme conditions of total war and advanced balance of payments problems, as was the case during the Second World War. After the Korean War and the completion of the first stage of the Cold War re-armament program, the need for machinery to coordinate joint industrial mobilization quickly declined. In 1956 total trade in defence equipment came to only \$22.5 million, a notable contrast to the over

\$1 billion exchanged between 1949 and 1954.⁸³ Another chapter in North American industrial defence coordination would begin with the negotiation of the 1958 Defence Production Sharing Agreement.

As Franz Schurmann and others have noted, the Second World War signifies a turning point in the "logic of world power".⁸⁴ The United States emerged as the leading military and economic power with the capability and the ideology to assert its will throughout the globe. Having an industrial defence complex that was "more central to the world war machine than the world economy," the United States had a decisive effect on the re-armament programs of its "free world" allies.⁸⁵ The history of Canadian-American joint industrial mobilization reflects this thesis. As it had been demonstrated, from 1940 on Canada became primarily dependent on the United States for technology, markets, and capital to sustain its own industrial defence program. Within the context of this dependency relationship what and how much Canada produced was determined by the requirements of American strategic and tactical planning and the interests of its own defence industries. While Canada's manufacturing sector, as it has been noted, generally benefited from this relationship in the period under study, it was nonetheless assigned the secondary role of producing components and smaller weapons systems that supplemented the defence production of its southern neighbour. Nationalist critics would later charge that Canada's dependency relationship would have an overall negative impact in the longer period. In economic terms the branch plant economy restricted research and development, aggravated balance of payments problems through the outflow of profits and dividends and in time of recession it was the Canadian firms rather than their American parents that would cut back production first. Moreover, this dependency relationship would limit Canada's international political options, as the case of trading with the people's Republic of China in the late 1950's suggests.⁸⁶

The implication of the nationalist argument is that the policy adopted was not in the country's interest and that alternatives should have been considered. As it was, another option was tried, the early postwar history of the Canadian aircraft industry being a case in point. In 1948 the government allocated funds for the production of the CF100 prototype and within two years these interceptors of world class capability were being produced from the assembly lines of the Avro plant outside of Toronto.⁸⁷ The CF100 program was a successful one, to be sure, but a minor incident in September 1950 illustrates in microcosm the problems that

were to follow. The Canadian fighter was on display in New York and much to the embarrassment of the Canadian officials present, it was unable to take off because its starter battery had died and a replacement could not be found.⁸⁸ The incident underscored a larger point that weapons systems and their components should be made interchangeable if North America was to have a "rational" defence system. In the case of the CF105 (Avro Arrow), American defence planners made it clear, if it wasn't already, that they would never adopt for their own defence or for NATO a complicated weapons system that was of foreign design made by a non-American company. The United States and some of the European NATO countries rejected the CF105, claimed to be one of the most advanced interceptors of its day, in favour of the F104, a plane of questionable capability in comparison with the Canadian plane.⁸⁹ Not only was the F104 adopted by the United States and its European NATO allies, it was eventually chosen by Canada to replace its F-86 squadrons in Europe while another American plane, the F101 Voodoo would be the CF100 successor in North America. In the light of these developments, it could be argued that the reality of American military and economic power greatly affected not only its adversaries, but its allies as well.

TABLE I

CANADA'S FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1914-1953 (in thousands of dollars)

Year	<u>Total Exports</u>		<u>Total Imports</u>	
	United States	Great Britain	United States	Great Britain
1914	169,318	184,115	308,364	98,754
1918	441,273	586,558	741,339	72,906
1939	389,754	323,886	496,898	114,007
1945	1,227,439	971,455	1,202,418	121,693
1946	908,577	598,799	1,405,297	141,341
1953	2,463,051	688,874	3,221,214	453,381

Source: M.C. Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto, 1965), p. 83.

TABLE II

UNITED STATES CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CANADA: SELECTED YEARS, 1914 to 1953 (in millions of dollars)

Year	Direct Investment	Portfolio Investment	Total
1914	---	---	881
1918	---	---	1,630
1939	1,881	2,270	4,151
1945	2,304	2,686	4,990
1946	2,428	2,730	5,158
1953	5,206	3,664	8,870

Source: M.C. Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada, (Toronto, 1965) p. 169; F.A. Knox, "Excursus" appearing in Herbert Marshall, Frank Southard, and Kenneth Taylor, Canadian-American Industry (New York, 1936), p. 229.

TABLE III

COMBINED CANADIAN-UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF SELECTED
MUNITIONS: 1 JULY 1940-31 AUGUST 1945

(Unit-each, or as designated)

Type	Grand Total	United States	Canada	
			Total	Under U.S. Contract
Airplanes, military types-----	307,483	291,619	15,864	5,254
Combat-----	205,581	200,026	5,555	1,652
Trainer-----	64,061	54,773	9,288	2,850
Cargo and liaison-----	37,841	36,820	1,021	752
Patrol vessels-----	2,438	*2,158	280	25
Mine craft-----	1,164	*966	198	9
Landing vessels, 750 tons and over-----	1,085	1,069	16	0
Ocean-going cargo and supply vessels-----	5,504	*5,113	391	0
Artillery, field, tank and self-propelled	223,897	207,988	15,909	2,445
Artillery, anti-aircraft (Army)-----	63,411	49,909	13,502	589
Mortars and bomb throwers-----	186,234	111,246	74,988	46,567
Small arms (thousands)-----	21,808	20,188	1,620	299
Ammunition, ground artillery (thousands)-	360,696	324,897	35,799	10,259
Ammunition, mortar and bomb thrower (thousands)-----	115,037	102,413	12,624	1,000
Ammunition, small arms (millions)-----	46,140	41,746	4,394	502
Tanks and tank chassis-----	108,941	103,226	5,715	0
Scout cars and carriers-----	132,416	89,072	43,344	6,783
Military trucks, all types (thousands)---	3,245	2,472	733	0

Includes conversions; 147 patrol vessels, 104 mine craft, and 349 cargo vessels.

Source: U.S. Civilian Production Administration, Official Munitions
Production of the United States (Washington, 1947).

This report contains a combined U.S.-Canadian supplement.

TABLE IV

NET VALUE OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORDERS FOR DEFENCE
PROCUREMENT IN CANADA

(thousands of dollars)

Programme	1954 Jan 1 - Dec 31	1953 Jan 1 - Dec 31	Total for period April 1, 1951 - Dec 31, 1954
Aircrafts-----	2,114 Cr.	16,559	159,850
Weapons-----	5,522 Cr.	1,317	29,945
Ammunition and explosives-----	148	9,993	62,289
Electronics and communication equipment-----	26,544	21,251	97,021
Other-----	1,253	7,274	47,498
Total-----	20,308	56,393	396,603

Source: Department of Defence Production, Fourth Report, 1954
(Ottawa, 1955), p. 45.

TABLE V

NET VALUE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION ORDERS PLACED
IN THE UNITED STATES

(In thousands of dollars)

Programme	1954 Jan 1 - Dec 31	1953 Jan 1 - Dec 31	Total for period April 1, 1951- Dec 31, 1954
Aircraft-----	86,617	8,596	342,578
Tank-automotive-----	5,737	253 Cr.	13,128
Weapons-----	1,213	4,567	22,166
Ammunition and explosives-----	3,432	3,383	28,432
Electronics and communication equipment-----	10,533	32,721	91,785
Other-----	3,092	12,308	31,017
Total-----	110,624	61,322	529,105

Source: Department of Defence Production, Fourth Report, 1954
(Ottawa, 1955), p. 42.

Footnotes

1. This point is a central theme in the work of J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle (New York, 1945); Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto, 1976); and R.D. Cuff, and J.L. Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime (Toronto, 1975).
2. This conclusion is based on a survey of the literature listed in S.L. Motiuk, Canadian Forces College Reading Guide for the Study of War, National Defence, and Strategy (Ottawa, 1967).
3. Two notable exceptions are Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington, D.C., 1959) and R. Warren James, War-time Economic Cooperation (Toronto, 1949).
4. Major General E.S. Hughes, "Industrial Mobilization", Military Review 27 (February 1948), pp. 3-8; Max E. Fieser, Economic Policy and War Potential (Washington, D.C. 1961); Horst Mendershausen, The Economics of War (New York, 1941).
5. "The Northern Frontier" was a popular term used by many American businessmen to describe the potential for economic expansion in Canada. See, for example, Editorial, "Canada Goes Boom", Bluebook 27 (June 1953), pp. 2-7; V.L. Horoth, "New Boom Areas in the Canadian West", The Magazine of Wall Street, August 11, 1951, pp. 494-95; and James Montagne, "Investment Over the Border", Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 1946, pp. 8-9.
6. Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad From 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Herbert Marshall, Frank Southard, Kenneth Taylor, Canadian-American Industry (New York, 1936); Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question (Toronto, 1971).
7. Robert C. Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto, 1974), pp. 275-293; R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime (Toronto, 1974), passim.
8. Editorial, Business Week, October 11, 1952, p. 84.

9. J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1976), pp. 114-19; C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa, 1970), pp. 101-11.
10. American economic mobilization for war is discussed in Otis Graham, Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon (New York, 1976), pp. 69-91; Gerald D. Nash, The Great Depression and World War II (New York, 1979), pp. 129-140; and Richard Polenberg, War and Society (New York, 1972), pp. 5-36.
11. C.P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945," International Journal LX (Spring 1954), pp. 107-124; Raymond J. Barrett, "Joint Board on Defense," Military Review X (October 1967), pp. 75-82; J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 145-48.
12. The economic problems that provide the backdrop for the Hyde Park declaration are in Canadian American Relations in Wartime, pp. 69-92; Frederick Winant, "United States Canadian Cooperation in Preparedness," Public Affairs 13 (Summer 1951), pp. 64-67.
13. "Exchange of Defense Articles With Canada", Department of State Bulletin, IV, No. 96 (April 26, 1941), p. 494. The agreement also noted that "while Canada has expanded its productive capacity manyfold since the beginning of the war, there are still numerous defense articles which it must obtain in the United States, and purchases of this character by Canada will be even greater in the coming year than in the past. On the other hand, there is existing and potential capacity in Canada for the speedy production of certain kinds of munitions, strategic materials, aluminum, and ships, which are urgently required by the United States for its own purposes." Thus Canada's favourable treatment by the United States referred to as "exemptionalism status" was rooted not so much in transcendental idealism as in national self-interest.
14. Department of External Affairs Records, (hereafter DEA), file 1497-40, Memo on JEC, no date; PAC, RG 28A (Department of Munitions and Supply Records), vol. 143, file 3-J-2-1, Joint Economic Committee Minutes, January 6, 1942.

15. A.F.W. Plumptre, Mobilizing Canada's Resources for War (Toronto, 1941), pp. 82-86; Warren James, Wartime Economic Cooperation, pp. 26-27, 108-110, 212-213, 328-332; Arthur Cheever Cressy, Jr., "Canadian-American Cooperation in World War II" (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1951), pp. 193-9.
16. William R. Willoughby, "The Canada-United States Joint Economic Agencies of the Second World War," Canadian Public Administration 15 (Spring 1972), pp. 66-68.
17. Quoted in S.W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, p. 79. The structure and function of the MCC is also discussed in Jack Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 146-47; and R.W. James, Wartime Economic Cooperation, pp. 227-28.
18. DEA records, file 1497-40, Memo on Material Coordinating Committee, June 26, 1941.
19. PAC, RG 49 (Department of Defence Production Records), vol. 136, file 13-42-1, Report of the JWPC, April 27, 1943; RG 19E, vol. 3547, file J-olg, Report, April 26, 1943.
20. C.D. Howe quoted in Cecil Lingard and Reginald Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, 1941-1944 (Toronto, 1950), p. 86.
21. For an overview of the structure and function of these wartime boards see PAC, RG/2 (Privy Council Records), vol. 53, file W-29-7, Report on the Activities of Combined Production Boards; W.H.D. Hall, North American Supply (London, 1951), pp. 100, 199ff; S.W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, pp. 79-85.
22. The impact of World War Two on Canadian-American commercial relations before 1939 is discussed in H.L. Keenleyside and Gerald S. Brown, Canada and the United States (New York, 1952), pp. 371-80.
23. PAC, RG 36/19 (Industrial Defence Board Records), vol. 17, file sf/2, Aircraft Production in Canada Report, November 8, 1950; W.B. Burchall, "Great Expansion in Production Capacity", Industrial Canada 45 (January 1945), pp. 117-119; and John de Navarry Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply vol. I (Ottawa, 1950), p. 351.

24. PAC, RG 49, vol. 137, file 13-91, Joint War Production Committee Report, August 2, 1945; A.F.W. Plumptre and S.D. Pierce, "Canada's Relations with Wartime Agencies in Washington", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XI (August 1945), pp. 402-11. The relationship between the experience of the Second World War aircraft production program and the postwar F-86 program is discussed in W.A.B. Douglas interview, with Air Commodore Larry Dunlap, August 1981.
25. J.L. Steward, "The Automotive Industry was ready for all out war production", Industrial Canada 45 (January 1945), pp. 128-130; Sun Life of Canada, The Canadian Automotive Industry (Toronto, 1956), pp. 8-9.
26. PAC, RG 19 E 3, vol. 3574, file JWPC minutes, April 26, 1943; RG 2/18, vol. 47, file D-18-2, Report, May 12, 1942.
27. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 503-606; John de Navarry Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, vol. I, pp. 351-59; PAC, RG 19, file 183-6-4, Canada's Industrial War Effort, 1939-1945, Chapter V. From a virtually non-existent industry in 1939, there were by early 1942 some 25,000 workers engaged in the production of guns and an equal number in turning out small arms.
28. PAC, RG 2/18, vol. 147, file p-18-2, JWPC Report, July 27, 1943; RG 49, vol. 136, file 13-42-1, JWPC Report, July 24, 1942.
29. PAC, RG 28A, vol. 1, Industry File, Canada's Industrial War Effort: A Year-end Review, January 22, 1944.
30. Compared to the British-American wartime industrial mobilization, the relationship with Canada was more extensive because of the longer time period of cooperation, geographic proximity, the demand for Canadian resources, and the presence of American subsidiaries. For an overview of the former see S. McKee Rosen, The Combined Boards of the Second World War (New York, 1951), and Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London, 1955). Economic relations within the Axis bloc are examined in Frank W. Ikle, German-Japanese Relations, 1936-1946 (New York, 1956) and Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis: A Study of the Relations Between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1949).

31. R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars, Canadian Prosperity (Toronto, 1978), pp. 1-20; Lawrence Aronsen, "The Northern Frontier", pp. 246-292.
32. Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary File, Box 172, Acheson to Truman, September 28, 1945.
33. "Agreement to Continue Hyde Park", Canada, Treaty Series 1948, No. 1 Exchange of Notes, May 7 & 15, 1945.
34. Lawrence Aronsen, "The Northern Frontier", pp. 10-39, R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars-Canadian Prosperity, pp. 64-139; Terrence Fay, "The Proposed Canadian-United States Customs Union, 1947-48", Bulletin of Canadian Studies IV (April 1980), pp. 38-53.
35. PAC, MG 32 (Brooke Claxton Papers), vol. 221, Defence file #4, no date.
36. PAC, RG 2/18, vol. 59, file C-10-D, Heeney memo to Cabinet Defence Committee, December 1, 1945.
37. National Archives, United States Department of State, Military Cooperation Committee Records, "Report of Proceedings, May 1946; Virginia W. Brewer, "Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee", Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, December 2, 1965. The MCC remained part of the PJBD until 1949. In that year it separated and became closely integrated with the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of NATO.
38. For an overview of strategic and political intelligence reporting in Canada see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada; Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto, 1972), pp. 76-77, 99-100, 320-72; and Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto, 1978), pp. 17-18. The relevant literature on the United States is extensive, see, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York, 1961), pp. 25-64; Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York, 1972), pp. 477-509; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (New York, 1978), pp. 163-256.
39. United States House, Committee on Armed Services, The National Defence Program -- Unification and Strategy October 1949 (Washington, D.C. 1949), p. 518.

40. Walter Millis, ed. The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 350; See, also, Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, 1961), pp. 31-32.
41. A.G.L. McNaughton, "North American Security", Industrial Canada 51 (July 1950), pp. 77-78.
42. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. National Security Act of 1947, as Amended through December 31, 1969. Print. 91st Congress, 2nd Sess. 1970; R. Maxil Ballinger, "Mobilizing for Atomic War", Conference Board Reports (Washington, D.C., 1950), pp. 4-15; and Editorial, "NSRB Rushes Mobilization Plans", Business Week, August 5, 1950, p. 2.
43. PAC, RG 36/19 vol. 2, file C. 1/Organization, Department Report, December 6, 1948; and N.A., "Industrial Defence Board Set Up", Industrial Canada 49 (May 1948), p. 95.
44. Directorate of History Records, Department of National Defence, PJBD Journal, vol. 6, file 955.013D, November 20, 1947; PAC, RG, 2/18, vol. 77, file d-100-E, Gill to Undersecretary of State External Affairs, December 28, 1948. For an overview of negotiations before the creation of the JIMPC see R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars -- Canadian Prosperity, pp. 167-70.
45. DEA records, file 10763-40, Smith to Cabinet Defence Committee, August 5, 1949.
46. Department of Defense, "Import Policies and National Defense", General File 122-L, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Box 875.
47. DEA papers, file 10763-40, Snow memo, "Cooperation in Industrial Mobilization Planning, June 20, 1949; "President's Report", The Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association, The Bulletin, 14 (September, 1950), pp. 1-2.
48. DEA papers, file 10763-40, press release, June 1, 1949.
49. DEA papers, file 10763-40, McNaughton memo to External Affairs, July 18, 1950.

50. William R. Willoughby, "Canadian-American Defense Cooperation", Journal of Politics 13 (Autumn 1951), pp. 693-94.
51. John Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3 (Toronto, 1969), p. 188.
52. PAC, MG 26 J4 vol. 249, file F2579, Draft Statement on Standardization, April 10, 1947; Ottawa Citizen, November 19, 1948.
53. Arms exports to Britain were largely American designed weapons. Under the provision of the NATO Mutual Aid Program Canada gave to Britain in 1952, 350 F-86 airframes, radar and other American designed electronic equipment worth \$50 million. See the Globe and Mail, August 14, 1952 and Ottawa Journal, August 15, 1952.
54. Specific examples of standardized equipment between Canada and the United States included F-86 and T33 aircraft, aircraft guns and radar equipment, .30 calibre field rifles, mortars (4.2 inch chemicals), 105 and 155 mm. howitzers, and 57 mm. and 75 mm. rifles. PAC, RG 36/19, vol. 17, file S./15/5, Weapons Panel memo, January 15, 1951. The Canadian forces evolved into an interesting hybrid having a British organizational command structure using mostly American made or designed equipment. Industrially, Canada was being integrated into a North American mould, but organizationally (politically and militarily) it would continue to reflect British traditions.
55. PAC, MG 27 III B (Brooke Claxton Papers), vol. 162, file 89-2-6-2, Orders placed for reference by the Federal Government, 1949-1951, June 2, 1952.
56. According to a 1949 government study, if war were to break out in that year followed by total industrial mobilization for defence, peak production would be reached in 1952. Measured in 1949 dollars, it was estimated that in the first three years of war, Canada would produce munitions worth \$10.8 billion, of which \$7.9 billion would come directly from its own industries and \$2.9 billion from raw materials and production materials imported from the United States. By 1952 Canadian production of an essentially war nature would be 32.3 percent greater than peak production in 1944. DEA papers, file 10763-40, JIMPC report, March 29, 1950.

57. The Montreal Daily Star, October 17, 1949 and the Financial Post, February 18, 1950.
58. Excerpt of NSC 68 quoted in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1975 (New York, 1976), p. 99, See, also, NSC-68, "The United States Objectives and Programs For National Security", April 14, 1950, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1950 1, (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 237-9.
59. PAC, RG 49, vol. 706, file 247-3, vol. I Joint Planning Committee Report, September 12, 1950.
60. Dean Acheson quoted in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p. 100.
61. PAC, RG 36/19, file-IDB Agenda, July 27, 1950; Financial Post, June 24, 1950; Ottawa Journal, June 24, 1950; The reports in the Canadian newspapers indicated that some progress was made in getting around the "Buy America Act" provisions before the Korean War broke out.
62. PAC, RG 49, vol. 707, file 247-5, vol I, Privy Council Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, August 9, 1950.
63. The October 26, 1950 agreement is reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, No. 592 (October 1950), pp. 742-44.
64. DEA, file 10763-40, Report on JIMPC, March 12, 1951; PAC, RG 49, vol. 744, file on JIMPC, August 2, 1952. In July of 1951 Canadian and American officials met to discuss the re-activation of the JIMPC and it was agreed that some new sub-committees would be created to deal with on-the spot problems in the prices and production of defence materials in short supply.
65. Financial Post, October 27, 1951; Financial Post, November 10, 1951.
66. PAC, RG 49, vol. 25, file-DDP Press release, February 28, 1952.
67. C.D. Howe quoted in the Toronto Daily Star, October 16, 1950.
68. Alfred E. Eckes, The United and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Astin, Texas, 1979), pp. 166-168; Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense pp. 271-72.

69. International Materials Conference, Report on Operations of the Operations of the International Materials Conference, February 26, 1951 to March 1, 1952 (Washington, 1952), pp. 1-3; H.H. Liebnafsky, "The International Materials Conference in Retrospect", Quarterly Journal of Economics 71 (May 1957), pp. 267-288.
70. DEA papers, file 10763-40, Washington Embassy Report, August 13, 1951; Economic Division Report, March 30, 1951.
71. C.D. Howe quoted in the Ottawa Morning Citizen, November 8, 1950.
72. PAC, RG 49, vol. 486, file 200-8-6, Net Value of Contracts Placed With Major Contractors, April 1, 1951 to March 31, 1958. In this period the American contractors in the top 15 were Canadair Ltd. (\$641 million), Imperial Oil Ltd. (\$134 million), Canadian Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Co. Ltd. (\$122 million), Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd., (\$91 million), General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. (\$76 million), Trans Canada Telephone System (\$75 million), and Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (\$72 million).
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84. Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York, 1974), p. xxiv; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Middlesex, England, 1975), pp. 11-22; William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, U.S.A.) pp. 162-201.
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LA PERCEPTION DU NORAD PAR DIVERS
COMMENTATEURS DU CANADA

[Serge Bernier]

L'opinion publique, qui est un aspect fondamental de toute politique militaire, est souvent intervenue dans les décisions stratégiques du gouvernement canadien. On notera les divergences profondes causées au Canada par la participation nationale dans la guerre des Boers de 1899-1902, ou encore, à l'occasion des deux guerres mondiales de notre siècle, chacune conduisant à une conscription controversée. On ne pourrait probablement pas circonscrire les divergences actuelles en les qualifiant d'affrontements entre Canadiens de langue française et de langue anglaise, surtout en ce qui touche l'alliance la plus récente liant le Canada aux États-Unis.

Le capitaine Serge Bernier traite de la réaction publique à l'accord canado-américain sur la défense aérienne du continent nord-américain qui eut, comme résultat, l'établissement du NORAD. Cette décision, prise malgré le peu de compréhension de ses conséquences par la population canadienne, fit tomber le gouvernement Diefenbaker et amena des changements de grande envergure quant au rôle et à la structure des Forces armées.

Dans l'article qui suit, nous voulons présenter les différentes façons dont certains commentateurs canadiens ont perçu les implications contenues dans le concept de défense aérienne intégrée mis officiellement sur pied par le Canada et les États-Unis en 1958. Pour y arriver, nous avons constitué, pour la période 1958 à 1981, un échantillon d'écrits incluant des articles de journaux, de magazines et de revues académiques dont la liste fut dressée à partir du Canadian Periodical Index ainsi que de l'index du quotidien de langue française Le Devoir. À ceux-ci s'ajoutent quelques livres canadiens touchant exclusivement ou en partie au sujet sous étude. Au total, 116 textes ont ainsi été réunis.

Nous ne prétendons pas avoir fait le tour de tout ce qui a été publié au Canada sur le North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Toutefois, nous croyons que le nombre et la

diversité des sources consultées fournissent un éventail significatif des opinions émises concernant le NORAD.

Par ailleurs, nous avons volontairement laissé de côté les dossiers officiels du NORAD que le Service historique des Forces canadiennes possède. Surtout parce que ces documents sont en général classifiés à un degré qui aurait rendu leur utilisation à peu près impossible. De plus, nous ne voulions pas devoir juger de certains commentaires à partir d'une 'position de force'. Toutefois, ce travail de comparaison entre les 'faits' et la 'perception' que l'on peut en avoir pourrait être très utile à bien des égards dans le cas du NORAD; il reste à faire.

Ceci étant dit, il est bien entendu que l'auteur se tient entièrement responsable du contenu de son texte. D'autant plus que, peu à peu, il a été conduit à faire ses propres commentaires sur le NORAD.

Avant de nous engager dans le fond de notre matière, il est bon de couvrir, même de façon générale, la question des relations canado-américaines qui, directement ou indirectement, sont abordées à d'autres endroits dans cette revue.

L'accord amenant à la naissance du NORAD ne tombe pas dans un vide de collaboration canado-américaine. Dès leurs débuts, les colonies anglaises et françaises en Amérique du Nord se sont porté un intérêt mutuel dans tous les domaines. Cette attention ne fut pas toujours amicale, loin de là. Pourtant, à divers niveaux, une coopération serrée s'instaure très rapidement entre les territoires qui formeront peu à peu le Canada et les États-Unis. Vers le milieu du XIX^{ème} siècle la tendance au rapprochement devient, semble-t-il, irréversible. Toutefois, des traces des difficultés passées se retrouvent encore en 1921, du côté canadien, dans les plans que le chef de l'état major a en main en vue d'une invasion éventuelle des États-Unis.

En général, cette animosité, reflétée principalement par le point de vue militaire, tend à disparaître au XX^{ème} siècle. Dans les années 1930, en prévision de la tourmente mondiale qui pointe, la défense de l'hémisphère nord américain devient un concept avec lequel il faut compter.

Ainsi, en 1936, le Président américain Delano Roosevelt laisse entendre que la défense du Canada fait partie de

la politique de défense des États-Unis. Deux ans plus tard, il déclare, très clairement cette fois, que les États-Unis ne se contenteraient pas de simplement laisser faire, si le territoire canadien était menacé d'invasion. C'est l'application de la doctrine de Monroe au cas canadien. Le Premier ministre canadien, William Lyon Mackenzie King, répond alors que son pays considère comme son devoir de faire tout en son pouvoir pour se garder à l'abri d'une attaque ou d'une invasion possible. Le Canada fera en sorte que, si une telle occasion se présentait, les forces ennemies ne puissent poursuivre en territoire canadien leur route jusqu'aux États-Unis, que ce soit par terre, par mer ou par air. Les états-majors des deux pays mènent, dès lors, des discussions secrètes destinées à mettre au point des mesures de défense communes en cas d'attaque.

En août 1940, deux mois après la défaite française en Europe et alors que les États-Unis sont toujours neutres dans le conflit, face à un Canada qui y est déjà engagé, Roosevelt et King se rencontrent et s'entendent, suite à une proposition américaine, pour mettre sur pied la Commission permanente conjointe de planification militaire. Cette commission, à caractère consultatif, tient ses réunions à huis clos et prépare des recommandations à l'intention des deux gouvernements.

Une collaboration dynamique s'instaure qui s'amenuise après 1944 pour renaître en 1946 alors que la guerre froide s'annonce. Les innovations technologiques des années 1939 à 1945 ainsi que l'apparition de l'ennemi soviétique ont rendu tout le continent nord américain très vulnérable. Des mesures communes de défense s'imposent.

En février 1946, un comité conjoint de collaboration militaire est créé. Chacun des deux pays y délègue des représentants militaires des trois éléments ainsi que des fonctionnaires des Affaires étrangères. Le 12 février 1947, le Premier ministre du Canada et le Secrétaire d'État américain font une déclaration simultanée sur la collaboration des deux pays en matière de défense en temps de paix. On y prévoit l'échange de militaires et, en certaines occasions, d'observateurs (manoeuvres, élaboration ou essai d'armes nouvelles de combat, normalisation des armes, du matériel et de l'organisation); la mise à la disposition mutuelle d'installations militaires navales et aériennes; un minimum de formalités dans les mouvements d'aéronefs et de navires au-dessus du territoire et dans les eaux territoriales de chaque pays.

De 1950 à 1954, trois réseaux de radars sont construits au nord du continent donc, en très grande partie, sur

le territoire canadien, afin d'alerter, contre toute menace venant du nord, les forces aériennes américaines prévues pour la défense et les représailles. En 1956, un groupe d'étude canado-américain se penche sur la défense aérienne des deux pays. En décembre, il recommande la création d'une structure intégrée binationale comme étant la méthode la plus efficace pour assurer cette défense.

Le 12 septembre 1957, un commandement opérationnel intégré, pour la défense aérienne du continent nord américain, commence à fonctionner sur une base expérimentale. Le quartier général est établi à Colorado Springs, aux États-Unis. Les officiers des deux pays qui y servent, de même qu'une partie des forces aériennes de chacun, tomberont sous ce commandement. Le commandant de cette force et son adjoint doivent être de nationalité différente (jusqu'à maintenant, le premier rôle fut toujours rempli par un Américain et le second par un Canadien). On dressera un plan commun de combat.

Le 12 mai 1958 un échange de notes diplomatiques, entre le Canada et les États-Unis, valable durant dix ans, officialise ce commandement. Depuis, les deux pays ont renouvelé leur entente à des intervalles irréguliers (1968, 1973, 1975, 1980).

On pourrait croire qu'un accord comme celui du NORAD, liant deux pays voisins, dont la puissance politique, économique et militaire réciproque est tellement disproportionnée, causerait de nombreuses mésententes et entraînerait de multiples prises de position, en particulier en ce qui a trait au "petit" allié. Cependant, bien peu de traces des problèmes quotidiens, qui existent certainement, comme dans toute entreprise humaine, sont parvenues jusqu'à nous:¹ il est dans la nature de tels conglomérats internationaux, de ne pas rendre publics ces incidents, qui, de toute façon, ne tirent sans doute pas à conséquence. Quant aux problèmes relevant de la politique, nous en aurons une petite idée plus loin.

Qu'en est-il alors, de l'opinion de la population canadienne vis-à-vis du NORAD? Sa réaction, pour ou contre l'accord, n'est guère perceptible. Nous pensons ne pas nous tromper de beaucoup en affirmant qu'une grande majorité des Canadiens ignorent jusqu'à l'existence du commandement intégré qui pourrait, un jour, conduire une guerre au-dessus de leur tête. "Il semble que plus les politiques de défense d'un pays sont fondamentales, moins elles reçoivent d'attention."²

Il nous reste donc, pour entrevoir les perceptions que les Canadiens ont eu du NORAD, à chercher chez les politiciens et les commentateurs de l'événement. Nous avons décidé de laisser de côté les interventions directes des politiciens. De façon indirecte toutefois, à travers les commentateurs, plus ou moins indépendants, qui nous ont fourni la matière de ce qui va suivre, certains hommes politiques trouvent leur place dans ce travail. Soulignons tout de même que seul le CCF, ou son successeur le NPD (Nouveau Parti démocratique -- gauche modérée), s'est opposé au NORAD. Conservateurs et Libéraux, tout en s'attaquant réciproquement lorsque l'autre était au pouvoir, ont accepté le commandement intégré et ses implications.

Quelques données supplémentaires s'imposent ici. À l'instar de beaucoup d'autres peuples, les Canadiens, à travers les âges et, singulièrement, après que leur pays fût passé du stade de colonie française, à celui de colonie anglaise (1763), se sont très peu intéressés aux problèmes militaires. Un des résultats de ce manque d'intérêt général est qu'il n'y a pas eu de penseurs stratégiques d'envergure, si l'on exclut l'éphémère George T. Denison.³ Aujourd'hui encore, il y a très peu de spécialistes des problèmes de la défense.⁴

Cette lacune est encore plus évidente dans la partie francophone de la population canadienne⁵ et trouve sa résonance dans le peu d'attention que le NORAD y a reçu. Ainsi, notre collecte d'écrits, et ce après un détour spécial par Le Devoir, ne nous a fourni que onze articles de langue française ... dont le plus consistant était une traduction de l'anglais.⁶ Plusieurs autres étaient des communiqués de presse émis par la Presse canadienne et qui, par conséquent, paraissaient dans la plupart des journaux canadiens à peu près au même moment: à la lecture, ils nous ont semblé avoir également été traduits de l'anglais.⁷

Trois de ces onze articles firent suite à des déclarations venues du gouvernement du Québec à l'effet que si cet état devenait un jour indépendant du reste du Canada, il ferait partie du NORAD et de l'OTAN. Les auteurs de ces textes se tenaient loin d'un concept de stratégie globale ou, même, strictement militaire. Leurs propos tournaient plutôt autour de la "stratégie" électorale du Parti québécois au pouvoir. Quelques lignes étaient tout de même consacrées aux problèmes internationaux et au fait que le poids des États-Unis aurait joué un rôle dans cette prise de décision.⁸ Il est par ailleurs intéressant de souligner que cette conclusion à laquelle étaient parvenus les "stratèges" péquistes avait déjà été atteinte par les militaires. Dans

une entrevue, le lieutenant-général D.R. Adamson, Canadien en poste au NORAD, qui répondait à une question d'un journaliste portant sur ce qui adviendrait lors d'une éventuelle séparation du Québec, arrivait à la réponse que les Péquistes allaient nous servir quelques mois plus tard.⁹

Notons, enfin, que le peu d'intérêt accordé au NORAD par les grands journaux canadiens est de plus lié à des événements qui plongent l'organisme sous les réflecteurs durant quelques jours (exemples: démission du général Barber, fausses alertes au quartier général du NORAD en 1980, etc). C'est une situation normale étant donné le type de journalisme qui est pratiqué au Canada. Une exception de marque à cette règle est le Financial Post (Fin. Post) qui suit le NORAD d'assez près depuis ses débuts. Comme nous le verrons, la communauté d'affaires canadienne, à laquelle est destinée ce journal, a de bonnes raisons d'être aussi bien renseignée que possible sur le NORAD.¹⁰

Passons maintenant aux aspects stratégiques et politiques du NORAD tels que perçus par les commentateurs que nous avons consultés.

Après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, les Canadiens se tournent vers le développement pacifique de leur Nord, soit vers cette vaste zone presque inhabitée commençant, approximativement, à 150 kilomètres de la frontière américaine.¹¹

Au même moment, face à la dégradation rapide de la situation mondiale une crainte voit le jour aux États-Unis: celle qu'une attaque aérienne, venue du Grand Nord, puisse un jour détruire les centres industriels du continent.¹² Dès lors, aux yeux des Américains, le territoire canadien prend une place stratégique d'une importance encore plus grande que celle qu'il avait tenue durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Ce vaste espace pourrait en effet servir à se prémunir contre une telle éventualité. Étant donné l'existence de la Commission permanente conjointe sur la défense ainsi que la nature de la menace définie par les Américains, il n'est pas douteux que l'utilisation militaire du nord canadien devait jouer un rôle primordial et supplanter, pendant quelques années, son usage pacifique.

Dès 1946, selon le général Foulkes, chef de l'état-major des Forces canadiennes de 1945 à 1951, un effort aérien conjoint américano-canadien est entrepris pour la défense de l'Amérique du Nord.¹³ Au début, cette coopération est peu tangible: tout de même, bien avant 1957, un certain nombre d'officiers canadiens servaient à Colorado Springs, qui est devenu, depuis, le quartier général du NORAD.¹⁴ Le lien

deviendra de plus en plus visible à mesure que la menace soviétique grandira. Car la protection des forces de représailles aériennes des États-Unis, constituées par le Strategic Air Command (SAC), prendra une importance grandissante.

Dans les années 1950, le poids de la défense de l'Ouest -- incluant l'Europe occidentale -- repose presque entièrement sur les épaules américaines et ce, de toutes les façons. Le SAC, en tant que force de contre-attaque, a un rôle important à jouer à l'intérieur de la stratégie globale de l'Occident. À l'époque, c'est une arme si puissante que l'on croit qu'elle dissuadera toujours l'U.R.S.S. de s'attaquer à l'Occident. Il faut donc la protéger d'une destruction surprise ou d'un "Pearl Harbour" anti-SAC comme l'on disait.

On songeait, depuis quelques années, aux meilleures façons d'éviter toute surprise. La parade est trouvée au tournant des années cinquante: des bases de radar seront construites en ligne au nord du Continent. En cas d'attaque, ces radars alerteraient le SAC, lui permettant ainsi de prendre son envol et de jouer son rôle.¹⁵

Les Américains considèrent comme primordiale la coordination américano-canadienne, en matière d'alerte du SAC: ils l'obtiennent. Dès 1952, la ligne de radar Pinetree fonctionne sous contrôle d'opérateurs américains. En 1954, une nouvelle série de bases de radar est mise en place plus au nord: la ligne DEW (alerte lointaine). Puis arrive le commandement aérien intégré au NORAD.

Ce que l'on met en place, en 1957, à la fois de façon intérimaire et officielle, c'est une coordination opérationnelle d'une partie des forces de l'air des deux pays en vue de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord. Mais un tel arrangement existait déjà jusqu'à un certain point.¹⁶ Avec NORAD, un plan de défense sera préparé en commun et devra être approuvé par les autorités politiques de chacun des pays. Toutefois, les forces de défense resteront nationales. Le niveau de participation (humaine, économique, etc.) de chacun des partenaires, au sein même du NORAD, n'a jamais été précisé. Délicatesse américaine? Entre-temps, la contribution de chacun reste sujette à des négociations continues.¹⁷

La fonction du commandement intégré restera, à travers les ans, celle de servir d'alerte au SAC, tout en interceptant, le plus loin possible des centres habités, les forces aériennes attaquantes. Mais ses prérogatives s'élargiront avec le temps. Ainsi, en 1960, le Space Detection and

Tracking System tombe sous le contrôle opérationnel du NORAD de même que le National Space Surveillance Control Center, qui analyse et catalogue des données reçues du monde entier. Le fait que l'on s'occupe du spatial, et non simplement de l'aérien, ne sera entériné qu'en 1981. Durant plus de 20 ans, l'organisme sera donc ouvert à des critiques venues d'opposants qui demanderont sa disparition sous le prétexte que son rôle aérien était dépassé.¹⁸

NORAD évoluera aussi au niveau technologique. Ainsi, les simples bases de radar seront peu à peu complétées par les SAGE (Semi Automatic Ground Environment) dont chaque élément peut fournir, sur le champ, des données concernant des centaines d'objets volants; les radars pouvant détecter au delà de la courbe de la terre (OTH-B); les systèmes volants de détection et de contrôle (AWACS), etc. D'autre part, on passera d'une stratégie d'interception par chasseurs (années 50) à un presque abandon de ceux-ci (années 60 et 70), à un retour, à la fin des années 70, à ce mode d'interception. C'est, qu'entre-temps, la menace sera passée du bombardier à long rayon d'action, à celle des missiles, pour revenir au bombardier supersonique.¹⁹

Tout ceci fera dire à R.K. Swanson, en 1972, que l'histoire du NORAD en est une de batailles perpétuelles contre différentes craintes et contre une technologie sans cesse dépassée.²⁰

Mais le NORAD était-il nécessaire au Canada? Quelqu'un a déjà souligné que, en théorie, le Canada faisait face à deux craintes de nature militaire: une venant des États-Unis et l'autre de l'URSS. L'avantage du NORAD c'est que celle venant du sud est éliminée et qu'elle se transforme, en fait, en garantie contre la menace qui pourrait venir du nord.²¹

Cette interprétation, un peu rapide, doit, selon plusieurs, être complétée par le fait que l'organisation d'une défense aérienne intégrée, entre les États-Unis et le Canada, est inévitable. La position géographique du Canada, son immensité territoriale, sa faible démographie, (environ 25 millions d'habitants) dont découlent des possibilités économiques limitées, servent de preuve à cette thèse. Ou bien, (que le NORAD ou quelque chose d'équivalent existe ou pas) l'espace aérien canadien serait utilisé automatiquement par les États-Unis, en cas de nécessité; ou bien le Canada se prépare, en commun avec son voisin, à participer de plein gré, ne serait-ce que pour des raisons de fierté et de souveraineté, à l'éventuelle bataille qui pourrait se dérouler dans ses cieux.²²

Ces points de vue nous permettent de reconnaître un problème crucial qui est posé au Canada par sa participation au NORAD, soit celui de la façon dont sa souveraineté se trouve affectée. À cet effet, il semble aujourd'hui admis que le nouveau gouvernement conservateur, dirigé par John Diefenbaker, n'ait pas pris toute la mesure politique de l'accord lorsqu'il s'y engagea.²³ Le débat, auquel il accepta difficilement de soumettre l'échange de notes diplomatiques (le NORAD ne découle pas d'un traité) dut lui ouvrir les yeux car, par la suite, l'équipe conservatrice prit ses distances vis-à-vis du NORAD. Cette occasion avait fait ressortir l'importance qu'attachaient, à la souveraineté de leur pays, les Parlementaires canadiens. Depuis, le thème "souveraineté" est resté à l'honneur. Les opposants ont attaqué NORAD sous cet angle.²⁴ Les "neutres" ont souligné les difficultés que le Canada pourrait avoir à côtoyer de si près une super-puissance.²⁵ Enfin, les gouvernements successifs ont tout fait pour démontrer que le Canada restait pleinement souverain au sein du NORAD.²⁶

D'ailleurs, le dilemme n'est pas nouveau. Ainsi, en 1947, on s'assure que le nombre de Canadiens sera majoritaire dans chacun des centres expérimentaux canado-américains devant exister dans le Nord canadien.²⁷ Lorsque, plus tard, on permet aux Américains d'installer des bases-radars et de les faire fonctionner, on s'arrange pour que les États-Unis reconnaissent explicitement, par l'entente, la souveraineté du Canada sur le Grand Nord (les Américains avaient, jusque là, évité d'accepter officiellement ce fait).²⁸

Une énumération d'actions suffira à faire comprendre la sensibilité des politiciens canadiens à ce sujet. Le gouvernement conservateur, jusqu'en 1963, refuse d'armer ses intercepteurs, ainsi que les deux bases de missiles anti-missiles Bomarcs, de têtes nucléaires qui resteraient sous contrôle américain. Lorsque le gouvernement libéral prend la relève, il veut tenir sa promesse électorale de les armer. Mais comme, en 1963, le Bomarc est une arme dépassée, on assiste plutôt à sa mise au rancart. En 1968, lors de la première reconduction de l'entente, le nouvel échange de notes canado-américain précise que le Canada n'est absolument pas tenu, par NORAD, à participer activement à une défense anti-missile (qui lierait probablement encore plus le Canada aux États-Unis).

Dès ses débuts, NORAD a divisé l'Amérique du Nord en commandements régionaux dont plusieurs, qui incluent des territoires s'étendant des deux côtés de la frontière,

sont exclusivement couverts par des forces aériennes américaines. En 1969, le Premier ministre Trudeau annonçait que les activités du NORAD, se passant en territoire canadien, relèveraient des seuls Canadiens. Là-dessus, souligne John Gellner, il n'y a pas de mésentente entre les deux pays. Les États-Unis veulent certainement que le Canada maîtrise totalement son espace aérien. Mais à condition qu'il soit vraiment maître chez-lui.²⁹ Or, à ce jour, certaines régions du pays sont encore sous la protection américaine. Sans doute parce que les États-Unis n'ont pas très confiance aux possibilités canadiennes. Les nouveaux moyens de défense dont se munit, en ce moment, le Canada (avions F18 et AWACS) devraient lui permettre de contrôler son territoire à compter de 1982. Mais la question se pose: jusqu'à quel point le Canada n'a-t-il pas dû s'engager à se rééquiper -- chez les Américains? -- afin d'obtenir ce contrôle? Si oui, il faudrait admettre que certains domaines d'importance, en matière de défense, échappent au Canada.

Mais la susceptibilité de beaucoup de Canadiens, quant à la souveraineté de leur pays à l'intérieur de NORAD, n'est pas unanime. Lors de la première grande enquête journalistique sur le NORAD, les militaires canadiens à Colorado Springs soulignent qu'ils sont très embarrassés des plaintes formulées par leurs compatriotes concernant la souveraineté de leur pays. D'abord, le Canada est loin de participer de façon proportionnelle à l'effort commun. Ensuite, au cours des huit premiers mois d'existence du NORAD, le commandant adjoint a été aux commandes durant 60% du temps, suite aux nombreuses absences du commandant. À ces moments, il avait les pleins pouvoirs qui auraient pu l'amener à conseiller au Président américain, tout comme au Premier ministre canadien, le déclenchement d'une guerre.³⁰ Nous signalons, pour notre part et à titre d'information seulement, que l'état américain du Maine est couvert par le Quartier général de North Bay au Canada ... Nous ne tenterons pas, toutefois, de soupeser la valeur économique-politico-militaire du Maine par rapport à celle des vastes territoires canadiens mis sous la protection américaine.

De toute façon, l'opposition au NORAD ne vient pas que des adeptes de la souveraineté. Ainsi, NORAD avait à peine été mis sur pied, que l'âge des missiles et même des satellites était là (Spoutnik I: 1957). Plusieurs avancèrent que, jusque là, il avait été impossible de se défendre totalement d'une guerre nucléaire qui aurait été largement conduite à l'aide de bombardiers. L'ère spatiale, dans laquelle nous pénétrions, nous laisserait encore plus démunis dans une telle éventualité. Le Canada ferait donc aussi bien de laisser tomber l'accord.³¹

Les anti-NORAD surent également prendre le contre-pied de l'affirmation voulant que la participation canadienne serve au fonctionnement de la dissuasion mutuelle. Ils eurent beau jeu de rappeler que seule l'une des deux super-puissances utilisait le territoire canadien. Comment cette situation pouvait-elle aider à la dissuasion mutuelle? Il aurait fallu, pour cela, que l'U.R.S.S., afin de se prémunir contre toute attaque surprise, puisse avoir accès, tout comme les États-Unis, aux réseaux d'alerte (surtout le plus nordique des trois) situés en sol canadien.³²

Le NORAD est aussi mis à l'épreuve à un autre titre. On prétendait, en 1958, que, grâce aux implications du commandement intégré, le Canada serait consulté par son voisin et qu'il aurait ainsi la possibilité -- qui n'aurait pas existé autrement -- d'influencer les décisions américaines en matière d'affaires étrangères et de défense.³³ En effet, l'échange de lettres de mai 1958 mettait l'accent sur la consultation entre les deux pays signataires. Mais, dès le début, on se demanda comment une décision conjointe, de commencer une guerre, pourrait être prise assez rapidement pour répondre aux urgences modernes, et satisfaire, en même temps, à la notion de souveraineté.³⁴

Toute l'existence du NORAD démontre que l'influence canadienne sur les décisions américaines d'importance, portant sur les affaires étrangères ou la défense, fut bien minime. La crise de Cuba allait servir de révélateur spectaculaire quant au niveau réel de la consultation entre les deux partenaires. Les États-Unis agirent seuls à cette occasion. Le Canada fut traité de la même façon désinvolte que tous les autres alliés des États-Unis, à l'exception de l'Angleterre. On connaît la réaction publique française à cette désinvolture. Mais il n'y en eut pas d'équivalente venant du voisin le plus rapproché des États-Unis. À cette occasion, pourtant, le NORAD avait été mis en état d'alerte, ce qui impliquait, qu'on le veuille ou non, le Canada.

La frustration de beaucoup de Canadiens fut grande sur le coup; elle aurait certainement été accrue si certaines informations essentielles leur avaient été immédiatement fournies. Le Canada aurait pu être en guerre, sans même avoir eu le temps de la déclarer. Ce qui l'aurait ramené à la "belle époque coloniale" qui, somme toute, n'était éloignée que d'une trentaine d'années.³⁵ Dès lors, les arguments "influence" et "consultation" disparurent des écrits pro-NORAD pour se retrouver abondamment chez leurs adversaires.³⁶

Mais la crise de Cuba n'avait-elle pas servi qu'à éclairer une facette inhérente à un accord auquel les États-Unis étaient partie?³⁷ Tous les amis des Américains, petites ou moyennes puissances, n'avaient-ils pas été traités à peu près de la même façon, de sorte que le danger avait été "également" distribué? Finalement, est-ce que ces jours, mémorables par la tension qu'ils créèrent, eussent été différents si le NORAD n'avait pas existé?

La réaction à la présence de missiles soviétiques à Cuba n'est toutefois que la partie visible de l'iceberg. Dans bien d'autres domaines, le Canada n'était -- et n'est toujours -- qu'informé de ce que les bureaux américains préparent. Le remplacement des Bomarcs, l'acceptation américaine de la théorie des missiles anti-missiles et la rédéfinition constante de la menace contre laquelle il doit se tenir prêt, en sont des exemples.

Laissons nous entraîner, brièvement, sur un autre terrain. Au niveau des renseignements militaires, la dépendance canadienne, par rapport aux États-Unis, est presque totale. Dans ce cas, le Canada peut-il véritablement faire sa propre évaluation des possibilités militaires soviétiques?³⁸ Est-il possible que les deux pays, indépendamment des renseignements que chacun a en mains, puissent définir pareillement la menace à laquelle ils doivent faire face?³⁹ La réponse est difficile. Il est incontestable que le Canada a suivi certaines appréciations faites par les Américains.⁴⁰ Ainsi en fut-il de l'évolution de la menace militaire?⁴¹ Par contre, les responsabilités qu'ont les États-Unis en tant que super-puissance, les ont conduits à s'enfoncer dans le borbier vietnamien ou à intervenir en Amérique du Sud. Dans ces cas, comme dans beaucoup d'autres, le Canada a analysé la situation de façon toute différente. À l'intérieur de l'accord aérien canado-américain, la menace, de même que la réponse que l'on doit lui faire, semblent être définies de façon unilatérale: il n'y a pas de place, en tous les cas, pour les désaccords d'importance. Il en va tout autrement à l'extérieur de cette entente limitée.

La crise de Cuba allait produire d'autres effets. Les plans canado-américains n'avaient pas été appliqués intégralement à cette occasion. Ainsi, l'aviation canadienne n'entra officiellement en état d'alerte que deux jours après celle des États-Unis; avions et Bomarcs canadiens restèrent sans armes nucléaires; le Canada refusa que les avions américains se déploient sur son territoire dans les bases prévues à cette intention selon les plans préparés par le NORAD. D'où des critiques américaines véhémentes, supposément proférées à titre privé, mais reproduites dans des

journaux canadiens.⁴² Valait-il la peine, demandaient les Américains, de maintenir un accord que l'allié ne respectait pas le moment venu?⁴³ (Question inverse, bien sûr, de celle posée par certains Canadiens qui se doutaient que leur influence, auprès de Washington, avait été nulle -- ce qui ne sera confirmé que plus tard.) À quoi serviraient, au niveau stratégique, et en cas de guerre éclair, des Bomarcs sans leurs têtes nucléaires puisqu'il faudrait, au minimum, une demi-journée pour les armer? Ce temps serait-il disponible? Certains Américains avançaient que toute la défense aérienne de l'Amérique était affaiblie à cause de la volonté mitigée des Canadiens d'y participer.⁴⁴

Or, ces arguments furent repris par les Libéraux qui étaient alors dans l'opposition. Ils firent de l'armement des Bomarcs un thème d'élection. Cette situation, combinée à d'autres faits qui se seraient passés au cours de la campagne électorale (assez difficiles à prouver toutefois), firent dire à certains Conservateurs que les États-Unis s'ingéraient dans les affaires intérieures du Canada.⁴⁵ Que cela ait été vrai ou non, il est symptomatique que Dalton Camp -- une sommité conservatrice de l'époque -- ait mentionné ce point qui nous ramène à la question de souveraineté discutée plus tôt.

Le NORAD présente, d'autre part, des aspects économiques qui reviennent souvent dans les commentaires. C'est un instrument d'alerte coûteux, pour dire le moins. Les chiffres cités varient énormément mais sont significatifs. Les bases d'alerte auraient coûté \$500 millions de 1954 à 1957. Le premier commandant du NORAD prétendit que, de 1950 à 1965, la défense intégrée avait coûté \$61 milliards.⁴⁶ Au Canada, les années fiscales 1967-1968 et 1968-1969 réservèrent, au NORAD, \$139,470,000 et \$134,683,000 respectivement (\$237,500,000 en 1980). On estimait, alors, que les États-Unis versaient \$1,700,000,000 par année dans le système (\$1,912,000,000 en 1980).

Depuis 1978, le Canada s'est lancé dans un vaste programme de réarmement qui servira le NORAD, mais aussi l'OTAN (ceci, après cinq ans de gel des dépenses et dix ans de dégradation de nos forces).⁴⁷ Simultanément, les Canadiens veulent contrôler entièrement leur espace aérien civil ou militaire. Des milliards de dollars sont et seront investis suite à ces décisions. Un général canadien, en 1977, disait que nos industries devraient se préparer à tirer le maximum de la manne qui allait bientôt tomber.⁴⁸ Le nouveau nationalisme du gouvernement canadien voudrait-il être aussi rentable que le fédéralisme d'un ex-gouvernement québécois?

Le système d'alerte et de défense contre une attaque aérienne est, de quelque point de vue que l'on se place, extrêmement coûteux.⁴⁹ Certains prétendent que le NORAD est absolument nécessaire aux Canadiens, qui ne pourraient assumer seuls les coûts d'une telle défense.⁵⁰ D'autres -- incluant sans doute les précédents -- y cherchent leur profit. Dès 1958, on se demande si le Canada aurait, au moins, sa juste proportion de la production de la défense.⁵¹ La réponse, affirmative, était fournie l'année suivante, lorsque l'on créa le Programme conjoint de productions militaires par lequel les industries canadiennes pouvaient participer à l'adjudication des contrats de défense américains.⁵² Cela conduisit, plus ou moins, à un marché commun en matière de défense qui devint très rapidement profitable au Canada, surtout à cause des exigences de la guerre au Vietnam.⁵³ Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale estimait, en octobre 1980, que depuis 1959 le Programme avait permis au Canada d'obtenir un solde global positif de \$1,1 milliard. De plus, le Canada put se tenir à la fine pointe dans certains secteurs dont l'électronique et l'aviation.⁵⁴ Au cours des années 1960, environ 500 industries canadiennes participèrent aux contrats américains. En 1969, \$300 millions tournaient autour de ces contrats.⁵⁵ C'est un bienfait pour les Canadiens qu'ils perdraient sans doute si NORAD n'existait plus.⁵⁶

Dans les années 1950, le Canada avait eu une politique de production militaire nationale coûteuse. On s'était essouffé à produire certains items. En 1959 -- un an après NORAD -- le développement du chasseur canadien Arrow était stoppé. À la place, le Canada se munit de Voodoos et de Bomarcs américains.⁵⁷ L'industrie de défense canadienne ne devait pas mourir à cause de NORAD et on la sauva à l'aide du Programme conjoint.

L'économie canadienne ne subirait-elle pas un effet de distorsion à cause de ce programme? Très peu, si l'on songe que, de toute façon, elle dépend de l'américaine à 70%.⁵⁸ Mais le jugement de la communauté d'affaires ne pourrait-il pas, lui, être influencé par les bénéfices qu'il tire du NORAD ou plutôt, du programme conjoint qui, n'en doutons pas, lui est implicitement lié. Nous avons constaté, plus tôt, que le Fin. Post avait suivi les efforts de NORAD de très près. Cet intérêt s'est exprimé soit de façon neutre, soit par l'approbation sans condition du NORAD. La seconde manière a prédominé avant 1962. Par exemple, en 1960, le Canada devait changer ses chasseurs CF100 s'il voulait garder son influence dans NORAD.⁵⁹ Le Fin. Post disait encore que le Canada avait plus d'influence, au sein de l'organisme, que sa participation monétaire n'aurait dû lui en

donner. Les officiels canadiens devaient souvent plier l'échine devant les exigences américaines mais ils pouvaient également infléchir les politiques américaines qui leur déplaisaient.⁶⁰ Suite à la crise de Cuba, un correspondant du Fin. Post avançait que le Canada pourrait perdre les bénéfices du programme conjoint à cause de son manque d'enthousiasme. D'ailleurs, tout le blâme du différend canado-américain qui en était né reposait sur les épaules canadiennes.⁶¹ L'approfondissement de cette histoire ramena sans doute le journal à réviser ses positions. En effet, il semble s'en tenir, depuis, à fournir des informations, aussi exactes que possible, de ce qui se passe à Washington concernant NORAD; parfois, tout de même, se glisse une question controversée à laquelle on n'ose pas fournir de réponse.⁶²

Les dépenses canadiennes encourues à cause de NORAD et compensées, jusqu'à un certain point, par l'activité économique qu'elles génèrent, ne sont pas acceptées d'emblée par tous. Elles deviennent, pour certains, une excellente raison pour prôner l'annulation de l'entente.⁶³

Les opposants, comme nous avons pu le constater, soulignent que NORAD est inutile des points de vue militaire, politique et économique (cette inutilité est d'ailleurs souvent accouplée à celle de l'OTAN). Dans ces conditions, écrit Warnock, le Canada n'a rien à perdre à le quitter.⁶⁴

Ne voulant pas seulement détruire, les "antis" proposent des solutions de rechange. Le Canada, disent-ils, pourrait, hors du NORAD, poursuivre une politique étrangère beaucoup plus indépendante qui, par ricochet, aiderait à maintenir une véritable identité canadienne dans les affaires internationales. C'est, en quelque sorte, "l'option Canada". Cette nouvelle attitude pourrait avoir plusieurs résultats. Le Canada prendrait une distance plus grande par rapport aux deux super-puissances; il pourrait ainsi mieux participer à réduire les tensions américano-soviétiques. On suggère encore l'utilisation plus poussée des Forces canadiennes au maintien de la paix dans le monde ou, encore, le transfert des sommes ainsi économisées vers l'aide au Tiers-Monde⁶⁵ ... ou, sur un ton plus plaisantin, vers de meilleures causes, incluant la guérison de la blessure causée à notre orgueil national par l'abandon aux Américains de notre défense aérienne.⁶⁶

Certaines de ces alternatives sont mises de l'avant, dès 1947, lors du débat sur la déclaration de Louis Stephen Saint-Laurent, relative au statut des forces étrangères en visite au Canada (4 juin 1947); l'opposition considérait déjà que les principes qui étaient alors émis conduisaient à un asservissement du Canada.⁶⁷

À travers les opinions que nous avons rapportées ci-haut, nous avons pris connaissance de l'ambivalence inévitable qui doit accompagner une entente, telle celle du NORAD, où une super-puissance (nucléaire, économique et politique) s'unit à un pays qui, même s'il est fort économiquement et politiquement, est absent du club nucléaire et, de toute façon, "ne fait pas le poids". Ajoutons que le débat entre les commentateurs "indépendants" que nous avons consultés est, bien souvent, un leurre. La plupart des opposants au NORAD utilisent, par exemple, les arguments que le Nouveau Parti démocratique expose au Parlement. Ce n'est pas une coïncidence.

Ce qui est acquis c'est que l'entente existait, en pratique, avant 1957; les Américains voulaient la formaliser. Finalement, un nouveau gouvernement, dont les membres n'avaient aucune expérience du pouvoir (les Conservateurs avaient été hors d'office depuis 1935) ont accepté un peu rapidement un système qui aurait sans doute été moins voyant si les Libéraux étaient restés en place. Ceux-ci ont profité de cette erreur politique pour garder le NORAD sur la place publique entre 1957 et 1963. À leur retour au pouvoir, on devait armer les vecteurs montés ou non qui, en sol canadien, servaient le NORAD. Mais, on se débarrassa rapidement des Bomarc sans les remplacer; seuls les Voodoos peuvent encore recevoir des armes nucléaires, et il en reste peu. De plus, on parvint à effacer le NORAD du débat public grâce à des reconductions successives furtives. Certains y voient là une preuve que les politiciens ont senti que le NORAD n'était guère populaire au sein de la population en général.⁶⁸ La façon dont Lester B. Pearson l'a renouvelé, en 1968 (pour cinq ans, avec possibilité de le terminer suite à un préavis d'un an) laissait présager l'arrivée prochaine d'un nouveau chef libéral qui, en principe, était anti-militariste et internationaliste. En moins de neuf ans, cet idéaliste s'est converti en politicien canadien "pure laine", presque militariste⁶⁹ et très nationaliste (le bon nationalisme canadien par rapport au mauvais qui, prétend-il, vient du Québec).

Ces revirements, au plus haut niveau, sont parfois suivis. Gellner, éditeur depuis nombre d'années de la Revue militaire canadienne et très près de la chose militaire, passe d'anti-NORAD (1961-1962) à pro-NORAD après 1962.⁷⁰ Il se fait d'ailleurs aussi brillant dans chacune des causes, ce qui n'est pas le cas d'un autre des rares défenseurs du NORAD.⁷¹

NORAD a-t-il amélioré les relations canado-américaines? Il nous paraît qu'il fût plutôt un instrument qui a fourni des munitions (Cuba-Bomarcqs etc ...) aux anti-Américains à un moment où, justement, on rêvait les relations entre les deux pays.⁷² En plus, l'entente par laquelle, après tout, le Canada accepte de devenir la première ligne de défense d'un autre pays,⁷³ aurait brisé le consensus qui existait chez nous, depuis 1945, sur la politique de défense.⁷⁴ De fait, il est certain que le débat nucléaire qui a cours au Canada dans les années 1960, ne se serait pas déroulé de la même façon -- puisque nous ne doutons pas qu'il aurait tout de même eut lieu -- n'eut été de la situation tout à fait particulière qu'avait créée le NORAD. De plus, le fait que l'aviation canadienne soit, en bonne partie, devenue un appendice de l'américaine, lui a valu, jusqu'au moment de l'intégration des Forces canadiennes, tout au moins, des commentaires accusateurs qu'elle n'aurait sans doute pas reçus autrement.⁷⁵ Cela lui a nui presque autant que certains articles vides de fond que des officiers canadiens de l'élément air (en général) publient, de temps à autre, sur la valeur intrinsèque de NORAD.⁷⁶

Par contre, cette coopération resserrée, entre militaires canadiens et américains, a peut-être eu un bon côté. Il semble que, lors de la crise de Cuba, l'aviation canadienne se soit mise sur le pied d'alerte prévu dès que l'ordre est arrivé de Colorado Springs. Donc, bien avant que le Premier ministre ait pris la décision de suivre les Américains. Si cela se vérifiait, la preuve serait faite que le système de coopération, mis sur pied par les alliances militaires occidentales d'après-guerre, pourrait fonctionner aussi bien qu'espéré ... à condition bien sûr que le politique suive. L'on sait combien souvent l'inverse -- c'est-à-dire, accord au niveau politique mais entente parfois difficile à celui des opérations militaires -- s'est produit dans l'histoire (lors des coalitions anti-napoléoniennes ou, au cours des deux guerres mondiales du XX^e siècle).

Au NORAD, au contraire de ce qui se passe à l'OTAN, Canadiens et Américains se retrouvent en tête-à-tête. La première grande enquête journalistique sérieuse posait déjà toutes les questions auxquelles aucune réponse officielle n'a encore été apportée. Le Canada a-t-il une véritable liberté de choix dans ses affaires militaires? A-t-il ou aurait-il une voix à émettre sur le "quand" et le "comment" de l'utilisation de représailles nucléaires par les Américains? Au fond, le Canada a-t-il le plein contrôle de sa destinée ou n'est-il qu'un wagon attaché à la locomotive américaine?⁷⁷

Les responsables canadiens savaient, bien avant 1954, qu'un concept comme celui du NORAD, conduirait à un rétrécissement de la souveraineté de leur pays.⁷⁸ Ainsi, le genre d'armes que le Canada doit avoir en sa possession n'est plus une décision qui ne relève que de lui.⁷⁹ Il doit choisir, en grande partie, en vue du NORAD et de l'OTAN. À la fin, il s'agit de savoir si beaucoup des reproches imputés au NORAD n'auraient pas existé de toute façon? Notre réponse à cette interrogation est affirmative! Mais était-il nécessaire que cet état de fait soit officialisé et qu'il conduise à des désaccords entre les deux gouvernements qui s'étaleraient parfois sur la place publique? Ou encore, était-il nécessaire que les Canadiens aient une autre occasion de laisser percer leur anti-américanisme? Notre réponse à ces deux questions est un non mitigé. Si l'on croyait que NORAD fût nécessaire, il fallait y convertir l'opinion publique au départ, et maintenir son intérêt au long des années. Il ne fallait pas, croyons-nous, jouer furtivement avec un accord qui, un jour, selon qu'il fonctionne bien ou non, pourrait sauver le pays ou le conduire au désastre.

Au demeurant, pouvait-on en entretenir les Canadiens? Car, comment justifier les milliards de dollars investis pour prévenir le SAC, et le protéger (ainsi, éventuellement, que certains centres industriels) alors que presque aucun argent n'est mis dans la protection civile.⁸⁰ L'on sait, pourtant, que la population serait extrêmement touchée en cas de guerre nucléaire. Peut-être le gouvernement fédéral a-t-il voulu éviter un débat sur sa politique de défense générale qui est faible à bien des égards. On a souvent l'impression que la défense, qui relève entièrement de ce niveau de gouvernement, est escamotée, alors qu'on se lance dans des échanges sans fin, avec les provinces, au sujet de responsabilités qui relèvent plutôt d'elles.

Suite à tout ce qui précède, nous sommes en droit de nous demander, comme le faisait un commentateur, si NORAD ne serait pas le symbole de notre manque de réalisme et de notre indécision générale?⁸¹

Notes

1. Voir, tout de même, "Air defences too weak - Canadian General", Winnipeg Free Press, 13 juillet 1979, p. 1, où le major-général Ross Barber (Canadien) quitte son poste en protestation de l'emphase mise sur la défense anti-missile qui, prétend-il, laisse le continent ouvert aux bombardiers. Et "Canadian memo hitting NORAD plan minimized", Winnipeg Free Press, 24 novembre 1977, p. 13, où un mémorandum du major-général K.C. Lett (Canadien), qui faisait le procès de certains plans du NORAD, "coule" aux journaux.

2. Gray, C.S. "Air Defence: a sceptical view", Queen's Quarterly, vol. 79, printemps 1972 p. 3 à 13. Les mouvements anti-nucléaires, canadiens, s'attaquent, en général, à d'autres dangers qu'à ceux que pourrait causer la participation du Canada au NORAD.
3. Denison publia Modern Cavalry en 1868. Il reprit sa thèse (les cavaliers devaient maintenant devenir des fusiliers montés) dans History of Cavalry qui obtint le prix du tsar de Russie décerné "au meilleur ouvrage de tous les temps et de tous les pays, sur la cavalerie et les opérations militaires montées".
4. Gray, C.S. "Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy", Behind the Headlines, XXXI, juin 1972, nos 3 et 4, p. 2; Cox D. "NORAD renewed", Canadian Forum, vol. 48, mai 1968, p. 37; Sutherland R.J., "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation", International Journal XVII, no 3, été 1962, p. 202 et Gray, C.S., "Still on the team: NORAD in 1973", Queen's Quarterly, vol. 80, automne 1973, p. 298 à 404.
5. Voir, à ce sujet, Gravel, Jean-Yves. "Présentation" dans le Le Québec et la guerre. Montréal, Boréal express, 1974, p. 5 à 22.
6. Newman, P.C., "NORAD". Magazine Maclean, no 2, mai 1972, p. 19, 68 à 70, traduction de "Last days of NORAD", Maclean's Magazine, no 75, 21 avril 1962, p. 18-19 et 63 à 66.
7. "Le Canada renouvelle avec les États-Unis les accords de NORAD", Le Devoir, 1 avril 1968, p. 1; "NORAD: fausse alerte", op. cit., 9 juin 1980, p. 4 col. 1, art. 4; "Trudeau réaffirme sa foi en NORAD", op. cit., 29 décembre 1977, p. 1, col. 1, art. 2; "Autre fausse alerte à NORAD" (Reuter), op. cit., 6 juin 1980, p. 6, col. 4, art. 2. Deux exceptions dans ces communiqués: "La voix des femmes proteste contre le renouvellement du traité de NORAD sans débat parlementaire", op. cit., 15 avril 1968, p. 1 et Fauqueux, Didier, (Agence France Presse) "NORAD devra remplir une mission élargie", Le Droit, mercredi 13 mai 1981, p. 32.
8. Painchaud, Paul. "Le rôle du Québec dans l'Alliance atlantique". Le Soleil, 29 avril 1980, p. A6, Col. 1 art. 3; Vigny, Georges. "La vraie nature du Québec". Le Devoir, 9 mars 1978, p. 4., col. 1, art 2 et Morissette, Rodolphe. "Un Québec souverain et associé adhérerait à l'OTAN et au NORAD". op. cit., 4 juin 1979, p. 7, col. 1, art. 1.

9. Adamson. "Separate Quebec alters NORAD". Winnipeg Free Press. 30 décembre 1977, p. 6.
10. En tout, 17 articles en vingt-deux ans, répartis assez inégalement cependant. Mais cela constitue une sorte de record. Le Fin. Post a également publié deux importantes sections sur la défense canadienne en général (en 1977 et 1978 soit au moment où le gouvernement canadien prenait la décision de rééquiper sérieusement toutes ses forces militaires).
11. Lloyd, Trevor. "Frontier of Destiny - The Canadian Arctic". Behind the Headlines, Toronto, C.I.I.A., 1946, 16 p; Lorsque, en 1966, R. St-J. Macdonald publia, The Arctic Frontier (Toronto University of Toronto Press) un seul article fut consacré à l'utilisation militaire du nord canadien soit, Sutherland, R.S., The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic, p. 256 à 278.
12. S.S. "The Arctic Frontier and its Defence". The World Today. Juillet 1947, p. 292 à 298. Cette peur existe aussi chez certains Canadiens. Voir, à ce sujet, les documents significatifs préparés dès 1944, par le Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems. Eayrs, James, In Defence of Canada. Peacemaking and Deterrence. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 275 à 288.
13. Foulkes, C. "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age". Behind the Headlines, vol. XXI, mai 1961, no 1, p. 2 et 11. Voir aussi Barkway, Michael. "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defence". International Journal, vol. XIV, no 2, printemps 1959, p. 99 à 110.
14. De Poe, N. "How NORAD worked in Mid-East Crisis". Saturday Night, 73, 30 août 1958, p. 8-9 et 30-31.
15. Fraser, R.B. "What if war comes on land?" Maclean's Magazine, vol 71, 22 novembre 1958, p. 16-17 et 80-82. Voir aussi Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic".
16. Stairs, D. "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy" dans Massey, Hector J. The Canadian Military. A Profile. Toronto, Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972, p. 102.
17. Swanson, R.K. "NORAD: origins and operations of Canada's ambivalent symbol". International Perspectives, vol. 1, novembre-décembre 1972, p. 3 à 7.

18. Gray, "Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy"; "Defence in the 70s: Comments on the White Paper", Behind the Headlines, Vol XXX, octobre 1971, p. 3-4 (Andrew Brewin), 11 à 13 (J.L. Granatstein); Cox, D. "NORAD renewed", Canadian forum, vol. 48, mai 1968, p. 37 à 39; J.P. "NORAD va-t-il mourir de sa belle mort?" (éditorial) Cité Libre, vol. 15, novembre 1964, p. 1 et 2; Gray, "Air Defence: a sceptical view", (NORAD est inutile au point de vue stratégique.); Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic" p. 273-74 (NORAD sera valable aussi longtemps qu'il y aura des bombardiers.); Holmes, J.W. "Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues", Behind the Headlines, XXIX, March 1970, nos 1 et 2, 16 pages (NORAD doit être maintenu car la menace des bombardiers pourrait revenir). Enfin, voir la cinglante réponse à ces critiques, venue de Gellner, J. "What's a billion dollars? Enough to hamper other programs equally as urgent as purchasing Lockheed patrol aircraft". Executive, vol. 18, octobre 1976, p. 46.
19. "NORAD useless - experts". Montreal Star 27 août 1979, p. A4 où le général James Hill, commandant du NORAD, dit que ses intercepteurs de bombardiers sont dépassés par la nouvelle menace en présence. Aussi, "Air defences too weak - Canadian general".
20. Swanson, "NORAD: origins and operations of Canada's ambivalent symbol", p. 3.
21. Swanson, R.F. "The United States as a National Security Threat to Canada". Behind the Headlines. XXIX. Juillet 1970, nos 5 et 6, p. 10.
22. Cohen, M.A. "NORAD, NATO and the national interest". Saturday Night. no 73, 19 juillet 1958, p. 36; Taylor, J.E. "A Strong Man Armed". Canada and the World, vol. 44. septembre 1978, p. 21; Newman, P.C. "Last days of NORAD", p. 66; Eayrs, James. In Defence of Canada. 219 à 362; "What's the score in NORAD?" Canadian Aviation, vol. 31, no 12, février 1958, p. 38; Swanson, R.F. "The United States as a National Security Threat to Canada", p. 10; Gellner, J. "Problems of Canadian Defence" Behind the Headlines. Vol. XVIII, 1958, no 5, 14 p.; Foulkes, C. "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age" p. 18; Sutherland, R.J. "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation" p. 202; Laliberté, Denis. "Même si l'alliance sert surtout les fins américaines, la présence du Canada au sein de NORAD obéit au plus élémentaire réalisme" Le Devoir, 28 juillet 1975, p. 5, col. 1, art. 1; Preston, Richard A. Canada in World Affairs, 1959-

1961. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 140 à 150; Boyer, Gilles. "La politique de défense". Le Soleil, 18 septembre 1975, p. A4, col. 1, art. 1.
23. Gray, "Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy", p. 2; Conant, M. "Canada's Role in Western Defense", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XL, avril 1962, p. 431 à 442 et Cox, "NORAD renewed".
 24. Stanley, George F.G. Nos Soldats. Montréal, Éditions de l'Homme, 1980, p. 552; Pope, W.H. "Let the Russians Use the DEW-Line too?" Maclean's Magazine, vol. 72, no 10., 5 décembre 1959, p. 60; Conant, Melvin. The Long Polar Watch. Canada and the Defense of North America. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962, p. 88 et "Time to rediscover NORAD: Trudeau's visit" (Editorial) Toronto Globe and Mail, 4 janvier 1978, p. 7.
 25. Fraser, R.B. "Could Canada Stay Out of a U.S. War". Maclean's Magazine, vol. 71, 6 décembre 1958, p. 24-25 et 72; McLin, John B. Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1967, 251 p.; Swanson, "NORAD: origins and operations of Canada's ambivalent symbol", p. 3; Conant, M. "Canada's Role in Western Defense" Taylor, "A Strong Man Armed" p. 21.
 26. Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues", p. 2.
 27. S.S. "The Arctic Frontier and its Defence"; Lloyd, Trevor. "Canada's Strategic North" International Journal, vol. 2, 1946-47, p. 144 à 149.
 28. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic", p. 271.
 29. Gellner, "What's a billion dollars?" p. 43.
 30. Fraser, R.B. "Could Canada Stay Out of a U.S. War".
 31. McNaught, K. "National affairs". Saturday Night. vol. 80, mars 1965, p. 14 à 16; Gellner, J. "Liberals and NORAD". Canadian Commentator, vol. 5, no 2, février 1961, p. 2 à 4; Pope, "Let the Russians Use the DEW-Line too?" p. 10 et 60; Hertzman, Lewis, "Canada and the North Treaty Organization", dans Hertzman, Lewis, John W. Warnock et Thomas A. Hockin, Alliances and Illusions, Edmonton, Hurtig, 1969, p. 5; Gray, "Air Defence: a sceptical view"; Cox, "NORAD renewed", et Pope, W.H. "Strategy and Air". International Journal, vol. XVIII, no 1, hiver 63-64, p. 81 à 83.

32. Pope, W.H. "Let the Russians Use the DEW-Line too?", p. 60-61 et "Defence in 70s: Comment on the White Paper" (Major-Général F.S. Carpenter) p. 7 et 8.
33. Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age" p. 11 et 12 et Fraser, "Could Canada Stay Out of a U.S. War".
34. Fraser, R.B., "Our Airborne Maginot Line" dans Maclean's Magazine, vol. 71, 8 novembre 1958, p. 87; Newman, "Last days of NORAD" p. 66 et Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959-1961, p. 149-150.
35. "Time to rediscover NORAD: Trudeau's visit" (Editorial) Globe and Mail, 4 janvier 1978, p. 7.
36. Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues" p. 4; Fraser, "Could Canada Stay Out of a U.S. War" p. 25; Cox, "NORAD renewed"; "Time to rediscover NORAD: Trudeau's visit". Trois personnes différentes attaquent les mythes "influence" et "consultation" dans Alliances and Illusions par Hertzman, Warnock et Hockin: Dalton Camp, dans la préface (p. XI et XXI); Hertzman, dans "Canada and the North Treaty Organization" (p. 5) et Warnock, John W. dans son article "Canada and North American Defence" p. 57 à 68.
37. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, p. 217.
38. Gellner, J. "What's a billion dollars?" p. 46.
39. Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues", p. 4 et 5.
40. Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p. 7.
41. L'Américain Conant laisse même entendre qu'aux débuts de NORAD, les États-Unis firent accepter la crainte-missile. Dès que le Canada eut abandonné son projet de construire un intercepteur Arrow - dès lors devenu inutile - ils revinrent à la menace-bombardier. Les intercepteurs montés revenant à la mode, on vendit des Voodooos au Canada. Puis arriva la vraie conversion à la menace-missile. Voir Conant, "Canada's Role in Western Defence" p. 437.
42. "How Canada rubs NORAD" Fin. Post, vol. 56, 3 novembre 1962, p. 1; Nash, C.K. "Canada has been in U.S. Defence?" Fin. Post, vol. 56, 20 octobre 1962, p. 1 et 2 et Newman, "Last days of NORAD".

43. Gellner, J. "NORAD failure boosted war risk" Canadian Aviation, vol. 35, no 12, décembre 1962, p. 35 et Veni Vidi (pseud) "Current and Candid" Canadian Aviation, vol. 35, no 12, décembre 1962, p. 52.
44. "How Canada rubs NORAD" (Fin. Post) et Nash, "Canada has been in U.S. Defence?".
45. Hertzman, Warnock et Hockin, Alliances and Illusions, Camp. p. XVII-XVIII et Warnock, "Canada and North American Defence" p. 62 et 63.
46. "What's the score in NORAD?" p. 39 et Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic".
47. Taylor, "A Strong Man Armed" p. 21.
48. "New equipment to be sought to modernize NORAD radar" Fin. Post, vol. 71, 19 février 1977, p. D4, "Getting control over our NORAD territory" op. cit., vol. 72, supplément du 15 avril 1978, p. 19.
49. Baxter, C. "How far will we go in new defence deal with U.S.?" Fin. Post, vol. 61, 25 mars 1967, p. 1 et 4; "Bomarcbs may boost North Bay district" op. cit., vol. 53, 12 septembre 1959, p. 71; Fraser, "Our Airborne Maginot Line" p. 19; Newman, "Last days of NORAD" Camp, Préface de Alliance and Illusions, p. XVII. L'auteur prétend qu'il a coûté cher en temps perdu, matériel, main d'oeuvre, dignité et souveraineté.
50. Cox, D. "Requirements of Diplomacy called for renewal of NORAD" International Perspectives, vol. 4, juillet-août 1975, p. 13 à 17. Son témoignage est mitigé puisque NORAD, ajoute-t-il, serait inutile au niveau militaire. "Time to rediscover NORAD: Trudeau's visit" Globe and Mail; Gellner, "What's a billion dollars?" p. 46 et McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, p. 60.
51. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961.
52. Gellner, J. "The Place of Defence in the Economic Life of Canada" The Canadian Military, a Profile, p. 131.
53. Les États-Unis avaient mis de côté leur "Buy America Act" ainsi que certains droits de douanes et restrictions fiscales. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, p. 217.

54. Gellner, J. "The Place of Defence in the Economic Life of Canada", p. 132 à 134.
55. Warnock, "Canada and North American Defence" p. 89. Le NORAD aide aussi au développement de certaines villes. Voir "Bomarc's may boost North Bay district" Fin. Post.
56. Baxter, C. "NORAD: What will U.S. Want and what will Canada Agree to now?" Fin. Post, vol. 61, 25 mars 1967, p. 25-26; Laliberté, "Même si l'alliance ..." Gray, Colin S. Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance, Toronto, Clark, Irwin & Company, 1972, p. 208. Bien que plus tôt (p. 88 et 89) Gray ait soutenu que le programme pourrait être poursuivi entre les deux pays sans NORAD.
57. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, p. 172.
58. Gellner, "The Place of Defence in the Economic Life of Canada", p. 119 à 137. Ce que récuse Gray, "Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy" p. 19.
59. "Fighter - CL-44 defence swap: it could work" Fin. Post, vol. 54, 19 mars 1960, p. 31.
60. "NORAD losing ground in U.S. defence row", Fin. Post, 26 mars 1960, p. 3.
61. Baxter, C. "What we did in 'big alert'", Fin. Post, vol. 56, 3 novembre 1962, p. 1 et 4.
62. Baxter, C. "Canadian Officers pushing war score could be problem", Fin. Post, vol. 61, 16 septembre 1967, p. 1 et 2 et Solomon, Hyman, "Prickly Questions about NORAD's future not yet asked", Fin. Post, 28 septembre 1974 (où NORAD se situe-t-il dans les relations canado-américaines, demande-t-on?).
63. McNaught, "National Affairs" p. 15 et 16; Lapointe, P.M. "ET NORAD?" (éditorial) Le Magazine Maclean, vol. 7, 3 mai 1967; Granatstein J.L. "NORAD: renew or not?" Canadian Forum, vol. 47, juin 1967, p. 49 et 50; "La voix des femmes proteste contre le renouvellement du traité de NORAD sans débat parlementaire" Le Devoir.

64. Warnock, "Canada and North American Defence" p. 56. Warnock défend à nouveau ce point de vue, et beaucoup d'autres qui ont tous, à leur base, un anti-américanisme notoire dans "Partner to Behemoth. The Military Police of a Satellite Canada". Toronto, New Press, 1970 & 340 p.
65. Les trois auteurs de Alliances and Illusions appuient l'une ou l'autre de ces alternatives à NORAD dont Hockin, Thomas A. "The Foreign Policy Review and Decision making in Canada" p. 112 et 113; Holmes, "Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues" p. 14; Ritchie, Ronald S., "Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada", International Journal, vol. XIV, no 3, été 1959, pp. 202 à 212; Pope, "Let the Russians Use the DEW-Line too?"; J.P. "NORAD va-t-il mourir de sa belle mort?"; Burchill, C.S. "An Alternative Statement" International Journal, vol. XVIII, no 1, hiver 1962-63, p. 78; McNaught, "National Affairs", p. 15 et 16; Granatstein, "NORAD: renew or not?" p. 49 et 50. Voir aussi Thomas A. Hockin dans "Defence in the 70's: Comments on the White Paper" p. 14.
66. Eayrs, J. "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada" Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXVII, nos 1-2, avril 1969, 16 pages.
67. St-Laurent, L.S. "Visiting Forces - United States - Discipline International administration when in Canada" dans Debates House of Commons, p. 3790 à 3814 et suivantes ainsi que Lloyd, "Frontier of Destiny - The Canadian Arctic".
68. Cox, "NORAD renewed", p. 37.
69. Voir son programme de réarmement et ses déclarations en 1977 dans "Trudeau to be 1st Canadian PM to visit NORAD's nerve centre" Winnipeg Free Press, 27 décembre 1977, p. 15; Nickerson, Alex, "NORAD - deep under Cheyenne Mountain" Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 6 janvier 1978, p. 7; "Trudeau enthusiastic on NORAD" Winnipeg Free Press, 29 décembre 1977, p. 1 et 4.
70. Gellner, "Liberals and NORAD" p. 3 et 4; et "NORAD failure boosted war risk" comparés à "Cooking talk is phony issue" Canadian Aviation vol. 36, no 10, octobre 1963, p. 41 et 42.

71. Laliberté, "Même si l'alliance ...".
72. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959 à 1961, p. 140 et Cohen, "NORAD, NATO and the national interest" p. 36.
73. Taylor, "A Strong Man Armed" p. 20. Un fait sans précédent, selon l'auteur.
74. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, p. 37.
75. Conant, The Long Polar Watch. Canada and the Defense of North America, p. 84; Stanley, Nos Soldats, p. 552 et Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defence" p. 106-107.
76. Le dernier en date: Weston, W.C. (Colonel) "A Look Ahead at North American Air Defence in the Eighties and Beyond" Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 10, no 14, printemps 1981, p. 6 à 11.
77. Fraser, "Our Airborne Maginot Line".
78. "NORAD losing ground in U.S. defence row" Fin. Post.
79. Ritchie, "Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada". L'auteur écrit: "... Canada's decision on military hardware to be used on its soil and by its forces is no longer unilateral. Or, if unilateral, at least no longer Canadian." p. 202.
80. Cox, "NORAD renewed" p. 39 et Pope, "Let the Russians Use the DEW-Line too?" p. 60 et 61.
81. McNaught, "National Affairs" p. 16.

MILITARY EDUCATION, PROFESSIONALISM, AND DOCTRINE

[R.A. Preston]

While armed forces may have been seen in the nineteenth century as nationalistic institutions, the world wars and alliances of the twentieth century encouraged such a sharing of military doctrines, procedures, and values that military leaders often seemed less nationalistic than their civilian counterparts. In Canada, training and doctrine pushed officers of all three armed services into first a British, and later an American, mould, reinforcing the thesis of military sociologists who have argued the universalism of the profession of arms.

However Professor Richard Preston, the leading historian of Canadian military education, argues that specific military doctrines and forms of officer education have begun to develop in Canada, to meet the needs of a bilingual country whose armed forces have a heavy commitment to international peacekeeping. Since the 1950's, the reorientation of the Canadian forces to serve national as much as alliance goals has led to a conscious effort to "Canadianize", without damaging the service capacity to co-operate with current and potential allies.

To assess military power one can make fairly precise computations of manpower, armouries, natural resources, economic, industrial, agricultural, and technical capacity, and of the implications of strategic location and geographic configuration. Certain other factors are less measurable: ideology, national temperament, military tradition and reputation, and political organization: these must all be counted in the reckoning. But one other intangible element carries disproportionate weight, the quality and morale of a state's armed forces and their potential contribution to stability and effective government as well as to national security. Training, education, professional development, and indoctrination can be crucial.

Indoctrination means teaching that can guide or shape conduct. This is to say a "military doctrine." Brigadier-General Dale O. Smith defined military doctrine as a body of

concepts and principles that has achieved enough official support to be taught in service schools and to have gained acceptance at the highest staff levels. He said that it refers to the philosophy of waging war.¹

Military doctrine must be distinguished from the familiar principles of war on the one hand, and from military policy, strategy, and tactics on the other. The principles of war are unchanging general truisms that apply to the conduct of operations in the widest sense. Policy, strategy, and tactics adapt the principles of war to meet the requirements of specific situations at the appropriate levels of action. Basic military doctrine must be suited to the nature of the armed forces and to the times for which they are designed. It may change or vary, even if only slowly, as new circumstances, interpretations, or applications bring forth different beliefs and teachings. It should be the basis on which military leaders give responsible advice to their civilian masters who determine policy. Once policy is enunciated the military should carry it out faithfully, even if the policy departs in some measure from their tendered advice. On the other hand, to be effective the advice that has been given must have taken into its purview the political, economic, and other factors on which policy can be based. Otherwise it will be self-defeating. Finally, basic military doctrine includes, but must be distinguished from, strategic doctrines and tactical doctrines which relate to particular circumstances.

Basic military doctrine may be implicit and tacit, or explicit and overt. Older services and countries with a long military tradition impart doctrine tacitly. On the other hand, arms of service that seek to assert the significance of their contribution, like the U.S. Air Force which wished to assert the importance of air power as against earlier army doctrine and continuing army domination, may teach basic doctrine overtly.² Similarly, nations striving to assert their emergence from colonial dependency, their autonomy within an alliance with a powerful ally, or some other implication of conditions peculiar to their circumstances, may strive to stress a distinctive national military doctrine. An Italian officer recently explained why. "Doctrine is valid and sound only in so far as it reflects and is congruent with cultural background, and in so far as it is not limited to axioms, principles, and well-written statements. Otherwise doctrine can easily mislead with dangerous consequences."³

How far has military education and the development of military professionalism in Canada produced and accepted Canadian military doctrine? Canada became primarily responsible for defence in 1867 but, increasingly confident that the Americans would not resort to war about Canadian-American issues, and engrossed with peaceful development of a vast territory, Canadians were reluctant to assume defence costs. They placed their trust in a part-time militia.⁴ Conditioned by what Dr. Morton described as defencelessness coupled with invulnerability, Canadian military professionalism was slow to emerge. The Royal Military College in Kingston, modelled on West Point, was staffed by British officers who brought their Imperial military values, attitudes, and methods. A few graduates were commissioned annually in the British Army; most of the rest took up civilian professions and at first rarely served even in the militia.⁵ Most Militia officers were not fit to command because few of them could spare three months to attend the Militia schools staffed by Canada's first regular officers. The permanent force officers' time was occupied with instruction, limiting their practical professional experience. Not until the eve of the First World War did they get training opportunities to develop their professionalism.⁶

Though the model for both regular and Militia officers was British professionalism, political patronage pervaded Canada's forces. Confrontation between military proficiency and political interference came to a head in 1914 when Sir Sam Hughes, an eccentric Minister of Militia, gave appointments in the Canadian Expeditionary Force as personal political favours. In Britain and France the CEF trained under British officers and NCOs. It was at first commanded and staffed by British regulars. It was under the operational command of the British GHQ; but it had a degree of independence because its commander could communicate directly with the Canadian government.⁷ CEF officers came to value British military expertise and to resent political intrusion;⁸ but Hughes's contempt for British staff officers hastened the appointment of a Canadian as GOC and of Canadians in all but a few of the staff slots. The Canadian Corps became one of the most proficient units in trench warfare. It resorted more than most other allied units to raids, barbed wire, meticulous preparation for attack, massed machine-gun tactics, and precise counter-battery work. Many of these distinctive characteristics derived from its Canadian roots and from the degree of autonomy which it enjoyed.⁹ This was embryonic Canadian military professionalism.

Canada had no navy until the eve of the war. Its naval college founded in 1910 was designed to produce full-time professional officers, rather than part-time officers like RMC. Its staff, from the Royal Navy, taught British doctrine though with some awareness of Canadian characteristics. During the war Canada built a navy of small ships. But after the war the naval college was closed and the navy was reduced to a token force officered by men whose ideas were shaped by the RN and its "big ships".¹⁰

First World War experience had led to the belief that Canada needed larger regular armed forces, but budgeting restrictions kept the Militia's strength at less than 4,000,¹¹ and there was little opportunity for training and professional development. British ties, including cooperation for Imperial Defence, were its governing factors.¹² From shortly before the war, RMC had produced fifty graduates annually, but in peacetime conditions the pick of these accepted a few commissions offered by the British Army each year and the rest, as before, became civilians, serving in the Militia if a unit was conveniently near. In addition to an engineering course that led to a final year in a Canadian university, RMC gave some basic military training, including artillery drills. What gave RMC cadets their military indoctrination was the four years under strict military discipline. Although now staffed by Canadian officers and civilian professors, British service ideas and ideals still prevailed.¹³

But some individuals began to think that what Canada's armed forces needed instead was a military doctrine and equipment appropriate to their national circumstances. A Canadian lieutenant won a prize for an essay which advocated a "gradual but steady progress in the post-war military thought of this dominion towards distinctively Canadian doctrine supplementary to, but not incompatible with, the British imperial doctrine of which it is part."¹⁴ The fact that he, like the better-known planner of an invasion of the United States, Colonel "Buster" Sutherland Brown,¹⁵ was apparently thinking of operations against the United States, does not detract from the fact that this was a diversion from orthodox British Imperial Defence teaching and a step towards a national doctrine. The official Canadian Defence Quarterly was edited for a long time in the thirties by an officer with an original turn of mind, Colonel Kenneth Stuart, who published articles derived from sessions of the Imperial Defence College in London in which Canadian and Australian officers questioned British interpretations of

Imperial Defence strategy, including those of the IDC Commandant, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.¹⁶ Some Canadian service personnel were thus beginning to kick against the pricks of a military doctrine of which British military leaders were the high priests.

In 1939 Canada declared war on Germany only seven days after Britain. Canadian divisions had three years of training, much of it in Britain, before they went into action. This long period of preparation, and the operations that followed, once again made Canada's regular and Militia officers experienced soldiers. Towards the end of the war it was assumed that, while the Militia would still be embodied in a future major war, expanded regular regiments would play a greater part and give the lead. The other two services would similarly be larger than before the war. The chief of the general staff, General Charles Foulkes, appointed a committee to study the problem of producing officers in peacetime. RCN and RCAF officers attended as observers.¹⁷

The technical requirements of modern war now made imperative an adequate supply of what at that time were sometimes exclusively called "professional officers", meaning only the officers in the technical corps, not all regulars. Technical officers must be educated to the same standards as their opposite numbers in industry, which in Canada meant an honours degree in engineering or its equivalent. The officer production committee was chaired by an ex-cadet of RMC, Deputy CGS Brigadier D.M. Chesley, and it had three other ex-cadet members. The Chesley committee recommended the re-opening of RMC which had been closed in 1942. It said that the college could combine military training in leadership and discipline with mental training in the fundamentals of military, scientific, and cultural knowledge. It visualized that the RMC would, as before the war, offer a choice between regular and Militia service.¹⁸

But to produce all the regular officers that Canada now required would require a very large expansion of the College or the addition of a second source of officers. General Foulkes, who was not an ex-cadet, argued that the latter step would make for an officer corps lacking in desirable homogeneity. He therefore proposed that all officers should be drawn from the universities. After graduation they would take a one year, purely military, course at RMC.¹⁹ Douglas Abbot, Minister of National Defence, then appointed a committee of officers, civil servants, academics, and scientists to draft an officer-production plan. Chaired by Brigadier Sherwood Lett, DCGS, with only one member who had served on the faculty of RMC and an ex-cadet to represent

the RMC club, this committee recommended two parallel routes to a commission, one through RMC and the second through the universities' training corps.²⁰

The naval college had been re-opened at Royal Roads, B.C., in 1942, the year when RMC closed, to train officers for Canada's expanding wartime navy. In 1947 Royal Roads began to admit applicants for RCAF commissions to its two-year courses.²¹

Brooke Claxton, a new Minister of National Defence, after some delay, decided to adopt the Lett Committee's dual scheme, provided it linked RMC with Royal Roads to produce officers for all three services in a tri-service college system.²² In 1951, when the Korean War showed that the Cold War would increase the demand for regular officers, a Regular Officers Training Plan restricted entry to RMC, Royal Roads, and the ROTP university training units to applicants for regular long-service commissions.²³ After graduating from the Canadian Services Colleges, technical officers went on to complete an engineering degree by a further year in a Canadian university.

All that was common to all three services in the new tri-service college system, apart from very basic military training and life under a military regime, was an academic element. This caused some to fear that military training and indoctrination had been downgraded too much. These doubts were only partly assuaged by the outstanding performance of Canadian Army RMC graduates sent direct to Korea. But the RCAF had from the first insisted on a four-year college course for all its aspirants for long-service commissions; and this held the line.²⁴ General Guy Simonds, when he succeeded Foulkes as CGS, continued to believe that non-technical army officers needed only a two-year course at RMC or junior, instead of senior, matriculation.²⁵ Yet he, too, apparently believed in the value of academic development, for he would have sent the non-technical officers for a further year of general study in a university at the pass-degree level later in their careers.²⁶

The Royal Canadian Navy continued until 1950 to send its officer candidates to RMC or the sister college, Royal Roads, for only two years' academic work before going to sea. It followed up sea service by a six-months' sub-lieutenant course at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, England. That practice ceased after a mutiny on the aircraft carrier Magnificent led to a royal commission that charged the root of the trouble had been that R.N.-trained officers were out of touch with Canadian ratings. The commissioners,

Leonard Brockington, L.O. Audette, and Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff Rear-Admiral Rollo Mainguy said that the RCN was a pallid imitation and reflection of the Royal Navy. It lacked Canadian navy traditions. The commission found that mutiny had arisen from conflict between RN attitudes and a healthy Canadian national consciousness among the ratings.²⁷ RCN cadets therefore now began to follow the same tri-service path to a commission as their fellows in the other two services. The Canadian Services' Colleges' course was rounded out as one of the complete routes to a commission in all corps when arrangements were made in 1959 for RMC to give degrees in engineering, science, and arts on a par with Canadian universities.²⁸

The requirement of a four-year academic preparation and a university degree for long-service commissions in all three services had left doubts about objectives in officer preparation. In 1949, soon after RMC re-opened, the Adjutant-General, Major-General G. Weeks, had convened a committee of army officers to advise him about officer development. It concluded that basic to its enquiry was a need for clarification of the Army's purpose and role.²⁹ This may have referred to the question whether a large expeditionary force would ever be needed again. The frequent use of the word "indoctrination" in all these debates suggested that many believed that Canadian officers needed something more than an academic education and a basic military training supplemented by summer training with the service of the individual's choice. Education and training in the service colleges and OTC units were now completely in the hands of Canadian personnel. It was apparently taken for granted that cadets would naturally develop a loyalty to their country now that there was no "colonial" or "imperial" conflict of interest or purpose.

Meanwhile one of the results of industrial and trade development since 1914 had been that Canada had become more closely associated economically with the United States. Exports of raw materials to the United States, pulp and ores, led the sale of wheat to Britain as the mainstay of the Canadian economy. The two wars, which had developed her industrially, had simultaneously made Canada more dependent on the United States instead of on Britain for investment capital and for manufactured goods. The Imperial Preference tariffs negotiated at Ottawa in 1932 had also had the perverse effect of encouraging Americans to build branch plants within Canada to get behind the protective walls; and so they further increased Canadian economic subservience to the United States. Finally the Second World War brought the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements for cooperation for

defence and war production.³⁰ After the war, although some Canadian soldiers wanted to revive Canada's old military standardization with Britain (and one Chief of the General Staff, Guy Simonds, went so far as to introduce a guards regiment of the European type),³¹ it was clear that in future Canada would be dependent more on the United States for weapons, training, and mutual defence with a resultant substantial American influence on military doctrine in Canada. Canada might try to offset her new ties to the United States by stressing links with Europe in NATO from 1949 on, but that alliance, and NORAD from 1957, reinforced Canada's dependence on the United States. Canada had, in effect, substituted a junior partnership in an American alliance for its former British-Empire military relationship.

Events during World War II had shown that this new tie could be even more irksome than the old. Canadian officers had argued that Canadians would fight better when in recognizable Canadian units, formations, commands, armies, navies, and air forces; but the RCAF was virtually entirely integrated into the RAF, limiting opportunities for Canadian airmen to rise to top staff jobs. The Canadian Army had enjoyed considerable autonomy within the United Nations alliance, although under British operational direction; but RCN officers had chafed first under the British Admiralty and then under American command. Dr. Douglas's chapter in this book shows that Canadian sailors wanted control of the Atlantic off Newfoundland but that when they got it the RCAF did not have suitable aircraft to project that control to mid-Atlantic.³² The truth was that before the War Canada had not developed either a military organization with the necessary equipment, or a military doctrine, either to fight in an alliance, or to serve distinctive Canadian interests where those diverged from the general objective of winning the war.

A most imperative motive for the development of a distinctive Canadian military system was domestic. One-third of the nation was French-speaking. Yet, although there were prestigious French-speaking army regiments, French-Canadians were under-represented in the upper echelons of the Army and even worse throughout the RCN and the RCAF which were rigidly monolingual.³³ Seeing this as an obstacle to national unity, and because the Liberal government was dependent on Quebec votes, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in 1951 established the Collège Militaire Royale (CMR) at St. Jean, P.Q. as a third Canadian Services College.³⁴ Later, in the seventies, when extensive language programs were introduced in the federal civil service to foster bi-lingualism, the Canadian Services Colleges set up second-language programs

to ensure that every graduate was competent in both of Canada's official languages. Canada is not alone in having linguistic minorities, but she has probably gone further than any other country to provide for equality. Bilingualism thus introduced at the pre-commissioning level introduced a feature that made Canada's military establishment distinctive from its British and American allies. However some die-hards complain that this must be at the expense of military efficiency. The official response is that bilingualism is essential for the maintenance of national unity which is a source of strength.

A new means of further clarifying the distinctive nature, purpose, and role of the Canadian Armed forces in other respects had come with the post-war development of advanced military educational systems. In the First World War, Sam Hughes's pathological hatred of staff officers had slowed the development of staff courses for the CEF. The second conflict saw an army staff college set up, first in Britain and then, after RMC closed down in 1942, at Kingston in Ontario. After the war the army and air force each maintained its own staff college, the former at Fort Frontenac in Kingston, and the latter at Armour Heights in Toronto. Canada also set up a higher level National Defence College for Army brigadiers and above, and their equivalents in the RCN, RCAF, and civil services. NDC was housed with the Army staff college. Canadian staff colleges drew much from British practice and example. The National Defence College was modelled on the Imperial Defence College and was established by a British General.³⁵ Though some Canadian officers still went to Britain or elsewhere for staff training, most now stayed in Canada. All these institutions were a means by which Canadian interests, purposes, and attitudes could be served or developed. Potentially this could be a step towards defining a Canadian military profession and a Canadian military doctrine.

The development of military professionalism in Canada after World War II must, however, be considered in relation to contemporary sociological theory. The martial virtues developed by military training and operational experience had long been recognized: and education and training as the foundations of military professionalism also had a long background history;³⁶ but it was not until 1957 that they were satisfactorily defined and described. Samuel Huntington showed that military education is an intellectual process that develops skills, corporateness, and a spirit of service, much in the same way as with other professions like law, medicine, and the church.³⁷

Morris Janowitz's The Professional Soldier published in 1960 then stimulated scholarly investigation of the qualities that distinguish military professionalism from civilian aspects of society and of the role of the military and its influence.³⁸ A preliminary conclusion of sociologists and others was that military professionalism is universal and general in nature. Immediately after the Second World War an American psychologist, G.D. Spindler, by studying the German and American armies, had come to the conclusion that throughout the entire West a common heritage from feudalism "provided rationale for considering the military as universal in its characteristics,"³⁹ a rather startling contradiction of the contemporary popular belief that Nazi Germany's militarism was sui generis. In similar vein Huntington wrote that "the peculiar skill of the military officers is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes in time or location..., the same standards of professional competence apply in Russia as in America, and in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth".⁴⁰ This view has laid the basis for some to assume that in the nuclear age there are correct military responses to international situations that are based on purely military considerations. So, in a 1980 book by a West Point political scientist on nuclear doctrine, after paying lip-service to civil supremacy, the author proceeded to assume that military doctrine must determine, rather than serve, national policy.⁴¹ This is the extreme position on the universality of military doctrine. However most sociologists had put a low profile on well-recognized national differences in order to "press for the broadest conclusions about military professionalism" for the purpose of exploring political implications, in order to focus on what is common to all military men regardless of nationality, and in order to evaluate the impact of the profession on the conduct of affairs.⁴²

Sociologists' assertions that military doctrine is universal in nature, and their efforts to distinguish the qualities of military professionalism from civilian, overlooked the fact that law and the church, and even medicine, are to some extent subject to variations based on national circumstances. They also tend to play into the hands of military groups and great powers that wished to stress the concept of a universal military doctrine for their own advantage and to diminish understanding that small allies need to develop a military doctrine that can serve their interests as well as the common good.

Bengt Abrahamsson, a sociologist whose work was based on Swedish and American examples, suggested that, after adequate consideration of "international invariances,"

national and other deviations could be worked out in greater detail.⁴³ In 1953 Janowitz had indeed noted Raymond Gart-hoff's demonstration that Soviet military doctrine diverged from Western military universalism by drawing upon Marxist-Leninism, Imperial Russian doctrine, foreign influences, and the geographical-political basis of the power situation in the U.S.S.R.⁴⁴ Janowitz had also remarked that Hanson W. Baldwin, the distinguished New York Times military correspondent, had coined the phrase "military philosophy" and had said that it derived from mens' hearts and minds, from social mores and customs, from a people's traditions and environment, from national and racial attitudes, from geography, and from the nature of the potential military threat. Hence in 1960 Janowitz had qualified Huntington's dictum thus, "the military profession of each nation developed a military doctrine which reflects its social environment."⁴⁵

But in some respects Janowitz helped to separate military doctrine from national considerations. Noting the non-emergence of an American military doctrine, Janowitz identified two opposing schools of thought. Both of these, he said, claimed to be based on scientific and professional understanding of war-making but actually stemmed from a dichotomy in the fundamental social and political values in American society. He labelled the first of these "absolutist." It assumed that war is inevitable and that the goal in conflict must be total victory. Janowitz called the rival school "pragmatic." Pragmatists believe that war is only one of several instruments in international relations and that political objectives can be achieved by adapting the use or threat of force to suit the nature of the desired objectives. They assume that technological and other developments have brought the need for a new trend in military organization which Janowitz called "the constabulary concept."⁴⁶ He applied this concept to T.C. Schelling's hypothetical "Special Surveillance Force" proposed for the purpose of monitoring arms limitation by the superpowers. That force would employ the traditional military capabilities of readiness, speed, reliability, self-sufficiency, versatility, and ability to improvise, but in the constabulary rather than the traditional military role.⁴⁷

Janowitz advanced the constabulary concept to facilitate innovation in military organization and doctrine. He remarked that there are still absolutists among the American military, but he inferred that the pragmatic constabulary concept is now more appropriate because nuclear technology and other developments have affected the way in which future conflict is likely to develop. The constabulary concept is

relevant not only to peacekeeping forces but also to deterrent forces. Janowitz suggested that an understanding of the nature of the trend might be aided by making comparisons of the American military with the military of other countries, and especially of the so-called "new nations."⁴⁸

In the 1960's many sociology seminars studied armed forces generally, and forces in Western Europe, in peacekeeping operations, and in emergent nations in particular. They produced several volumes of published papers in a thorough exploration of the way in which the models developed by Huntington and Janowitz apply elsewhere as well as in the United States. Many of these papers suggested that the self-image of the soldier everywhere has been affected by changes in the nature of warfare, of technology, and of society. Authors discussed the nature of the military and its organization in various countries, its growing acceptance of a constabulary or fire-brigade role, and its universalism along with the retention of some, usually unspecified, national distinctions.⁴⁹ A paper on the Irish Army which did more than most to identify national distinctions found that the Irish soldier was kept in a constabulary role in readiness for a battle that "he will never fight."⁵⁰ Two papers showed that, contrary to popular belief, the military in new nations have shown themselves to be less, and not more, nationalistic than contemporary civilian groups.⁵¹ Thirdly, international peacekeeping forces were seen as the constabulary role in action; and at least one scholar found them to be effective because of the common and universal characteristics of military professionalism which facilitate cooperation.⁵² Sociological scholarship thus tended to confirm the importance of the concept of a military doctrine that was universal in application and to agree with the soldier's predilection in all countries to regard himself as a professional first and a nationalist second, overlooking the possibility of distinctive national military characteristics or attitudes.

This flow of sociological scholarship had paid too little attention to Canadian examples to explore the possibility of national implications in the development of military doctrine. Although Canada had been among the first to train troops for peacekeeping duties and place them on stand-by (but not exclusively) for U.N. emergencies, Janowitz listed only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark in that respect, even when those countries only called up reservists and militiamen for ad hoc duty in Cyprus;⁵³ but he did, however, note that Canada had taken the lead in peacekeeping by organizing an international conference on the subject in 1964.⁵⁴ There was no paper on Canada among those published

from the proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology at Evian in 1966 which covered national military images and peacekeeping.⁵⁵ At a smaller follow-up session in London, McGill sociologist David Solomon reported that Canadian officers in Cyprus felt that they were playing a "professionally detached role" and they were there "to serve the U.N. and the contending parties." One of them told Solomon, "This is no job for soldiers, but only soldiers could do it."⁵⁶ Hence, editor J. Van Doorn said that Solomon's paper indicated the detachment of the Western officer from political considerations and his willingness to adapt to new roles,⁵⁷ an apparent confirmation of the primary importance of universalism, rather than national distinctiveness, in military professionalism. When C.C. Moskos in 1970 pointed to the levels of conflict within UNFICYP forces and said that some were due to national differences,⁵⁸ editor Van Doorn commented only on Moskos' references to the universal characteristics in national contingents.⁵⁹

Other disciplines have shown a greater awareness of the importance of national circumstances in the formulation of military doctrine. A number of the essays in The Theory and Practice of War, a volume of historical essays presented to Basil Liddell Hart in 1966, showed the way in which the military in Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States had at various times attempted with varying degrees of validity and success to fashion peculiarly national forms of military doctrine.⁶⁰ Another work describes the Soviet view, "Military doctrine ... is formed on the basis of the entire life-experience of a state and is the result of an extremely complex and protracted historical process of creation and development of state ideas. Therefore, military doctrine is national in character. There can be no single military doctrine for all states..."⁶¹ Canadian sociologist, Pierre Coulombe examined the "changing military career in Canada" to show the effects of the integration of the three services in the 1960's on the evolution of a more Canadianized constabulary force, using that phrase, as had Janowitz, to mean not only peacekeeping forces, but also deterrent forces generally. Coulombe discussed the social and ethnic composition of Canada's forces and their capacity to contribute to social change without seriously diminishing their combat readiness. He suggested that unification of the three Canadian armed services which had taken place in the late 1960's would lead to forces that were more Canadian in their composition and outlook.⁶²

During the early 1960's, while the seeds that Huntington and Janowitz had planted were beginning to bear fruit in academic discussion of military professionalism, the

Canadian armed forces were seeking a clarification of their role and an awareness of their purpose and identity. In 1958 the Director of Military Training had stated that the Army Staff College, in addition to teaching staff duties in field and static formations in time of war, must broaden the knowledge of Canadian officers "in such ways as will be valuable to them and to the Army in peace time."⁶³ But four years later the Commandant complained that the College taught no formal Canadian tactical doctrine. He said that twenty-three per cent of the instruction was on current doctrine and seventy-seven per cent on what had come to be known in the college as "Canadian Army Staff College Future Doctrine" for which Canadian, British, and American manuals could not be used; but these had to be "followed fairly religiously ... stifling discussion." He felt that only one doctrine should be studied at the College, "the official one;" therefore he asked that Army Headquarters give directions about equipment and likely changes in organization so that the College could teach doctrine and not concepts.⁶⁴

One of the things that called for change in traditional staff college instruction on tactics and organization had been mentioned in 1958, namely "the growing number of international staff appointments associated with our participation in NATO, UNEF, and other pact agreements."⁶⁵ But by 1964, when Canada hosted the international conference on peacekeeping, participation in that international constabulary function had already become a continual duty for Canada's armed forces. Indeed, Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, told the delegates that the adaptation of the military art to maintaining the peace might be said to have been "too successful" in the sense that it had militated against permanent political solutions and was becoming a permanent military duty.⁶⁶ Whether they liked it or not, Canadian officers would have to accept this new role for a long time to come. The question therefore, was how could the profession be educated for it?

A potent factor that induced re-examination of the role of Canadian service officers, and therefore a new look for a doctrine, was the reorganization of Defence Headquarters and the creation of an integrated defence which was approved by Parliament in 1964 and made law in 1968. A Manpower Study in 1965, which used Huntington's criteria for military professionalism, pointed to the complexity of military skills now needed by the Canadian officer. It commented that the general public was not impressed by military professionalism and was suspicious of the military mind. It discussed the development of a career philosophy to strengthen the officer corps, and it explored training requirements for

integrated services in which field commands would be reorganized on functional lines. What the officers of the former three services had in common must be the professionalism needed as a base for carrying out various different functions. The report added that a special need of Canadian officers was bilingualism; but this would vary in degree with the employment in which individual officers were engaged.⁶⁷

On October 16, 1967, to report on the implications of the integration of the officer corps and on a means of offsetting a current drain of many highly trained officers, General J.V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff, established the Officer Development Board under Major General R. Rowley. The ODB examined Canada's military education system and compared it with those of other powers. It analysed contemporary theory of military professionalism and made a careful distinction between a "military philosophy" for the solution of social and political problems that views conflict as universal and inevitable and places emphasis on the importance of continual preparedness, and the "military ethic" which includes a code of moral values and makes a clear distinction between armed strength and bellicosity. The Rowley committee thus applied Hanson Baldwin's phrase "military philosophy" to what was in effect Janowitz's absolutism that glorifies violence. By contrast Rowley's "military ethic" was Janowitz's pragmatism which embodies the military virtues of ordered power, discipline, and restraint and fully recognizes the supremacy of the civil power.

The ODB study asserted that in the first half of the twentieth century the Canadian Militia's links with the British Army had given Canadian officers the social outlook and elitist attitudes of their British contemporaries and so had isolated them from Canadian society. Canadian officers also leaned towards an imperial strategy rather than to a concern for Canada's own problems: promotion examinations had covered imperial military geography and imperial military history rather than Canada's economy and foreign policy. From about 1925 the Canadian government had turned away from imperial strategy planning; but Canadian officers, consciously or otherwise, had continued to think in terms of imperial defence centralization. This was partly because Canada had no intelligence capability and was dependent on British sources, and partly because of the tradition of standardization. Not until the Second World War were the broad principles of a truly Canadian foreign policy laid down to give the military positive guidance. These principles were the maintenance of national unity, a belief in the concept of political liberty, respect for the rule of law, and acceptance of international responsibilities. Certain

special Canadian considerations must also be part of the context in which a Canadian force must work, namely bilingualism and biculturalism, and equality of opportunity for all.

The ODB also said that the Royal Military College could still indoctrinate cadets with those aspects of leadership that had in the past guaranteed national security; and it could preserve the military traditions that had historically engendered pride and coherence in the officer corps. But the guiding principles of the Canadian educational system must now be to prepare officers to contribute to a Canadian national strategy, to foster a Canadian national ethic, to promote bilingualism and biculturalism, and to further the unification of the armed forces while at the same time remaining abreast of scientific, technological, economic, educational, military, and strategic changes. The Rowley Report therefore proposed modifying officer-production methods borrowed from the major powers to make them fit the concept of a "distinctively Canadian military ethic to produce the right kind of officer for our unified forces within the context of expected sociological trends to the turn of the century." To achieve this desired Canadianization of the officer corps, the ODB proposed centralizing all Canada's military educational institutions under one command, and in one place.⁶⁸

This proposal was made in accordance with the ODB's terms of reference which were to recommend the ideal system without taking cost into consideration. But the relocation of institutions would have faced great resistance from established interests. Even more important, it would have been prohibitively expensive. All that was done therefore was the centralization of the administration of military education. Furthermore, within a year of the appearance of the ODB report, Prime Minister Trudeau's government issued its long-awaited White Paper on foreign policy which turned away from the internationalism of the Pearson years towards a greater concern for Canada's immediate interests. Accordingly, a directive of September 8, 1970, instructed the Canadian Defence Educational Establishments, the organization set up to oversee all parts of the officer education system, to extend Rowley's findings by conducting a study of the way in which the military profession in Canada should develop in the next two decades.⁶⁹ This new study could also take into its purview, not only the revised foreign policy, but also the subsequent revision of Canadian defence policy to stress the preservation of Canadian sovereignty and territorial

control. That policy was not announced publicly until August 24, 1971 in the White Paper, Defence in the Seventies, but its broad outlines were presumably known earlier to the C.D.E.E.

As a preliminary to making this new study of military professionalism, Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch invited a number of Canadian academics to a seminar of officers at Fort Frontenac, the site of the National Defence College in Kingston, to present their views on various aspects of the Canadian military profession in the 1970's. Their papers covered a wide variety of subjects including the deterrent contribution of conventional forces, security functions, peacekeeping, technical education, and the future composition of the armed forces based on present sociological trends. Most of these papers stressed the increasing rapidity of social and technical change and the probability of continued international tension short of total nuclear war; but they also added that many of the problems that faced Canadian forces were peculiarly Canadian. Collectively they led to a conclusion that Canada, while building on the traditions of the past, should give immediate attention to military educational development to prepare for her new responsibilities. The C.D.E.E. circulated those papers as preliminary reading for a second seminar of senior officers held in October 1971.⁷⁰

A Working Group of the C.D.E.E. Directorate also prepared a preliminary "draft report of a study of professionalism" for the new seminar. The group's draft paper was careful to assert that it was not a revision of the Rowley Report to bring it in line with what some critics had seen as a "shift away" from the international nature of the Canadian military commitment. It said that the Rowley report was written in a time of transition or ambivalence but that, nonetheless, despite its emphasis on internationalism, its strongest theme was one of "Canadianism." It had aimed at an officer development system to meet Canadian needs, to function in a Canadian milieu, to help produce people to contribute to a Canadian national strategy.⁷¹

The Working Group referred to the work of sociologists Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer who had pioneered the concept of military professionalism; but it noted, without giving details, that each of those authorities had spoken about the military profession "in what are really quite different terms."⁷² The Group's own interpretation of the nature of the modern military function was more like that of Sir John Hackett who regarded the military profession, not as "managers of violence," but as responsible for an ordered application of force in the resolution of social problems.⁷³

That is quite different. A second difference from the sociologists' approach is that while most sociological writing had been directed to identifying similarities with, and differences from, other professions and had become absorbed in a debate about the relation of the military to the state and its contribution to stability or instability, the Working Group turned to the specific nature of Canadian military professionalism.

The thesis in the Working Group's draft report was that, if loyalty and commitment are keywords in speaking of a military professional in Canada, then "identity" is also needed. It noted the switch from an emphasis on internationalism to Canadianism in Canadian foreign and defence policy but held that Canada had continued to accept its international responsibilities.⁷⁴ It said that in peacetime Canadian forces needed to know what the military is for before they can decide how they will be organized and developed; and it suggested that this would now be easier because a closer emphasis on Canadianism could facilitate the formulation of a "statement of Canadian military professionalism" or a "philosophy of Canadian military service."

Ignoring the useful distinction that Rowley had made between a "military philosophy" and a "military ethic," it attempted an expression of a Canadian military philosophy under four headings:⁷⁵ the military in Canadian society, the society from the point of view of the military, the individual from the point of view of the military, and the military from the individual serviceman's view point. The group argued that contrary to trends in the United States and Western European countries, a feeling of nationalism is now stronger in Canada than in the past, despite the growth of transnationalism among Canadian youth. It asserted that one reason for this was "the American shadow," and the second was the "the northern frontier."

The report asserted the struggle for articulation of a Canadian identity has thus now given way to an awareness of Canadianism and that this can be seen in the revision of Canadian foreign-aid and defence policies, in concepts of the quality of life and of economic nationalism, in the issues of Quebec separatism, bilingualism, and bi-culturalism, and in the declaration of jurisdiction over adjacent ocean resources. The group stated that members of the armed forces are as much involved in these developments as are all other Canadians. They should therefore be encouraged to believe in Canada and in the notion that its Armed Forces contribute not only to its security but also to the growth of the nation.⁷⁶ Final recommendations were that, while fighting

skills must be maintained, a philosophy of service with a Canadian orientation must be developed within the forces, the commitment to the armed forces' goals must be emphasized, and these should be related to national goals.⁷⁷

In July, 1971, in an address entitled "The Challenge of Change" delivered to the Staff College at Armour Heights, the Chief of the Defence Staff confirmed the need for a critical look at "our professional approach." After noting that tremendous technical development has enhanced the role of the professional engineer and the military manager in the Canadian military hierarchy, he declared that what was needed was a greater capacity to give the civilian authorities advice about the military elements in political decision-making. For this the military professional must clearly understand the aims and objectives of the nation. General Sharp declared the first of these objectives to be "national unity within Canada as a sovereign state." That, he said, can obviously not be achieved unless nuclear war can be deterred; but equally obviously it cannot be achieved if too high a proportion of national resources are devoted entirely to deterring war. He commented that internal schism and social unrest must be avoided and that the unique characteristics of the nation must be maintained despite the preponderant influence of the United States. Canada must control its own land, sea, and air space and must also preserve the "unique Canadian identity." Canadian armed forces should contribute to these ends in conjunction with their traditional military roles, but not instead of them. They could do so by showing how two cultures can be accommodated within the armed forces to create something uniquely Canadian. They must be not mere copies of either British or American models but must have distinctive uniforms, medals, and awards, their own military customs and traditions, and their own headquarters in Europe.

The recent unification of the armed forces was, Sharp said, "uniquely Canadian" and so made easier the demonstration of the existence of a Canadian military identity. He concluded that there must be a "Canadian military professionalism." His main thrust was thus on domestic reasons for developing a Canadian angle to military professionalism. But on turning to the international scene he stressed there was also the need to demonstrate a "uniquely Canadian identity" in order "to exert obviously Canadian influences in foreign and economic affairs."⁷⁸

Delivered to a staff college audience and published in its journal General Sharp's views had only a limited impact. Two books of essays had wider circulation. Hector

J. Massey, a Canadian political scientist, published, The Canadian Military: A Profile, a number of papers by academic military specialists who discussed the historic British influence on Canadian military traditions and procedures and the trend towards Canadianization now being furthered as a result of unification. Most of these papers talked in terms of the desirability of developing a distinctly "Canadian military ethic," "philosophy," "ethos," or "doctrine" (these words were used inter-changeably).⁷⁹

A second volume of papers, edited by R.B. Byers and Colin S. Gray with the suggestive title, Canadian military professionalism: the search for identity,⁸⁰ consisted of four of the papers prepared for the seminar on professionalism. The co-editors added an introduction and a conclusion. Professor Byers asserted that the statements of Canadian foreign and defence policy made in 1970 and 1971 provided an opportunity for the development of a distinctly Canadian military ethic. Theoretically, the corporate nature of the military profession would now evolve in the direction of Canadianization of customs, traditions and values; but this could not be taken for granted.⁸¹ In the concluding chapter Mr. Gray retorted that there was a sharp division within the Canadian forces. Traditionalists believed that the only role for the armed forces was to fight, and saw the addition of other duties only as a useful means of maintaining financial expenditures. But the adoption of new roles actually means that the military perform tasks that could be done by civilians. He said that "Modernists" in the armed forces have not found a new role beyond the concept of the survival of armed forces which some now think redundant. Gray argued that a justification for the retention of armed forces could be in the need for insurance against presently unidentified emergencies.⁸²

Canada's military education system must produce military professionals for the coming decades who are flexible enough to adjust to change. The system now draws officers mainly from two different sources, the universities and three military colleges which all give a university-type education and degrees. The military colleges' curriculum permits specialization but includes more preliminary science than is usual in university courses in the social sciences and the humanities. It provides for advanced specialization in the sciences, engineering, arts, and man management. All these courses give a basic educational foundation for future development. They retain the essential criteria of academic excellence as in the universities; but they have more relevance for future military careers. Some believe that, nevertheless, they represent an expensive duplication of what can

be done more cheaply in the universities. Justification for their continuance is the belief that training in a military college provides a spirit of service and corporateness that can permeate the whole officer corps. Canadian military college cadets train in the summer months alongside their university colleagues with whom they will serve in the future. To sum up, the objective of pre-commissioning military education is not to provide immediate overall competence and knowledge but, as is the case with other professions like medicine, to give future professionals the foundation for later self-development and the flexibility to adjust to change.

Later in their careers all Canadian officers have further organized opportunity to develop their professionalism and to continue to adjust to fast changing technology and society. The military professional spends much more of his time in advancing his education in this way than does his civilian equivalent. Where Canadian military schools do not exist, advanced specialized scientific and technical training can be obtained in university graduate schools in Canada or elsewhere or in foreign military schools. But for all officers professionalism is defined and enriched in the armed forces' own schools and colleges, the Land Forces Staff College, the Canadian Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and the National Defence College. This echelon of institutions not only teaches staff duties, it also provides for intellectual development. In it the seeds of Canadian military doctrine should germinate to bear fruit throughout the armed forces.⁸³

However the quest for an acceptable and convincing Canadian military doctrine has still much to do. In two articles in the Air University Review Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic has shown the dilemma imposed for American military professionalism by the advent of deterrent strategy and has analysed it as a conflict between soldiers and statesmen.⁸⁴ The problem for Canadians is even more complex because Canadian military doctrine must also take into account Canada's involvement in international peacekeeping duties. A perceptive article by Nils Orvik suggests that Canada can assert a distinctive national military doctrine to strengthen, rather than oppose, her allies, and so to give more effective support to the Western alliance.⁸⁵ Such a doctrine need not necessarily be set out in a manual, as is that of the USAF. Written constitutions and precisely formulated doctrines are more in the American, than in the British and Canadian, way of doing things. The important point is that a Canadian military doctrine should teach members of the Canadian armed forces that they have a vital

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THE UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

[David P. Burke]

No policy more consciously demonstrated the Canadian government's determination to abandon traditional roles and attachments of her armed forces than the move to unification in 1964-67. Inspired by an initial determination to find additional funds for equipment from a frozen budget through greater administrative efficiency, unification became a symbol of a government's determination to assert civil supremacy over the military and of an ambitious minister's determination to prove himself as an innovator.

In one of the first thoroughly documented studies of a complex and controversial reform, David Burke has revised some of the accepted judgements about the unification controversy and reexamined the assumptions and actions of both the proponents and the critics of the development. It is true that current research is beginning to uncover still more documentation that may modify some of Burke's judgements in this pioneer study. Nevertheless, his contribution may help to explain why other countries somehow resisted the temptation to follow Canada's example.

One of the most remarkable accomplishments of the Pearson administration was the abolition of the Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force, and the creation in their place of a single military service, the Canadian Armed Forces. Oddly, this step is hardly mentioned in the histories and memoirs of the period, though it remains the most through-going military reorganization in any developed country in this century. In no other case have well-established, independent services been swept away. As a revolution in defence organization it is rivaled only by the creation of the Royal Air Force in 1918 as a third service independent of the British Army and Navy. But while the precedent of the RAF has been followed by most countries with significant military aviation, the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces remains unique. Canada is not noted for adventurous innovations in institutions. How and why, then, did its government take this bold step?

The Pearson administration justified its military reorganization on solely rational grounds in its 1964 White Paper on Defence.¹ However, it is the purpose of a White Paper to justify policy on rational grounds no matter how it was arrived at. A more accurate and complete understanding of why Canada unified its forces requires attention to the internal politics of the Cabinet, the Department of National Defence (DND), and the House of Commons during the Pearson years. Events in those arenas came together at two nodal points to produce the unification decision. The first of these was reached early in 1964 with the publication of the White Paper on Defence and the passage of an accompanying bill to amend the National Defence Act. Enactment of the bill led to abolition of the three Service headquarters and the jobs of their military chiefs as well as of all subordinate Navy, Army, and Air Force commands. In their place the government established one defence hierarchy under a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This process, called integration, preserved the three services but increasingly intermixed their personnel. It was accompanied by trauma within the military establishment but surprisingly little strife in Parliament or elsewhere outside the services. The second nodal point was reached in the period from mid-1966 to mid-1967 when legislation was introduced to abolish the Navy, Army and Air Force and to substitute one service for them. This step was christened unification. It inspired bitter and public resistance.

This study traces this two-step process as a landmark in the development of Canadian military institutions and as a case study in the politics of Canadian defence policy. To do so it focuses on the events that surrounded and led to the passage of the bills authorizing integration in 1964 and unification in 1967.

Prelude

Unification was not a part of the Liberals' defence policy before their victory in the 1963 election. They had been in opposition since 1957. While out of power, they had elaborated a defense policy clearly distinguished from the Conservative government's by an emphasis on ground-air forces intended for world-wide intervention for peacekeeping operations and low-intensity war, and by renunciation both of nuclear weapons and of a combat role in air defense. However, in mid-January of 1963, with the Tory Cabinet deadlocked on the acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons, Lester Pearson took a step on his own initiative that would change his party's position and establish the limits of the defence policy his own government would later adopt. Before a

Liberal Party group in Scarborough, Ontario, Pearson stated that the government should reexamine the whole basis of Canadian defence policy and negotiate with the country's allies for a non-nuclear role for Canada in the Western alliance. In the meantime, however, he pledged that "a new Liberal Government would put Canada's armed services in a position to discharge fully the commitments undertaken for Canada by its predecessors."² These included the acquisition of nuclear weapons. He went on to call for a new defence policy emphasizing world-wide mobility and the integration of the three armed services, both in operations and administration.³ Unification was not mentioned.

Pearson's Scarborough speech had an immediate effect. Within his own party his nuclear volte-face infuriated the Liberal left. As one example, Pierre-Elliott Trudeau responded by refusing a Liberal candidacy and writing a scathing attack on Pearson for Cité libre, the influential journal of opinion which he edited in Montreal.⁴ But Pearson's change of position had an even more profound effect among the Tories and the MP's of the minor parties on whom the Conservative minority government depended for its life. The nuclear question irrevocably split the Cabinet. The Minister of National Defence resigned and called publicly for acquisition of nuclear weapons. On the same day Pearson moved a vote of want of confidence. The government fell.⁵

Somewhat strangely, in the election campaign that followed, defence quickly faded as an issue. Walter Gordon, a close personal friend and confidant of Lester Pearson, was Liberal campaign chairman. He and those closest to him were appalled by Pearson's espousal of nuclear weapons and were primarily interested in the economic nationalist and social legislation planks of the platform. They promised "sixty days of decision" after the inauguration of a Liberal government, and to make their whirlwind of reforms possible, they called for a decisive majority in the House of Commons. In that they were disappointed. The Liberals were returned to power in April 1963, but with only 41.1 percent of the vote and four seats less than a majority in the House of Commons. It was hardly a sweeping mandate, and if Social Credit and the socialist New Democratic Party withdrew their support, the Liberal government would fall.

Integration

Paul Hellyer had been Liberal defence critic in opposition, but he did not want to be Minister of National Defence. The post was a notorious graveyard of political careers, and Hellyer's ambitions were large. His ultimate

goal, well-known to his political colleagues, was to be prime minister.⁶ Lester Pearson was sixty-six. It seemed likely that he would lead the Liberals in one more election at most. Hellyer was thirty-nine. For an ambitious young Liberal front-bencher a higher visibility department or one commanding significant patronage would have a better launching pad than DND for a try for the leadership of the party. As defense critic in opposition, Hellyer was an obvious choice for Minister of National Defence, but his selection was not automatic. All of the post-War ministers had served in uniform during one or both world wars, all but one as officers. Two were ex-generals, one with the Victoria Cross. Hellyer had never been an officer, and all his wartime service in the Air Force and Army had been in Canada. However, Lester Pearson was convinced that National Defence needed an overhaul, and he believed that someone from outside the department, with no institutional or emotional ties to the DND or the military services was needed to do the job. Quite apart from his service as defence critic, Hellyer filled that requirement.⁷ He was offered National Defence and Lucien Cardin the Associate Minister's portfolio. Both accepted.

On the day Hellyer took office he announced that Canada would immediately acquire nuclear weapons under U.S. control. He then turned over day-to-day administration of the department to Cardin, thus freeing himself for attention to policy questions, as the Prime Minister expected him to do. His next step was uncertain. Outside the nuclear question, the Liberal government was undecided as to the details of defence policy. It was not at the center of the Cabinet's concern. When the twenty-sixth Parliament first met on May 16, 1963, the only defence item in the Throne Speech was a statement that Canada should have the weapons needed to perform the tasks the country had undertaken in the alliance.⁸ Instead, the emphasis was on social and fiscal policy, and the unquestioned star of the Pearson Cabinet was Walter Gordon, the incumbent of the Finance portfolio.

Hellyer was caught in a vicious cost squeeze. The Liberals were committed to very expensive social programs -- universal medical insurance, the Canada Pension Plan and other welfare schemes. Within the Cabinet, the consensus was that defence expenditures should be held to \$1.5 billion a year, \$230 million less than the defence appropriation inherited from the Conservatives for fiscal 1962-1963.⁹ Even with the \$1.73 billion appropriation bequeathed by the Tories, the share of defence funds allocated to equipment purchases had sunk from a peak of 42.9 percent in 1953-1954 to 13.9 percent in the current fiscal year. If the trend continued at the same rate, equipment funds would reach zero

in fiscal 1966-1967.¹⁰ Hellyer clearly had to make drastic changes in DND. If not, National Defence would continue to absorb more funds than any other department, but for lack of modern equipment Canada's forces would lose their credibility both as a fighting force and as a supporter of Canadian industry.

Hellyer's first response to his money problems was to declare a moratorium on major equipment purchases and to launch a major review of defence policy. He faced a series of deadlines. The current fiscal year would end in March 1964, ten months away. Because of this, Cabinet consideration of specific proposals on defence would have to begin as soon as possible after the 1963 Christmas recess. This meant that he would have to clear his plans with other directly interested departments and the Prime Minister before Christmas. As a practical matter, his proposals would have to emphasize mobile non-nuclear forces and integration of common military functions, as Pearson had promised at Scarborough and during the campaign. In addition, the Liberals had endorsed Canada's existing defence commitments. Hellyer could only shift the emphasis of defence policy and try to find more efficient ways to carry it out.

Hellyer formalized his deadlines by telling the Cabinet in the summer of 1963 that he would produce a draft white paper by Christmas. His method was unconventional. The usual procedure was for the permanent officials of the department to write the first draft of a White Paper in accordance with general directions from the minister. Instead, Hellyer told his Deputy Minister and Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, that he wanted an overall study of defense policy to be conducted as the basis for a white paper. Though he did not say so, he intended to write the paper himself, a decision that was to give him much greater control of policy by permitting him to keep the contents secret until the last moment in the drafting process.

In the event, several studies contributed to the project, the most important of which was the report of an ad hoc group chaired by Dr. Robert Sutherland, a senior analyst on the staff of the Defence Research Board and a member of the Directorate of Strategic Studies. He was a protégé of Miller. Neither the Sutherland report nor any other study prepared at this time seriously questioned Canada's defence commitments. They all assumed that the Cold War would continue and that Canada's defense posture would remain essentially the same. Therefore, in the Sutherland report the cost squeeze resulted in organizational tinkering to permit

Canada's commitments to be borne within a fixed budget. His organizational proposals derived mainly from the report on DND by the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco Commission)¹¹ which had appeared five months before. The Glassco report called for integration of functions common to two or more armed services, giving the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff independent executive powers to control such functions, and for more rational personnel practices administered with greater inter-service consistency.¹²

In anticipation of the Glassco criticisms of personnel policy, DND had established the Minister's Manpower Study Group in 1961. It had ceased to function the next year, but Sutherland borrowed freely from its conclusions in the organizational section of his report to Hellyer. Time and again the Group had found that the only way to economize on a function was to amalgamate it completely. Merely integrating the personnel staffs of the three Services, for example, while retaining three very different personnel systems, was so marginally cost-effective as hardly to be worthwhile.¹³ Despite the implications of this finding, the Sutherland Report, when it was forwarded to the Minister in the late Summer of 1963, only cursorily examined the option of complete service unification and (like the Glassco Report) dismissed it in favour of integrating certain specific functions and placing them under a strengthened Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.¹⁴

While Sutherland was writing, Hellyer was settling into his department. One of his first steps was to choose as his Special Assistant Wing Commander William Lee, the head of RCAF public information. First as an Air Force officer and then as Hellyer's civilian Executive Assistant, Bill Lee would become a major force in the department and in Hellyer's political career. He presided over the merger of all DND information services into a single office reporting formally to the Minister, and in practice to Lee. This step reduced the ability of the Services to resist ministerial policy. At the same time it equipped Lee with a tool to conduct a coordinated campaign to publicize Hellyer's policies and to present them in the most politically effective light. By coincidence, Lee had long been an advocate of complete service unification. He had suggested it for several years to his Air Force superiors, always without effect. Lee brought up the subject at the meeting in which Hellyer offered him the Special Assistant's job. Hellyer at that time was not interested. For a while at least, Lee dropped the subject.¹⁵

As Hellyer learned his department he became increasingly frustrated by its structure and disappointed in many of its key leaders. The textbook model of a Canadian department of government was of a single pyramid of permanent officials topped by a career deputy minister who worked in a one-to-one relationship with the Minister. Ministers could devote at most a few hours a day to running their departments; their responsibilities as cabinet members, party leaders and representatives of their ridings filled the rest of their time. In the confidential relationship of the minister to his deputy, policy guidance flowed down to the department, and pre-coordinated advice and policy proposals flowed up. Ministers' offices were deliberately kept small: an executive and a special assistant plus a few secretaries and office help. As a result, ministers lacked adequate resources for policy elaboration in their own office staffs. The place for that was within the departments and in the Cabinet itself. There were exceptions to this simple model (e.g., double departments such as Health and Welfare), but by and large the system worked as the myths of Canadian government said it did -- except in the Department of National Defence.

DND was not a neat pyramid headed by a single deputy minister. Six persons (the three Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, the Deputy Minister, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee) each had the right of direct access to the Minister. Instead of one, there were six channels of advice to the Minister, and the advice that flowed through them was often uncoordinated and in conflict.

Thus, when Hellyer tried to identify programs he could cut to stay within his funding, he heard from the Chief of Staff of each Service in his capacity as defender of its own pet projects. The situation was tailor-made to point up lack of coordination between the Services, to erode the Minister's confidence in their senior officers, and to sow doubt regarding the rationality of policy-making in DND. By early Fall of 1963, repeated instances of service conflict and failures of coordination had convinced Hellyer that he needed a military hierarchy that worked like the civil service elite in other departments: a single group of experts who would coordinate policy proposals fully before they were presented for ministerial consideration. But he was uncertain what form that hierarchy should take.

Lee, however, was again talking unification, suggesting that it would not only produce the kind of military staff Hellyer wanted, but that it would also allow utilization of scarce skills without regard to Service. His

favourite example was the naval jet pilots whose expensive training had gone to waste after the Royal Canadian Navy retired its last fighters. Because of differences in personnel policies (especially regarding promotion) there had been no practical way to transfer the pilots who wanted to make the change to the RCAF unless they resigned from the Navy and started again at the bottom. It is not known whether Lee, the public relations expert, was also promoting unification as the dramatic issue that could put Paul Hellyer in the headlines and keep him there, but to some in DND Hellyer seemed consciously to be seeking such an issue in the early Autumn of 1963.¹⁶

The most publicly obvious -- and least influential -- manifestation of the defence policy review in the first months of the Pearson administration was the activity of the Special Committee on National Defence of the House of Commons. Its establishment was a break with Canadian tradition that had been proposed by Pearson in his Scarborough speech and several times during the campaign. Hellyer had been sincerely concerned by the lack of information legitimately available to him in opposition, and he strongly supported the idea of a permanent parliamentary defence committee as a legitimate channel of information, including classified data, to members of all parties in the House. From the start the committee was very active and popular with its members. It travelled widely and met often, but the effect of its opinions on the White Paper and unification was nil. The committee was deliberately kept out of the question of defence organization, and its interim report did not appear until five days before Christmas, by which time the first draft of the 1964 White Paper was complete and in the process of consideration by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. However, one of the Committee's witnesses did affect the policy search in DND. In mid-October, 1963, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, retired former Chief of General Staff, appeared before the committee and proposed that the Canadian armed forces be reorganized as a "tri-service force." He went on to say that "its organization should be very much like that of the United States marine corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brush-fire situations."¹⁷ The Marine Corps, of course, is a single military service. Simonds' timing was perfect. Just as Hellyer's ideas on reorganization were crystalizing, the Canadian marine corps proposal with its implication of tri-service unification was receiving general, if slightly bemused, approval in the press.

No one can point to the moment when Paul Hellyer decided the three services should be merged. He did not support the idea when he became Minister of National Defence, nor for the first six weeks or so of his tenure. But from mid-June through mid-August of 1963, Hellyer thought more and more in terms of a single service, and by mid-September, when he began to think about the details of the White Paper, he had quietly embraced the policy and had begun to lay the ground-work for its acceptance by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

It was a very personal and individual decision. The idea had been latent in the Department for years. It had been the footnote in every study, the alternative that was always mentioned and as consistently dismissed. But Hellyer's distaste for untidy organization, his impatience with inefficiency and confusion, and his need for an issue to convert the defence portfolio into a platform for an attempt to gain the leadership all increased the chance that he would take unification seriously. He had to save money in defence, and the Liberal endorsement of Canada's existing defence commitments insured that economies would be sought (in the short term, at least) through cuts in headquarters and support overhead rather than through bold changes in the operational forces. And once one began to think seriously of merging the headquarters, training and support establishments of the three services and manning them without regard to the service affiliation of personnel (as the Sutherland report suggested), the argument was strengthened for going the whole distance and merging the Services themselves. Finally, Lee's advocacy of unification, Hellyer's frustration with the parochial advice of the service heads, and General Simonds' Canadian marine corps idea all helped to raise the unification idea in Hellyer's mind and to persuade him that a single service for Canada was in the country's interest -- and his own.

For the time being Hellyer kept his decision for unification from the Prime Minister and from all but one or two members of his personal staff. The senior military and civilian leadership of DND only knew that a general review of defence policy was nearing completion, a white paper would be prepared, and a sweeping reorganization of the department was in the cards. Bill Lee fed leaks to the press. They produced stories that were substantially correct, but did not extend to unification. The public reaction was apathetic, but generally favourable.¹⁸ It was time to draw unification and the general review of defence policy together and to secure their endorsement by the Cabinet and parliament. The White Paper provided the vehicle for that task.

The first step in the drafting of the paper was to secure terms of reference that were congenial to Hellyer's purposes. This process began with an off-the-record meeting in mid-September of the members of the Cabinet Defence Committee. No minutes were kept, and the members were not accompanied by departmental representatives or members of their staffs. At the meeting, Hellyer presented an oral outline of the principles he proposed to follow in his long-range study of defence policy. (He described the process as lying in the future although the Sutherland study and others that would contribute to the White Paper were already completed or underway in DND). The group discussed Hellyer's ideas, and the Prime Minister asked him to put the principles, as reflected in the consensus of the meeting, in writing for his consideration. Hellyer did so in a September 25, 1963, letter to Pearson. The Defence Minister outlined the consensus to suit his own purposes in twelve very general but appealingly worded points. Except for a reference to a policy that looked at least ten years ahead, Hellyer's summary bound him only to policies to which he was already committed by Liberal statements in the election campaign earlier in the year.¹⁹ Pearson accepted the Defence Minister's interpretation of his own marching orders, and Hellyer was free to proceed with a draft of the White Paper constrained only by previously announced policy and by what he felt he could sell to the Prime Minister, to his Cabinet colleagues, and to the elite of the defence bureaucracy.

Hellyer continued to guard control of the White Paper closely. He kept preparation of the draft entirely within his own office. Available funds were the main constraint on his efforts. In October he cancelled several equipment programs. A former Chief of Staff who spoke to Hellyer repeatedly at this time found him set firmly on reorganizing to reduce manpower by a specific (and apparently arbitrary) figure, ten thousand men. To a member of the Deputy Minister's staff, Hellyer seemed especially impressed by the need to cut overhead in the military headquarters in Ottawa and in the subordinate commands, and the desirability of having a single pool of military personnel. Despite these clues, and the rumours that inevitably circulate in an organization that expects to be reorganized, Hellyer's intention to unify the Services was not guessed before its announcement by any of the informants to this study.²⁰

The draft White Paper was written in longhand by Hellyer in eighteen days in late November and early December 1963, with scant input from his personal staff and none from the officers and civilian officials who had traditionally performed this function.²¹ At no time were the Chiefs of

Staff asked to contribute to the draft or to approve or comment on it until after it had been approved by the Prime Minister. Hellyer's reason was simple. He was convinced that if he revealed the proposal for either integration or unification earlier, resistance to it from the senior military leaders would imperil the entire scheme. Even so, he was careful to state the decision to unify in the blandest and least obtrusive form. After a description of the failings of the existing staff structure and its apparent inability to coordinate the policies and actions of the three Services, the White Paper stated, "... the government has concluded that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada."²²

Though an incomplete draft of the White Paper was cleared with other departments, it did not include the section on organization, which Hellyer could legitimately protect as a matter involving his department alone. The integration-unification proposal first left Hellyer's office as a secret appendix to the copy of the draft White Paper which he sent to Lester Pearson on Friday, December 27, 1963.²³ In large part the White Paper had been tailored to fit the Prime Minister's background and ideas. In accord with the post-Scarborough position of his party, it accepted all of the defence commitments Canada had undertaken within the alliance. But at the same time Hellyer stressed the idea of tailoring mobile conventional forces to the peacekeeping role which had been at the heart of Pearson's foreign policy thinking since the Suez Crisis of 1956. After studying the draft and discussing it with Hellyer, Pearson indicated that he was in full agreement with it. His endorsement of the draft, and specifically of the unification of the Services, opened the way for Hellyer to reveal the reorganization annex to the two groups whose support (or at least acquiescence) were vital to its success: the military elite and the Cabinet.²⁴

Hellyer's first target on the Chiefs of Staff Committee was its Chairman, Air Chief Marshal Miller. Before he revealed the White Paper to the other Chiefs of Staff, Hellyer had long and intense discussions of the draft with him. Hellyer believed that Miller remained unalterably opposed and that he did all he could to keep the unification sentence out of the draft. In contrast, Miller later said he found unification acceptable when the contents of the draft were made known to him, but in his mind it remained a distant prospect -- something the forces would come to after they had earned to live together in an indefinite period of integration.²⁵

The White Paper was revealed to the rest of the senior military leadership in two stages. In the first week of February 1964, before submission of the draft to the Cabinet, Hellyer informed the service Chiefs of Staff of his plan to unify the armed forces. Though they supported integration, all three opposed unification, with Admiral Rayner expressing the most vigorous opposition. He urged that all references to it be struck from the draft as the subject had not been discussed by the Chiefs of Staff, and he later refused to believe that it could be considered the policy of the Government of Canada without the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.²⁶

Though unification was distasteful to the Chiefs of Staff, the White Paper also confronted them with two very large and distracting tasks, integration and the development of a ten-year defence program. These required their immediate attention, while unification lay in the indefinite future. This suited Hellyer's political purposes perfectly. He did nothing to shift the focus of attention of the Chiefs of Staff which, in the usual bureaucratic manner, was soon rivetted on the tasks with most pressing deadlines for action.

Similarly, when Hellyer revealed the contents of the White Paper to the senior officers of National Defence Headquarters (he did so on the Saturday before it was approved by the Cabinet and tabled in the House) there was what one observer called an "unholy fight" on the issue of unification. However, this did not deter Hellyer. He had told the senior officers what would be done, and he tacitly expected them to obey or resign. Of course, no one resigned. Many thought that Hellyer would not last long enough in National Defence to see unification through, and no one was likely to quit as long as he thought unification might simply go away.²⁷

Cabinet consideration of the White Paper began at a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee in mid-February, 1964. While for the military elite the most immediate and compelling issue raised by the White Paper was integration of headquarters and support establishments, for the Cabinet the salient issue was money. Except for Pearson, Hellyer, and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, the members of the Cabinet were not really interested in the reorganization scheme except as a means to hold down defence appropriations and thus release funds for their own departments. To Hellyer's disappointment, the Cabinet received the White Paper without enthusiasm. At their insistence, it was sent back for rewriting to play down reequipment and to emphasize reorganization. There was no dispute in Cabinet over unification, which Hellyer advocated chiefly in terms of increased

efficiency and economy through elimination of the overhead inherent in three competing services. Consequently, while sending the White Paper back for re-writing, the Cabinet formally authorized Hellyer to draft a bill to amend the National Defence Act to abolish the positions of the members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and to "substitute an authority charged with all their functions, powers and duties whose title would be Chief of the Defence Staff."²⁸ It was the first formal step in the merger of the armed forces.

At about this time Hellyer acted to settle the continuing Cabinet dispute over defence spending by negotiating a gentlemen's agreement with Finance Minister Walter Gordon. It provided for a defence appropriation of \$1.5 billion a year rising by two percent a year for inflation. Hellyer realized that inflation was running about 3.5 percent a year, but believed guaranteed, if slowly diminishing, funds for defence were preferable to the uncertainty that went with continuing pressure to cut defence expenditures to provide money for competing programs.²⁹ This agreement was to have at least as great an effect on Canadian defence policy over the next decade as anything in Hellyer's White Paper or in the two major defence bills passed by Parliament during the Pearson administration.

The rest went very smoothly. By the third week of March the revised White Paper was ready for approval. On March 24 the Cabinet Defence Committee considered the paper for the last time. The next day Hellyer presented it in Cabinet, insisting on an unequivocal pledge of support for the accompanying reorganization bill before he tabled the White Paper in the Commons. He got the pledge, and the White Paper was approved for tabling the next day.³⁰

The introduction of the White Paper and the reorganization bill (eventually numbered C-90)³¹ marked Hellyer's public debut as the dynamic young minister who was revolutionizing Canada's armed forces. His performance was impressive from beginning to end. Hellyer had briefed himself well. He had all the facts, figures and charts, and he had tended to the parliamentary groundwork, arranging the timetable to permit Bill Lee to publicize the White Paper for six weeks before Parliament could take any action on Bill C-90. In a series of statements in and out of the House, Hellyer claimed that integration would reduce military strength by ten thousand persons through a twenty percent cut in the fifty thousand serving in headquarters, training and support units. These savings would be devoted to capital expenditures, raising them from fourteen to twenty-five percent of defence expenditures.³²

During the debate on Bill C-90, the House swallowed these dazzling, round figures whole. The response of the Conservative defence critic, Gordon Churchill, foreshadowed the weakness of the Opposition's response to the bill. He offered no opposition to integration and virtually ignored the prospect of unification.³³ Instead, he stressed concentration of excessive power in a single Chief of Defence Staff. Faced by this feeble resistance, Hellyer easily shepherded an unamended Bill C-90 to passage in the House on July 7, 1964. Nine days later the bill received the Royal Assent.³⁴ Hellyer had a parliamentary mandate to begin the reorganization of the Canadian armed forces as a single service.

Unification

There was little public controversy for two years after the White Paper and Bill C-90. However, beginning in mid-1966, at the second nodal point in the decision process, opposition became public, vocal and intense. In the intervening years the subordinate service headquarters in the field had disappeared, and functional commands had been established in their place. Air Transport and Air Defence Commands remained much as they had been under the RCAF. A unified Training Command was created on the basis of the corresponding Air Force organization. All Army combat forces and RCAF tactical air forces in Canada were merged into Mobile Command, the vehicle for Canada's new land-air striking forces, and all operational naval forces and RCAF maritime air units were absorbed into the new Maritime Command. Only the final step remained -- legislation to abolish the headless and now largely formless Army, Navy and Air Force and to substitute one service for them. At this point bitter resistance broke out. Led by the Commander of Maritime Command, Rear Admiral William Landymore, it was echoed in attentive circles in the civilian community and in Parliament. It soon threatened both the unification policy and Paul Hellyer's prime ministerial ambitions.

Admiral Landymore was a brilliant and popular naval commander, among the last and best of those who, before becoming officers in the RCN, had experienced the full impact of life as cadets and midshipmen in the pre-war Royal Navy. He had opposed unification from the beginning. But from the summer of 1965 it was increasingly difficult for Landymore to ignore the prospect of unification or to resist it only passively. In June, 1965, at a conference of senior officers which Landymore attended, Paul Hellyer had announced his plan to have a single uniform and a single rank structure in the Armed Forces by July 1967. Landymore had repeatedly told

his subordinates that there was no plan to destroy service identity or to replace traditional service uniforms. As a result, the Minister's statement caused widespread distress in the fleet and in Landymore's Halifax headquarters.

The Admiral decided to act. In July 1965 he called a meeting of all naval officers in his command in the rank of commander and up. The Air Force officers who made up one third of the integrated Maritime Command Headquarters were excluded. At the meeting Landymore declared that unification had not been defined, that it could only be accomplished by an Act of Parliament, and he made it clear that he saw no merit in it. He went on to declare that he would represent the views of those at the meeting, whatever they were. He then asked his audience to stand to signify agreement with five points: That they wanted him to represent their views; that they would feel free to speak openly on their views within the Service and in public until the law was changed; that they would not consider loss of identity of the Navy to be inevitable and become apathetic about it; that they would not ask to be retired because of unification (Landymore pledged that he would take appropriate action in protest if their views were ignored); and that for the information of others, their meeting had been called to discuss morale. Landymore held two further meetings of the same sort by mid-August. Only three of the 230 officers who attended his meetings failed to signify agreement with their commander's five points. He concluded that it was now his responsibility "firmly and consistently to represent their point of view."³⁵ It was a strange way to run a navy, especially one whose Queen's Regulations and Orders stated that:

No officer or man shall without permission obtained under article 19.37 ...

- (f) publish his opinions on any military question under consideration by superior authorities; or
- (g) take part in public discussion relating to orders, regulations or instructions issued by his superiors; ...
- (h) publish in writing or deliver any lecture, address or broadcast in any way dealing with a subject of a controversial nature affecting other departments of the public service or pertaining to policy.³⁶

Hellyer soon heard about Landymore's meetings, and he concluded that he would have to relieve him of his command. However, Landymore was an enormously popular officer. Furthermore, the only officer who had been forced out over unification so far had been Landymore's predecessor in Halifax, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Brock. It would be difficult to dismiss two Flag Officers, Atlantic Coast, in succession, especially as Hellyer had just named Landymore as Commander-Designate of the integrated Maritime Command. Hellyer delayed. Consequently, it was Landymore who came to Ottawa ten months later to appear before the House of Commons' Standing Committee on National Defence to testify on Maritime Command as part of the committee's consideration of the defence estimates for 1966-1967.

Landymore's prepared testimony had been submitted for clearance by the Minister. Bill Lee and John Grant (a civilian from DND Information Services) actually reviewed the text. They made extensive revisions to the section on personnel to soften Landymore's remarks on the effect of the shortage of naval personnel on readiness. Landymore was upset, but he did not protest the revisions, and his testimony went uneventfully.³⁷ Hellyer had attended the hearing, and on the way out of the building he asked Landymore to stay in Ottawa for a talk. They met the next day, and from their discussion it was clear that Landymore could not carry out the policy Hellyer was bound to have. Hellyer intimated that Landymore would be fired, but rather than acting immediately, he asked him to come back to Ottawa for another discussion.³⁸

There was a three week interval before Hellyer's next meeting with Landymore. During that time Hellyer decided that General Moncel, whom most observers expected to succeed Miller as Chief of Defence Staff, should not do so because of his resistance to Hellyer's apparent timetable for unification. In his place, Hellyer selected General Jean-Victor Allard, the Commander of Mobile Command and one of unification's most vocal supporters. He was a brilliant field officer, but mercurial, with a reputation for driving his staff officers to distraction. The economy was booming, and prospects were bright for second careers of ex-senior officers. With the retirement of Moncel, the appointment of Allard, and unification looming, large numbers of the most senior generals, admirals, and air marshals applied to retire.³⁹

Landymore returned to Ottawa to attend Air Chief Marshal Miller's retirement dinner. Two days later, he and Hellyer met again. Landymore was as opposed to unification as ever, and Hellyer asked him to resign. Landymore refused,

in part to protect his pension which would be reduced if he retired at his own request. Hellyer told Landymore he would "arrange" his pension (as he had those of other senior officers) by relieving him from command at a date to be decided later, and Landymore returned to Halifax.⁴⁰

The next day, at his farm outside the city, he received a call from the Canadian Press. The head of CP's Halifax bureau told him that Hellyer's version of the departure from service of the country's top admirals was coming over the wire. He asked Landymore for a statement, and the admiral suggested a time that day when the press would find him at home. At the appointed hour, Landymore faced a farmyard full of reporters, photographers and TV cameramen. Landymore denounced unification and the loss of the Navy's identity, claimed it was demoralizing the Navy's officer corps, and said he was astonished "that other top service men haven't come out and expressed their well-known disillusionment in the program."⁴¹ The story was front-paged across Canada. ("Revolt against Hellyer: Defiant Halifax Rear-Admiral Sacked" was the Ottawa Citizen headline.)⁴²

The story moved on the Canadian Press wire while Hellyer was isolated in an RCAF aircraft on the way to Edmonton. A very brief summary of it was radioed to Hellyer just before he landed. When he emerged from the aircraft he exploded to the waiting press. He made marvellous copy ("Admirals or Me! Hellyer's Career on Line" was a typical headline).⁴³ He announced that if the government weakened its stand on unification, "they'll have to get a new minister." He said that he expected more resignations from high-ranking officers, that there was a wealth of talent below the senior ranks, and "At least 90 percent of the forces are absolutely behind the plan." He continued, saying that Landymore's public objections were "an obvious violation of regulations", but that to prevent him from becoming a martyr he would not be court-martialed. He asserted that the admirals and other senior officers had never really believed unification would occur. "Suddenly they have discovered we are serious and it is going to happen."⁴⁴

With that it seemed clear that when Parliament returned from its summer recess a unification bill would be introduced and Hellyer's future would hang on its passage. Links were quickly solidified between Landymore, the Halifax naval establishment (serving and retired) and the Conservative opposition. Landymore retired in an extravagant naval ceremony. At its conclusion, while Landymore and his wife were driven to the gate of the dockyard between ranks of cheering sailors, every warship in the harbour broke out signal flags reading, "Well Done."⁴⁵

Hellyer was in trouble for the first time in his cabinet career. A recent poll of prospective convention delegates had named him the most likely man to succeed Pearson as Liberal leader. He was thus a particularly attractive target for a Conservative opposition that needed something to distract the public from the bloodletting then going on among the Tories in the fight to unseat Diefenbaker as Conservative leader. Hellyer could have avoided the fight if he had moderated the pace toward unification. His friends all advised delay, arguing that a unification bill gave too great an opportunity to the Opposition. But Hellyer sincerely believed that unification was in the best interest of Canada and of the armed forces themselves, and he was increasingly frustrated by bureaucratic delay. He ignored his advisers and ordered the preparation of a bill to amend the National Defence Act to create a single service. Then Lester Pearson offered him a change of portfolio before the bill was introduced. Hellyer declined, and stayed in National Defence to shepherd the bill through the House himself.⁴⁶

As a result, Hellyer was attacked on unification from the time Parliament was recalled to deal with a railway strike in late August. The Tories put special emphasis on his revision of Landymore's testimony to the Special Committee on National Defence, picturing it as a deliberate attempt to deceive the House. The unification bill, numbered C-243, was finally introduced on November 4, 1966. It provided for a single service, the Canadian Armed Forces, to which all members of the Navy, Army and RCAF would be compulsorily transferred. Throughout the Fall and early Winter, media coverage gave wide play to Hellyer's stubborn defence of unification and his impatient remarks in the House. A parade of news stories on his arrogance appeared, to the delight of the Opposition. Finally, on February 2, 1967, Bill C-243 passed second reading. Thus approved in principle, it was referred to the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Previously, the bill would have been considered by the entire House sitting as the Committee of the Whole, thus tying up the work of the Commons until the bill had passed the committee stage. However, the House of Commons was now operating under the new and experimental Standing Orders of 1965 which greatly increased the role of its committees. Under the new rules, at this stage it was the role of the Standing Committee on National Defence to consider legislation in detail, to make revisions that did not touch on its fundamental features, and to report the revised bill back to the House for final consideration. Though there was little

experience with the new rules, Hellyer had every reason to believe the unification was assured. He was in for a surprise.

Among the members of the Defence Committee, the charges that they had been deliberately deceived had touched a nerve. From the 1964 White Paper until the early 1966 hearings on the defence estimates, suspicion and resentment of Hellyer had grown in the Committee. Its members were getting much more information on defence than had ever before been given to backbenchers and the Opposition. But all information from official sources had to pass muster before Hellyer and the few aides and officials who were also running the public information campaign in favour of him and his policies. Some MP's doubted that this was much improvement over being denied any information at all. Admiral Landymore's charges of deception had crystalized the disquiet among the Committee's Tories and those Liberals who opposed Hellyer's political ambitions and felt that the Committee was being used as a channel for propaganda in his leadership campaign. Both groups welcomed the prospect of a showdown.⁴⁷

The committee chairman, David Groos, set a marathon schedule of meetings in an attempt to complete consideration of the bill by the end of February, four weeks away. Except for meals, the Committee sat from ten in the morning until ten at night. Exhaustion inevitably set in, and tempers flared. For two weeks the list of witnesses grew, and the schedule of hearings slipped. Then Admiral Landymore appeared.

Three full sessions on February 15 and 16 were devoted to the admiral, who came meticulously prepared. He drew a large press contingent and an overflow audience packed with naval partisans and navy wives. Landymore's first two sessions were also the first Hellyer had missed since the beginning of the hearings.⁴⁸ Landymore acquitted himself well, telling the story of his resistance to unification and his dismissal from command. He made his case that his testimony had been censored, and he called for unification to be set aside. If that was impossible, he wanted the bill amended to permit the release of all servicemen who did not believe in unification, and to scrap the proposed new uniform and the adoption of Army titles of rank. He went on to recommend further study of several matters, including the political dangers lurking in Mobile Command. He described it as "dangerous to our democracy. If ever a commander of the Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made organization to achieve it."⁴⁹ With that novel assertion Landymore overreached himself. Under questioning, the charge was made to look ridiculous.

Otherwise, he had an easy time before the Committee, and he made his points, some with considerable effect. He then returned to Halifax to a hero's reception by his fellow naval officers in the wardroom of the Halifax naval base, HMCS Stadacona.

If it had not been for a statement by Hellyer a week later, the Landymore affair might have rested there. Hellyer appeared before the Committee on February 23. Throughout the hearing he seemed tense and exhausted, but he weathered the questioning throughout the afternoon and evening and continued to do so until just before the ten o'clock adjournment. Then Michael Forrestal, the Halifax Tory, was given the floor for the last questions of the night. He pressed Hellyer for his reasons for dismissing Landymore:

... would you state for matter of clarification whether or not Admiral Landymore was fired because he spoke publicly to the press prior to your asking for his resignation or your arriving at an understanding of his position? Would you agree that that was not the reason?

MR. HELLYER: Mr. Forrestal, I presume in asking this question you take the responsibility for asking it.

MR. FORRESTAL: Yes, of course, I do. I asked it.

MR. HELLYER: Admiral Landymore was fired for 18 months of consistent disloyalty to the people he was paid to serve.⁵⁰

With growing heat Hellyer went on to say that Landymore had known of the government's intention to have a single Service since a November 19, 1964, commanders' conference in Ottawa, that he had opposed it then and had gone back to Halifax "to do everything he possibly could do to prepare for an ultimate confrontation on the issue."⁵¹ Hellyer's resentment poured out as he described Landymore's anti-unification meetings with naval officers. He said that his own greatest mistake was not to dismiss Landymore earlier.⁵²

Hellyer's outburst put the Landymore affair back in the headlines, and the Opposition demanded that the admiral be called back to answer Hellyer's charges of disloyalty. The Committee met the next morning knowing that the hearings on Bill C-243 would be prolonged indeed. The Chairman urged the members to confine their questions to the bill and stay

away from personalities, but from the replies of the Conservatives it was apparent that this would be impossible. They demanded that the admiral be given a chance to reply to the charges against him.⁵³ Hellyer responded:

As far as Admiral Landymore is concerned, he can clear his name very simply. If he will say, on his honour, that there was no such meeting such as I described last night, and that he said nothing similar to the contentions that I made last night; then I will accept his word as an officer and I will be happy to apologize.⁵⁴

Groos adjourned the meeting and went straight to the National Defence Medical Centre where he was hospitalized with a threatened heart attack.

With that, under the chairmanship of Grant Deachman, the hearings settled down into a long (and unprecedented) filibuster in committee. Landymore did reappear, and Hellyer stated that, though he refused to condone the admiral's actions, he accepted without reservation Landymore's statement "that there was no disloyalty to his Service or his country."⁵⁵ This neatly sidestepped the issue of his loyalty to his superiors and to the policies of his government, but it avoided the conversion of the committee into a court of inquiry and the possible withdrawal of Bill C-243.⁵⁶

Unification once again disappeared from the headlines, but the committee sessions dragged on. Hellyer concluded that the government had got unification into committee and could not get it out. He was increasingly apprehensive that the Prime Minister would either withdraw the bill or allow it to be held over until the Fall Session, perhaps to die then. Indeed, only a last minute threat by Hellyer to resign persuaded Pearson to continue the House in session, rather than to prorogue it and begin a new session after Easter, a procedure that would have killed Bill C-243, forcing either its abandonment or its reintroduction at the first stage of consideration by the House. Pearson agreed that the House would simply adjourn for Easter and that the unification bill would be the first and only piece of legislation to be dealt with when the House returned.⁵⁷

The Committee continued to hear witnesses until the eve of the Easter recess, when it became clear to the Conservatives that committee sessions might be continued through the break. With this they gave in, and the bill was voted clause by clause in a single evening with minor, non-substantive revisions.⁵⁸ Worn out, Hellyer left on his

vacation only to return to find that the Prime Minister had again agreed to deal first in the House with another matter. Once again, Hellyer threatened to resign, and on April 3 the amendments to Bill C-243 were reported back to the House. Unification had at last survived the Committee.

The debate in the House on third reading was a prolonged anticlimax. Arguments heard in the Commons five months before, on second reading in December and January, and in the seventy-four sittings of the Defence Committee were paraded again. Finally, the government resorted to the new "guillotine" procedure of the experimental Standing Orders of 1965 to set a limit on debate. On April 25, a few hours before the guillotine was to take effect, the Conservatives permitted Bill C-243 to come to a vote. It passed with sixty-nine Conservatives and four maverick members of the NDP opposed. There was just time to clean up the pending business before the MPs left for Montreal and the opening of Expo 67.⁵⁹

Hellyer appeared to have done what he had set out to do. He had developed a new Canadian defence policy as a potential bridge from the nuclear past to a more independent, distinctively Canadian future, and he had found an issue which had made his name familiar from coast to coast. But his success was tinged with irony.

A year after C-243 passed, the Liberals met in convention to choose a new Leader. In the interim Paul Hellyer had turned the defence portfolio over to his former Associate Minister, Léo Cadieux. Hellyer became Minister of Transport, taking Bill Lee with him as executive assistant. On February 1, 1968, Cadieux presided over the abolition of the Army, Navy and Air Force, agreeing at the last minute to allow the use of naval rank titles for the sailors of the new Service.

In Transport Hellyer continued to campaign for the leadership, but he was seldom in the headlines, and he never recovered from the personal attacks in the debates and committee hearings that began with the Landymore's revolt and continued until the passage of his unification bill. On the eve of the convention, Maclean's magazine invited "five top image makers" to characterize the leading Liberal candidates. A few phrases convey their verdict on Hellyer: "reputation for arrogance . . .," "looks like the teacher who says, 'You speak out of turn, boy, and out you go . . .'", "the face of a willful, confident man . . .," "an officer in mufti."⁶⁰ The Conservatives could not have put it better if they had written it themselves.

When the convention met, Hellyer's campaign manager was Bill Lee. They put up a good fight, but they did not have a chance against a competitor who had not even been in Parliament in 1963 when they seized the unification issue and began to lay the groundwork for Hellyer's leadership campaign. Pierre Elliot Trudeau had entered the House of Commons for the first time only three years before. He was four years older than Hellyer, but he looked ten years younger. While Hellyer's issue was unification, Trudeau's were national unity, equal treatment for the French Canadians and respect for individual rights. As Minister of Justice, Trudeau made amendment of the Criminal Code what defence organization was to Hellyer. Trudeau championed reform of the abortion and birth control laws. Somehow, Hellyer's repeated boast that "unification is not new. The only thing is new is that Canada is doing it," seemed a bit pale beside Trudeau's assertion that "the State has no business in the bedrooms of the nation."

At the convention Paul Hellyer held on as Trudeau's totals steadily grew. After the third ballot, as the television cameras zeroed in, Bill Lee pleaded with Hellyer on the convention floor to release his delegates in a final move to stop Trudeau. Hellyer angrily refused. He dismissed Lee, turned to his supporters and stubbornly led his own cheers.

Trudeau won on the next ballot.

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36. Ibid., 27 February 1967, 1708.
37. Ibid., 16 February 1967, 1162, 1172-6, 1180-1211, and interviews.
38. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Defence, Proceedings and Evidence 16 February 1967, 1163, and interviews.
39. Interviews.
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MILITARY STUDIES IN CANADA: AN OVERVIEW

[A.M.J. Hyatt]

To the continual surprise of Canadians, military affairs have attracted a steady and sometimes a distinguished flow of scholars, particularly in the area of military history. Historians profited from both early government patronage and from the leadership and example of Colonel Charles Stacey and his Historical Section. A broader range of military studies has begun to emerge with the growth of official support to other branches of the social sciences.

A.M.J. Hyatt presents an overview of the state of military studies in Canada in the form of a critical bibliography of the major published works. He also comments on existing gaps and future developments in the literature of Canada as a military power.

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart became a legend in his own lifetime, as much admired by scholars as he was by military men and politicians. There were many reasons for the respect accorded to him by scholars, but few of these overshadowed the sentences with which he ended the Lees Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1933. "The study of war", Liddell Hart asserted,

requires the method of work that prevails in a University as well as the attitude of mind which is inculcated there. But it is not likely that these needs will be fulfilled until men of learning change their attitude of mind towards war, and learn to regard it as a branch of knowledge worthy of exploration.¹

He was distressed that scholars not only refused to study war, but also opposed its study within an academic environment. His words were welcome indeed to those few souls who did attempt seriously to study war within a university. The attitudes which he observed in British universities were also present in Canadian schools. Canadian professors had little time for or interest in military studies which were of passing concern only to historians who, for the most part, were "engrossed first in constitutional studies, and then in economic and social interpretation of politics. This

thrust ran against what was patronizingly termed 'old fashioned' military history".² Carl Berger has demonstrated that interest in Canadian war history had steadily declined after the First World War so that by the late 1930s only a few very professional historians were interested in its study. Some well-established scholars downgraded the importance of military events, or, as in the case of Frank Underhill, who had written a history of the Canadian Corps following the First World War, a little more than a decade later, "typified in an extreme fashion the revulsion against militarism and the anti-war spirit of the thirties".³

An attempt to survey the state of military studies in Canada a half century later must surely begin by noting that 'things could be much worse'. There has been considerable growth of interest in military studies in fifty years which can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. Military studies are no longer the sole preserve of historians (a mixed blessing in the view of many historians), but are now a focus of interest for a variety of social scientists (psychologists, sociologists and political scientists), as well as students of literature and philosophy. Within the long-established, discipline-oriented societies of professional academics, special groups devoted to various aspects of war studies now exist.⁴ War, strategy and military institutions are studied seriously in Canadian universities and have entire courses devoted to them at both undergraduate and graduate level in many schools. A random check of thirty-six university calendars for the academic year 1980-81 showed formal courses in these subjects offered in either the history or political science departments of twenty-six. Other indicators also suggest that a very different situation now prevails from the one that Liddell Hart described. The number of books written about war has probably never been greater in Canadian history than in the last decade. A comprehensive analysis of this literature exceeds the limits of this essay, but it is possible to show that the number of studies has grown enormously and that many books are very good. Some would argue that the state of anything is a result of the resources lavished on it, and it will be shown that military studies are now the beneficiaries of greater government support than has been the case previously. In short, there are more scholars studying war, more books about war being published, more money and resources given to such study than ever before has been the case in Canada. One might ask: "What more is required?" The simple answer is that in spite of all these good things there is still some distance to travel before reaching the cross-roads to perfection. War is a very depressing subject, and there continues to be lots of it to go around. But to answer the

question properly one must look more closely at some of the positive factors which have been mentioned.

It should be emphasized that this essay will deal principally with the twentieth century. It is necessary therefore to point out that Canadian historians such as William Eccles, Guy Frégault, Barry Gough, Gerald Graham, Julien Gwyn, J.M. Hitsman, Desmond Morton, Fernand Ouellet, George Rawlyk, C.P. Stacey, I.K. Steele, Fred Thorpe and S.F. Wise, have made substantial contributions to a reinterpretation of early Canadian military history. Furthermore, vast restoration and reconstruction projects by federal and provincial governments are providing new historical and archaeological sources of considerable value to scholars in the field.

Turning to the more recent field, the literature on military studies has now expanded to the point where some Canadian bibliographic guides are devoted to military and defence studies. O.A. Cooke's The Canadian Military Experience 1867-1967 is the most useful introduction to printed monographs, books and pamphlets on Canadian military history, but does not include periodical literature or Canadian contributions to non-Canadian military history.⁵ Essays on military bibliography by Jack Granatstein and Desmond Morton provide fine introductions for beginners including periodical literature, but both omit serious consideration of regimental histories.⁶ C.E. Dornush has compiled the best guides to regimental histories, but his work is of more interest to librarians and bibliophiles than historians attempting to quickly find useful material in a maze of tedious writing.⁷ The most comprehensive guides, unfortunately, are also the most difficult to use. These are Claude Thibault's Bibliographia Canadiana and the series of bibliographies by L. Motiuk.⁸

Some comment on the pattern of publication may not be out of place. Most students of military studies in Canada would agree that the work of Charles P. Stacey is pre-eminent. In his work, according to Carl Berger, "Stacey revealed himself to be the country's finest practitioner of technical history".⁹ Stacey's writing spans the entire course of Canadian history and students now argue heatedly over which is his finest book.¹⁰ Perhaps his best work is not a book at all, but the influence which Stacey exerted and the tradition which he established within the Canadian Army's Historical Section. Although he was not Canada's first official military historian, he has been the country's most important official historian and perhaps the most influential historian. Stacey began his teaching career in

the United States at Princeton before the Second World War and did not again hold a full-time university position until after his retirement from the Canadian army. Yet he molded professional thinking to a greater degree than most men who spend their entire careers teaching. Stacey played an important role in bringing into the Canadian Army Historical Section able practising historians to work on various stages of the Canadian Official History of the Second World War.¹¹ G.F.G. Stanley, J.B. Conacher, Gerald Graham, G.W.L. Nicholson and Eric Harrison were among his early recruits. Later, J. Mackay Hitsman, D.J. Goodspeed, T.M. Hunter, Reg Roy, John Swettenham and H.F. Wood participated in the production of the official history. Most of those men and their successors have made substantial personal contributions in addition to their work on the official history.¹² Stacey and subsequent directors, G.W.L. Nicholson, G.M.C. Sprung, S.F. Wise and Alec Douglas, have maintained a "vital core" for military historians, both professional and amateur.¹³ The most prolific and important practicing Canadian historians born after 1940 served in the Army Historical section. Desmond Morton and Jack Granatstein, for example, both write with Stacey's precision and are matching his productivity.¹⁴ It bears repeating that Stacey's importance in developing a corps of military historians in Canada is probably even more significant than his writing, which can hardly be overemphasized.

If the influence of Charles Stacey and the Canadian Forces Historical Section is the most dominant factor in historical military writing in Canada, one must acknowledge also the impact of the postwar history department at the Royal Military College of Canada. Stacey has outlined the difficulties and tensions which developed between a professional historian attempting to produce honest official history and the politicians wary of cost and political reputations, but the growing pains of professional history at a small military college devoted mainly to the production of engineers must be surmised between the lines of Richard Preston's history of the Royal Military College of Canada.¹⁵ Reopened in 1948 with an arts complement substantially strengthened compared to its prewar size, the Royal Military College, despite the best intentions of its planners, was marked by internal struggles between scientists and humanists which were much greater than those which are normally seen in a university. Competing for human resources with the more costly sciences at a time when university professors of all kinds were in very short supply, the achievements of the first postwar department head at RMC were remarkable. Within a very short time George F.G. Stanley put together an outstanding collection of talented historians. Stanley and his

colleagues, Richard A. Preston, Donald Schurman, Sydney Wise, Ezio Cappadocia and Frederick Thompson had an enormous impact on students at the college, many of whom were already predisposed toward military studies. A number of graduates went on to become professional historians or political scientists.¹⁶ All of the original faculty group, except Thompson, eventually left the college to take up important posts elsewhere, and carried with them an interest in military history demonstrated not only by their publications, but by the students they have developed. Wise became director of the Historical Section in 1966 and later director of the Institute of Canadian Studies and Dean of Graduate Studies at Carleton University. He was succeeded at the Historical Section by W.A.B. Douglas who had been a serving officer at RMC while the original group in the history department was still mainly together. Schurman, who left RMC in 1967 for Queens University, returned to the College in 1980 as Head of the Department. Preston moved to Duke University as William K. Boyd Professor of History, and later founded the Canadian Studies Centre at Duke.¹⁷ Stanley became Dean of Arts at RMC and then moved to Mount Allison University.¹⁸ Cappadocia at McMaster University served for several years as Chairman of the History Department. Thompson as Head of the Department at RMC inaugurated what has become a most important Canadian annual meeting for military historians.¹⁹

Historians are divided on the influence of institutions versus individuals in history. In the specific case of post-World War II military history in Canada, there is no resolution of the argument, but there is absolutely no doubt that the individuals associated with the two institutions under scrutiny, the Canadian Army Historical Section, now renamed the Directorate of History/Service Historique, and the History Department of the Royal Military College of Canada, have played a prominent role in the development of the discipline.

There has been, of course, a significant body of scholarly work on Canadian military history developed by historians who have had no formal connection with these institutions. Historians writing in French have not been primarily attracted to military affairs, but the work of scholars like Guy Frégault and John Yves Gravel must be specially noted. Frégault challenged the traditional view of the roles played by Bigot and Vaudreuil in the fall of New France, offering a fresh and challenging thesis for this important chapter of Canadian history. Gravel applied some of the newer methods of social history to a Quebec militia

battalion; his work makes the scorn sometimes shown by traditional historians for regimental history seem very old-fashioned.²⁰ Quantitative studies now being undertaken by Jean Pierre Gagnon of the Directorate of History are expected to add significant new dimensions to the genre.

Political leadership during wartime has been studied more carefully in Canada than many other subjects. Stacey has led the way with his masterful official volume on war policy, though his recent works on Mackenzie King show a dislike of the wartime prime minister usually controlled in his official volumes.²¹ A very different view of King is found in Granatstein's Canada's War.²² King seems likely to be as fascinating for historians as he was dull to his constituents. Much of the fascination comes from his diary, perhaps the most remarkable record ever left by a Canadian politician. Don Forster and J.W. Pickergill's published version of this document is less consulted since the entire diary has become available.²³ Norman Ward's edition of the diary of Chubby Powers is extremely useful, while Robert Bothwell and William Kilborn present a fascinating portrait of C.D. Howe, the man usually reckoned to be the most important wartime member of King's cabinet.²⁴ First World War politicians have also been well served by Canadian historians. R. Craig Brown's biography of Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden and John English's study, The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-1920, are both excellent.²⁵ Roger Graham's biography of Arthur Meighen is partisan, one-sided and the only book-length study of the author of the Wartime Elections and Military Voters Acts.²⁶ The growth of militarism and its association with imperialism is much related to Canadian politics and has been ably investigated by Canadian scholars. Carl Berger, Norman Penlington and John Kendle have made important studies of these phenomena in Canada, while A.P. Thornton's work is now regarded as a classic on the general problems of imperialism.²⁷

Naval history has been less well served by historians in Canada than is the case with wartime politics or land warfare. Gerald Graham is a rare world-class historian of seapower, who served in Stacey's wartime historical section.²⁸ The official history of the Canadian Navy before 1933, and of naval establishments during the Second World War is solid, dull and not the equal of the army history. Joseph Schull's account of operations is an excellent popular narrative with little analytic content. The Korean volume is an adequate analysis written in quite a lively style.²⁹ More recently, Barry Gough has reminded us that

gun-boat diplomacy was used on West Coast Indians.³⁰ Periodical literature and a new collection of essays reflect a greater interest in naval history. Air Force history started even more slowly than the history of the Canadian navy, but the appearance of the first volume of the long-heralded official history suggests that the air history may have a more happy resolution.³¹

Oral historians sometimes make claims of novelty for their technique which seem hard to justify, but it does have particular significance for the history of war where other methods of documentation are often impossible. Surprisingly little effort has been made to use this technique in Canadian military history. Victor Hoar, writing on the Canadians who served in the Mackenzie-Papineau battalion during the Spanish Civil War was able to integrate interviews with participants in a solid historical narrative.³² Joyce Hibbert was also able to extract considerable information from war brides and tell a hitherto ignored story very well.³³ Barry Broadfoot, on the other hand, had conducted more extensive interviews and provided less rigorous testing and analysis of these interviews in his Six War Years than most other practitioners of the art.³⁴ In The Great War and Canadian Society there are some excellent transcripts of interviews with First World War veterans, and in the introductory essay some rather exaggerated claims for oral history as a discipline.³⁵

A book of essays on The Canadian Military: A Profile is useful but uneven, and Roy MacLaren has produced interesting accounts of the Canadians on the Nile expedition of 1882, in Russia in 1919, and in irregular operations during the two world wars.³⁶ Joy B. Cave, who is not a professional historian, shows how valuable can be the contribution of a dedicated amateur in her charming book What Became of Corporal Pittman?³⁷ Good studies of the impact of war on special regions or the contribution to war of these regions are also scarce. Barbara Wilson and John Thompson are the pathfinders with their studies of Ontario and the Prairies during the First World War.³⁸

Before turning from the historical study of war in Canada to the more contemporary studies of the social scientists, some other observations should be made. It is only natural that work on Canadian military history should demand the greatest attention from historians working in Canada. Donald Grant Creighton often claimed that his study of Canadian history resulted from the financial difficulty of travelling to France and the relatively easy access to Canadian documents. In spite of similar difficulties, which are the normal fare for all historians who choose subjects for which

sources are physically remote and costly to reach, there has been in Canada a small group of historians who have made very important contributions to the study of the war beyond the limits of Canadian national history. Richard Preston and Sydney Wise produced Men in Arms, which rivals Theodore Ropp's War in the Modern World as the most important survey of the history of warfare ever written in North America. Never one to lavish praise on rivals, Field Marshal Montgomery in his own History of Warfare singled out the work of Preston and Wise as one of only two recent books which he found "most instructive".³⁹ Donald Schurman's Education of a Navy is of fundamental importance for historians of the British Navy as is the work of Gerald Graham who, while living in England, has remained an unreconstructed Canadian, and whose Politics of Naval Supremacy is a classic in the field.⁴⁰ Martin Kitchen and Ulrich Trumppener have developed significant new dimensions in German military history, and Peter Hoffman, though not primarily a military historian, has studied the opposition to Hitler.⁴¹ D.J. Goodspeed, Murray Hunter and Dominic Graham have made important contributions, while Richard Glover's masterful Peninsular Preparation has placed him permanently in the front rank of military historians.⁴² These men, despite the cost of overseas travel and the inconvenience of overseas research, have made highly significant contributions to the history of warfare.

Memoirs and novels, which only can be most briefly sampled in this essay, often are rejected as history by purists, but they may be pure gold to the historian. Perhaps the most important Canadian memoir of a general is E.L.M. Burns', General Mud which records the experience of an RMC ex-cadet in two world wars. A remarkable man, Burns has also produced a number of important books ranging from his experience as a United Nation's peacekeeper to a text book on nuclear war.⁴³ W.R. Bird's, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, the memoirs of Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, and Hal Lawrence's A Bloody War are other examples of this genre.⁴⁴ Novels may be a less certain source than memoirs but the work of Hugh Garner, H.F. Wood, Timothy Findley and Donald Jack are evidence of popular interest in Canadians at war and provide fine reading.⁴⁵

Recently, social scientists in Canada have examined defence questions in greater detail than had been the case previously. The leader in this endeavour has been Professor James Eays of the University of Toronto whose work In Defence of Canada leaves all subsequent students in his debt.⁴⁶ Others, John Gellner, Jon McLin, Andrew Brewin, W.J. Kronenburg, Colin Gray, James Dow, Gerald Porter and Brian Cuthbertson have contributed substantially to the

small community in Canada attempting to understand Canadian defence policy.⁴⁷ They have been joined by students like Robin Ranger who has addressed his attention to more general questions.⁴⁸ Still others, historians mainly, John Holmes, Denis Stairs, Alastair Taylor, David Cox and Stephen Clarkson, for example, are interested in defence as a factor in the formulation of foreign policy, but also have made important observations on military matters.⁴⁹

Thus far we have taken note only of the authors of monographs and book-length studies. But a great deal of the literature on Canadian military and foreign affairs has appeared in shorter form in a variety of journals. The founding of journals devoted to studies in these areas, and the willingness of established journals to publish articles relating to warfare more frequently, must surely be applauded by scholars. In particular, the various publications of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the improvement in the Canadian Defence Quarterly under the editorship of John Gellner and the growing number of articles on war-related subjects accepted by established journals and university quarterlies, is a most welcome trend. The appearance of Conflict Quarterly published by the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick is a manifestation of this trend and demonstrates also the impact of the recently inaugurated programme of federal subsidy for defence studies.

This welcome program notwithstanding, one regrets that the Department of National Defence has done so little recently to foster a journal devoted to Canadian defence studies. During the 1920s and 1930s, surely two of the financially leanest decades for the Department of Defence in Canadian history, it was possible to finance the publication of the old Canadian Defence Quarterly. In the tight years following 1945 the army and the air force sponsored journals which published serious analytical pieces from time to time. The void left by their disappearance is substantial.

In 1967 the Department of National Defence did announce three-year subsidies to five Canadian universities to establish chairs of strategic studies. This action, which coincided with the decision to disband the Canadian Officers Training Corps on university campuses, was taken to encourage the development of academic training in war studies. Acadia, Laval, Carleton, Queens and University of Victoria thus received a subvention, which varied considerably from university to university, to develop military studies. After one year Laval dropped out of the programme and was replaced

by the University of Toronto. On the expiration of the original three year period, the number of subventions was increased with grants being extended to the original five plus the University of Toronto, Dalhousie, the University of New Brunswick, University of Western Ontario and University of British Columbia for a five year period. The last year of this period, 1975-76, was the first time when all grants to all participating universities were equal. A third round of the program provided grants to Acadia, Laval, Queens and Victoria, all of which had received subventions in the first and second rounds, to University of British Columbia, Dalhousie and University of New Brunswick which had been supported only in the second round, and to University of Alberta which had not previously received a grant. Upon expiration of these grants in 1981, the programme was again changed slightly to fund five centres of graduate studies in military and strategic studies, U.B.C., Calgary, Queens, Laval and Dalhousie and three undergraduate centers at York, U.N.B., and Acadia for a further five year period.⁵⁰

This programme, as well as the decision to fund scholarships and fellowships, has contributed to the growth of interest in military and strategic studies in Canada which was a part of its original purposes. How much it has contributed can be easily measured in dollars,⁵¹ but in academic value the question is probably impossible to answer. Those institutions which have received assistance probably could put forward credible arguments to support the programme. At the very least, the programme has coincided with an increasing number of scholars working on militarily related subjects. On the other hand, Canadian universities in the late sixties and early seventies expanded rapidly in all fields and it is not clear whether the percentage of scholars working on military subjects as a function of the total number of scholars in Canada has changed. It seems difficult in other words, to be sure that the strategic studies program has been worth the dollars devoted to it. Nor is it easy to measure the impact of strategic studies conferences organized by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and the Royal Canadian Military Institute under the leadership of George Bell. Probably all of these programmes achieved less for the dollar than did the army's Canadian Officers Training Programme, the navy's University Naval Training Divisions and the air force's University Reserve Training Programme before they were terminated in 1967. Had these programmes continued to exist the new emphasis on strategic studies sponsored by the Department of National Defence might have had substantial impact. A rather more modest enterprise, post-doctoral fellowships sponsored by the Directorate of History, has produced some tangible results. Five fellows have so far been selected. Two of them,

Ruth Pierson and Lawrence Aronsen, are contributors to this collection. A third, Elinor Senior, has published the results of her work in a monograph;⁵² and at the time of writing Ronald Haycock and Terry Copp are still engaged in research.

Jack Granatstein once argued that "until the 1960s the number of academic experts in ... [foreign and defence policy] could be counted on two hands -- with fingers to spare".⁵³ While this is no longer the case, thanks in part to the strategic studies programme, there remains the question of what do we expect of military studies in a country like Canada?

Cries from students within the profession at large that there is a "crisis in military historiography" should not obscure the legitimate concerns within the Canadian community that certain subjects remain insufficiently investigated.⁵⁴ The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies noted in 1975 that:

more study is needed of the impact of military institutions on Canadian society. Many aspects of Canadian military policy between the two World Wars and during the Second World War have yet to be investigated by scholars. Detailed case studies have yet to be done on the employment of our armed forces in peacetime and on the influence of the armed forces on national policy in both peace and war ... There has been a tendency to treat naval and air force history as antiquarian pastimes ... Francophone aspects of Canadian military history deserve much more attention.⁵⁵

All of these criticisms remain largely unanswered, though in some areas promising starts have begun.

Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of all national military history is its tendency to self praise. Even historians possessed of an otherwise carping spirit have national troops advancing with "courage", while enemy attacks are "fanatical". On the whole this tendency seems as universal among Canadian military historians as among other varieties. Criticism, even blame, can be readily attached to policies, but when men are being killed, "our boys" are heroic and the others are evil.

The presence of "emotional and ideological perspectives", it has been suggested, can have a damaging impact on scholarship. For example, in the United States during the last two decades these perspectives apparently contributed

substantially to a lessening of interest in military, diplomatic and political history on the part of professional historians. This tendency, plus the demand from professional soldiers for "practical returns and predictive conclusions" deflected military men from an interest in history toward the harder social sciences, and resulted in a situation which substantially curtailed serious historical research, but which fostered in the same period a substantial growth of public interest in military topics.⁵⁶ In Canada one observes precisely the same public demand for coffee table books and thrillers on military themes.⁵⁷ One may also discern the same desire among Canadian military men for "practical returns and predictive conclusions". It is this desire, in large part, which fostered the strategic studies programme initially, and, perhaps, which downgraded history vis à vis the harder social sciences in each successive round of grants. As far as being practical and predictive is concerned, it might had been better to concentrate on some of the newer history techniques which could meet the wishes of professional soldiers. For example, Professor Brown's contribution to this volume on the basis of quite limited statistical analysis should revise a few common assumptions about First World War recruiting. Misleading myths in that area still make trouble for the military policy makers. Whether or not being practical and predictive really helps the soldier seems questionable in any event. Donald M. Schurman in an essay on the evolution of Sir Julian Corbett's strategic ideas best outlined this problem. Corbett's notions of strategy, Schurman demonstrates, were developed while working on a book "written originally for historical purposes only".⁵⁸ If artists like Corbett "are neglected by the busy men who are active in promoting a marriage between immortal truth and the latest thing in twenty minutes, then it may not be the historians who are the losers".⁵⁹

Walter E. Kaegi Jr. insists that following the Vietnam war "it became difficult for any historian in the United States to find an academic position for the study of ... military history and even to have his research published by respectable presses and journals."⁶⁰ This is not the place to discuss the evolution of Canadian universities or the academic profession in Canada, but as these topics impinge on Canadian military studies two general observations may not be out of place. First it has been in part because of the demand of military men for "practical returns" that many universities have been able to begin or continue teaching military studies. Secondly, although the prospects for full-time employment in universities is at least as dismal for young scholars in Canada as in the United States, this has not produced the situation which Mr. Kaegi observes where

"graduate students in history have avoided military historical research topics and problems". Indeed, in Canada, it is astonishing that so many excellent students continue to work in these areas when the prospects for permanent employment in any area in a university are so appallingly slim.

A conceivable clue to this paradox is the fact that in Canada so much of military history and military studies always has been subsidized by the Canadian federal government. It is a curious irony that an "unmilitary people", to use George F.G. Stanley's famous phrase, and successive Canadian governments to whom defence has often meant little beyond ceremony, should lavish federal subsidy on military history. But it is true that the most powerful impetus in military scholarship in Canada has come from federal grants. It is also true that the number of civilian historical officers now employed by the federal bureaucracy considerably outnumbers the historians in any of Canada's largest universities. A cynic might observe that all things which succeed in Canada must have government backing, but such an argument completely overlooks the influence which particular individuals have had in Canadian military historiography.

Canada has been enormously influenced by the presence of the United States, but if there are similarities there are also important differences. In terms of military historiography, it is not "emotional and ideological perspectives" which have caused the greatest problems, but the lack of them. The anti-war, anti-social, anti-communist and anti-establishment attitudes so visible in the United States during the last days of Vietnam and afterward were rarely seen as anything but pale and meaningless reflections in Canada. Let me clarify: no one could seriously lament in his nation the absence of corrosive social unrest and bitterness which afflicted the United States after the Vietnam war. No serious student could regret that his country did not participate in such a muddled and divisive conflict. But the postwar conflict in the United States is also an indication that in a fundamental way politicians and citizens were concerned about the defence of their country and its attempts to maintain a stable world. Similar concern in a Canadian setting seems very hard to identify.

Canadians rarely take defence seriously, and it never becomes an emotional issue until a crisis has occurred. Just as the purchase of Leopard tanks seemed more easily identified with the problems associated with entry to the European Economic Community than with Canadian defence priorities, similarly the establishment of chairs of strategic studies

seems more clearly a sop to universities for the cancellation of the Canadian Officers Training Corps than a genuine commitment to the intellectual study of war. Warnings by military men or scholars or demands for emotional commitment, seem less desirable to Canadians than the comfortable complacency that comes from the belief that Canada is invulnerable. Yet it is a fundamental assumption of most scholarship on Canadian participation in two world wars that in war Canadians first discovered and then developed a common sense of nationalism. The Commission on Canadian Studies, for example, observed that:

Canadian involvement in twentieth century wars ... as well as the country's arrangements for defence in peacetime, have profoundly influenced Canada's development and have had an impact not only upon external relations but upon the internal fabric of Canadian society as well.⁶¹

The assumption that national defence and national identity, when the chips are down, has predominated over regional concerns and parochial rights has been more accepted than examined by Canadian scholars. The assumption is unquestionably attractive, but it may also be academic wishful thinking. At the very least, it is an assumption that does not seem to be reflected in the attitudes of large numbers of Canadian citizens and politicians. Canadians experienced both nationalism and division in wartime and in preparing for war. It is the combination of the two, not the primacy of nationalism, which has made wartime a period of internal crisis for Canada. This deserves more investigation by scholars. The successful implementation of bilingualism in the Canadian armed forces, which has in some ways complicated military studies and which deserves more study, is perhaps the most significant peacetime preparation against the return of a familiar wartime problem.

In any event, Liddell Hart was correct when he argued that the study of war required "the method of work that prevails in a University as well as the attitude of mind which is inculcated there". This method and attitude now seems to be accepted in Canada. But war continues to demonstrate the chameleon qualities which Clausewitz long ago observed. It has become infinitely more dangerous and no less likely to happen. Something more than academic "attitudes of mind" seems necessary to persuade Canadians that thinking about defence is worth their time and effort.

Footnotes

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CANADA AS A MILITARY POWER

EPILOGUE

Paul Hellyer won the battle for unification. Whether he solved problems or created them -- political and military opinion is still ambivalent about this -- he started something that developed a momentum of its own, uniquely Canadian. The concept has always had plenty of detractors, but the few books about defence policy published in Canada since 1968 have not really challenged unification. In 1979 the short-lived Tory government of Joe Clark did. It appointed a task force in September of that year to undertake a thoroughgoing review of the unified forces. The task force did not table its findings in the House of Commons until May, 1980, several months after the Clark government had fallen. The Department of National Defence accepted twenty of the thirty recommendations made, and rejected some of the more fundamental changes that had been called for. Internal evolution was nevertheless underway. The formation of Air Command in 1975 created, with Mobile and Maritime Command, an operational concept approaching the traditional idea of three separate services, even though they remained within the framework of unification.

Battle, the ultimate ordeal, had not been visited upon the Canadian army, navy or air force since the Korean War. Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Egypt in 1967 coincided with integration of the Canadian command structure. Weaknesses revealed by this experience stemmed from the absence of UN planning. Canadian land, sea and air forces all played their part in retrieving the Canadian contingent from a disastrous situation. Neither then nor subsequently has there been any reason to think that the concept of unification hampered their activities seriously. Mobile Command, that is to say the army, received good press for the efficiency and discretion of soldiers called out under the War Measures Act in 1970 after the kidnapping in Montreal of a British diplomat and a Quebec politician by members of the Front pour la Libération du Québec (FLQ). Activities such as the Canadian military mission to Nigeria (1968-70), the Canadian contribution to the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam (1973), other peacekeeping operations, search and rescue missions at home, relief efforts abroad during major world disasters, have attracted more praise than criticism. Cyprus in 1974 became a battleground for a few days, and Canadians with the Nations Forces, reinforced by the Canadian Airborne Regiment, responded effectively. That spoke well for discipline

and training in the Canadian army; it was not a serious test of the nation's military institutions. The effort mounted in 1978 to retrieve parts of the Soviet Satellite Cosmos 954 from the Northwest Territories made some unusual demands on the unified command structure. Thanks to a satisfactory state of readiness and a measure of luck the operation was successful.

It is pertinent to note that controversy over the country's military preparedness thrives. Critics deplore reductions in the armed forces from more than 100,000 in 1965 to about 80,000 men and women in 1976. They argue that financial restraints, which brought to a halt the second phase of Paul Hellyer's material acquisition programme in the mid-70's, have left the services dangerously short of essential equipment. Since 1977 moderate increases in personnel and equipment have taken place, but this has by no means blunted criticism. It has not prevented serving officers from having profound concern about the effects of departmental reorganization on the military qualities of men and women in uniform. Nor has it silenced those who object to the imposition of bilingualism and biculturalism because they say it weakens morale, undermines effectiveness and takes too many precious defence dollars.

"B & B" policies have an older and more deeply rooted origin than unification, although the unified force has provided a convenient vehicle for implementing language requirements. The francophones of Canada did not flock to the colours of unilingual English volunteer forces. Nor, as Craig Brown and Don Loveridge have shown, did many other segments of the population. Imposing conscription in the two world wars of the twentieth century, however, and seeing it as a tool for ensuring that French Canadians did their part, has been a great, probably the greatest, divisive force in the nation's history. Yet French speaking formations such as the 22nd Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force of 1914-1919, and its successor, the Royal 22nd Regiment, have perpetuated a francophone military tradition of significant dimensions. Creating a bilingual army, navy and air force is the perceived solution to the military, political and social problems embodied in these considerations. There has been limited progress. As with all fundamental reforms, it is inevitable that some loss of efficiency, some diversion of resources and some morale problems have resulted. There have also been positive results that will have to be taken into account when future historians evaluate the policy.

A unified and bilingual force raises additional questions about living with military allies. Canada, as R.A. Preston points out, has patterned its services on the British model, adapting them to NATO and American variations. A number of respected analysts have argued, and Professor Preston has embellished their arguments, that it is important to maintain a Canadian identity in defence policy and doctrine, especially because the United States is so close, so rich and so powerful. Indefensible and invulnerable as Canada has been, and indefensible as it may continue to be -- modern weapons render the country terribly vulnerable -- there is considerable truth to the thesis advanced by Professor Roger Swanson in 1970 that Canada's greatest threat lies in American domination of Canadian defences. Concern about American economic, financial and social influence is a Canadian fact of life. After the defence sharing agreements of 1940 this worry assumed a military dimension as well. Who was to control Canadian forces on Canadian territory became a point of bitter argument between the Canadian and United States governments in 1941. Colin Gray has argued that the proper response is to continue emphasizing Canadian aspects of defence, to make sure they mesh with a Canadian rather than American strategic doctrine. In practice something like that has in fact happened. International crises have led Canadian governments to agree on the formation of adequate forces in the field, including sufficient to protect legal sovereignty at home, to make a recognizable national contribution to alliance warfare and to ensure national control of Canadian forces abroad.

Maintaining national control of the army, navy and air force abroad, and building up sufficient military strength at home to satisfy national, political and military needs has, twice in the present century, demanded very large forces for the size of population. That runs counter to the preferences of successful Canadian politicians, but on these occasions events got out of their control. Canada has thus from time to time become a military power. If the strain of future world crises is adequately to be endured by the nation, its military institutions will have to be better prepared, and more attuned to both national and international circumstances, than they were in 1914 and 1939. What lies in the future, however, will no doubt depend as in the past more upon accident than design.

Footnote

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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